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Abstract 
 
The competitive strength of online businesses is increasingly being determined by the 
amount, variety and quality of the data they hold. Providers of online platforms such as search 
engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms employ business models that are 
dependent on the acquisition and monetisation of personal data of users. Many internet 
companies can be seen as so-called ‘multi-sided’ platforms that bring users and advertisers 
together. By accumulating and analysing information about the behaviour and interests of 
users, providers of these platforms are able to improve their services to users in the form of 
more relevant search results, social interactions and purchase recommendations as well as to 
advertisers in the form of better targeted advertising. Datasets built on the basis of the 
information that individuals disclose when using online services have become an economic 
asset in the digital economy. 
Against this background, the thesis explores how existing competition concepts can be 
applied to data-related competition concerns in digital markets. The main focus is on potential 
refusals of dominant providers of online platforms to give access to their data. In line with its 
significance in the digital economy, data is becoming a necessary input of production for a 
variety of services competing with or complementary to the services offered by incumbent 
providers. By refusing to share information with potential competitors or new entrants, 
incumbents may limit effective competition and innovation to the detriment of consumers. In 
this context, the question rises whether such a denial of a dominant firm to grant competitors 
access to its dataset could constitute a refusal to deal under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and lead to competition law liability under the so-called 
‘essential facilities doctrine’. Because of the particular nature of data collected by providers of 
online platforms and the new business models that are employed, potential refusals to share 
data give rise to new competition concerns. While the thesis concerns the application of EU 
competition law to a specific type of conduct, it also raises several broader and more 
fundamental issues including the appropriate analysis of multi-sided platforms under 
competition law, the trade-offs that have to be made between protecting different types of 
competition and innovation (competition in versus for the market; sustaining versus disruptive 
innovation), and the relationship between competition and data protection law. 
The thesis concludes that existing competition concepts are still fit for purpose in the digital 
economy, provided that their application is adapted to the peculiarities of online platforms. 
Even though the necessary tools are available, competition authorities and courts have to be 
willing to employ them in such a way as to ensure that the competition analysis reflects the 
competitive reality of digital markets. To that end, recommendations are provided for 
bringing the application of competition law in line with the demands of dynamic markets and 
for adequately protecting consumer welfare in the online environment. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
RISE OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY - The digital economy has brought about new market 
developments which have impacted society as a whole. Online services bring many benefits 
to consumers in the form of new types of social interaction and other innovative 
functionalities. At the same time, the use of digital processes has enabled market players to 
increase their productivity, resulting into lower prices and intensified competition in many 
sectors. The advent of the digital economy also transformed commercial behaviour and led to 
new business models. While digitalisation continues to contribute to a dynamic evolution of 
markets and competition, concerns are increasingly being raised about the alleged powerful 
market positions of a number of key players.
1
 
WELFARE EFFECTS OF DATA COLLECTION AND USE - The significance of data for digital 
markets and digital business models plays a key role in this regard. Innovative products and 
services are increasingly being offered online which enables providers to collect information 
about the profile, behaviour and interests of users. The knowledge that can be extracted from 
this data forms the basis for the competitiveness and growth of individual players in digital 
markets. Datasets built on the basis of the information that individuals disclose when using 
online services have become an economic asset in the digital economy.
2
 In general, the 
increasing collection and use of data has positive welfare effects. The greater knowledge 
about the interests of users may lead to better quality of services and enable companies to cut 
costs, for example, because of more precise advertisement targeting possibilities. However, 
the increased collection and use of data can also result in negative welfare effects. In 
particular, having control over and being able to analyse large volumes of data may form a 
source of power for incumbent market players.
3
 
ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW - It is instructive to note that as early as 2010 Tim Berners-Lee, 
known as the inventor of the world wide web, identified several trends which in his view 
threaten the internet as we know it. One of the referred threats concerns the walling off by 
large social networking sites of information posted by users from the rest of the web. By 
assembling information disclosed by users into databases and reusing the information to 
provide value-added services only within their own sites, providers create closed silos which 
may, in the view of Berners-Lee, lead to the fragmentation of the web and threaten its 
existence as a single, universal information space.
4
 Such developments also raise questions 
about the role of competition law in addressing potential forms of abuse of dominance 
relating to data. In this regard, the Competition Commissioner recognised in a January 2016 
                                                 
1
 MONOPOLKOMMISSION, ‘Competition policy: The challenge of digital markets’, Special report No. 68, July 
2015, par. S3 and S4, available at http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/s68_fulltext_eng.pdf. 
2
 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, ‘Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class’, January 2011, available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf. 
3
 MONOPOLKOMMISSION, ‘Competition policy: The challenge of digital markets’, Special report No. 68, July 
2015, par. S3 and S10. 
4
 T. BERNERS-LEE, "Long Live the Web: A Call for Continued Open Standards and Neutrality", Scientific 
American December 2010, vol. 303, no. 6, (80). 
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speech that there is scope for competition enforcement in cases where only a few companies 
control the data needed to satisfy customers and cut costs because this could give them the 
power to drive their rivals out of the market.
5
  
 
1.2 Focus of the thesis 
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE - Against this background, the thesis explores how existing 
competition tools and concepts can be applied to data-related competition concerns in digital 
markets. The key focus of the thesis is on potential refusals of dominant firms to give access 
to data on online platforms such as search engines, social networks and e-commerce 
platforms. Even though the analysis may also be applicable to other online services, particular 
attention is paid to the three latter types of online platforms because of the importance of data 
for their business models and the fact that they are commonly referred to as ‘gatekeepers’ of 
the internet. In line with its significance in the digital economy, data is becoming a necessary 
input of production for a variety of products and services competing with or complementary 
to the services offered by incumbent providers of online search engines, social networks and 
e-commerce platforms. By refusing to share information with potential competitors or new 
entrants, incumbents may limit effective competition to the detriment of consumers. In this 
context, the question rises whether the denial of a dominant firm to grant competitors access 
to its dataset could constitute a refusal to deal under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union
6
 and lead to competition law liability under the so-called 
‘essential facilities doctrine’. This doctrine attacks a particular form of exclusionary 
anticompetitive conduct by which a dominant undertaking refuses to give access to a type of 
infrastructure or other form of facility to which rivals need access in order to be able to 
compete. 
MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION - The main research question of the thesis revolves around the 
issue of whether and to what extent data may constitute an essential facility. While scholars 
have pointed to the probability of competitors asking access to data stored on online 
platforms,
7
 it is not clear how an obligation of dominant firms to give access to the data on 
their platforms would fit with earlier decisions and judgments. The essential facilities doctrine 
has already been applied to physical infrastructures including ports and tunnels as well as to 
intangible assets protected by intellectual property rights. Because of the particular nature of 
data collected by providers of online platforms and the new business models that are 
employed, potential refusals to share data give rise to new competition concerns and may 
require a different analysis under the essential facilities doctrine. 
                                                 
5
 Speech of Competition Commissioner Vestager, ‘Competition in a big data world’, DLD 16 Munich, 17 
January 2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-big-
data-world_en. 
6
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. 
7
 D.S. EVANS, "Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy", Northwestern University 
Law Review Colloquy 2008, vol. 102, (285), p. 304; C.S. YOO, "When Antitrust Met Facebook", George Mason 
Law Review 2012, vol. 19, no. 5, (1147), p. 1154-1158; S.W. WALLER, "Antitrust and Social Networking", North 
Carolina Law Review 2012, vol. 90, no. 5, (1771), p. 1799-1800. 
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BROADER ANALYSIS - The focus on the issue of whether and to what extent refusals to give 
access to data may constitute abusive behaviour under Article 102 TFEU also enables an 
analysis of how existing competition tools for market definition and assessment of dominance 
can be applied to online platforms. In addition, the imposition of a duty to share data with 
competitors raises questions about the interaction of competition law with data protection 
legislation considering that the information collected by providers of online platforms may 
also include personal data of individuals. So even though the thesis mainly deals with the 
specific question of how the essential facilities doctrine should be applied to data, a broader 
analysis of other, related issues is required in order to give an adequate answer to the research 
question. This ensures that the findings have a wider relevance beyond the reach of the 
essential facilities doctrine and also allow for more general conclusions about how 
competition law can be adequately applied to new developments in digital markets. 
 
1.3 Structure and methodology 
PART I - The thesis consists of three self-standing parts which each have a different angle and 
approach. Part I outlines the economic characteristics of search engines, social networks and 
e-commerce platforms, including their multi-sided nature, with the aim of analysing how 
relevant markets can be defined and dominance can be assessed of providers of online 
platforms. A law and economics methodology is used to this end. Findings from economic 
literature about multi-sided businesses are integrated into the analysis of how existing 
competition tools can be applied to online platforms. In this regard, guidance is taken from 
previous decisions of the European Commission and judgments of the EU Courts as well as, 
to a more limited extent, from relevant cases in other jurisdictions. Attention is also paid to 
economic literature examining the relationship between competition and innovation, and to 
business literature which distinguishes between different types of competition and innovation. 
Findings from the business literature form the basis for the normative analysis of the essential 
facilities doctrine in part II. 
PART II - Part II revolves around the application of the essential facilities doctrine to data. 
Next to refusals to deal, two other potential competition problems involving access to data 
and online platforms can be identified, namely restrictions on data portability and 
interoperability as imposed by providers of online platforms. Before engaging in an in-depth 
analysis of the essential facilities doctrine, attention is paid to these possible competition 
issues as well as to the question of whether and to what extent user data as collected by 
providers of online platforms is protected under data protection and intellectual property 
regimes. Even though the analysis mainly focuses on EU competition law, the development of 
the essential facilities doctrine under US antitrust law
8
 is also discussed because the concept 
originated at that side of the Atlantic. In this regard, relevant EU and US decision-making 
practice, case law, policy documents and literature are studied. In addition, by building on the 
findings from the business literature analysed in part I, the economic trade-off to be made in 
refusal to deal cases is discussed. While this trade-off remains a choice between two valid 
                                                 
8
 While the term ‘antitrust’ is mostly used in the US, it is more common to refer to ‘competition’ in the EU. In 
this thesis, both terms are used interchangeably. 
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policy options (i.e. to intervene or not to intervene), a need for a more coherent application of 
the essential facilities doctrine that is in line with the underlying economics can be identified. 
To this end, insights are drawn from the economic trade-off which form the principles on 
which a proposed framework for the application of the essential facilities doctrine is built. 
Afterwards, it is analysed how the essential facilities doctrine can be applied to potential 
refusals of dominant firms to give access to data on online platforms. In that context, regard is 
also had to the role of data as a competitive advantage or entry barrier in digital markets and 
to market definition and dominance with respect to data. 
PART III - Because the data to be shared by a dominant provider of an online platform may 
also include personal data, possible limitations that data protection legislation puts to the 
imposition of a duty to deal under competition law also have to be assessed. In addition, 
dominant firms may rely on their obligations under data protection law as an objective 
justification for refusing to supply data to competitors. Against this background, the role of 
data protection interests in competition enforcement is explored in part III. In particular, it is 
analysed whether and to what extent data protection may constitute a non-price parameter of 
competition. Furthermore, the more controversial issue of whether competition enforcement 
can be used to promote data protection interests is examined. To this end, the inherent 
limitations of competition enforcement as a body of law mainly concerned with economic 
efficiency are outlined, while also providing suggestions for better aligning the enforcement 
of the two regimes in the context of merger and abuse of dominance cases. A doctrinal legal 
research methodology is applied in part III relying on an analysis of relevant EU legislation, 
policy documents, case law and literature in the field of data protection and competition law. 
Developments in the decision-making practice of the US Federal Trade Commission and in 
US legal doctrine are also covered where appropriate.  
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STATE OF THE ART - By relying on a variety of approaches, the thesis 
aims to contribute to ongoing academic and policy discussions about how data-related 
competition concerns should be addressed under competition law. At the same time, the 
analysis conducted in the three parts has a wider relevance for competition enforcement in 
digital markets that is outlined in the conclusion. 
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Part I: Competition and Innovation on Online Platforms 
DEFINING ONLINE PLATFORMS - The evolution of the internet has led to the rise of different 
types of platforms that bring two or more groups of customers together. By focusing on online 
platforms, this thesis intends to concentrate on internet services that act as an intermediary or 
a platform between users and advertisers.
9
 Web-based businesses such as search engines and 
social networks aim to build an audience for advertisers. In order to attract users, these 
platforms provide users a service like search functionality (Google) or social networking 
possibilities (Facebook). Access to the user traffic is sold to advertisers who generate the 
money for the platform. Although transaction or e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and 
eBay still mainly rely on income from fees they charge the sellers on their platforms, the 
provision of advertising services also starts to raise a considerable amount of revenue.
10
 For 
the purposes of this thesis e-commerce platforms will therefore also be considered as online 
intermediaries. 
OUTLINE - The goal of the first part of the thesis is to study the economic characteristics of 
online platforms and to analyse how current competition tools for market definition and 
assessment of dominance may be applied to search engines, social networks and e-commerce 
platforms. In addition, economic and empirical literature on the link between competition and 
innovation is examined in order to consider the effect of changes in market structure resulting 
from competition law interventions on the level of innovation in a market. Attention is also 
paid to the role of innovation as a parameter for competition in dynamic industries such as 
the online intermediary sector.  
 
 
  
                                                 
9
 Content providers and application developers can be considered as the third customer group on some online 
platforms. 
10
 In addition to the fees it charges sellers, Amazon receives income from its own sales as a retailer. Amazon’s 
revenues from its ad business in 2013 were estimated to amount to $835 million, placing it ahead of Twitter that 
accounted for $583 million in advertising revenues. See R. Hof, ‘Amazon's Ad Business Suddenly Looks Real’, 
Forbes, 5 June 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2013/06/05/amazons-ad-business-
suddenly-looks-real/. 
20 
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2 Business models and economic characteristics of online platforms  
 
2.1 Introduction 
CHARACTERISING ONLINE PLATFORMS - Online platforms have several characteristics which 
distinguish them from other businesses. In addition to operating solely on the internet, these 
platforms act as intermediaries between different customer groups and form part of the so-
called ‘network economy’. In this chapter, the economic features of online intermediaries are 
discussed with a focus on search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms.  
OUTLINE - In section 2, the business models of these platforms are analysed. This is followed 
by a description of their multi-sided nature in section 3 and a discussion on the extent to 
which network economy characteristics are present in each of the respective types of 
platforms in section 4.  
 
2.2 Describing the online intermediary environment 
While search engine and social network providers mainly rely on advertising to fund their 
respective platforms to which they offer users access free of charge, advertising services 
constitute only an additional revenue source for e-commerce platforms.
11
 The functionalities 
of these three types of online platforms are discussed below as well as the business models 
that the leading firms in these industries employ. 
 
2.2.1 Search engines 
HISTORY - The online search business has seen rapid growth after the emergence of the first 
search engine Archie, which was only used by academics, in 1990. Along with the 
development of the internet that became accessible to the general public in the mid-1990s, the 
search engine business flourished as the need for a good search engine rose that could help 
users to navigate through the wealth of information. Despite the emergence of several search 
engines in the mid-1990s such as AltaVista, Lycos and Yahoo, Google, which entered the 
market only in 1998, was able to take the leading position in the industry. Google’s eventual 
success is said to be due to its PageRank algorithm which ranks search results according to 
their relative importance instead of on the basis of the number of times a search query is 
displayed on a certain web page. The latter was how existing search engines ranked search 
results at that time.
12
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 It was reported that Amazon made $187 million in ad revenues in the US in the first quarter of 2015, while its 
total US revenues amounted to $1 billion that quarter. See K. Liyakasa, ‘Amazon’s Q1 Sheds (More) Light On 
Ad Revenues’, AdExchanger, 23 April 2015, available at http://adexchanger.com/ad-exchange-news/amazons-
q1-reveals-ads-business-may-bank-1-billion-a-year/.  
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 For a more elaborate overview of the development of the search engine industry, see A.D. VANBERG, "From 
Archie to Google - Search engine providers and emergent challenges in relation to EU competition law", 
European Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 3, no. 1, (1), p. 2-4. 
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HORIZONTAL VERSUS VERTICAL SEARCH ENGINES - The main classification used for search 
engines is based on the distinction between general or horizontal search engines like Google 
and specialised or vertical search engines which only cover a particular type of service or 
content such as shopping (Ciao), travel (TripAdvisor) and maps (Euro-Cities). Google 
provides a horizontal search engine but also operates many different vertical search engines 
including Google Shopping, Google Images, Google Scholar, Google Books, Google News 
etc. By bringing order to publicly available web pages, Google aims to organise the world’s 
information and make it universally accessible and useful.
13
 The search results page that 
Google displays consists of a combination of web results from its horizontal search engine 
and listings from its vertical search engines. This service that merges search results composed 
of links to websites with the display of search results consisting of maps, pictures, news etc. is 
referred to as ‘universal search’. 
BUSINESS MODEL - The main search engines such as Google, Bing and Yahoo provide users 
access to their service free of charge and use contextual advertising to finance their business. 
They sell advertising space by letting companies bid on keywords that they deem relevant to 
their business. An auction determines the rank of the advertisements in the search results 
taking into account the maximum bid of the advertiser for the keyword and the relevance of 
its advertisement to the user’s search query. Pay-per-click is the most commonly used 
advertising model and implies that the advertiser pays every time a user clicks on its 
advertisement and thus effectively visits its website. A search query leads to the display of 
two types of search results. The advertisements tailored to the search query are displayed as 
sponsored results at the top or right side of the page. For the non-sponsored or organic search 
results that are displayed under the sponsored ones, the search engines uses ‘robots’, ‘spiders’ 
or ‘crawlers’ to explore the web in order to find and index relevant content.14  
RELEVANCE OF SEARCH RESULTS - Search engine providers rely on an algorithm to return 
relevant results to the search queries of users. In order to improve their search algorithm and 
the performance of the search functionality delivered to users, well-known search engines 
including Google, Yahoo and Bing collect information such as the date and time of the search 
and the location of the user (based on the Internet Protocol (IP) address) and store data about 
the search queries that users have looked for as well as the links that are subsequently clicked 
on. These query logs or search logs (hereafter: search data) are used by the search engines to 
improve the relevance of their search results in the future by looking at, for example in which 
language, from which geographical location, and at what time of the day a user enters a 
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 J. GRIMMELMANN, "The Structure of Search Engine Law", Iowa Law Review 2007, vol. 93, no. 1, (1), p. 7 and 
11-12. For a description of the working of a web crawler, see also Case No COMP/M.6281 – Microsoft/Skype, 7 
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particular search query.
15
 In addition to search data which cannot lead to the identification of 
a specific user and which enables a search engine to improve its search results on the basis of 
these general indicators, the prevailing search engines create profiles of each individual user 
by combining information about earlier search preferences and behaviour of the specific user 
on the platform. When a user is logged in on the search service, the provider is able to 
combine data about that user’s search history and other information which is collected in the 
context of the use of additional services that the search engine might offer such as maps, 
video search and email.
16
   
ALTERNATIVE SEARCH ENGINES - Although alternative search engines such as Ixquick (also 
referred to as Startpage)
17
 and DuckDuckGo also rely (partly) on advertising to fund their 
business,
18
 they do not track users and therefore call themselves ‘privacy-friendly’.19 The 
privacy-friendly search engines either do not collect personal data from searchers at all or 
retain this data for only a few days.
20
 While user traffic to privacy-friendly search engines is 
increasing,
21
 the collection of user data seems vital for a search engine to keep attracting users 
and advertisers. Since users are not charged a monetary fee for access to the search service, 
quality and in particular the relevance of the search results is an important parameter of 
competition.
22
 Personalisation of search results therefore improves the attributes of a search 
engine that users deem important and helps the search engine to keep attracting users. The 
availability of personal data of users also enables the search engine to better target 
advertisements which gives advertisers a better chance to reach interested buyers.
23
 For this 
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20
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https://ixquick.com/eng/privacy-policy.html. 
21
 See C. Farivar, ‘Fueled by Snowden and Apple, private search engine DuckDuckGo rapidly grows’, Ars 
Technica, 25 June 2015, available at http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/06/fueled-by-snowden-and-apple-
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OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ‘Online Targeting of Advertising and Prices - A market study’, May 2010, p. 5, 
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reason, the search engine will attract more advertisers if the ads are well-targeted to users. 
More effective targeting also enables the search engine provider to charge more for its 
advertising services. Furthermore, under the pay-per-click advertising model that is most 
commonly employed in search engines, the advertiser only pays when a user clicks on its 
advertisement. To gain revenue, the search engine thus has to ensure that the advertisements 
displayed in the search results are so relevant for the user that it clicks on them.
24
 The 
accumulation of user information is vital in this perspective. 
 
2.2.2  Social networks 
HISTORY - Social networks, understood in this thesis as services enabling users to create a 
public or semi-public profile and a list of friends or contacts,
25
 started to emerge on the 
internet in the late 1990s. SixDegrees.com was the first website that enabled users to create 
profiles, list their friends and browse through their list of contacts and those drawn up by 
others on the same platform. Before the launch of SixDegrees.com in 1997, each of these 
three features existed separately on other websites but they were never combined in one 
service. Although SixDegrees attracted a lot of users, it did not succeed in achieving a 
sustainable business and therefore had to shut down its website in 2000. Several new social 
networks came and went afterwards with Friendster and Myspace being the most successful 
ones. Facebook started to compete with Myspace in 2005 and has meanwhile established 
itself as the leader of the social network industry. Although it was designed to support 
Harvard students only, Facebook expanded its audience to include eventually everyone.
26
 
TYPES OF SOCIAL NETWORKS - Next to social networks that target the general public, 
specialised social networks exist that focus on a particular type of user such as LinkedIn 
                                                                                                                                                        
available at 
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Communication 2008, vol. 13, no. 1, (210), p. 211). 
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 For a more elaborate overview of the development of the online social network industry, see D.M. BOYD AND 
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Communication 2008, vol. 13, no. 1, (210), p. 214-219 and J. HEIDEMANN, M. KLIER AND F. PROBST, "Online 
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which is a business network aimed at people in professional occupations and ResearchGate 
which is dedicated to scientists and researchers. In addition, websites that initially focused on 
sharing of media content started to implement social network features and have become social 
networks themselves. In this context, a distinction has been made between ‘user-oriented’ and 
‘content-oriented’ social networks separating social networks that focus on social 
relationships and communities from social networks in which the networks of  users are not 
determined by their underlying social relationships but instead by their common interests. 
YouTube is an illustration of the latter.
27
 Other social networks like Twitter center around 
microblogging, a feature that Facebook, Google+ and others have integrated into their service 
in the form of status updates.  
BUSINESS MODEL - Unlike other advertising-based platforms, social networks do not offer 
content themselves but provide the means for users to interact and create content in the form 
of profiles, messages, photos and videos. Similar to search engine providers, the prevailing 
online social network providers give users access to their service free of charge and rely on 
advertising to finance their business.
28
 Facebook gets additional revenue from fees related to 
payments that take place on the social network. Facebook gives developers free access to the 
application programming interfaces (APIs) that enable them to integrate applications in its 
platform,
29
 but every time a user makes a purchase through the payment platform that 
Facebook provides it receives a fee from the application developer at issue.
30
 These purchases 
mainly originate from games. Nevertheless, advertising still constitutes the key revenue 
source of Facebook. In the last quarter of 2015, 96% of Facebook’s revenue was reported to 
originate from advertising.
31
 Advertising also accounts for the largest part of Twitter’s 
income. Twitter’s other revenue source is the licensing of data.32 Until August 2015, Twitter 
worked with a number of certified data resellers including DataSift and NTT Data which 
bought a license from Twitter to access, search and analyse the full stream of tweets. 
Companies that needed Twitter data for example for providing social analytics services to 
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clients thus had to contact one of these resellers. As of August 2015, Twitter establishes direct 
relationships with companies using Twitter data for commercial use.
33
 
RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS - Social network providers are able to improve the 
quality of their service to users by increasing the relevance of social interactions and 
suggested contacts that are displayed to a particular user. An algorithm is used to select which 
pieces of information are most relevant for a specific user. For example, the stories that are 
displayed in a user’s News Feed on Facebook are influenced by the connections and activity 
of that user on the platform. The stories from friends with whom a particular user interacts the 
most will appear highest in his or her News Feed.
34
 Facebook’s algorithm responds to signals 
of users including: how often a particular user interacts with a specific friend, page or public 
figure who posted a story; the number of likes, shares and comments a post receives in 
general and from the friends of the user at issue; how much the user has interacted with this 
type of post in the past; whether or not the user and others are hiding or reporting a given 
post.
35
 By monitoring and collecting information about the behaviour of users on their 
platform, social network providers are thus able to improve the relevance of their social 
network features.  
TARGETED ADVERTISING - As a result of the content that users upload and the profile that they 
have constructed, social network providers can gather information about their users that is 
utilised to sell targeted advertising. Facebook enables advertisers to target users on the basis 
of location, demographics (including age, gender and education), interests (based on 
Facebook pages that a user ‘liked’ and hobbies and interests it mentioned in its profile), 
behaviours (such as purchase behaviour and device usage), connections (to reach users who 
are connected to the advertiser’s page, event or application as well as their friends), custom 
audiences (to create audiences based on the advertiser’s own customer data, including emails, 
phone numbers or user IDs) and lookalike audiences (to create audiences based on insights 
the advertiser gained from Facebook marketing to find more people who like its products and 
services).
36
 Advertising on Twitter takes place in the form of so-called promoted tweets, 
promoted accounts and promoted trends. Promoted tweets are purchased by advertisers and 
appear in a user’s timeline if the tweet is likely to be interesting and relevant to that user. The 
relevance of a promoted tweet for a particular user is assessed on the basis of several aspects 
such as what or who a user chooses to follow, how a user interacts with a tweet and what or 
who a user retweets.
37
 When an advertiser promotes its Twitter-account, it is displayed to 
relevant users on the basis of the public list of whom they follow.
38
 Thirdly, promoted trends 
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appear at the topic of the trending topics list on Twitter and are time-, context-, and event-
sensitive trends promoted by advertisers. Users are able to click on a promoted trend to view 
all the related tweets including a promoted tweet from the advertiser at the top. Users are also 
able to tweet about the promoted trend by including the trending hashtag or the trend terms.
39
  
ADDING SOCIAL CONTEXT TO ADS - The main distinction with advertising on search engines is 
that social network providers are able to sell advertisements containing social context. For 
example, Facebook enables the display of stories about social actions a user’s friends have 
taken, such as ‘liking’ a page or checking in to a restaurant, as advertisements.40 In Google+ 
itself no advertisements are shown. However, Google displays so-called ‘shared 
endorsements’ as advertisements in its other services. If a user takes an action on Google+, 
including ‘+1’ing’, commenting and following, his or her profile name and photo can be 
displayed across all Google services to other people that he or she has chosen to share that 
content with, unless this function is manually turned off in the privacy settings.
41
 In addition, 
Google enables AdWords advertisers to turn Google+ posts into display ads that run across 
the web.
42
 
INTEGRATING SEARCH AND SOCIAL NETWORKING - Although search engines and social 
networks have different functionalities, both services are converging due to the cooperation 
between companies in both segments. Bing integrates data from several social networks, 
including Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare, a location-based social network site for mobile 
devices, in its search results. Next to the web search results, Bing displays a so-called ‘social 
sidebar’ that contains posts or comments from friends and experts on these social networks 
that are relevant to the search query and that may help the user to find the best answer to his 
or her request.
43
 In turn, Facebook introduced the search functionality ‘Social Graph’ in 
January 2013 that enables users to find content shared by their friends on Facebook. Google 
provides both a search engine and a social network. When a user is signed in to its Google 
Account, Google combines the information that users provided on its other services or that it 
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collected about users on these other services including its social network Google+ for 
displaying relevant search results.
44
  
 
2.2.3 E-commerce platforms 
HISTORY - In the context of the rising popularity of the internet in the 1990s, companies 
started to look at the online environment as a new sales channel. The prevailing e-commerce 
platforms Amazon and eBay both started their business in the mid-1990s. Amazon established 
itself as an online retailer for books but rapidly expanded its product range. In addition to its 
own retailing activities, Amazon launched the Amazon Marketplace in November 2000.
45
 On 
this platform Amazon acts as an intermediary enabling sellers to offer their goods at a fixed 
price to potential buyers. eBay similarly provides a platform for sellers and buyers to come 
together. eBay started as an online auction platform where buyers can enter bids in order to 
acquire a product and has been expanded to offer sellers the option to supply their goods at a 
fixed price. 
BUSINESS MODEL - Most e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and eBay provide buyers 
free access to their platform and charge sellers different types of fees for putting their goods 
for sale on their website. These fees include charges for monthly subscriptions and individual 
transactions.
46
 Advertising services form an additional revenue source for both Amazon and 
eBay. In addition to the fees Amazon receives from sellers and advertisers, it generates 
revenue by acting as a retailer and selling products on its own behalf. 
RECOMMENDATION SYSTEM - The recommendation or recommender system is central to the 
working of e-commerce platforms. Since transaction fees form part of the revenue of these 
platforms, it is vital that relevant purchase suggestions are made to users so that they engage 
in as many transactions as possible. The availability of information about the purchasing 
behaviour of users, their virtual shopping cart and the items they have viewed, liked or rated 
creates advantages for incumbent providers that have been able to improve their 
recommendation system with every interaction made in the past. The collection and analysis 
of data on the behaviour and preferences of users permits the platform to better predict in 
what products users are interested based on their similarity with other users. Think of, for 
example, the products that Amazon features under ‘Customers Who Viewed This Item Also 
Viewed’ or ‘Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought’. In order to return the most 
relevant purchase suggestions to users, recommendation systems typically use an algorithm 
based on so-called ‘collaborative filtering’. This is a method of making automatic predictions 
about the interests of users by collecting preferences from many users. In addition to 
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matching users with similar interests and making recommendations on this basis, e-commerce 
platforms create profiles of returning users leading to personalised recommendations which 
are made in accordance with, among others, the individual purchase history of users and the 
items they have rated and liked in the past.
47
 
TARGETED ADVERTISING - Advertisements on Amazon are displayed to users in several places 
such as in the search results and on product pages. Advertisers can add keywords to their 
product ads which enables Amazon to show them to potentially interested customers 
conducting a search on its website. Advertisements are also displayed on existing product 
pages targeting users who are looking for the same or similar products that are already offered 
for sale on Amazon. On the basis of the product category and the description provided by the 
advertiser Amazon determines where advertisements appear in accordance with what is most 
relevant to users.
48
 eBay provides several targeting possibilities on the basis of demographic, 
geographic, contextual and behavioural factors.
49
 Both Amazon and eBay also engage in 
personalised advertising based on personal information provided by users and previous 
purchases and products viewed on their platforms.
50
  
 
2.3 Multi-sided businesses 
By creating interactions between users and advertisers, online platforms act as multi-sided 
businesses. Before describing the multi-sided nature of search engines, social networks and e-
commerce platforms, attention will be paid to the developing economic theory on multi-sided 
platforms.  
 
2.3.1 Multi-sidedness in general 
TERMINOLOGY - While multi-sided businesses have existed for a much longer time, only 
around 2002 they were discovered as constituting a particular type of industry that deserves 
special attention from competition authorities and courts. Several scholars contributed to the 
development of the concept, but the term ‘two-sided market’ seems to have been introduced 
by Rochet and Tirole.
51
 Armstrong uses the same term
52
, whereas Caillaud and Jullien
53
 and 
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Parker and Van Alstyne
54
 refer to respectively ‘indirect network effects’  and ‘two-sided 
network effects’. Evans speaks of ‘multi-sided platforms’ in order to distinguish the 
businesses that serve several customer groups from the markets in which they compete.
55
  
EMBEDDING - The concept of multi-sidedness relies on the theories of network externalities 
and multi-product pricing.
56
 At the core of the network externalities literature lies the finding 
that end-users do not take into account or, in other words, do not internalise the impact of 
their purchase on others. However, the theory of network externalities in itself cannot 
sufficiently analyse behaviour of multi-sided businesses, since it does not take multi-
sidedness into account. While the multi-product pricing literature describes the 
interdependency of pricing decisions, it does not allow for externalities in the consumption of 
different products. A buyer of a razor will usually also take into account the price of 
razorblades in his purchase decision and will thus internalise the impact of his purchase on the 
demand and surplus of other products. However, an end-user in a multi-sided market does not 
consider the effect of his purchase on the other side of the market. The theory of multi-
sidedness therefore combines elements from both the theory of network externalities and 
multi-product pricing. From the economic literature on network externalities, it derives the 
notion that there are non-internalised externalities among end-users. From the multi-product 
pricing theory, it borrows the focus on price structure.
57
 
DEFINING ‘MULTI-SIDED MARKETS’ - In this thesis, the term ‘multi-sided market’ is not used 
because of its inherent assumption that multi-sided businesses cannot compete with one-sided 
businesses in a relevant market defined for competition law purposes, while there is no reason 
to exclude this possibility from the outset. To avoid a biased approach towards market 
definition in competition law, reference is only made to ‘multi-sided businesses’ or ‘multi-
sided platforms’ here. In the economic literature, however, the concept of multi-sidedness has 
been developed and described as a form of market structure. Several definitions of ‘multi-
sided markets’ have been put forward by scholars in this regard.58 According to Rochet and 
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Tirole, ‘a market with network externalities is a two-sided market if platforms can effectively 
cross-subsidize between different categories of end users that are parties to a transaction’. 
They claim that most markets with network externalities are multi-sided markets.
59
 Later on, 
Rochet and Tirole proposed a different definition: ‘a market is two-sided if the platform can 
affect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the market and reducing the 
price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in other words, the price structure matters, 
and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board’.60 Armstrong defines multi-
sided markets as markets involving ‘two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,” 
where one group’s benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that 
joins the platform’.61 In the view of Evans, three conditions have to be met for a market to be 
multi-sided. Firstly, there must be two or more distinct groups of customers. For example, 
shopping malls have to attract retailers and visitors. Secondly, externalities have to be 
associated with the two groups of customers becoming connected or coordinated in some 
way. Shoppers benefit when their favourite shop is located in a mall nearby, while a retailer 
benefits from being in a location that attracts interested shoppers. Thirdly, an intermediary is 
required that internalises the externalities created by one group for the other group. The 
shopping mall brings customers and retailers together and enables both groups to generate 
value from their interaction that they would not, or at least not to that extent, have obtained 
without it.
62
  
CHICKEN AND EGG PROBLEM - A phrase that is often used to characterise multi-sidedness is the 
need of a firm ‘to get both sides on board’.63 In the example of the shopping mall, enough 
retailers have to be present in the mall in order to attract shoppers and enough customers must 
visit the mall in order to encourage retailers to open a shop. This leads to the ‘chicken-and-
egg’ problem.64 Retailers will only join the mall when there is a prospect that a sufficient 
number of shoppers will visit the mall. Shoppers, in turn, will only be inclined to come to the 
mall when there are enough appealing shops. Thus, the mall has to find the right price 
structure to make sure that both groups will be present in good proportions, while at the same 
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time making money.
65
 In practice, most malls do not charge customers for a visit, while 
retailers have to pay to open a shop.
66
 
INDIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS - While Rochet & Tirole at first relied on the existence of 
indirect network effects to identify multi-sided platforms,
67
 in later work they refer to the 
underinclusiveness of such a definition and propose to look at whether the price structure of 
the platform affects the economic outcome.
68
 A reference can also be made here to Hagiu & 
Wright who argue that the critical feature of multi-sided platforms is their capacity to enable 
direct interactions between distinct types of affiliated customer groups. In their view, indirect 
network effects are neither necessary nor sufficient for a business to constitute a multi-sided 
platform.
69
 However, most scholars agree that the essential feature of a multi-sided business is 
the existence of indirect network effects.
70
 In the economic literature on network effects that 
was initiated by respectively Katz and Shapiro
71
 and Farrell and Saloner
72
, a distinction is 
made between direct and indirect network effects. Both network effects arise when the utility 
that a single consumer derives from consumption of a good increases with the number of 
other consumers purchasing the good. In case of a direct network effect, an increase in the 
number of purchasers directly raises the overall quality of the product. A commonly used 
example of a good having direct network effects is the telephone network. The utility that a 
consumer derives from purchasing a telephone is a function of the number of others that have 
already joined the telephone network. An indirect network effect exists when an increase in 
the number of consumers of a good leads to a higher demand for compatible products that 
make the good more valuable in an indirect way. An example of this is the hardware-software 
paradigm. Depending on the number of other purchasers of a hardware good, its value rises 
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for a single consumer because the amount and variety of compatible software will increase 
with the quantity of hardware units that have been sold.
73
 
MULTI-SIDED NETWORK EFFECTS - In the case of multi-sidedness, the ‘indirectness’ of the 
network effect does not relate to the complementarity of products but to the connection 
between the different sides of a platform. Parker and Van Alstyne referred to ‘two-sided 
network effects’ to clarify that the network effects must cross customer groups and differ 
from the ‘ordinary’ type of indirect network effects.74 If users on one side of the platform buy 
a good that affects another side’s choice of a different good, this special type of indirect 
network effect is present that may point to the multi-sidedness of a market. Put simply, the 
more users join one side of the platform, the more valuable the platform becomes for 
customers on the other side. As new users join Facebook, for example, more advertisers will 
be inclined to buy (additional) advertising space on Facebook, since they will reach a larger 
number of potential buyers. The term ‘cross-side’ network effect is also used to denote that 
the strength of one side of the platform has an impact on the growth of another side.
75
 To 
prevent that terms are mixed up, a clear distinction has to be made between the ‘ordinary’ 
type of indirect network effect that occurs in one-sided markets and the ‘peculiar’ type of 
network effect that is often also simply referred to as indirect network effect but which points 
to the multi-sidedness of a business.
76
 Therefore, the term ‘multi-sided network effect’ is used 
in this thesis to refer to a network effect that crosses customer groups in multi-sided 
platforms.
77
 When reference is made to ‘indirect network effects’, this only concerns the type 
of network effects that signify the complementarity of products in one-sided markets. 
EXTERNALITIES - It is vital that the customer groups are not able to internalise the multi-sided 
network effects on their own. In that case, the platform would not be needed as an 
intermediary between the different sides.
78
 Multi-sided network efforts that are not 
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appropriated by the customer groups are referred to as externalities,
79
 since they are external 
to or not accounted for in the individual decisions of the customers.
80
 For example, shoppers 
do not take into account that by visiting a shopping mall they make it more attractive for 
retailers to open a shop there. Because of information and transaction costs, it is difficult for 
members of distinct customer groups to internalise the externalities themselves.
81
 As long as 
the intermediary can coordinate the interaction more efficiently than the two customer groups 
are able to do themselves in a bilateral relationship, the platform is multi-sided. In theory, 
retailers could pay customers directly, instead of paying the shopping mall, to visit their stores 
but this does not happen in practice. The mall thus facilitates the interaction between the two 
groups.
82
  
PASS-THROUGH - One way in which the customer groups can internalise the multi-sided 
network effects is by passing through the difference in cost of interacting to the other side.
83
 
Filistrucchi et al. mention the example of an already established couple that goes to a 
nightclub. If the man would be charged more than his girlfriend for entering the club, the 
couple could decide to split the total costs in equal amounts. In this situation, only the price 
level and not the price structure matters. Since the focus on price structure is a necessary 
element of a multi-sided platform, the business turns into a one-sided firm that sells 
complementary goods.
84
 In more economic terms, if the so-called Coase theorem does not 
apply to the interaction between the two customer sides, the platform is multi-sided.
85
 Under 
the Coase theorem, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome irrespective of the initial 
allocation of property provided that transaction costs are sufficiently low. However, according 
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to Coase, transaction costs are in practice rarely low enough to enable parties to discuss and 
negotiate among themselves.
86
 
MULTI-SIDED STRATEGIES - Whether a particular intermediary constitutes a one-sided or a 
two-sided business often is a firm’s choice rather than a fixed outcome derived from the 
structure of the market. Therefore, Rysman proposes to speak of ‘two-sided strategies’ instead 
of ‘two-sided markets’.87 Indeed, Armstrong shows that a supermarket can also be regarded as 
a two-sided platform. In his model, the supermarket fixes the price per consumer and pays the 
supplier based on how many consumers visit the supermarket.
88
 This contradicts the usual 
characterisation of a supermarket as a one-sided reseller in which a supplier sells its products 
to the supermarket which takes possession of the products and resells them to consumers, 
without the supplier being dependent on the actual behaviour of consumers.  
MATTER OF DEGREE - Hagiu argues that the one-sided merchant or reseller and the two-sided 
platform or marketplace should be seen as the two extreme cases. Several businesses exist 
that have features of both. In Hagiu’s view, ‘there is a continuum of forms of 
intermediation’.89 Although the iTunes store, for example, exhibits multi-sided network 
effects by bringing publishers and consumers together, the extent of Apple’s control over the 
pricing and distribution of songs and videos makes the platform more similar to a reseller 
which takes possession of the songs and videos it distributes.
90
 Therefore, multi-sidedness 
seems to be a matter of degree.
91
 Furthermore, the multi-sided nature of a business may not 
always be decisive for the analysis. According to Rysman, ‘the interesting question is often 
not whether a market can be defined as two-sided - virtually all markets might be two-sided to 
some extent -  but how important two-sided issues are in determining outcomes of interest’.92 
In the view of Evans, the strength of the multi-sided network effects will determine whether 
the multi-sidedness ‘matters enough to have a substantive effect on the results of economic 
analysis’.93 Filistrucchi et al. conclude that, although there is still controversy about the exact 
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definition of multi-sided platforms, the different definitions proposed are consistent enough to 
allow the identification of those markets where multi-sidedness might matter.
94
  
 
2.3.2 Establishing a multi-sided business 
COMMITMENTS - Because of the multi-sided network effects, multi-sided businesses have to 
attract several customer groups at the same time. To ensure that all sides of the platform will 
be present, the provider has to make commitments to customers on side A that customers on 
side B will be there once they join the platform and vice versa.
95
 For some multi-sided 
businesses such as payment card systems, yellow pages and transaction platforms, these 
commitments must take place almost simultaneously. For example, consumers will only 
acquire a payment card when they know they can use it at stores and vice versa, merchants 
will only participate in new payment systems when they know that enough customers will 
make use of it. In other multi-sided platforms, the commitments take place sequentially.
96
 
Operating system providers usually start attracting developers for writing applications well 
before the system is launched to users. This is to prevent that users will not be interested in 
purchasing a license once the operating system is launched, due to the lack of sufficient 
applications that run on the operating system.
97
 
PRICE STRUCTURE - Next to making reliable commitments, the chicken-and-egg problem can 
be solved by setting a price structure. By determining the price for a particular side of the 
platform, the business should take into account to what extent the presence of that side attracts 
customers on the other side. For example, in advertising-based online platforms, advertisers 
usually benefit more from the presence of users than users value the advertiser side. In order 
to convince users to join the platform, the business could decide to let users join the platform 
for free or even pay them to join.
98
 This is especially likely in the introductory period of a 
platform to attract users and make the platform valuable for the other side.
99
 The business will 
then cross-subsidise the loss on the user side by charging advertisers more than the marginal 
costs of the advertiser side.
100
 Unlike pricing in one-sided markets, the optimal price on a 
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particular side of a multi-sided platform does not follow marginal cost on that side.
101
 In 
accordance with the Ramsey pricing rule,
102
 the best strategy is to charge a higher price to the 
customer group which has more inelastic demand and is thus less sensitive to price than the 
customers on the other side of the platform. Since users are more responsive to price and their 
participation attracts a large number of advertisers on the other side who are relatively price 
inelastic, the user side will be subsidised.
103
 The use of skewed pricing by multi-sided 
platforms also reflects the fact that one customer group is easier to get on board than the 
other. In addition, the price structure of a platform is influenced by the presence of ‘marquee’ 
and ‘captive’ customers. Marquee customers make the multi-sided business more valuable to 
customers on the other side of the platform. As a result, the platform can raise the price for 
participation to customers on the other side. At the same time, the price to the marquee 
customer side will be lowered. For example, the American Express business clientele was 
appreciated so much by merchants that American Express was able to charge a relatively high 
price to merchants in comparison to other payment card providers.
104
 Captive customers are 
extremely loyal to the platform irrespective of the price that is charged, for example because 
of long-term contracts. This allows the platform to increase its price to these captive 
customers and reduce the price to the other side.
105
 
INVESTMENT - Platforms may also attract customers by investing in one side of the market in 
order to lower the costs of participation for customers on that side. For example, by offering 
developer support, operating system providers can make it easier and less costly for 
developers to write applications for their operating system. This may discourage developers 
from writing applications for competing operating systems.
106
    
SWITCH TO TWO-SIDEDNESS - According to Rysman, potential platforms may also overcome 
the chicken-and-egg problem by starting as a one-sided firm and switching to a multi-sided 
business model as they become more established. An example is Amazon that started as a 
one-sided merchant for the sale of books and now also provides a platform where sellers and 
buyers meet.
107
 In the early days, Google acted as a one-sided firm too providing search 
services to users and trying to gain revenue from licensing its search engine to other firms. 
                                                                                                                                                        
CAILLAUD AND B. JULLIEN, "Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service providers", RAND 
Journal of Economics 2003, vol. 34, no. 2, (309), p. 310. 
101
 D.S. EVANS, "The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets", Yale Journal on Regulation 2003, 
vol. 20, no. 2, (325), p. 328. 
102
 Ramsey pricing has been described for the first time in the context of taxation by F.P. RAMSEY, "A 
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation", Economic Journal 1927, vol. 37, no. 145, (47). 
103
 M. RYSMAN, "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets", Journal of Economic Perspectives 2009, vol. 23, no. 
3, (125), p. 130. See also the overview of several multi-sided business models in J.-C. ROCHET AND J. TIROLE, 
"Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets", Journal of the European Economic Association 2003, vol. 1, no. 
4, (990), p. 992. 
104
 D.S. EVANS, "The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets", Yale Journal on Regulation 2003, 
vol. 20, no. 2, (325), p. 353. 
105
 J.-C. ROCHET AND J. TIROLE, "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets", Journal of the European 
Economic Association 2003, vol. 1, no. 4, (990), p. 1007-1008. 
106
 D.S. EVANS, "Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy", Northwestern University 
Law Review Colloquy 2008, vol. 102, (285), p. 354; J.-C. ROCHET AND J. TIROLE, "Platform Competition in 
Two-Sided Markets", Journal of the European Economic Association 2003, vol. 1, no. 4, (990), p. 1017. 
107
 M. RYSMAN, "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets", Journal of Economic Perspectives 2009, vol. 23, no. 
3, (125), p. 132. 
38 
 
Two years after Google was launched, it started to sell advertising slots and turned into a 
multi-sided platform.
108
 
CRITICAL MASS - To be successful, the platform has to achieve a critical mass of both 
customer groups. The platform has to attract enough customers at all sides to ensure that it 
creates sufficient value for everyone. Furthermore, it is vital that the sides of the platform 
grow in a stable and balanced way. For example, online platforms that attract users by giving 
them access to content, either created by other users (e.g. online social networks) or by the 
platform provider itself (e.g. newspaper websites) have to make sure that there is a good 
balance between content and advertising. If the amount of advertising would overtake the 
availability of content, users could be driven away from the platform. By getting as much 
customers as possible on board, the platform can also prevent rival businesses from 
establishing themselves. A platform that has more customers on both sides on board is more 
valuable than its competitors and will therefore likely attract even more customers.
109
  
 
2.3.3 Multi-sided nature of online platforms 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS ADVERTISING - Although the advertising-based media industry is 
generally accepted to be multi-sided,
110
 it can be seen as a peculiar form of a multi-sided 
business. Unlike multi-sided platforms such as shopping malls and payment card systems 
where both customer groups value the other side, advertising may not always positively affect 
the demand of ‘consumers’ of media content.111 Empirical research shows that, although 
advertisers value a television channel more if it has more viewers, viewers tend to be averse 
to advertising.
112
 If advertising drives customers on the other side of the market away, a 
negative multi-sided network effect is present. Since research has shown that the value of a 
TV channel diminishes for viewers as advertising increases, the TV market can be 
characterised as having one negative multi-sided network effect. In order to establish a multi-
sided platform, at least one customer group must be found that is interested in interacting with 
the other side. This implies that at a minimum one positive multi-sided network effect has to 
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be present.
113
 Because advertisers value a platform more when the number of users that it 
attracts increases, the advertising-based media industry, including the TV market, is 
commonly acknowledged to be multi-sided.
114
   
ADVERTISING ON SEARCH ENGINES - Although it is not entirely clear what the attitude of users 
towards advertisements on online platforms is, these businesses are widely regarded as multi-
sided platforms.
115
 As advertisers positively value the user side, online intermediaries qualify 
as multi-sided platforms under the principle that only one positive multi-sided network effect 
has to be present for rendering a business multi-sided.
116
 In certain circumstances, the 
advertiser side may exert a positive multi-sided network externality on users. Users that are 
looking for a purchase through a search engine will positively value the display of 
advertisements in their search results. However, it is not clear whether searchers that are not 
interested in making a purchase enjoy positive or negative externalities from advertising or 
whether they are indifferent. Next to transactional queries that look for websites to perform a 
purchase, informational queries that are meant to obtain data or information and navigational 
queries that look for a specific URL on the internet can be distinguished.
117
 As it is estimated 
that only 10 percent of all search queries aim at making a purchase, it remains uncertain how 
the majority of searchers that look for information or specific URLs value advertising.
118
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ADVERTISING ON E-COMMERCE PLATFORMS - On e-commerce platforms buyers and sellers 
exert positive network externalities on each other. Both groups attach value to each other’s 
presence, since the likelihood of a transaction increases as the number of members on the 
other side of the platform grows. With regard to the advertising services provided by e-
commerce platforms, the interaction between buyers and advertisers is relevant. Since sellers 
are not interested in making a purchase but rather want to vend their own products and 
services, they do not fall within the audience of advertisers and may even be seen as 
competitors. However, users on e-commerce platforms often change sides: a customer may be 
a seller in one transaction and a buyer in another.
119
 When reference is made here to ‘users’ of 
e-commerce platforms in relation to advertisers, customers qualifying as buyers in a certain 
transaction are targeted. With regard to the link between users and advertisers on e-commerce 
platforms the same applies as explained above in the context of advertising on search engines. 
While it is clear that advertisers benefit from the presence of users, the multi-sided network 
effects may not be reciprocal and even be negative. Nevertheless, since the majority of users 
on e-commerce platforms are looking for a purchase, users will more likely positively value 
the display of advertisements that highlight products similar to the one they are seeking. The 
multi-sided network effect that the advertiser side exerts on users could thus be positive.  
ADVERTISING ON SOCIAL NETWORKS - For online social networks, advertising that includes 
social context might be positively valued by users. Sponsored stories on Facebook are an 
example of such a type of advertising. Sponsored stories were provided by Facebook until 
April 2014
120
 and offered businesses the possibility to display their brand or product as a 
message coming from users. When a user engaged with a page, app or event that a business 
had paid to highlight, a message or story was displayed on the user’s page to all of his or her 
contacts containing the action of the user in relation to the business, as well as the logo and 
the link to the business page.
121
 One could argue that users value this type of advertising 
positively because it forms part of the user content and provides details of the interests and 
activities of contacts.
122
 However, users often like a page because they will get a discount or 
another type of advantage as a result of which the interaction with a certain business does not 
necessarily say something about the interests of users. Furthermore, sponsored stories were 
one of the most controversial types of advertising on Facebook that even led to the filing of a 
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class action lawsuit in the United States regarding privacy violations which Facebook settled 
in August 2013.
123
  
ADVERTISERS AS PLATFORM FINANCERS - While users on search engines and social networks 
may not be interested in the advertisements that are displayed, one can argue that advertisers 
still exert a positive multi-sided network externality on users by way of financing the 
platform. Prevailing search engines such as Google and social network sites like Facebook 
rely to a large extent on advertising revenues.
124
 Advertising allows these providers to 
continue to offer their platform to users without having to charge them a monetary fee and to 
invest in the development of the platform. The more advertisers join the platform, the more 
funding is available to keep the platform free and attractive for users. Although advertisers 
thus do seem to impose a positive network externality on users,
125
 this externality is smaller 
than the network effect that the user side exerts on advertisers. The difference in the size of 
the two multi-sided network effects explains why online platforms are usually offered to users 
free of charge while advertisers have to pay to interact with users.  
THIRD CUSTOMER GROUP - Whereas users and advertisers are the two predominant customer 
groups on search engines and social networks, in both platforms a third group of customers 
can be identified. Website owners or content providers form the third side in search engine 
platforms. The search engine connects users with website owners on the basis of their search 
query. Unlike advertisers, website owners do not pay the search engine for being included in 
the search results.
126
 Their websites are displayed in the non-sponsored or organic search 
results in the order of relevance as determined by the search algorithm. Instead of qualifying a 
search engine as a three-sided platform bringing users, advertisers and website owners 
together, one could also argue that a search engine consists of two two-sided platforms 
bundled into one: one platform that brings website owners and users together and another 
platform that connects advertisers with users. In social networks, applications providers 
constitute the third group of customers on the platform. Application developers on Facebook 
have free access to the platform for integrating their services such as games.
127
 Social 
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networks could also be framed as comprising two interconnected two-sided platforms: one 
platform that matches application developers with users and vice versa, and another platform 
that lets advertisers interact with users. The advertiser side forms the only revenue source in 
the currently predominant search engine and social networking platforms. 
PLATFORMS WITHOUT ADVERTISERS? - The question can be raised whether and to what extent 
revenue streams other than advertising are available to fund search engine and social 
networking platforms. While social network providers could start charging developers for 
integrating applications into their platform, it is questionable whether they will be able to 
extract enough revenues from developers to maintain the same level of quality and investment 
in new features.
128
 A decrease in revenue may lead to a lower quality of the platform and 
require the social network provider to charge users. In theory, search engine providers could 
start charging website owners for being included in the organic search results. However, this 
would restrict the number of webpages that the search engine can display to match the user’s 
search query and lead to a decrease in relevance of search results. Since the quality of the 
search results is vital for keeping users on the platform, it is unlikely that search engine 
providers will start to require website owners to pay for having their website indexed. Instead, 
the search engine provider will probably start charging searchers a monetary fee for using the 
search engine. Even though other revenue streams are potentially available, the reliance on an 
advertising-based business model enables the currently predominant platform providers to 
offer their services to users for free while maintaining the quality of the platform and ensuring 
investment in new functionalities. The third customer groups in search engines and social 
networks are not considered here further, as their role on the respective platforms as website 
owners and application developers is subordinate to the interaction between users and 
advertisers. 
VIABILITY OF EXTERNAL REVENUE SOURCES - Bork & Sidak state that the indirect network 
effect that advertisers would exert on users does not raise barriers to entry, because 
advertising revenues are not the only source of funding for investing in product 
improvements.
129
 In addition, Manne & Wright argue that the argument does not turn on 
network effects but merely points to supply-side economies of scale and only concerns the 
question of how to finance a platform. They explain that providers of online platforms can 
also choose to use other revenue sources to fund the platform. For example, Microsoft could 
rely on its revenues from the sale of operating systems to improve its search engine Bing.
130
 
However, although providers indeed may rely on revenue sources that do not come from the 
platform itself, the viability of such a business model can be questioned. The fact that the 
provision and development of the platform is dependent on income from external origins 
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makes its continuous operation vulnerable. As discussed above, in the absence of advertising 
revenues, the provider will likely start to charge users a monetary fee. Furthermore, the 
decision of the provider to rely on advertising reinforces the multi-sided nature of a platform, 
because two-sidedness often is a choice of a firm rather than a fixed structure of a market.
131
 
 
2.4 Network economy characteristics of online platforms 
Online platforms form part of the so-called ‘network economy’ which consists of firms that 
rely on interconnection for the transmission of their goods or services. Whereas old network 
industries such as electricity, gas and railways depend on physical infrastructures and tangible 
assets, new network industries including online intermediaries such as search engines, social 
networks and e-commerce platforms are characterised by the predominance of virtual 
networks and technology. Unlike old economy businesses, new economy industries are 
subject to rapid technological change and innovation. Since both types of industries form part 
of the network economy, they possess similar features such as economies of scale, network 
effects and switching costs. 
 
2.4.1 Economies of scale 
FIXED VERSUS MARGINAL COSTS - Firms active in the network economy have to make 
substantial investments in order to enter the market. Once the initial investment is made, the 
incremental costs of creating additional units decreases and may even be negligible. As a 
result, supply-side economies of scale are present according to which the average costs of 
providing products and services decline as the scale of production increases. In economic 
terms, network economy industries are characterised by relatively high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs.
132
 This is also the case for search engines, social networks and e-commerce 
platforms. The creation of these online platforms require substantial investments in server 
infrastructure to ensure that the traffic can be handled effectively. In addition, investments in 
research and development (R&D) are necessary to develop advertising tools as well as, 
respectively, a search algorithm for search engines, social networking features for social 
networks and a recommendation system for e-commerce platforms.
133
 The setting-up of these 
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platforms therefore involves relatively high fixed costs.
134
 Although constant investments are 
necessary to maintain and improve the quality of the respective platforms, the extra costs of 
displaying an additional advertisement, answering an additional search query, facilitating an 
additional interaction among users and making an additional purchase suggestion are very 
limited. Online platforms therefore exhibit increasing returns giving rise to supply-side 
economies of scale.
135
  
 
2.4.2 Network effects136 
SCALE ECONOMIES IN CONSUMPTION - Network effects or network externalities are a source of 
scale economies in consumption rather than production and are therefore also referred to as 
demand-side economies of scale. Many network industries are characterised by network 
effects which occur when the utility that a consumer derives from consumption of a good 
increases with the number of others purchasing the good. A network effect is either direct 
when a product or service becomes more valuable as the number of users grows, or indirect 
when the increasing number of users of a good leads to more complementary products or 
services which raise the value of the network.
137
 While network effects are beneficial to 
consumers in the short term by increasing consumption utility, they also make it easier for 
undertakings to achieve a dominant position and to reinforce barriers to entry which may have 
negative effects on competition and innovation in the long run.
138
 In the context of the review 
of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp, the European Commission stated in this regard that 
‘the existence of network effects as such does not a priori indicate a competition problem’ but 
that such effects may ‘raise competition concerns in particular if they allow the merged entity 
to foreclose competitors and make more difficult for competing providers to expand their 
customer base’.139 
NO (POSITIVE) NETWORK EFFECTS ON THE ADVERTISER SIDE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - The 
advertiser side of online platforms is not characterised by the presence of positive network 
effects. Advertisers do not benefit when more advertisers join a platform. To the contrary, the 
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display of additional advertisements may impose a cost on the advertisers that have already 
advertised on the platform. In these circumstances, a ‘congestion effect’ or negative network 
effect may arise according to which the value of the platform for advertisers decreases as 
more advertisers join. This can be explained by the fact that advertisers have to compete for 
the attention of the user. Furthermore, the platform may be able to impose higher prices on 
advertisers when the demand for displaying advertisements rises.
140
  
NETWORK EFFECTS ON THE USER SIDE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS - In online social networks, both 
direct and indirect network effects are present on the user side of the platform. The value that 
a user derives from a social network directly increases in accordance with the number of other 
users that are on the network since more people can be reached through the same system. As 
more users join the social network and the variety of available personal information grows, 
the number of compatible applications that are offered on the platform such as games will 
also increase. This indirectly raises the value of the network for its users.
141
 In accordance 
with the multi-sided nature of social networks, network effects only start to create value once 
a critical mass of users, advertisers and application developers is achieved at which point the 
social network will become self-sustaining.
142
 First mover advantages therefore only seem to 
occur after a critical mass has been reached.
143
 For attaining a critical mass of users, not only 
the total number of users is important but also the amount of interactions among users. 
Features that facilitate user interactions thus help the social network to gain a critical mass by 
increasing the degree of connectedness among its users.
144
 
SCOPE OF THE DIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS ON THE USER SIDE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS - 
Nevertheless, a particular user may not attach value to having additional users on the social 
network with whom he or she does not share common interests or a common language. The 
heterogeneity of user preferences in the form of the identity of the people with whom a 
specific user would like to interact through the social network may thus offset the network 
effects to a certain extent.
145
 In the context of consumer communications apps, the European 
Commission indeed noted that the relevance of the user base appears to be more important 
than its overall size. However, the Commission also made clear that the size of the network 
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can have a value for users in two ways: (1) a larger network implies that it is more likely that 
existing contacts will already be using a communications app and (2) a larger network will 
afford greater opportunities for contact acquisition and discovery.
146
 Respondents to the 
market investigation conducted in the context of the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook 
had indicated that the size of the user base and the number of a user’s friends or relatives on 
the same communications app are parameters which raise the utility of the service for a user 
since they increase the number of people he or she can reach. For that reason, the Commission 
considered that network effects did exist in the market for consumer communications apps.
147
 
INDIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS ON THE USER SIDE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - Direct network effects 
do not play a role on the user side of search engines and e-commerce platforms, because 
unlike in communication services users do not directly benefit if others employ the same 
search engine or e-commerce platform. The benefit that a user gets from having more users on 
the same platform, is indirect.
148
 The search results that a search engine produces, the 
interactions and contacts that a social network suggests, and the purchase recommendations 
that an e-commerce platform makes become more relevant in accordance with the number of 
exchanges completed.  
ROLE OF DATA ON THE USER SIDE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - With regard to the performance of 
search engines it has been reported that next to a well-functioning search algorithm, the 
availability of data on previous search queries is crucial. This data includes the search queries 
entered into the search engine and the links subsequently clicked on by users. The personal 
information such as age, gender and occupation that a search engine has collected about users 
also gives rise to a network effect, because it improves the ability of the search engine to offer 
better results to users that have the same age, gender and occupation. The more search data 
the search engine can access, the more relevant the search results that it returns will be.
149
 As 
relevance is also critical to, respectively, recommendation systems and social network 
features, the same applies to the role of data in e-commerce platforms and social networks. In 
particular, information about the purchasing behaviour of users is employed by providers of e-
commerce platforms to give users more relevant suggestions for future purchases. By 
observing the behaviour of users on their platform, providers learn about the preferences of 
users and are better able to predict in what products users are interested on the basis of their 
similarity with other users. Social network providers, in their turn, gather data about the 
activity and connections of users on their platform and use this information to select the most 
relevant social interactions to be displayed to users.  
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ROLE OF DATA ON THE ADVERTISER SIDE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - It is important to note that a 
provider will also become better at targeting advertisements as the amount and variety of data 
that it has gathered about users increases. The more detailed information is available about the 
profile, interests and behaviour of users, the more precise possibilities a provider can offer 
advertisers to select the category of users to which an ad should be displayed. Better targeted 
advertising services will give the provider the opportunity to increase its revenue. This is 
especially the case for online platforms employing a pay-per-click advertising model which 
entails that an advertiser only pays when a user clicks on its advertisement. To gain revenue, 
the platform thus has to ensure that the advertisements displayed to a specific user are so 
relevant that he or she clicks on them. Furthermore, more advertisers will be attracted to a 
particular platform as the targeting possibilities improve because of the higher probability that 
a user buys the advertised product or service. As a consequence of the rise in demand for 
advertising, the advertising revenues of the provider will also increase. This phenomenon can 
be referred to as economies of scale in terms of the monetisation of user data by providing 
targeted advertising services.
150
 
VALUE OF ADDITIONAL DATA - With regard to the role of data in search engines, it has been 
argued that the value of having additional information declines as the amount of data rises. 
The strength of the network effect thus depends on the volume at which the returns from 
additional information start to diminish. The lower the amount at which the benefits from 
supplementary data begin to decrease, the weaker the network effect related to search data is 
and the more likely it is that multiple providers can obtain the necessary information.
151
 In 
this light, Manne & Wright argue that above a certain minimum scale that is necessary to 
develop an effective search algorithm, additional searches and users only provide a limited 
advantage.
152
 Similarly, Bork & Sidak state that only a low number of searches have to be 
conducted in order for a new search engine to initiate the process of learning by doing and to 
start competing with the incumbent provider.
153
 According to Lerner, there are many inputs 
other than search data to provide high quality search results such as engineering resources and 
web crawling and indexing technologies.
154
 
ROLE OF DATA IN SEARCH ENGINES - In the Microsoft/Yahoo merger decision, the European 
Commission found no conclusive evidence that the scale of data collection leads to more 
relevant search results. Google argued that the importance of scale has been largely 
overstated, because the value of incremental data declines as the amount of data increases. 
Nevertheless, the respondents to the market investigation almost unanimously indicated that a 
large volume of search queries is an important aspect of a successful search engine. Scale 
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seems particularly important for being able to improve the relevance of less frequent search 
queries (so-called ‘tail’ queries). For the most frequent queries, the relevance gap between 
Google and, respectively, Microsoft and Yahoo identified in the market investigation was 
only very small.
155
 The Commission concluded that ‘it is plausible that the merged entity 
through innovation and through its access to a larger index will be able to provide 
personalised search results better aligned to users’ preferences’.156 
 
Lerner argues that tail queries are also subject to diminishing returns to scale, because the 
provision of relevant search results in response to these queries involves clever engineering 
and good web crawling technologies rather than the use of search data.
157
 However, the 
probability that a search engine provider can match the tail query with a similar query that it 
has already seen before is likely to increase in accordance with the amount of search data that 
is available. Even though the perfect search result for a new unique query can probably not be 
provided, the most relevant search results may be displayed by relating new unique queries to 
existing queries that the search engine handled in the past. While the added value of a 
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more credible alternative to Google and provide greater value to advertisers by 
acquiring Yahoo due to the increase of scale in search advertising. The 
investigation of the Commission had indicated that scale is indeed an important 
element to be an effective competitor in search advertising. With regard to the 
potential effects of the merger on the different market players, namely advertisers, 
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frequently made search query thus seems limited, less frequent search queries may make a 
significant contribution towards improving search results. Such infrequent search queries 
include in particular queries consisting of several terms (so-called ‘long-tail’ queries) and 
queries relating to current events for which no information is yet available on users’ 
conduct.
158
 
ROLE OF MACHINE LEARNING IN SEARCH ENGINES - The ability of an online platform or another 
type of computer program to make and improve predictions on the basis of an algorithm that 
learns from data is called ‘machine learning’. In the context of the Microsoft/Yahoo merger 
decision, Microsoft argued that with larger scale a search engine can run tests on how to 
improve the algorithm and that it is possible to experiment more and faster as traffic volume 
increases because experimental traffic will take up a smaller proportion of overall traffic.
159
 If 
the intent of users making search queries changes due to a recent event, it is vital for a search 
engine to learn quickly and adapt to the new demands as soon as possible. When a celebrity 
dies, for example, search engines want to stop sending users to general pages about the 
performer and instead refer them to the latest news. How well a search engine is able to do 
this depends on how quickly it can get the required data. For an incumbent search engine 
provider it is easier to collect up-to-date information, because it has already established a 
large base of returning users which enables it to quickly adapt to new preferences of users. 
Google will thus adapt faster than Bing, because more people come to Google first.
160
 The 
partnership that Google concluded with Twitter in February 2015 giving Google complete 
access to the full stream of tweets passing through Twitter on a second-by-second basis also 
has to be put against this background. Because information shared on Twitter is very timely, 
tweets are very useful for a search engine provider to have indexed in order to enable users to 
find up-to-date information quickly.
161
  
LEARNING ECONOMY VERSUS NETWORK EFFECT - Controversy exists about the nature of the 
indirect benefit to users. Argenton & Prüfer refer to this benefit as an indirect network 
externality on the ground that users do not take into account that they enable a search engine 
to improve the relevance and quality of its search results by inserting additional search queries 
and clicking on particular search results.
162
 Other scholars argue that this type of indirect 
benefit cannot be seen as a network effect, but should be referred to as a learning economy.
163
 
According to Katz & Shapiro, a network effect arises if the attractiveness of a good today 
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depends on its sale history and if consumers today also care about the future success of the 
good. When only the first type of increasing return to scale occurs, in their view demand-side 
economies of scale other than network effects are present, such as learning economies.
164
 In 
other words, if there is no link between the value that users attach to the good and the future 
number of users, the good may be subject to learning economies instead of network 
externalities. Since the relevance of the search results that the search engine produces depends 
on the number of past users and search queries, one could argue that a user of a search engine 
is not concerned with the future success of the search engine when he or she enters a new 
search query.
165
 As a result, no network effects would be present on the user side of a search 
engine. 
UNCLEAR NATURE OF THE INDIRECT USER BENEFIT ON SEARCH ENGINES - Although Argenton & 
Prüfer refer to the indirect benefit that users enjoy on search engines as a network externality, 
they state that the phenomenon they have identified as an indirect network effect can also be 
regarded as a special form of learning by doing. Unlike the common type of learning effects 
that relate to the intangible production process in sectors like the aircraft industry, the learning 
economies in search engines concern data about previous searches that can be shared among 
firms.
166
 The exact nature of the indirect benefit that users enjoy of the number of past 
searches on search engines is thus not clear. In a speech, the former Commissioner for 
Competition referred to ‘strong economies of scale in user information that allow search 
engines to improve the service they bring to their users’ without specifying whether these 
scale economies have to be regarded as network effects.
167
  
  
2.4.3 Switching costs and lock-in 
A COSTLY SWITCH - Another common characteristic of network industries is the existence of 
switching costs that consumers incur when changing suppliers. As soon as a consumer makes 
an investment specific to his or her current provider that must be duplicated for any new 
supplier, switching costs are created.
168
 Due to switching costs, consumers can become 
locked-in to a given technology or platform. In this situation, the costs of changing to a new 
product or service are so high that consumers will stay with their current provider even if they 
prefer the products or services of a different supplier. The degree of lock-in is determined by 
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the level of the switching costs.
169
 A distinction can be made between inherent switching 
costs that are intrinsic to the nature of a product or service and strategic switching costs that 
reflect explicit choices made by firms in order to create switching costs. If a dominant 
undertaking acts to increase switching costs above their inherent level, this may be an 
indication of the abusive nature of the behaviour.
170
 Although switching costs always seem to 
be related to either financial expenses or the time and effort of consumers, several types can 
be distinguished such as contractual, compatibility, learning and search costs.
171
  
SWITCHING COSTS OF ADVERTISERS - In online platforms, switching costs can be present on 
both the user and advertiser side. Potential switching costs do not seem to prevent advertisers 
from using several differentiated advertising platforms, since multi-homing
172
 is common in 
the online advertising industry.
173
 Nevertheless, advertisers may experience switching costs 
when they want to change providers or use their advertisements on several platforms and 
cannot move their existing advertising campaigns to another platform. By restricting the 
possibilities of advertisers to transfer their advertising campaigns to competing services, 
providers of advertising platform create switching costs that may ultimately lead to a situation 
of lock-in when advertisers find it too burdensome to manually re-enter all the details of their 
advertising campaign in the new platform and therefore decide to stay with the platform they 
joined first even if better or cheaper options are available. In the Google case, which was 
opened in November 2010 after complaints from competitors about Google’s search 
activities,
174
 the European Commission expressed the concern that Google was creating 
switching costs for advertisers by limiting the portability of advertising campaigns on 
Google’s AdWords advertising platform. In particular, the Commission is worried that 
Google puts ‘contractual restrictions on software developers which prevent them from 
offering tools that allow the seamless transfer of search advertising campaigns across 
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AdWords and other platforms for search advertising’.175 In the negotiations about a potential 
settlement, Google made commitments to stop imposing obligations that prevent advertisers 
from porting and managing advertising campaigns across competing services.
176
 If the 
commitments become final, Google will no longer be able to prevent developers from 
offering functionality that copies online advertising campaigns between advertising services. 
Such a tool will enable advertisers to transfer their campaigns across different platforms and 
eliminate switching costs in the market.
177
  
SWITCHING COSTS OF USERS ON SEARCH ENGINES - Users of search engines do not seem to 
experience high switching costs.
178
 While a personal computer (PC) or a mobile device 
usually runs a single operating system that is only able to support a limited number of 
compatible applications, a user has unlimited access to every search engine that is available 
on the internet regardless of which operating system or web browser is installed. Because of 
the openness of the internet and the absence of compatibility costs, users can easily switch to 
another search engine and use several search engines at the same time.
179
 In this context, 
Google often states that ‘competition is only one click away’. Nevertheless, a user may be 
reluctant to leave a search engine that has accumulated information about its preferences and 
is therefore better able to adapt the search results to its expectations. The trend towards 
personalisation of search results may therefore raise switching costs and start to lock-in users 
if they cannot take their search history with them when changing search engines. In addition, 
this form of lock-in encourages user inertia. Even though better alternatives are available, 
users may tend to stay with the search engine they are most familiar with.
180
 
SWITCHING COSTS OF BUYERS AND SELLERS ON E-COMMERCE PLATFORMS - On e-commerce 
platforms both buyers and sellers may experience switching costs. Because of the 
personalisation of recommendation suggestions, users may stick with the platform that has 
collected information about its purchasing behaviour and is able to make more relevant 
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suggestions for future purchases on the basis of previous preferences. This issue is similar to 
that of personalisation of search results. With regard to the position of sellers, the reputation 
that they have built up on a particular platform forms a source of switching costs. E-
commerce platform providers add ratings to the seller’s profile on the basis of the number of 
positive or negative scores the seller has received.
181
 This enables sellers to gain reputation 
and attract buyers. When a seller cannot transfer its reputation developed on one platform to 
another, it may be discouraged from using a competing platform on which it does not benefit 
from the feedback scores collected previously. Buyers may be reluctant to enter into 
transactions with a seller that does not yet have any ratings. By limiting the portability of the 
sellers’ reputations, e-commerce platform providers can thus try to lock-in sellers to their 
system.
182
  
SWITCHING COSTS OF USERS ON SOCIAL NETWORKS - Since the central feature of social 
networks is the provision of personal information by users, social network providers can 
create switching costs by limiting the possibility for users to transfer their profile and other 
uploaded content such as videos, photos and status updates to a competing service.
183
 
Although social network providers do allow users to export their data,
184
 transferring a profile 
to a competing service requires a lot of time and effort, in particular because the data is not 
extracted in a format that can be easily imported into another social network. As a result, in 
practice users have to manually re-enter their profile information, photos, videos and other 
information in the new platform if they want to switch from one social network to another. By 
restricting the portability of this data, social network providers try to lock-in users to their 
service. Because of the switching costs, users may find it too cumbersome to change to 
another service and stay with the online social network of their first choice, even if better or 
more privacy-friendly services become available.
185
  
APPRAISAL OF DATA PORTABILITY ISSUES IN FACEBOOK/WHATSAPP - In its Facebook/WhatsApp 
merger decision, the European Commission made clear that it had not found any evidence 
suggesting that data portability issues would constitute a significant barrier to consumers’ 
switching in the case of consumer communications apps. According to the Commission, 
communication via apps tends to consist to a significant extent of short and spontaneous chats 
which do not necessarily carry long-term value for consumers. The Commission also 
considered that the messaging history remains accessible on a user’s smartphone even if the 
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user starts using a different communications app. Finally, the Commission took into account 
that the contact list can be easily ported since a competing app, after obtaining consent of the 
user, would get access to his or her phone book on the basis of which existing contacts can be 
identified.
186
 The question is whether the Commission will come to the same conclusion with 
regard to the transfer of profile information and other personal content in social networking 
services. Social networks offer users more than a basic communications service and instead 
focus on enabling users to create a personal profile which may include interests, activities, 
photo albums and comments of other users. The abandonment of such a carefully constructed 
digital identity in a particular social network is more likely to raise switching costs than is the 
case for communications apps.  
OTHER STATEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WITH REGARD TO DATA PORTABILITY - In 
the context of the introduction of the right to data portability in the General Data Protection 
Regulation,
187
 the Commission argued with regard to the use of online services that ‘the loss 
of contact information, calendar history, interpersonal communications exchanges and other 
kinds of personally or socially relevant data which is very difficult to recreate or restore [...] 
effectively creates a lock-in with the specific service for the user and makes it effectively very 
costly or even impossible to change provider and benefit from better services available on the 
market’.188 In a more general perspective, the former Commissioner for Competition stated in 
a speech that retention of data should not serve as barriers to switching in markets that build 
on users uploading their personal data. In addition, he argued that ‘[c]ustomers should not be 
locked in to a particular company just because they once trusted them with their content’. In 
his view, competition concerns may arise ‘if customers were prevented from switching from a 
company to another because they cannot carry their data along’.189 The extent of multi-
homing may reduce the switching costs in the market. However, while many users have 
profiles on several social networks at the same time, this type of multi-homing often concerns 
social networks serving a different purpose.
190
 For example, an individual may have a profile 
on Facebook to interact with his or her friends as well as a profile on LinkedIn in order to 
maintain his or her business network. The degree of user lock-in in social networks can be 
illustrated by the fact that the numerous changes made to the privacy policies of social 
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networks like Facebook have not led to a direct decline in activity in spite of the fierce 
opposition that these changes have sometimes caused on the part of the users.
191
  
SOCIAL LOCK-IN OF USERS ON SOCIAL NETWORKS - Apart from the switching costs that 
originate from the practical inability of users to move their data to a different social network, 
users may also become locked-in to a particular social network for social reasons.
192
 The 
currently predominant social networks are not interoperable in the sense that users of social 
network A cannot directly interact with users of social network B unless they have also 
created a profile on social network B. For this reason, users are required to join the social 
network on which their contacts are present or, more generally, the social network that has the 
most users. The user’s decision to join a particular social network is therefore often not based 
on the quality of the platform but merely depends on its user base. As a result, users may not 
be able to join the social network that has their preference in terms of functionality and 
privacy-friendliness. In the context of internet consumer communications services, the 
General Court in Cisco followed the reasoning of the European Commission outlined in its 
Microsoft/Skype merger decision that it is not difficult for users to switch to competing 
services considering that users typically communicate with only a small group of family and 
friends which would make it easy for them to coordinate a move to another service.
193
 
However, it has to be recognised that users do not interact in closed groups of only a few 
contacts in the sense that every individual in the group will usually communicate with users 
forming part of different groups which leads to a much more complex level of interconnection 
than that presented by the Commission and the General Court.
194
 Therefore, the fact that 
social network users engage in a regular two-way interaction with only a few people
195
 may 
not necessarily dilute the switching costs or lock-in that they experience.  
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Microsoft/Skype merger decision and Cisco judgment:  
In October 2011, the European Commission approved the acquisition of Skype by 
Microsoft. At the time of the merger, Microsoft and Skype both provided internet-
based communications software enabling users to communicate over the internet by 
way of instant messaging, voice calls and video communications.  
The Commission identified internet consumer and enterprise communications 
services as the markets affected by the proposed concentration. The Commission 
left the exact market definition of consumer communications services open and 
argued that the concentration did not give rise to competition concerns even though 
the new entity would become the market leader for video calls on Windows-based 
PCs, having a market share of between 80 and 90%. The Commission considered 
that market shares only provided a limited indication of competitive strength in the 
consumer communications services market which was a nascent and dynamic 
sector in which market shares can change quickly within a short period of time and 
in which products are offered free of charge. With regard to the market for 
enterprise communications, the investigation  of the Commission confirmed that 
Skype had a limited market presence for these products and did not compete 
directly with Microsoft's enterprise communication product Lync.  
Since Microsoft and Skype were active in neighbouring markets, the Commission 
also investigated possible conglomerate effects. As regards consumer 
communications services, the Commission found that the new entity had the ability 
but not the incentive to distort competition in favour of Microsoft’s and Skype’s 
products by degrading the interoperability of those products with competing 
products or by entering into bundling or tying practices. Furthermore, even if such 
a strategy would be employed, the anticompetitive effects would be non-existent or 
at most limited in the Commission’s view. As regards enterprise communications 
services, the Commission argued that Skype was at the time of the merger not an 
enterprise product, therefore its interoperability could not be considered decisive 
for competitors and a bundle or a tie between Skype and Microsoft’s products 
would not be a must have product for enterprises. Furthermore, Lync was found to 
face competition from other strong players in enterprise communications such as 
Cisco. 
 
In December 2013, the General Court dismissed the appeal brought by Cisco and 
Messagenet against the Commission decision. The General Court confirmed that 
the Commission was correct in finding that even on the narrow market for video 
calls on Windows-based PCs the combined market share of 80 to 90% was not 
indicative of market power given the particular characteristics of the market in 
question which is marked by short innovation cycles and products which are free. 
The General Court also held that the Commission's assessment of possible 
conglomerate effects was correct. In particular, the General Court rejected the 
argument of Cisco and Messagenet that Microsoft would be able to reserve to Lync 
preferential interoperability with Skype and with Skype's large user base to the 
detriment of competitors.  
 
Case No COMP/M.6281 - Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011. 
Judgment in Cisco Systems Inc. and Messagenet SpA v. Commission, T-79/12, 
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2.4.4 Barriers to entry 
OBSTACLES TO MARKET ENTRY - The presence of network economy features discussed above 
may lead to entry barriers that protect the position of incumbents and make it difficult for new 
entrants to gain a foothold on the market. Different definitions of barriers to entry have been 
put forward in the economic literature. The two definitions that have gained most attention are 
the ones of respectively Bain and Stigler. According to Bain, an entry barrier is any advantage 
that allows an incumbent to earn above-normal profits without the threat of entry.
196
 Stigler 
defined entry barriers as sunk costs that must be borne by a firm seeking to enter an industry 
but that are not borne by firms already in the industry.
197
 While economies of scale would 
qualify as entry barriers under Bain’s definition, Stigler’s notion rules out scale economies as 
barriers to entry.
198
 In the Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU, 
the European Commission made clear that it regards economies of scale and scope as entry 
barriers. In the Commission’s view, entry barriers may also take the form of ‘privileged 
access to essential inputs or natural resources, important technologies or an established 
distribution and sales network’. Furthermore, barriers to entry may include ‘costs and other 
impediments, for instance resulting from network effects, faced by customers in switching to a 
new supplier’. More controversially, the Commission states that a dominant undertaking’s 
own conduct may create entry barriers, ‘for example where it has made significant 
investments which entrants or competitors would have to match, or where it has concluded 
long-term contracts with its customers that have appreciable foreclosing effects’.199 This 
broad approach may have as a result that all network economy markets are found to be 
characterised by entry barriers, since network effects and switching costs are to some extent 
inherent to the network economy. Although network effects and switching costs tend to 
reinforce the position of the market leader and may lead to highly concentrated markets,
200
 
these economic features do not by definition prevent new firms from displacing the 
incumbent.
201
 
ENTRY BARRIERS IN THE COMMISSION’S DECISIONAL PRACTICE - Barriers to entry played an 
important role in two different Microsoft decisions of the European Commission. In both the 
2004 Commission decision,
202
 upheld by the General Court in 2007,
203
 in which Microsoft 
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was held liable for refusing to license interoperability information and for tying the Windows 
PC operating system to Windows Media Player, as well as the 2009 commitment decision
204
 
involving the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows, indirect network effects were identified 
in the PC operating system market that was dominated by Microsoft. In the Commission’s 
view, the indirect network effects raised a so-called ‘applications barrier to entry’ as a result 
of which potential competing operating systems could only be successfully launched if a 
critical mass of compatible applications was already available for them.
205
 However, the 
Commission has not always regarded network effects as a source of barriers to entry. In the 
Cisco judgment, the General Court agreed with the Commission’s conclusion in its 
Microsoft/Skype merger decision that the direct network effects present in the internet 
consumer communications services market did not give rise to entry barriers because users 
multi-homed and were able to switch providers easily.
206
 Similarly, the Commission argued in 
Facebook/WhatsApp that the network effects in the market for consumer communications 
apps were unlikely to shield the merged entity from competition from new and existing 
communications apps.
207
 The Commission argued that the network effects were mitigated 
because of the fast-moving nature of the sector as a result of which any leading market 
position even if assisted by network effects is unlikely to be incontestable.
208
 In addition, the 
Commission had found no significant costs preventing consumers from switching considering 
that communications apps are offered free of charge or at a very low price, customers of 
communications apps normally multi-home and neither Facebook Messenger nor WhatsApp 
were pre-installed on a large basis of handsets.
209
  
CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE IN MICROSOFT/SKYPE ?- As to the assessment of switching costs and 
network effects, the General Court in Cisco seems to contradict earlier statements made by 
the Commission in the context of Microsoft’s behaviour in the market for PC operating 
systems. In its commitment decision involving the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows, the 
Commission argued that although web browsers are downloadable for free, users are 
prevented from switching to competing browsers ‘due to the barriers associated with such a 
switch, such as searching, choosing and installing such a competing web browser, which can 
stem from a lack of technical skills, or be related to the user’s inertia’.210 In Cisco, the 
General Court maintained that the Microsoft/Skype case had to be distinguished from the 
situations that formed the basis of the Commission’s earlier decisions involving Microsoft, 
                                                                                                                                                        
203
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289. 
204
 Case COMP/C-3/39.530 – Microsoft (tying), 16 December 2009. 
205
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 1088 and Case COMP/C-
3/39.530 – Microsoft (tying), 16 December 2009, par. 25-28. 
206
 Judgment in Cisco Systems Inc. and Messagenet SpA v. Commission, T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, par. 81. 
Although the reasoning on the ease with which users can switch due to the small groups in which they 
communicate may not be convincing as explained above, the Commission relied on an empirical study that 
confirmed the fact that users employed different internet communication services at the same time which reduces 
the potential for entry barriers to arise. For a further discussion of this issue, see I. GRAEF, "Sneak preview of the 
future application of European competition law on the Internet?: Cisco and Messagenet", Common Market Law 
Review 2014, vol. 51, no. 4, (1263), p. 1275-1276. 
207
 Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, par. 135. 
208
 Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, par. 132. 
209
 Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, par. 109-111. 
210
 Case COMP/C-3/39.530 – Microsoft (tying), 16 December 2009, par. 48. 
59 
 
because contrary to the latter situations ‘there are no technical or economic constraints which 
prevent users from downloading several communications applications on their operating 
device, especially as the software concerned is free, easy to download and takes up little 
space on their hard drives’.211 In fact, the General Court thus did not distinguish the 
Microsoft/Skype merger from previous cases but countered earlier findings of the Commission 
that switching does not occur even if the software is available by way of a free download.
212
 
Nevertheless, a market study referred to by the Commission in its Microsoft/Skype decision 
confirmed that consumers use different communications services at the same time, while the 
majority of both consumers and enterprises using Internet Explorer did not download other 
web browsers at the time of adoption of the commitment decision in 2009.
213
 Instead of 
pretending that the factual scenarios in the markets for client PC operating systems and 
consumer communications services were different, the General Court could have argued that 
the studies showed that the situation has altered and users have apparently become better 
informed and more experienced in downloading and installing software. This would have 
made the General Court’s analysis more credible.214  
POSSIBLE CAUSE OF DIFFERING CONCLUSIONS AS TO EXISTENCE OF ENTRY BARRIERS - In 
Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission seems to distinguish the factual situations in the 
markets for client PC operating systems in 2009 and consumer communications apps in 2014 
by noting that neither Facebook Messenger nor WhatsApp are pre-installed on a large basis of 
handsets while Microsoft tied Internet Explorer to its PC operating system. By referring to its 
2009 Microsoft commitment decision targeting the latter practice, the Commission claimed 
that: ‘[s]oftware pre-installation can make switching more difficult, in view of users' inertia 
which leads to the so-called "status quo bias"’. Because users have to actively download both 
Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp, the Commission considered that they are more likely to 
actively download a competing consumer communications app.
215
 While the stance towards 
switching costs and network effects thus seems to have changed in the Microsoft/Skype and 
Facebook/WhatsApp cases, Commission officials still refer to network economy 
characteristics in speeches for their potential to protect the position of incumbents and to raise 
barriers to entry. To counter claims that there is no need for antitrust intervention in high-tech 
markets on the ground that the rapid pace of technological innovation would make entrenched 
positions of market power impossible to maintain, former Director-General for Competition 
Italianer stated: ‘In reality, these markets may often have characteristics which actually 
increase the likelihood of entrenched market power over time. These could for instance be 
network effects, sunk costs, tipping, lock-in and so on’. In particular, he argued that network 
effects may act as barriers to entry and can also lead to the tipping of the market in favour of 
one player or technology which has reached a critical mass.
216
 The former Commissioner for 
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Competition noted in a similar fashion that features such as economies of scale and network 
effects ‘make it easier for companies to become gatekeepers in their respective markets than 
it is in the brick-and-mortar economy - and by ‘gatekeeper’ I mean a specific type of 
dominant firm which holds a strategic position along the value chain’.217 The fact that 
contradicting outcomes are often reached with regard to the issue of whether the existence of 
network economy characteristics in a market give rise to entry barriers may be caused by the 
context in which these features are analysed. In this regard, it seems particularly relevant 
whether a case is examined under the merger review procedure or under the prohibition of 
abuse of dominance. Mergers are assessed ex ante as a result of which the existence of 
network effects and switching costs may be considered less problematic because of the 
unknown pace of an innovation cycle. Abuse of dominance cases, to the contrary, require the 
Commission to analyse markets in a backward-looking manner. Previous findings about 
network effects or switching costs as a source of entry barriers in the context of merger cases 
may therefore not be automatically transposed to abuse of dominance proceedings involving 
the same market.
218
 
USER DATA AS ENTRY BARRIER - The entry barriers that may be found in social networks, 
search engines and e-commerce platforms have a different nature than those playing a role in 
earlier competition cases. Whereas the barriers to entry in the abovementioned 2004 and 2009 
Microsoft decisions resulted from technological blocking and tying, the entry barriers in 
online platforms have an informational character.
219
 By accumulating information about the 
behaviour and interests of users, online platform providers are able to improve their services 
to users in the form of more relevant search results, social interactions and purchase 
recommendations as well as to advertisers in the form of better targeted ads. The amount and 
variety of user data to which incumbent social networks, search engines and e-commerce 
platforms have access may constitute a barrier to entry for potential competitors.
220
 However, 
due to diminishing returns to scale, the value of having additional user data may decline at a 
certain point. The strength of the entry barrier would then depend on the volume of 
information at which the benefits of additional data begin to decline. If the benefits of extra 
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information start to diminish only at a very high amount of data, large volumes of information 
can give a competitive advantage to a leading platform. In such circumstances, control of the 
largest share of user data may contribute to dominance.
221
 Whether the volume of data to 
which an incumbent has access gives rise to an entry barrier is subject to controversy. 
Opponents claim that new entrants do not need to have access to a large quantity of data in 
order to compete effectively, because data is widely available, has a non-rivalrous nature 
(which means that collecting data from some users does not prevent other companies from 
collecting identical data from the same users; also as a result of user multi-homing), the cost 
of data collection and analysis is very low and the competitive success of online platforms is 
driven by more than the amount of user data collected.
222
 Nevertheless, if the information 
necessary to compete on equal footing is not readily available to new entrants, the amount of 
user data collected by incumbent online platforms may constitute an entry barrier.
223
 Whether 
data gives rise to a barrier to entry thus depends on the circumstances of the case which 
means that it cannot be excluded at the outset that user data constitutes an entry barrier. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL AND INFORMATIONAL ENTRY BARRIERS - The 
different character of the entry barriers can also be seen from the policy that social network 
providers such as Facebook pursue. Contrary to Microsoft which was fined by the 
Commission in 2004 for not giving competitors access to its technology necessary to develop 
complementary applications, Facebook gives developers free and open access to its 
application programming interfaces. With regard to the ability of third parties to get access to 
user data, Facebook’s policy is more restrictive as its general conditions prohibit other 
websites from acquiring users’ content and information on its platform.224 In addition to the 
aggregation of user data, the lack of data and advertising portability may lead to obstacles to 
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market entry for new firms.
225
 If users and advertisers cannot bring their data or advertising 
campaigns with them when moving to another provider, they may find it too cumbersome to 
switch and become locked-in to the provider that they decided to join first. As evidenced by 
the statements in the Microsoft/Skype and Facebook/WhatsApp merger cases, the potential 
entry barriers in markets for online services are considered to be of a less durable character 
than the technological barriers identified in the market for PC operating systems. The 
significance of barriers to entry in the market for social networks, search engines and e-
commerce platforms is therefore dependent on whether they present a lasting competitive 
advantage for the incumbent providers. Irrespective of the existence of inherent barriers to 
entry that are intrinsic to the nature of the market in which providers of online platforms 
operate, firms may deliberately raise entry barriers by creating switching costs for users and 
advertisers, or by preventing competitors from gathering user data through exclusivity 
contracts with users and advertisers. According to the competition concerns identified by the 
European Commission in its Google investigation, Google allegedly engaged in both types of 
behaviour vis-à-vis advertisers by restricting the portability of advertising campaigns and by 
de facto obliging third party websites to obtain all or most of their online search 
advertisements from Google.
226
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
BUSINESS MODELS AND FUNCTIONALITIES - Search engines and social networks employ a 
similar business model. Providers of both types of online platforms offer users access to their 
services free of charge and fund their platforms by way of advertising. E-commerce platforms 
still mainly rely on revenues from transaction fees although advertising is becoming an 
increasing source of income. While the three types of platforms have different functionalities, 
there is a trend towards convergence. For example, Bing has integrated social networking 
features in its search results and Facebook has introduced a search functionality in its social 
network. Furthermore, e-commerce platforms may also be considered vertical search engines 
on the ground that buyers use services like Amazon Marketplace and eBay as places to look 
for products they are interested in purchasing.  
MULTI-SIDEDNESS - As intermediaries between users and advertisers, online platforms can be 
regarded as multi-sided platforms. However, the advertising-based media industry is a 
peculiar type of multi-sided business considering that users may not always positively value 
the presence of advertisers on the other side of the market. Nevertheless, under prevailing 
economic theory advertising-based media qualify as multi-sided businesses because 
advertisers benefit from the interaction with users. On e-commerce platforms, users are more 
likely to appreciate advertising as they are looking to purchase relevant products and services. 
While users on search engines and social networks may not be interested in the display of 
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advertisements, the fact that advertisers finance the respective platforms may give rise to a 
positive multi-sided network effect exerted by advertisers on users.  
NETWORK ECONOMY FEATURES - With regard to the network economy characteristics of online 
platforms, there is discussion about the extent to which one-sided network effects and 
switching costs are present in search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms. The 
issue that is of importance is whether these features give rise to entry barriers in the specific 
circumstances of a case. The informational nature distinguishes the potential entry barriers in 
online platforms from the ones found in previous competition cases which had a technological 
character.  
CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPETITION ANALYSIS - The multi-sided nature and the presence of 
network economy features may affect the way competition assessments have to be conducted 
on online platforms. By forming part of a rapidly changing environment, innovation also 
plays an important role in the markets in which search engines, social networks and e-
commerce platforms operate. This raises questions about the relationship between 
competition and innovation in dynamic markets including the internet. 
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3 Evaluating the link between competition and innovation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
ROLE OF INNOVATION ON ONLINE PLATFORMS - While price is still the predominant parameter 
for competition, in rapidly developing sectors such as the online intermediary industry 
competition is typically taking place on the basis of the level of innovation. Because users get 
access to most internet services including search engines, social networks and e-commerce 
platforms free of charge, they choose their provider based on aspects other than price such as 
quality and innovation.
227
 For these reasons, it is particularly important in this sector to 
consider to what extent competition law interventions affect the level of innovation by 
changing market conditions.  
THEORIES ON INNOVATION - Although it is widely accepted that competition creates incentives 
for undertakings to continue to attract customers by keeping prices low, the relationship 
between competition and innovation is not that uncontroversial. In the 20
th
 century, two 
divergent views emerged in the economic literature on the impact of market structure on 
innovation incentives. While Schumpeter argued that monopolies favour innovation, Arrow 
expressed the opposing view that competition is good for innovation. More recently, Aghion 
established a non-linear model for measuring innovation incentives according to which an 
increase in the level of competition at a certain level starts to diminish innovation. 
TYPES OF INNOVATION AND COMPETITION - Undertakings in the online intermediary sector 
often do not compete by lowering their prices but by introducing products and services that 
create a new market. In this context, two types of innovation and competition are 
distinguished in economic and business literature.  
OUTLINE - Section 2 discusses how the level of competition and innovation can be measured 
and how accurate currently used indicators of these phenomena are. This is followed by an 
analysis of economic theory and empirical studies on the causal relationship between market 
structure and innovation in section 3. In section 4, different forms of innovation and 
competition are described as well as their significance in dynamic sectors including the online 
intermediary industry. 
 
3.2 Measuring competition and innovation  
PROXIES - Before the relationship between competition and innovation can be discussed, 
attention has to be paid to the way both concepts are measured. In economic and empirical 
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research, proxies are used to quantify competition and innovation. The existence of a strong 
and reliable link between the proxy and the concept that is measured is vital.
228
 
INDICATORS OF COMPETITION - Several proxies can be used to measure the level of 
competition in a market. Indicators that are often relied upon include market shares, firm size, 
market concentration and the price-cost margin. Market concentration is measured by the so-
called Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which is calculated by squaring the market share of each 
firm in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. The outcome of the calculation 
ranges from 0 to 1 (or from 0 to 10,000 if whole percentages are used), moving from a large 
number of equally sized firms to a monopolist. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index increases 
both as the number of undertakings in the market drops and as the difference in size between 
those firms grows.
229
 Price-cost margin is also referred to as the Lerner Index and is typically 
used as an indicator of market power. The price-cost margin is the difference between price 
and marginal cost as a function of price ([P-MC]/P) and ranges from 0 to 1 with higher 
numbers implying greater market power. The larger the difference between price and 
marginal cost, the greater the degree of market power. Under the Lerner Index, the price in a 
perfectly competitive market equals marginal cost resulting in no market power and a price-
cost margin of 0.
230
 As opposed to the price cost margin, market shares and market 
concentration rely more directly on a particular definition of the geographic and product 
market.
231
 The main problem with the application of the price-cost margin is that it may be 
hard to find information about the costs of firms in the market. In addition, the theoretical 
foundations of the price-cost margin as a competition measure are not robust in the sense that 
models can be identified where more intense competition leads to a higher instead of a lower 
price-cost margin.
232
 The Boone indicator aims to address this issue by establishing a 
relationship between relative profit differences and efficiency. The idea underlying the Boone 
indicator is that competition enhances the performance of efficient firms and impairs the 
performance of inefficient firms which is reflected in their respective profits. In other words, 
more intense competition leads to a reallocation of output to more efficient firms which 
changes the relationships between the profitability of market players.
233
 The discussed proxies 
may give an indication of the level of competition in the market. Nevertheless, it has to be 
noted that markets in which only a couple of firms are active can be highly competitive 
whereas competition can be weak in markets with a lot of players.
234
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INDICATORS OF INNOVATION - R&D investment and patent activity are most commonly used 
as indicators of innovation. It is difficult to design a single indicator capturing all the different 
aspects that have an impact on innovation. Patent activity signals technological progress, but 
not all patents are brought to the market and lead to new products. Similarly, the amount of 
R&D investment may indicate the importance that market players attach to innovation, but it 
does not capture the effects or the success rate of the innovation activities in the economy.
235
 
R&D expenditure is an input to innovation that does not directly lead to innovative output. In 
other words, higher investment in R&D does not automatically translate into more innovation 
output.
236
 Often, a combination of several proxies is used in economic studies to make the 
analysis more accurate. In their model that is discussed below, Aghion et al. measured 
innovation by looking at the average number of patents acquired by firms in the industry 
weighed by the number of times each patent has been cited by another patent.
237
 Nevertheless, 
the fact remains that such indicators rather point to inventive activity which may or may not 
translate into innovation. 
INNOVATION PERFORMANCE OF THE EU - The European Commission measures the innovation 
performance of the different Member States of the European Union in order to assess the 
strength and weaknesses of each country’s research and innovation system.238 The method 
that the Commission uses in its yearly Innovation Union Scoreboard shows the complexity of 
measuring innovation. The measurement framework, referred to as the Summary Innovation 
Index, consists of three types of main indicators which are each composed of several so-called 
innovation dimensions which in their turn include a total of twenty-five different factors. For 
the main indicators a distinction is made between ‘enablers’ that constitute the basic building 
blocks for innovation to take place (including human resources, open, excellent and attractive 
research systems as well as finance and support), ‘firm activities’ which capture the 
innovation efforts at the level of the firm (including firm investments, linkages and 
entrepreneurship as well as intellectual assets) and ‘outputs’ which cover the effects of the 
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innovation activities of firms on the economy as a whole (including innovators and economic 
effects such as employment).
239
  
INNOVATION OUTPUT - In September 2013, the Commission introduced a new indicator that 
focuses solely on innovation output and that complements the Innovation Union Scoreboard 
and the Summary Innovation Index. This new indicator consists of four components that are 
chosen for their policy relevance. The first component is technological innovation as 
measured by patents. Patents are a crucial form of output of R&D investment and therefore 
show the ability of an economy to transfer knowledge into technology. Secondly, regard is 
had to the employment in knowledge-intensive activities as a percentage of total employment. 
This component captures the structural orientation of a country towards knowledge-intensive 
activities. The third component is the competitiveness of knowledge-intensive goods and 
services and is measured by aggregating ‘in equal weights the contribution of the trade 
balance of high-tech and medium-tech products to the total trade balance, and knowledge-
intensive services as a share of the total services exports’. This factor reflects the ability of 
the economy to export innovative products and to participate in global trade. The last 
component is formed by the employment in fast-growing firms of innovative sectors. 
According to studies, growth depends to a large extent upon fast-growing firms that generate 
a disproportionally share of jobs and contribute to increased innovation investments during 
economic recessions.
240
 The new indicator thus combines several proxies that relate to the 
output of innovation activities.  
RELIABILITY OF THE INDICATORS - Although there seems to be a relatively well-developed 
method for calculating the total rate of innovation in a country, it continues to be very hard to 
find reliable proxies for measuring the level of innovation in a particular industry or market. 
According to Gilbert, a complete analysis of the factors that influence innovation activity 
requires ‘estimates of the expected values of discoveries and data on the R&D activities of all 
potential innovators’. Since innovations often originate from unexpected sources such as 
firms in unrelated industries and even from individual inventions, it is very hard to detect all 
the potential sources of innovation.
241
 With regard to indicators for competition, Gilbert 
argues that ‘competition depends on the levels and industry distribution of firm costs, 
qualities, and brand recognition, on barriers to entry, on characteristics of demand, and on 
whatever animal spirits might motivate managers’.242 Proxies such as market shares, market 
concentration and price-cost margin may therefore not be able to capture all the different 
factors that influence the level of competition in a market. While economic scholarship is still 
in search for appropriate indicators that unambiguously quantify the rate of competition and 
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innovation in an industry, a combination of several proxies for the measurement of each 
phenomenon seems to be the best approach for now.  
 
3.3 Economic theory and empirical evidence on the relationship between competition 
and innovation 
Underlying the discussion in economics about the significance of market structure for 
innovation is the presumption that more innovation is beneficial for society. In the European 
Union, the alleged importance of innovation for economic growth is apparent from the role 
that innovation plays in the Europe 2020 strategy ‘for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’.243 One of the flagship initiatives of this strategy is the so-called Innovation Union 
which aims at improving ‘framework conditions and access to finance for research and 
innovation so as to ensure that innovative ideas can be turned into products and services that 
create growth and jobs’.244 Innovation is seen as one of the main drivers of economic growth 
in the European Union. Economic research confirms that R&D investment leads to 
productivity growth. Studies also show that the benefits of innovation to society are higher 
than the benefits to the firms that invest in R&D.
245
 Innovation concerns are high on the 
agenda of competition authorities,
246
 although the relationship between competition and 
innovation is not clear-cut. 
 
3.3.1 Schumpeter 
MONOPOLY FAVOURS INNOVATION - The debate in the economic literature about the 
relationship between market structure and innovation dates back to the view attributed to 
Joseph Schumpeter that monopolies benefit innovation and that perfect competition is not 
necessarily the best market structure for stimulating R&D investment.
247
 Schumpeter argued 
that monopolistic prices are not always higher and monopoly outputs smaller than competitive 
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prices and outputs, because certain advantages only occur on the monopoly level. In his 
opinion, superior methods are available to the monopolist ‘because monopolization may 
increase the sphere of influence of the better, and decrease the sphere of influence of the 
inferior, brains, or because the monopoly enjoys a disproportionately higher financial 
standing’.248 In other words, monopolies have more funding for R&D investment and have 
greater incentives to innovate, since they have a better prospect of reaping the benefits from 
inventions. In case several competitors implement a new technology, the benefits resulting 
from the invention have to be shared which may reduce each firm’s future incentives to 
innovate. In addition, Schumpeter stated that a monopoly can only be retained ‘by alertness 
and energy’ because of the pressure of potential entry of competitors introducing improved 
products in the market. Due to this pressure, the monopolist would continue to innovate and 
the price would move towards or even beyond the competitive price.
249
 Schumpeter used the 
Aluminum Company of America as an example of a monopoly that kept innovating to retain 
its position. From 1890 to 1929, the price of its product, corrected for inflation, fell to 8.8 per 
cent, while its output increased from 30 metric tons to 103,400. In Schumpeter’s view, 
competing firms would have been about equally successful.
250
 
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION - Schumpeter is also well-known for characterising capitalism as an 
evolutionary process or a ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’ in which old technologies 
are replaced by new ones. He derived the term creative destruction from the work of Karl 
Marx and presented it as an economic theory on innovation. In Schumpeter’s view, creative 
destruction is a process that ‘incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one’.251 Schumpeter did not 
regard perfect competition, under which firms produce homogeneous goods and do not have 
any influence on the price, as the most important type of competition. He argued that what 
counts is ‘competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of 
supply, the new type of organization’. This type of competition leading to creative destruction 
‘commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and […] strikes not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and at their very lives’. It 
forms an ever-present threat that ‘disciplines before it attacks’ and that is as effective ‘as a 
bombardment in comparison with forcing a door’.252 
 
3.3.2 Arrow 
COMPETITION FAVOURS INNOVATION - In 1962, Kenneth Arrow put forward a different vision 
entailing that competition rather than monopoly promotes innovation. He explained that the 
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incentive to innovate has to be assessed by comparing the potential profits from an invention 
with the costs. The economic model that Arrow established showed that incentives to 
innovate are less in monopolistic than in competitive markets, because the monopolist already 
benefits from profits without investing in R&D. Unlike an innovating competitor, a 
monopolist that innovates bears the cost of foregoing the monopoly profits it can continue to 
earn when it decides not to invest in R&D. According to Arrow, a firm in a competitive 
market has more incentives to innovate, because it has more to gain from innovation. Instead, 
the monopolist jeopardises its established profit flow by innovating. As Steve Jobs, co-
founder and former CEO of Apple, once said in an interview: ‘what’s the point of focusing on 
making the product even better when the only company you can take business away from is 
yourself?’253 In Arrow’s view, the only valid ground for arguing that a monopolistic market 
structure creates superior incentives to innovate is that a monopolist may be better able to 
capture the benefits of innovation due to its stable position on the market. However, the 
incentives to innovate resulting from the better appropriability opportunities have to be offset 
against the monopolist’s disincentive to innovate resulting from giving up the monopoly 
profits that it can continue to earn without innovating. Arrow argued that on balance, the 
competitive incentive to innovate always exceeds the monopolist’s incentive.254 The 
limitation on the monopolist’s incentive to innovate is also referred to as the ‘replacement 
effect’, since the monopolist accelerates its own replacement instead of developing a new 
business by innovating.
255
 The replacement effect will be strongest when the new technology 
completely substitutes the old one and when the monopolist does not expect a new entrant 
coming to the market.
256
  
PRE-EMPTION - Arrow’s replacement effect may be outweighed by the incentive of a 
monopolist to invest in R&D in order to pre-empt the entry of potential competitors. The 
incentive of the monopolist to pre-empt is the profit that it would lose if a rival successfully 
enters the market.
257
 If the incentive of the monopolist to pre-empt is stronger than the 
replacement effect, Arrow’s vision that competition leads to more innovation than monopoly 
does not hold.
258
 However, uncertainty about the probability of success of rivals to enter the 
market may undermine the pre-emption incentive of a monopolist.
259
 The monopolist has no 
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incentive to pre-empt if there is a large probability that competitors will not be able to gain 
any market share.
260
   
 
3.3.3 Aghion 
INVERTED-U MODEL - Both Schumpeter and Arrow assumed that there is a linear relationship 
between market structure and innovation implying that the two variables increase or decrease 
proportionally to each other. When this linear relationship is plotted in a graph, a straight line 
is visible. Following Scherer
261
 and Levin et al.
262
 who allowed nonlinearities in the 
relationship between competition and innovation and discovered the existence of an inverted-
U shape, Aghion et al. developed an inverted-U model according to which more competition 
initially leads to an increase in the level of innovation until the optimal point is reached 
beyond which additional competition has a chilling effect on innovation. Evidence for this 
theoretical model was found in empirical data. The data also provided support for the 
statement that the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation becomes 
steeper, the smaller the technological distance between competitors in an industry.
263
 Contrary 
to Schumpeter’s model which assumes that innovation overturns existing market structures, 
Aghion et al. adopt a form of step-by-step innovation in which a technological laggard cannot 
leapfrog the existing leader in the industry, but must first catch up with the current leader 
before it can try to take technological leadership itself. In addition, Aghion et al. assume that 
each industry is characterised by duopoly instead of monopolistic competition.
264
  
ESCAPE COMPETITION - Aghion et al. draw attention to the ‘escape-competition effect’ that in 
their view occurs in ‘neck-and-neck sectors’ where firms operating at similar technological 
levels are encouraged to innovate in order to acquire a lead over their rival. In these 
industries, more competition may reduce the profits of a firm in case it decides not to innovate 
(pre-innovation rents) by more than it reduces the profits if the firm decides to invest in 
innovation (post-innovation rents). In sectors where innovations are introduced by laggard 
firms which are always one step behind the leader in an industry, the rate of innovation will 
decrease as more competition evolves in the view of Aghion et al.. Additional competition in 
these sectors will mainly affect the post-innovation rents of the laggard firm which first has to 
catch up with the leader in its sector and go through the less profitable neck-and-neck stage 
before it can become a leader itself. Aghion et al. refer to this phenomenon as the 
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‘Schumpeterian effect’.265 In a later article, Aghion et al. have specifically examined the 
effect of the threat of entry on the innovation incentives of an incumbent firm. In their 
empirical model, they found that depending on the distance from the ‘technological frontier’, 
the threat of entry either spurs or discourages innovation. In sectors close to the frontier, the 
threat of entry encourages innovation because the incumbents know ‘that they can escape and 
survive entry by innovating successfully, and so they react with more intensive innovation 
activities aimed at escaping the threat’. In so-called laggard industries that are further behind 
the technological frontier, the threat of entry discourages innovation since ‘incumbents have 
no hope to win against an entrant’.266 This would suggest that dynamic markets, which are 
usually close to the technological frontier, are likely to experience an increase in the level of 
innovation as a result of a threat of entry.
267
  
 
3.3.4 Appraisal 
SOME CONCLUSIONS - Although the economic literature discussed above has led to opposing 
views which makes it difficult to reach strong conclusions on the relationship between market 
structure and innovation, it is possible to make some general remarks. Gilbert identifies a few 
conditions under which the economic theory discussed above supports the proposition that 
competition, instead of monopoly, is more likely to benefit innovation. First, if intense 
competition in the old product exists, the pre-innovation profit of a firm will be lower which 
in turn increases its incentive to innovate, since it does not have a high and stable profit flow 
that it will forego by innovating (the escape-competition effect). Secondly, if the innovation 
makes the old technology obsolete, the monopolist’s gain from innovation does not exceed 
the gain to a new competitor.
268
 The innovation is such a major improvement that a new 
market is established on which the innovator will be a monopolist as the only provider of the 
new technology.
269
 The third factor that is of importance in Gilbert’s view is the extent to 
which the monopolist can price discriminate among consumers after innovating. It is more 
attractive for a monopolist to work on a new technology if it will be able to price discriminate 
by offering both its old and new product. However, if price discrimination is not likely, 
Arrow’s replacement effect suggests that a competitive market structure rather than a 
monopoly benefits innovation. Lastly, if market conditions make pre-emption unlikely for 
example due to the existence of alternative R&D paths that the incumbent cannot foreclose, a 
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monopolist will not have an incentive to innovate in order to pre-empt the market entry of 
rivals.
270
 
SOME PRINCIPLES - Similarly, Baker has formulated four principles that relate the level of 
innovation in an industry to the extent to which competition takes place in the market. The 
first principle states that competition in innovation, that is defined as ‘competition among 
firms seeking to develop the same new product or process’ encourages innovation. According 
to this principle, firms in a race to innovate try harder to win. The second principle entails that 
‘competition among rivals producing an existing product encourages those firms to find ways 
to lower costs, improve quality, or develop better products’. This is a translation of the 
finding of Aghion et al. that investment in innovation may allow firms to escape competition. 
However, if firms do not expect to escape competition by innovating but rather believe to be 
subject to more competition, they have less incentive to innovate. This forms the third 
principle. The fourth principle involves the incentive of a firm to pre-empt the entry of rivals. 
According to this principle, ‘a firm will have an extra incentive to innovate if in doing so it 
can discourage potential rivals from investing in R&D’. In this situation, the firm not only 
benefits from its investments by introducing new or better products, but also by discouraging 
potential rivals from innovating.
271
  
INNOVATION INCENTIVES - The existence of incentives to innovate at the side of market 
players is vital for innovation to take place. An innovation incentive can be defined as ‘the 
difference in profit that a firm can earn if it invests in R&D compared to what it would earn if 
it did not invest’.272 Since the scope of an innovation incentive depends on many factors that 
sometimes have opposing effects, it is hard to predict how an incentive will be affected by a 
certain development or intervention, for example on the basis of competition law, in the 
market. Against the background of the economic theory, Gilbert has identified four factors 
that influence the existence of innovation incentives: (1) the profit that can be gained from 
innovation in the form of selling a new product, (2) the existing profit that is eliminated by 
innovating (Arrow’s replacement effect), (3) the reduction of competition that occurs when a 
firm is able to differentiate its products or lower its production costs by innovating (Aghion’s 
escape-the-competition effect) and (4) the possibility to pre-empt competition by deterring 
rivals from entering the market. As the incentive to pre-empt can offset Arrow’s replacement 
effect, the second and fourth factor point in opposite directions. The exact scope of the 
innovation incentive depends on the extent to which each of the four factors are present in the 
specific technological and market conditions.
273
 For instance, robust intellectual property 
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protection may increase the strength of the first factor, since an innovator will be better able 
to capture the benefits from introducing new products.
274
 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH - The economic theories put forward by Schumpeter, Arrow and others 
have been tested in numerous empirical studies.
275
 Although early studies confirmed the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis that the level of innovation tends to be larger in concentrated 
industries, in later and more refined statistical analyses this observation did not hold true.
276
 
Several problems can be identified from which the early empirical studies suffered such as 
failure to control for other factors that may influence innovation incentives and failure to take 
into account the differences in technological opportunities and appropriability across 
industries.
277
 For reaching a reliable conclusion on the link between competition and 
innovation, the effect of competition has to be isolated. In some industries, technological 
possibilities may be greater or firms may have better guarantees that they are protected from 
competition after innovating because of, for example, broad and strong intellectual property 
rights.
278
 Although later studies including the inverted-U model of Aghion et al. have tried to 
address these problems, it remains difficult to control for differences in industry 
characteristics and for factors other than competition that may affect innovation.
279
 According 
to Gilbert, an ideal way to test the effect of competition on innovation ‘would be a natural 
experiment in which external and unforeseen events cause a discrete change in the extent of 
competition in an industry with no other consequences for other determinants of innovation, 
such as technological opportunity or appropriability’.280 However, in his view none of the 
available studies in the literature entirely isolate the influence of factors other than changes in 
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competition.
281
 The empirical literature remains ambiguous and therefore it is difficult to 
make strong conclusions about the effect of competition on innovation.
282
  
ATTEMPTS TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND - Even though the economic and empirical literature on 
the link between market structure and innovation is not conclusive, there have been attempts 
to find a middle ground between Schumpeter and Arrow as the two main schools of thought. 
Motta argued in this regard that an environment ‘where there exists some competition but also 
high enough market power coming from the innovative activities, might be the most conducive 
to R&D output’.283 Another attempt to reconcile the divergent views in economic theory has 
been made by Shapiro who maintained that the perspectives of Schumpeter and Arrow are 
‘fully compatible and mutually reinforcing’.284 In particular, he argued that there is no need 
for a universal theory of the relationship between competition and innovation as far as 
competition policy is concerned. To this end, he offered three principles on which 
Schumpeter and Arrow converge in his view: (1) the contestability principle according to 
which the prospect of gaining or protecting profitable sales by providing greater value to 
customers spurs innovation; (2) the appropriability principle which states that increased 
appropriability spurs innovation; and (3) the synergies principle according to which 
combining complementary assets enhances innovation capabilities and thus spurs 
innovation.
285
 Following Shapiro, the views of Schumpeter and Arrow could be brought 
together by making a distinction between an ex-post and ex-ante perspective on innovation 
incentives. While Schumpeter focuses on the ex-post perspective by arguing that firms will 
only invest if they can expect to appropriate the benefits resulting from their innovations, 
Arrow focuses on the ex-ante perspective by asking himself what the best environment to 
promote innovation is and suggests that it is in a competitive environment that firms innovate 
more. Against this background, Director-General for Competition Laitenberger argued that 
‘as long as competition policy does not negatively affect equitable appropriability – for 
instance, as long as it respects IPRs – it will be compatible with both Arrow and 
Schumpeter’.286 
NO GENERAL LINK - What can be concluded from the review of the economic theory and 
empirical research on the interaction between competition and innovation is that there is no 
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universal theory of the relationship between competition and innovation and, consequently, 
no optimal market structure for stimulating innovation across the economy or even within a 
specific industry sector.
287
 The economic and empirical literature does not provide support for 
a conclusion that monopoly is beneficial for innovation as Schumpeter put forward. At the 
same time, there is no support for the finding of Arrow that a competitive market structure 
favours innovation. Although a plea for a case-by-case assessment may not come as a 
surprise, it is still worth emphasising that no general conclusion can be made on the 
appropriate way to relate innovation to market structure.
288
 The only general assumption that 
can be made for a sector is that there is room for competition enforcement in limited 
circumstances. Because of the absence of a clear link between market structure and 
innovation, the establishment of a competitive market in itself may not necessarily benefit the 
level of innovation in an industry. Nevertheless, it should also be accepted that competition 
policy can be essential for fostering innovation in certain circumstances.
289
  
 
3.4 Different types of innovation 
In new economy markets, innovation should not only be considered for assessing the effects 
of competition enforcement on society but also for determining the extent to and how market 
participants compete. In rapidly developing industries, which include online platforms, 
innovation has become the main parameter of competition. It is in these sectors that firms 
compete by creating products that overthrow or disrupt established market structures. 
 
3.4.1 Disruptive versus sustaining innovation 
EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE - The concept of disruptive innovation has been introduced in 
the business literature by Bower & Christensen who used it to explain why leading companies 
often fail to stay at the top of their industry when technologies or markets change.
290
 They 
make a distinction between two types of technological innovations: sustaining and disruptive 
technologies. Sustaining technologies present some level of improvement of an existing 
product but retain the aspects of the product that customers value. For example, in the disk-
drive industry sustaining technologies concerned technical measures that increased the storage 
capacity of hard disks.
291
 Sustaining technologies can be either of an incremental nature or 
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have a breakthrough or radical character. Both types concern improvements of established 
products that do not affect existing markets. An incremental innovation is an improvement of 
a product in ways that customers expect, while a discontinuous or radical innovation is 
unexpected but nevertheless does not affect established markets.
292
 Disruptive technologies 
have features that differ from the ones that mainstream customers value and often perform 
worse in at least one dimension that is particularly important for these customers. An example 
that Bower & Christensen mention is the introduction of the transistor radio that had inferior 
sound quality but offered new features such as small size, light weight and portability that 
eventually led to the establishment of a new market for small and portable radios.
293
 An 
important characteristic of a disruptive technology is that the aspects of the new product that 
customers do value improve at such a rapid rate that the new technology permeates 
established markets. Products based on disruptive technologies have features that initially 
only a few customers value. Often, they are cheaper, simpler and more convenient to use.
294
 
For example, the reason why personal computers have replaced mainframe-computers is not 
because of their superior technical performance but because personal computers started to 
meet the needs of most customers. The same has happened with the introduction of tablets 
and smartphones relying on internet services and mobile applications that are gradually 
overtaking the market for personal computer hardware and software.  
INCREMENTAL, BREAKTHROUGH OR RADICAL INNOVATION ALL RELATE TO THE TERM 
SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGY - It is important to stress that the term ‘sustaining technology’ as 
used by Christensen does not merely refer to the concept of incremental innovation. Similarly, 
Christensen’s notion of ‘disruptive technology’ cannot be equated with breakthrough or 
radical innovation. Both incremental and breakthrough or radical innovation fall within the 
category of sustaining technology as described by Christensen. The disruptiveness that 
Christensen refers to concerns a specific form of disruption that affects established markets. 
While the concepts of incremental and breakthrough or radical innovation refer to 
technological progress and qualify the innovation with respect to the prior state of the art (an 
improvement of a product versus an unexpected and significant technological change), the 
notions of sustaining and disruptive technologies rather refer to the relationship between the 
innovation and the value network around it. In this perspective, a sustaining technology 
develops within the value network, whereas a disruptive technology comes from outside the 
value network and displaces it.
295
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WHY LEADING COMPANIES FAIL - Bower & Christensen show that established companies do 
invest in the development of new technologies, but only as long as they address the needs of 
their existing customers. Since disruptive technologies initially do not meet the demands of 
mainstream customers, leading companies do not invest in the development of these 
technologies. At the time of their introduction, disruptive technologies only appeal to small or 
emerging markets and therefore look financially unattractive for established companies due to 
the low profit margins that are not sufficient to compensate their high cost structures. Because 
established companies are inclined to stay close to their existing customers, they do not 
sufficiently track the emergence of disruptive technologies that may attack their position in 
the market in the future. Furthermore, leading companies tend to innovate faster than the 
needs of their customers evolve so that many undertakings eventually provide products or 
services that are too sophisticated or expensive for most of their customers. By introducing 
sustaining technologies in the higher tiers of their markets, leading companies create space for 
disruptive technologies to emerge at the bottom of the market. At the point mainstream 
customers become interested in the disruptive technology, it is often already too late for the 
established companies to catch up. The new entrants will overtake the existing market and 
dominate the new market for the disruptive technology.
296
 
TWO TYPES OF DISRUPTION - In his later book that he co-authored with Raynor, Christensen 
changed the term ‘disruptive technology’ to ‘disruptive innovation’ arguing that it was not the 
technology itself that was disruptive but rather the use that companies made of it, or in other 
words the innovation that companies pursued by incorporating the new technology.
297
 
Christensen and Raynor also specified that there are actually two different types of disruption: 
low-end and new-market disruption. Low-end disruption attacks customers that do not need 
the high level of performance offered by established firms in the market. New-market 
disruption does not target existing customers, but competes against non-consumption and has 
to attract new customers that have not owned or used the prior generation of products or 
services. An example of new-market disruption is the introduction of the personal computer 
that enabled individuals to operate a computer system themselves, rather than relying on 
mainframe-systems that could only be used by skilled people. As the performance of the new-
market disruption improves, at a certain point in time it will become good enough to attract 
customers.
298
     
 
3.4.2 Appraisal 
MARKET CYCLES - According to the business literature discussed above, every market cycle 
ends with the introduction of a disruptive innovation leading to the creation of a new market 
that renders the existing market obsolete. In the new market, sustaining innovations will be 
introduced in the higher ends of the market until a new disruptive innovation comes up at the 
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bottom of the market that will once again overturn the existing market. Even though the 
process described by Christensen is more complicated than the linear process that Schumpeter 
had in mind, it has some similarities with the latter’s notion of creative destruction according 
to which old technologies are constantly displaced by new ones that change the entire market 
structure. In new economy markets, competition often takes place by way of creative 
destruction. Previous champions in the ICT sector have been driven out of the market by new 
firms that introduced disruptive innovations. IBM’s leading position in the market for 
mainframe computers has been overturned by Intel’s hardware and Microsoft’s operating 
systems which started to dominate the market for personal computers. In turn, their positions 
are being attacked by providers of tablets and smartphones and by internet companies who 
introduce disruptive innovations in the form of online platforms and applications in mobile 
operating systems. 
COMPETITION IN AND FOR THE MARKET - The introduction of new technologies that displace 
existing markets is commonly referred to as ‘competition for the market’ and contrasted with 
‘competition in the market’ which is the conventional type of competition that takes place in 
established markets.
299
 Competition in the market comprises competition on the basis of price 
and output as well as sustaining innovation which both take place in established markets, 
whereas competition for the market involves disruptive innovation which attacks existing 
market structures and leads to the development of new markets. The latter type of competition 
typically results into a monopoly position that is likely to persist for some time, until a new 
monopolist comes up that overturns the position of the previous incumbent. Although this 
type of competition is not yet well-developed in the literature, it seems that in sectors 
characterised by strong competition for the market, competitive pressure primarily comes 
from subsequent rather than concurrent competitors. The expectation of getting substantial 
market power encourages new entrants to introduce disruptive innovations that may enable 
them to overtake the position of the incumbent. However, if competition for the market is 
strong, market participants may have less incentive to compete within the market which could 
negatively affect product variety and prices.
300
 As shown in the business literature, 
competition in the market tends to come from the leading firms in the market, whereas new 
entrants typically compete for the market. Christensen refers to ‘asymmetric motivation’ as a 
cause for the fact that leading companies usually only introduce sustaining innovations that 
better serve their current customers and thus only compete within the market, while disruptive 
innovation comes from new entrants that compete for the market.
301
 However, the economic 
and empirical literature on the relationship between competition and innovation discussed in 
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the previous section can also explain this phenomenon. Because of the replacement effect, 
leading firms may have less incentive than new entrants to engage in disruptive innovation 
that overturns existing markets and leads established companies to forego existing profit 
flows.
302
  
TRADE-OFF - Although Schumpeter regards competition for the market in the form of creative 
destruction as the most important driver for innovation, competition in the market is vital for 
follow-on innovation. Follow-on innovation or cumulative innovation consists of 
improvements to existing products and would be referred to as sustaining innovation in the 
business literature. A trade-off has to be struck between encouraging competition in and for 
the market which stimulate different types of innovation.
303
 Competition for the market can be 
seen as a form of horizontal competition which involves the development of competing 
products that are mutually substitutable. This type of competition therefore typically results in 
disruptive innovation and the dominance of subsequent successful firms. Instead, competition 
in the market is a form of vertical competition that mainly stimulates follow-on innovation 
and leads to product improvements or complementary products. The two types of competition 
and innovation contribute to societal welfare in a different way. The preference of one model 
over the other therefore amounts to a policy choice. Although subsequent periods of 
dominance may incentivise new innovators to become the new market leader, it is important 
for the price level and product variety that a certain degree of competition in the market is 
also present. This will stimulate the incumbent to continue to innovate in order to keep its 
leading position. Therefore, a careful balance has to be found between the two models.
304
  
SELF-CORRECTING NATURE? - In periods in between races of competition for the market the 
incumbent should be under sufficient competitive pressure from new entrants to prevent it 
from prolonging its dominant position and delaying the entry of subsequent competitors 
contrary to consumer demands. Opponents of competition enforcement in dynamic industries 
claim that competition authorities should not interfere in new economy markets because of 
the temporary character of market power and the risk of deterring innovation in rapidly 
developing sectors.
305
 They argue that the costs from over-enforcement are significantly 
higher than the costs from under-enforcement because the latter costs are mitigated by the 
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self-correcting nature of the market which will bring a new wave of creative destruction 
keeping the market sufficiently competitive.
306
 However, if the incumbent enters into 
exclusionary strategies that postpone or even prevent the next wave of creative destruction 
from ever occurring, competition authorities should intervene. While temporary market power 
itself may not be harmful, practices that enable the incumbent to abuse its position and to 
create a durable form of market power should be avoided.
307
 In order to keep markets 
dynamic, competitive pressure from subsequent monopolists has to be maintained. In other 
words, it is necessary to keep markets contestable in the sense that entry and exit barriers have 
to be low.
308
 In this respect, impediments to innovation resulting from undertakings 
strategically raising entry barriers can have as detrimental effects for society as an 
intervention by competition authorities.
309
 Therefore, new economy sectors such as the online 
intermediary industry should not be immune from competition law intervention.
310
 Instead, 
competition authorities should handle these markets with care and put effort into analysing 
how conduct of undertakings may affect innovation.
311
 In a similar fashion, former Director-
General for Competition Italianer expressed his skepticism about claims that competition 
concerns may simply disappear in the online world by arguing that ‘We enforce competition 
law in the present, not in the future’ and ‘Nobody will know what the situation will be ten, or 
even five, years from now. This means that any of these companies is until further notice a 
potential client for us – and some already are’.312 
A THIRD TYPE OF COMPETITION - While competition for and in the market constitute the two 
prevailing types of competition, firms do not necessarily compete either within existing 
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markets or for future markets. In this regard, Petit coined the term ‘moligopolists’ for firms 
that have a monopoly for a certain service but that at the same time compete in oligopoly for 
other services. As examples, he refers to Microsoft as a monopolist in PC operating systems 
and an oligopolist in internet browsers and internet search, to Google as a monopolist in 
internet search and an oligopolist in self-driving cars and wearable computers in the form of 
glasses, and to Apple as a monopolist in handsets and an oligopolist in online social 
networks.
313
 These firms have overlapping activities even though they do not operate in the 
exact same relevant markets as defined under competition law. It is therefore unclear how the 
competitive pressure that these firms exert on each other can be analysed in competition 
cases. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
VALUE OF CURRENT PROXIES - Existing indicators of competition and innovation may not 
reliably reflect the presence of these two phenomena. As it is difficult if not impossible to 
bring all the different factors that influence competition and innovation together in proxies, it 
has to be recognised that the models or assumptions employed in economic theories and 
empirical studies are always a simplification of reality and may thus not reliably predict the 
level of competition or innovation in an actual market. Nevertheless, in the absence of more 
accurate indicators, currently used proxies such as market concentration and the level of R&D 
investment may be relied upon with a degree of caution.  
MISSING LINK BETWEEN MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION - Economic theory and 
empirical studies have reached different conclusions on the issue of how market structure and 
innovation relate to each other. A general causal relationship between the two therefore does 
not seem to exist. Because of the many factors that influence the effect of competition on 
innovation, it is not possible to identify an optimal market structure for stimulating innovation 
in a specific sector. Competition authorities should thus rely on a case-by-case assessment.  
FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE - Two types of innovation and competition are distinguished in 
economic and business literature. Competition for the market typically provides stronger 
incentives for disruptive innovation which is likely to result into products or technologies that 
overtake the existing market and will dominate the new market. Competition in the market, on 
the other hand, puts market players under pressure to operate as efficiently as possible within 
the existing market and generally stimulates follow-on innovation in the form of product 
improvements or complementary products. Both types of competition and innovation bring 
value to society albeit in a different way. The choice to favour one over the other involves a 
trade-off between diverse interests. Although competition in dynamic sectors such as the 
online intermediary industry typically takes place for the market, the importance of the other 
type of competition should not be undervalued. In particular when the market finds itself in a 
period waiting for the next wave of creative destruction to occur, the need for competition in 
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the market grows to ensure that the leading undertaking is under pressure to keep the quality 
and price of products at a competitive level. 
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4 Market definition and dominance on online platforms 
 
4.1 Introduction 
DIFFERENT APPROACH NEEDED FOR ONLINE PLATFORMS? - As discussed in the previous 
chapters, online platforms are characterised by their multi-sided nature, their network 
economy features and the predominance of disruptive innovation and competition for the 
market. Because of these characteristics, the standard approach towards market definition and 
the assessment of dominance may have to be adapted to reliably assess competition issues on 
search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms.  
PURPOSE OF MARKET DEFINITION - When evaluating alleged abusive behaviour and proposed 
concentrations, competition authorities and courts start their analysis by defining the relevant 
product and geographic market. The relevant product market includes all products or services 
which are regarded as substitutes by consumers on the basis of their characteristics, prices and 
intended use.
314
 The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring 
areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas.
315
 
Although it has been put forward that market definition is not useful anymore in the context 
of the more economic approach towards competition enforcement and considering that the 
combination of market power and consumer harm should be sufficient for finding 
anticompetitive harm regardless of any market definition,
316
 it is still an important step 
conducted by competition authorities and courts in competition cases. Nevertheless, market 
definition should not be seen as a goal in itself but as a means to identify the market position 
of undertakings and to assess whether their behaviour has a competitive impact on the market. 
A clear definition of the relevant market is not necessary in every competition case.
317
 As 
seen below, the European Commission regularly decides to leave the exact scope of the 
relevant market open in merger cases on the ground that the concentration at issue would not 
give rise to competition concerns under any alternative market definition. Although some 
indications may be derived from such merger decisions, no strong conclusions can be drawn 
about the appropriate market definition in the industry under investigation. 
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OUTLINE - In section 2, attention is paid to how relevant markets should be delineated for 
multi-sided platforms. This is followed by a discussion of market definition in new economy 
industries where disruptive innovation typically predominates in section 3. Section 4 focuses 
on the assessment of dominance on online platforms. While the chapter focuses on EU 
competition law, relevant cases in other jurisdictions will also be considered because of the 
limited number of precedents in the online intermediary sector. 
 
 
4.2 Market definition of multi-sided businesses 
Several approaches have been put forward for defining markets in which multi-sided 
platforms operate. An issue that has to be considered before determining the relevant market 
and assessing dominance is whether the multi-sidedness of a platform is critical to the 
competition analysis. Multi-sidedness should be seen as a matter of degree.
318
 If the multi-
sided nature of a business is merely an aspect of the industry that is not determinative for a 
particular competition issue involving a multi-sided platform, it may not be sufficiently 
pronounced so as to affect the behaviour of the firm and the way competition takes place. 
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether and in which circumstances multi-sided 
aspects are sufficiently substantial to have an influence on the application of competition 
law.
319
   
 
4.2.1 An approach for market definition of multi-sided platforms  
INTERTWINED SIDES - Because of the link between the two customer groups on online 
platforms, it is not correct to define and analyse the relevant market for each side in isolation. 
If the provider does not behave like a one-sided firm but takes the interdependence of the two 
sides of the platform into account in its pricing and production decisions, the application of a 
one-sided logic may lead to an erroneous assessment of the competitive strength of the multi-
sided business.
320
 If the product or service is given away at one side of the platform, there is a 
particular risk that the free side will be overlooked in the market definition.
321
 The 
KinderStart v. Google case in the United States illustrates this. In this case, the Court for the 
Northern District of California declined to apply antitrust law to internet search on the ground 
that the claimants had not cited any authority indicating that antitrust law is concerned with 
competition in the provision of free services. Although the District Court was aware that the 
provision of search functionality may lead to revenue from other sources, it argued that the 
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search market could not be regarded as a relevant market for antitrust purposes on the ground 
that KinderStart had not alleged that anyone pays Google to search.
322
  
MARKET FOR PERSONAL DATA - Instead of basing the market definition for an online platform 
on the services that are offered, the relevant market could be defined in accordance with the 
way the provider monetises its business. For online intermediaries this would mean that the 
relevant market consists of a market for personal information monetised through 
advertising.
323
 Such an approach is consistent with the nature of these platforms which do not 
gain revenue by selling their technology to consumers like ‘traditional’ ICT companies such 
as Microsoft and Intel, but rely on deriving benefits from valuable information they collect 
about their users.
324
 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR DATA? - However, a correct market definition under current 
competition law standards requires the existence of supply and demand for the product or 
service.
325
 One can doubt whether the collection of personal data from users by providers of 
online platforms constitutes an economic exchange. Although one may argue that users are 
increasingly aware that they give access to their personal information by utilising the features 
of online platforms,
326
 the provision of data does not seem to constitute a genuine supply of a 
product by users in exchange for being able to employ search or social networking 
functionalities. Contrary to usual economic transactions, users as suppliers of data cannot 
determine the amount and type of information they want to supply and do not have influence 
on what they will get in return. Instead, the providers of the online services unilaterally decide 
what type and which amount of data will be extracted and impose their practices on users as a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer. This interaction between users and providers therefore seems to 
constitute a form of one-sided retrieval of information rather than an economic transaction.  
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TRADING DATA - Current competition law standards only allow for the definition of a market 
for data in case the information is actually traded. Examples are the data licensing activities of 
Twitter and the sale of collected personal information about consumers by data brokers to 
other businesses. Under prevailing competition law principles, the relevant market for online 
services such as search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms thus cannot take 
data as object as long as there is no economic transaction between the respective providers 
and users for data, and the providers of these online platforms do not sell or trade data to third 
parties.
327
 So far, the European Commission has not yet had to define a market for personal 
data or for any of its particular usages.
328
 In its Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the 
Commission expressly stated that it had not investigated any possible market definition with 
respect to the provision of data or data analytics services, since neither of the parties involved 
was active in any such potential markets. At the time of the merger, Facebook only used the 
information about its users for the provision of targeted advertising services and did not sell 
user data to third parties or offer any data analytics services. WhatsApp did not collect 
personal data that would be valuable for advertising purposes and messages sent through 
WhatsApp by users were not stored in WhatsApp’s service but only on the users’ mobile 
devices or elected cloud. As a result, the Commission did not see a reason to consider the 
existence of a potential market for personal data.
329
 In such circumstances, current 
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competition law principles only allow for a market definition based on the services that online 
platforms offer. Even if it is considered that users pay for the free services with their personal 
data, the focus of market definition under existing standards is on the type of product or 
service offered instead of on the means of payment.
330
 
SHOULD ONE OR MORE MARKETS BE DEFINED FOR A MULTI-SIDED BUSINESS? - The crucial issue 
with respect to market definition of multi-sided businesses is whether one market for the 
platforms as a whole should be defined or whether separate markets should be distinguished 
for each of the sides of the platform. The European Commission explicitly considered this 
question in the context of payment cards. In its MasterCard decision of December 2007, the 
Commission did not define one but several relevant markets for payment card systems. 
MasterCard argued that one relevant market existed in which different payment card systems’ 
services compete with each other and with all other forms of payment including cash and 
cheques.
331
 The Commission did not accept this market definition proposed by MasterCard 
and stated that ‘Two-sided demand does not imply the existence of one single “joint product” 
supplied by a “joint venture”’.332 Instead, the Commission identified an upstream or network 
market in which card scheme owners compete to persuade financial institutions to join their 
schemes and a downstream market in which competition between financial institutions for 
card-related activities takes place. Within this downstream market, the Commission 
distinguished between a relevant market for acquiring and a relevant market for issuing 
services.
333
 In its decision, the Commission relied on the restrictive effects of the alleged 
practices in the acquiring market. The General Court upheld the market definition relied upon 
by the Commission.
334
 Before the Court of Justice, the General Court’s assessment of the 
market definition was not challenged as a result of which the Court of Justice dismissed the 
ground of appeal relating to market definition.
335
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In the literature, opposing views are present. In the context of search engines for instance, 
some authors claim that a different relevant market for each side of the platform must be 
delineated while others seem to allude to the definition of one market for the search engine as 
a whole.
336
 Arguably the most comprehensive contribution to the academic debate is the 
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 See T. HOPPNER, "Defining Markets for Multi-Sided Platforms: The Case of Search Engines", World 
Competition 2015, vol. 38, no. 3, (349), p. 352-356 (arguing that separate relevant markets have to be defined for 
each of the sides of a search engine) and J.D. RATLIFF AND D.L. RUBINFELD, "Is there a market for organic 
search engine results and can their manipulation give rise to antitrust liability?", Journal of Competition Law and 
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MasterCard case:  
In its 2007 decision, the Commission concluded that MasterCard’s multilateral 
interchange fees (MIFs) for cross-border payment card transactions with 
MasterCard and Maestro consumer debit and credit cards in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) violated Article 101(1) TFEU. MIFs are fees charged by a 
cardholder’s bank (the issuing bank) to a merchant’s bank (the acquiring bank) for 
each payment made at a merchant’s outlet with a payment card. The Commission 
concluded that MasterCard’s MIFs restricted competition between acquiring banks 
and inflated the cost of card acceptance by retailers without leading to proven 
efficiencies under Article 101(3) TFEU.  
MasterCard was given six months to conform to the Commission’s order to set its 
MIFs in compliance with the EU competition rules. MasterCard appealed the 
Commission decision before the General Court and pending the judgment, in April 
2009, unilaterally undertook to reduce its cross-border MIFs to 0.30% of the 
transaction value for consumer credit cards and 0.20% of the transaction value for 
consumer debit cards and to amend other rules and practices. The judgment of the 
General Court which upheld the decision of the Commission was issued on 24 May 
2012. 
On 11 September 2014, the Court of Justice confirmed that MasterCard’s MIFs for 
cross-border payment transactions in the EEA restrict competition in breach of 
Article 101 TFEU.  
 
In July 2015, the Commission issued a new Statement of Objections to MasterCard 
on  cross-border rules and MIFs relating to payments made by cardholders from 
non-EEA countries. 
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framework developed by Filistrucchi et al. which distinguishes between multi-sided 
transaction markets (‘payment card type’) and multi-sided non-transaction markets (‘media 
type’) in order to identify the appropriate approach towards market definition of multi-sided 
platforms.
337
 
TRANSACTION MARKETS - Depending on the qualification of the platform, Filistrucchi et al. 
argue that one relevant market for the whole platform or several interrelated relevant markets 
for each side have to be defined.
338
 In transaction markets, as the name suggests, a visible 
transaction takes place between the different customer groups which makes it impossible for a 
business in the market to target only one customer group. Undertakings present in these 
markets are therefore by definition multi-sided platforms.
339
 An example is the payment card 
industry where a payment card provider has to be active on the buyer as well as on the 
merchant side of the platform in order to do business. Because a single and observable 
transaction takes place, it is impossible to use platform A on the buyer side and platform B on 
the merchant side. Either the buyer and the merchant both use platform A or the transaction 
does not take place through platform A.
340
 Since a firm is either on both sides of the platform 
or on none, one relevant market should be defined for platforms in multi-sided transaction 
markets in the view of Filistrucchi et al.
341
 This also applies to the interaction between buyers 
and sellers on e-commerce platforms. Since a transaction takes place between the two 
customer groups, it is impossible for an e-commerce platform to be active on only one side. 
However, between users and advertisers on e-commerce platforms no observable transaction 
occurs. The working of e-commerce platforms is similar to that of search engines, social 
networks and other media businesses as far as the relationship between users and advertisers 
is concerned. 
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NON-TRANSACTION MARKETS - Media markets can be considered as multi-sided non-
transaction markets. In these markets, the situation is different. Because no observable 
transaction takes place,
342
 it is possible for a competing undertaking to be active on only one 
side of the platform. In other words, platforms in multi-sided non-transaction markets may 
also face competition from one-sided undertakings. For instance, an online search engine may 
experience competitive pressure from single-sided libraries on the user side. In addition, 
multi-sided businesses having only one overlapping customer side may compete with each 
another. An online search engine may theoretically, for example, compete with online social 
networks on the advertiser side, while its users will not regard the social network features 
substitutable to the search services that the search engine offers. If only one relevant market 
encompassing the two sides of the online search engine would be defined, the competitive 
pressure from single-sided firms and multi-sided businesses that overlap with the relevant 
platform on only one side would by definition be overlooked. It is therefore submitted that the 
variety of entities from which multi-sided online platforms experience competitive pressure is 
better reflected by a market definition which takes the services offered by their providers as 
object.
343
 This is also reason why, according to Filistrucchi et al., the most viable option 
would be to define a separate relevant market for each side of the online platform while taking 
into account the other sides as well. Only in case the multi-sided network effects on the 
platform are not reciprocal, market definition on the side of the platform that does not exert an 
externality on the other can take place without considering the other side in the view of 
Filistrucchi et al.
344
 In this context, the Autorité de la concurrence (the French competition 
authority) argued in its sector inquiry into the online advertising industry that it is sufficient to 
confine the competition analysis of search engines to the advertising side, because it would 
not ‘markedly modify the approach’ if the user side is also taken into account. In the view of 
the Autorité de la concurrence: ‘a moderate reduction in the number of commercial links is 
unlikely to prompt a web user to change search engines if the relevance of the organic results 
remains unchanged’.345 
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APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TOWARDS MARKET DEFINITION OF SEARCH ENGINES 
- In the Microsoft/Yahoo merger case, the Commission had to apply competition law to 
internet search for the first time. With regard to market definition, the Commission did not 
take a position on whether web search should be regarded as a relevant market of its own. 
Instead, it only assessed the legality of the transaction with regard to the market for online 
advertising.
346
 However, the Commission did consider the link between the user and 
advertiser side by examining potential anticompetitive effects of the transaction on 
innovation, relevance and variety of internet search to users.
347
 The Commission thus seems 
to have considered both sides together by way of a ‘business ecosystem’, as proposed by 
Evans, in which one cannot look at one side of the market in isolation of the other.
348
 In its 
abuse of dominance investigation against Google, the Commission appears to distinguish two 
interrelated markets with regard to Google’s search engine: web search and online search 
advertising. In a press release, the Commission stated that it ‘has concerns that Google may 
be abusing its dominant position in the markets for web search, online search advertising and 
online search advertising intermediation in the European Economic Area (EEA)’.349  
APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TOWARDS MARKET DEFINITION OF SOCIAL 
NETWORKS - In the context of its approval of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp, the 
Commission similarly identified separate relevant markets for the services provided to users 
on the one hand and the services offered to advertisers on the other hand. With regard to 
market definition on the user side, the Commission investigated the possibility of defining a 
relevant market for consumer communications services and social networking services. On 
the advertiser side, the Commission considered the existence of further sub-segmentations of 
the online advertising market.
350
 Instead of relying on a single relevant market for the 
platform or confining the analysis to the advertiser side, like the Autorité de la concurrence 
proposed in its sector inquiry, the Commission thus appears to follow the approach described 
by Filistrucchi et al. applicable to non-transaction markets as regards market definition of 
multi-sided online platforms. According to this approach, separate relevant markets have to be 
defined for the user and advertiser side of search engines, e-commerce platforms and social 
networks. For search engines and social networks a third relevant market can be distinguished 
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consisting of, respectively, content providers and application developers.
351
 These customer 
groups are not analysed here further, since their role on the platform is subordinate to the 
interaction between users and advertisers. With regard to content providers on search engines, 
the interaction seems to be rather one-sided as search engine providers are free to crawl the 
internet and index content in order to provide relevant results to search queries of users. One 
can therefore question whether the interaction between these website owners and the search 
platform provider amounts to an economic exchange, which constitutes a necessary 
precondition for being able to define a relevant market for competition purposes.
352
  
 
4.2.2 Relevant product market for the user side 
USER MARKET ON SEARCH ENGINES - On the user side, it has to be assessed which products or 
services are substitutable for online search engines, e-commerce platforms and social 
networks from the perspective of consumers. In its decision concerning the acquisition of 
Yahoo’s search business by Microsoft, the European Commission made some remarks about 
the general characteristics of an online search engine. The Commission distinguished general 
or horizontal internet search from vertical internet search, which targets a specific type of 
service, and site search, covering only the content of a particular website.
353
 Ultimately, the 
Commission left open whether internet search constitutes a separate relevant market. It also 
did not answer the question whether horizontal and vertical search engines fall within the 
same relevant market and whether offline search facilities can be seen as substitutes for online 
search engines, such as travel agencies for looking for holidays and libraries for looking for 
information.
354
 However, statements made in the Google Shopping case indicate that the 
Commission regards horizontal internet search as a separate relevant product market. In a 
statement, the Commissioner for Competition argued: ‘Google has had market shares of more 
than 90% in general internet search in most EU Member States for many years’.355 
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Google investigation:  
In November 2010, the European Commission opened an investigation against Google after 
having received complaints from competitors. Through former Competition Commissioner 
Almunia, the Commission expressed four concerns relating to Google’s search activities and gave 
Google the opportunity to propose commitments to prevent the finding of a violation of Article 
102 TFEU and the imposition of a fine. The four concerns of the Commission included: (1) the 
fact that Google displays links to its own specialised search services (such as Google Shopping, 
Google Flights and Google Maps) more favourably than links of competing services; (2) the way 
Google copies content from competing vertical search services and uses it in its own offerings 
without obtaining prior authorisation; (3) the exclusivity agreements of Google which require 
third parties to obtain all or most of their requirements of search advertisements from Google; and 
(4) the contractual restrictions that Google puts to the portability of online search advertising 
campaigns from its platform AdWords to the platforms of competitors. To address the concerns of 
the Commission, Google offered three consecutive sets of commitments (namely in April 2013, 
October 2013 and February 2014). With regard to the first and most controversial concern of the 
Commission, Google committed to label and separate promoted links to its own specialised search 
services so that users can distinguish them from organic search results and to display links to three 
rival specialised search services in a place clearly visible to users.  
While the former Competition Commissioner Almunia initially seemed to be of the view that the 
commitments from Google were adequate to address the concerns, he decided to reject the latest 
version of the commitments before the end of his mandate in November 2014 and asked Google 
to improve its offer. 
In April 2015, the current Competition Commissioner Vestager decided to refrain from 
concluding a settlement with Google. Instead, the Commission sent Google a Statement of 
Objections alleging that it has abused its dominant position in the market for general internet 
search services in the EEA by systematically  favouring its own comparison shopping product, 
Google Shopping, in its general search results pages. In addition, the Commission continues its 
investigation of other aspects of Google’s search activities including the favourable treatment by 
Google in its general search results of other specialised search services (such as Google Maps) 
and concerns relating to the copying of rivals’ web content, advertising exclusivity and 
restrictions on advertising portability. In parallel, the Commission opened a separate formal 
investigation into Google’s Android mobile operating system in April 2015 for which it sent a 
Statement of Objections to Google in April 2016.  
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USER MARKET ON E-COMMERCE PLATFORMS - So far, the European Commission has not yet 
made any specific statements about market definition of e-commerce platforms. Since these 
businesses enable users to search for products they would like to purchase, the user side of e-
commerce platforms can be regarded as a vertical or specialised search engine focused on 
shopping. The fact that the Commission seems to rely on a relevant market for horizontal 
internet search in the Google Shopping case, may indicate that the Commission does not 
consider vertical search engines as substitutes for a general web search service like the one 
offered by Google. At the same time, vertical search services are increasingly putting 
horizontal search engines under pressure. Although platforms such as Facebook and Amazon 
do not possess an index of the entire web and may therefore not be regarded as complete 
substitutes to Google’s horizontal search service, they are likely to create considerable 
competitive pressure for specific search queries whereby users are looking to purchase a 
certain product or service.
356
 Nevertheless, considering the statements of the Commission in 
the Google Shopping case, it is likely that vertical search will also be regarded as a relevant 
market of its own. Depending on whether vertical search engines targeting a service different 
than shopping are found to exert competitive pressure on e-commerce platforms, a separate 
relevant product market may be defined for vertical search solely encompassing shopping or a 
broader market including vertical search engines for other online content.  
USER MARKET ON SOCIAL NETWORKS - In the context of the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, the 
European Commission had to consider a potential relevant market for social networking 
services for the first time. While the Commission left the exact boundaries of such a market 
open, it made a number of statements with regard to the relationship between mobile 
consumer communications apps and social networks. The Commission concluded that 
although communications apps like Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp offer certain 
elements which are typical of a social networking service, in particular sharing of messages 
and photos, there are important differences between these two types of services.
357
 In the 
Commission’s view, social networking services tend to offer a richer social experience than 
communications apps. Whereas users of social networks are able to indicate their interests, 
activities or life events, and express opinions on other users’ postings, the functionalities of 
communications apps are more limited and focus on enabling basic communication between 
users. According to the Commission, there are also differences in usage in the sense that 
communications apps facilitate instant real-time communication, while messages in social 
networks are not normally expected to be responded to in real time. As a last difference, the 
Commission noted that social networking services tend to enable communication and 
information sharing with a wider audience than communications apps. Whereas postings on a 
social network are generally shared with all contacts of a user, communication on 
communication apps is more personal and mainly occurs on a one-to-one basis or within 
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small groups of a limited number of users.
358
 Ultimately, the Commission decided to leave 
open whether communications apps such as Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp fall within 
the scope of a potential market for social networking services, because the acquisition of 
WhatsApp by Facebook would not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
internal market under any alternative market definition.
359
 Therefore, no strong conclusions 
can be drawn from the Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision about the view of the 
Commission to the market definition of social networking services.  
SUBSTITUTES FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING SERVICES - In Microsoft/Skype, the Commission did 
take into account the competitive pressure coming from Facebook and Google in its analysis 
of the market for internet consumer communications services consisting of instant messaging, 
voice and video calls.
360
 The Commission even argued that these players have a competitive 
advantage towards Microsoft because they offer communications services as part of a broader 
user experience through Facebook’s social network and Google+.361 The General Court 
confirmed that Facebook and Google would exert competitive pressure on the merged 
entity.
362
 However, the fact that social networking providers such as Facebook and Google are 
considered to impose competitive constraints on providers of internet consumer 
communications services like Skype, does not mean that the latter services, in turn, have to be 
included in the competition analysis of a potential market for social networking services 
considering the richer user experience offered by social network providers. If communications 
apps were to be regarded as substitutes for social networks, the number of alternative 
providers in the relevant market would expand substantially, making it less likely that any of 
the market players has a dominant position. Apart from communications apps, online services 
that enable interaction and exchange of content between users, such as YouTube, may also be 
considered as substitutes for social networks.
363
 In the context of the Facebook/WhatsApp 
merger, the Commission noted that users employ online services, including communications 
apps and social networking services, in a complementary manner. Indeed, evidence was found 
that users of communications apps extensively multi-home. The existence of a considerable 
overlap between the user bases of WhatsApp and Facebook further confirmed this.
364
  
SUB-SEGMENTATIONS OF A POTENTIAL SOCIAL NETWORKING MARKET - Besides the relationship 
between social networking services and communications apps, the Commission assessed 
possible sub-segmentations of a potential market for social networks in its 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision. The Commission argued that social networking 
services should not be further segmented according to the platform (PC, smartphone and 
tablet) or the operating system (such as Windows, Mac, Android and iOS) on which they are 
available, because the time and resources needed for developing a social network for a 
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particular platform or operating system did not appear to be significant enough to support the 
existence of separate markets.
365
 With regard to a possible differentiation depending on the 
intended use of social networking services, respondents to the market investigation considered 
that a distinction could be drawn between social networks promoting interpersonal contact for 
private and entertainment purposes (such as Facebook or Google+) and services which are 
used for professional purposes (such as LinkedIn or Xing) even though the respondents 
acknowledged that there are overlaps between the purposes of intended use. Since no 
competition concerns would arise under any alternative market definition, the Commission 
decided to leave open whether social networking services should be segmented according to 
the intended use.
366
  
MARKET DEFINITION OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS - In other jurisdictions, 
statements have also been made about the market definition of social networking services. In 
the private competition case Qihoo/Tencent, the Chinese Supreme Court ruled in October 
2014 that instant messaging services constitute a separate relevant market of which 
microblogging services, such as Twitter, and social networks do not form part. The Court 
considered in this perspective, as did the European Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp,
367
 
that communication via social networking and microblogging platforms is aimed at an open 
group of a larger number of users, while instant messaging mainly consists of mutual private 
communications or internal communications within small groups.
368
 In a 2007 private 
competition dispute involving Myspace, the Court for the Central District of California 
defined a narrow relevant market for ‘Internet-based social networking’. Internet connectivity 
services were not regarded as substitutes, because their main purpose is to give users access to 
the Internet. Online dating sites also fell outside the relevant market, since social networks 
have more functions than dating sites such as getting in touch with old contacts and keeping 
current friends informed about life.
369
 The District Court did not consider potential offline 
substitutes in the form of so-called ‘brick and mortar’ undertakings that provide people a 
physical location to meet and exchange views. 
BRICK AND MORTAR SUBSTITUTES - It can indeed be doubted whether equivalents exist in the 
offline world for the possibilities that online search engines, social networks and e-commerce 
platforms offer their users. The strength of these online platforms lies in the fact that they can 
be accessed everywhere as long as the user is connected to the internet. Contrary to for 
example libraries, meeting places and street markets, users of online search engines, social 
networks and e-commerce platforms do not have to go to a specific geographic location to be 
able to use the functionalities of these platforms. Furthermore, the amount of information and 
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communication possibilities to which online platforms give users access cannot be compared 
with brick and mortar facilities that always have spatial limitations.
370
 
CONVERGENCE ON THE INTERNET - With regard to the availability of online substitutes for 
search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms, the growing convergence between 
the different functionalities provided by online platforms has to be taken into account. An 
example of convergence among internet services is the introduction by Facebook of a search 
functionality in its social network which enables users to search through posts, photos, videos 
and links shared on its platform.
371
 Although the Commission left the market definition for 
internet search open in its Microsoft/Yahoo merger decision, it explicitly distinguished 
Facebook’s social search functionality from internet search by arguing that this type of site 
search is limited to content from Facebook.
372
 This indicates that Facebook’s social network 
will not be included in a potential relevant market for horizontal internet search.
373
 E-
commerce platforms can be seen as vertical search engines on which users look for products 
they are interested in purchasing. The Commission seems to regard horizontal search as a 
separate market in the Google case as a result of which companies like Amazon and eBay are 
not included in the competition analysis. Nevertheless, it is increasingly being put forward 
that internet services are converging and can therefore be seen as substitutes although their 
functionality may differ to a certain extent.
374
 The view has even been expressed that all 
internet services are in competition with each other for the attention of the user.
375
 This would 
imply that there is a very broad market making it almost impossible for any undertaking to 
attain a dominant position.  
FUNCTIONALITY STILL PREVAILS - The Microsoft/Skype and Facebook/WhatsApp merger 
decisions provide evidence for the statement that the functionalities of online platforms are 
still likely to be decisive for the definition of the relevant product market. By defining the 
relevant market as the market for internet consumer communications in Microsoft/Skype and 
by considering a potential market for social networks in Facebook/WhatsApp, the 
Commission confirmed that the differences in purpose of online services justify the definition 
of separate relevant markets. In the Commission’s view, several relevant markets can thus be 
identified on the internet. With regard to the existence of an internet-wide relevant market for 
the attention of the user, the Chinese Supreme Court explicitly stated in Qihoo/Tencent that 
‘there exist obvious differences in properties, characteristics, functions and purpose of key 
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products or services, provided on various Internet application platforms’ as a result of which 
‘it is difficult to say that products or services on different platforms that provide different 
applications and functions can effectively substitute each other’.376  
 
4.2.3 Relevant product market for the advertiser side 
ONLINE VERSUS OFFLINE ADVERTISING - On the advertiser side, it is important to know 
whether a separate market has to be defined for, respectively, online and offline advertising 
and if so, whether a further distinction must be made between, for example search and non-
search advertising. The European Commission has consistently held that online and offline 
advertising do not fall within the same relevant market.
377
 In its Google/DoubleClick merger 
decision, the Commission explained that online advertising has several characteristics that 
distinguish it from offline advertising. First, online advertising is capable of reaching a more 
targeted audience in a more effective way. On the internet, an advertiser can choose to display 
an advertisement to a particular group of users. In offline advertising, advertisers cannot 
target their audience as precisely as in online advertising by combining information available 
about the user’s interests and preferences. Second, the measurement of the effectiveness of 
online advertisements is more precise compared with the systems available in offline 
advertising. In online advertising, advertisers can check how many users have viewed or 
clicked on their ads which enables them to retarget advertisements if necessary. The third 
distinguishing factor is the pricing mechanism applied to online advertising. Whereas offline 
pricing is estimated on the basis of general criteria, online advertising is paid on the basis of 
the exact number of users that viewed or clicked on the ad. The traditional offline media do 
not allow for such a precise connection between the reach and cost of the ad.
378
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FURTHER MARKET SEGMENTATION - In the merger cases Google/DoubleClick, 
Microsoft/Yahoo and Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission discussed whether potential 
submarkets could be delineated within the broader online advertising market. A market for 
intermediation in online advertising was defined in Google/DoubleClick which separates 
‘direct sales’ from ‘intermediated sales’ by publishers of web space to advertisers.379 In the 
context of direct sales, advertisers and publishers negotiate the sale of online advertising 
space directly. Intermediated sales, on the other hand, are sales which require the involvement 
of an advertising platform which acts as intermediary matching advertisers and publishers by 
acquiring a publisher’s web space through syndication agreements and filling this space by 
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Google/DoubleClick merger decision:  
At the time of the proposed concentration, the two parties were engaged in the 
following relevant activities. Google operated an internet search engine, offered 
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were not exerting a significant competitive constraint on each other’s activities. 
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in the Commission’s view that a sufficient number of other competitors would be 
left in the market. As a result, sufficient competitive pressure would remain after 
the merger. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the elimination of 
DoubleClick as a potential competitor would not have an adverse impact on 
competition in that market.  
The Commission also analysed the potential effects of non-horizontal relationships 
between Google and DoubleClick. Concerns expressed by third parties involved 
foreclosure scenarios based on DoubleClick’s market position in ad serving, 
foreclosure scenarios based on Google’s market position in search advertising and 
online ad intermediation services, and foreclosure scenarios based on the 
combination of DoubleClick’s and Google’s databases on customer online 
behaviour. The Commission found that such types of foreclosure would be unlikely 
to occur. Even if such scenarios did occur, they would not result in a significant 
impediment to effective competition according to the Commission. With regard to 
the possible combination of data of Google and DoubleClick after the merger, the 
Commission stated that this would be very unlikely to bring more traffic to 
AdSense so as to squeeze out competitors and ultimately enable the merged entity 
to charge higher prices for its intermediation services.  
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searching for interested advertisers. In Microsoft/Yahoo, the Commission left the exact 
product market definition with regard to intermediation open as the transaction would not 
raise any serious doubts under any alternative market definition.
380
 Since online advertising 
intermediation results in the display of advertisements on third party web pages instead of in 
the search results of the search engine platform, it will not be considered here further.
381
 
Within the market of online advertising, a distinction can be made according to the way 
advertisements are selected to appear on a user’s screen (search or non-search ads) and their 
visual appearance (text or display ads).
382
 Both correspond to some extent in the sense that 
search ads tend to be almost exclusively text ads, whereas non-search ads can be either text or 
display ads.
383
 In Google/DoubleClick, Microsoft/Yahoo and Facebook/WhatsApp, the 
Commission did not have to decide whether separate relevant markets existed for respectively 
search and non-search advertising, since the transactions reviewed in the three cases would 
not raise serious doubts as to the compatibility with the internal market under any of these 
market segmentations.
384
 
SEARCH VERSUS NON-SEARCH ADVERTISING IN GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK - In 
Google/DoubleClick, the Commission found that search and non-search advertising may exert 
some degree of constraint on each other from the perspective of the advertiser. The essential 
difference between the two types of advertising for advertisers is the way of targeting. While 
for search ads the targeting is based on the exact intent of the user that it revealed by entering 
the search query, for non-search ads the targeting is based on more general criteria such as the 
context of the visited web page and the geographical location of the user. Although search and 
non-search ads thus have different appearance and targeting properties, the Commission 
argued that from the advertiser’s point of view they can be considered substitutable to a 
certain extent on the ground that the differences of technical nature and aims are diminishing. 
In particular, the ability of non-search ads to target relevant users is improving and the use of 
search ads for building brand awareness is increasing.
385
 However, from the publisher’s point 
of view the distinction between the two types of online advertising is more clear. When a 
publisher decides to allocate space on a web page to a non-search ad, it cannot replace this 
space by selling search ads, since the latter only appear on a new web page generated by the 
search query which does not form part of the publisher’s content inventory. For this reason, 
the Commission concluded that search and non-search ads have to be considered as 
complementary in the perspective of the publisher.
386
 Although the Commission considered 
that search and non-search ads are substitutable on the demand side, supply side 
interchangeability thus seems more questionable.  
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SEARCH VERSUS NON-SEARCH ADVERTISING IN MICROSOFT/YAHOO - In Microsoft/Yahoo, 
Microsoft argued that search advertising is a separate product market, because the format and 
pricing of search ads is different, it is purchased by advertisers for different purposes than 
non-search advertising and search advertising is sold through an auction system which is not 
the case for other types of online advertising. The results from the market investigation were 
mixed in the sense that not all respondents confirmed the arguments submitted by Microsoft 
as reasons for making a distinction between search and non-search ads. A number of 
responses even highlighted a degree of convergence between the two types of online 
advertising.
387
 Since the transactions in both Google/DoubleClick and Microsoft/Yahoo would 
not raise serious doubts as to the compatibility with the internal market under any further 
market segmentation, the Commission could leave the exact product market definition open. 
SEARCH VERSUS NON-SEARCH ADVERTISING IN FACEBOOK/WHATSAPP - The Commission left 
the scope of the relevant market open for the same reason in its Facebook/WhatsApp decision. 
However, the Commission did make clear that the market investigation supported to a large 
extent the existence of a sub-segmentation of the online advertising market between search 
and non-search advertising. The majority of the advertisers who took part in the market 
investigation considered that search and non-search advertisements are not substitutable 
because they serve different purposes. While search ads mainly serve to generate direct user 
traffic to a merchant’s website, non-search ads are primarily used to build brand awareness.388 
Since the Commission left open whether a further sub-segmentation between online search 
and online non-search advertising was appropriate in the Google/DoubleClick, 
Microsoft/Yahoo and Facebook/WhatsApp mergers, future cases have to point out whether 
separate markets are to be defined for search and non-search advertising. If it is found that 
both types of online advertising fall within the same relevant market, Google and to a lesser 
extent Amazon, as providers of search advertising space (in this context Amazon’s e-
commerce platform can be regarded as a vertical search engine competing with Google for 
attracting advertisers interested in displaying ads in or alongside search results), and 
Facebook, as provider of non-search related advertising space, would be competing with each 
other which would reduce each of their market power.
389
 From the public statements made in 
press releases in the context of the Google case, it seems that the Commission is taking the 
view that online search advertising constitutes a relevant market of its own. For example, in a 
2013 press release the Commission stated: ‘Google also has a very strong position in the 
market for online search advertising’.390 The definition of separate relevant markets for 
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search and non-search online advertisements is in line with the approach taken by competition 
authorities in other jurisdictions.
391
 
ONLINE ADVERTISING SECTOR INQUIRY OF THE AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE - In its sector 
inquiry into the online advertising industry in 2010, the Autorité de la concurrence concluded 
that search advertising constitutes a separate relevant market on which it found Google to be 
dominant. The substitutability between search and non-search ads was considered to be 
relatively limited mainly because of the more precise targeting possibilities of search 
advertising.
392
 In the Navx case, the Autorité de la concurrence had already stated that online 
search-based advertising is likely to constitute a separate relevant market within the broader 
sector of online advertising.
393
 Both in the Navx case and in the sector inquiry, the Autorité de 
la concurrence refers to the US Google/DoubleClick merger decision in which the Federal 
Trade Commission defined separate relevant markets for search and non-search advertising by 
arguing that ‘advertising space sold by search engines is not a substitute for space sold 
directly or indirectly by publishers of vice versa’ because ‘the evidence shows that the sale of 
search advertising does not operate as a significant constraint on the prices or quality of 
other online advertising’.394 In the view of the Autorité de la concurrence, Facebook may 
improve its ability to target advertisements by relying on user profile data in the future, but at 
the time of the sector inquiry the targeting of profiles of social network users could not be 
regarded as an alternative to search-based ads. The reason given for this was that 
advertisements on Facebook do not satisfy active queries of users but are rather used for 
branding campaigns based on ‘likes’ by users.395  
SEPARATE MARKET FOR SOCIAL NETWORK ADVERTISING? - Although leaving open whether 
potential sub-segmentations of the relevant market for online advertising can constitute 
relevant markets in their own right, the Commission examined in Facebook/WhatsApp 
whether a separate relevant product market should be defined for the provision of online non-
search advertising services on social networking sites. This would mean that within a 
potential relevant market for online non-search advertising a further segmentation is made 
between online non-search advertising on social networking sites and online non-search 
advertising on other websites or platforms. The results of the market investigation were mixed 
in this regard. While a number of respondents considered that other forms of non-search 
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advertising are not as effective as advertising on social networking websites, other 
respondents took the view that many other advertising platforms offering non-search ads are 
equally well-placed to serve non-search needs.
396
 In a US private competition case against 
Myspace, the plaintiff alleged a relevant market for ‘advertising on Internet-based social 
networking sites’ arguing that there are no good substitutes because: ‘Such sites offer 
advertisers the unique ability to tap into user-generated content and to establish “buzz” 
about their products through word of mouth as users comment upon and share the advertising 
with others, essentially integrating an advertiser's message into the rumor mill’.397 Since the 
Court for the Central District of California considered that there was no anticompetitive 
conduct and causal antitrust injury, it could leave open whether this market definition was 
adequate.  
MOBILE VERSUS PC-BASED ADVERTISING - While leaving open whether the market for online 
advertising should be segmented between mobile and PC-based advertising, such a potential 
sub-segmentation has been considered by the Commission in a number of merger cases. In 
Microsoft/Yahoo, the Commission examined whether mobile search advertising should be 
distinguished from PC-based search advertising. In that regard, the market investigation had 
revealed that a majority of the respondents did not consider mobile search advertising as a 
separate relevant market even though it presents some distinguishing technical and 
commercial features in terms of the size of the ads and the appropriateness of location-based 
advertising.
398
 In the context of the setting up of a joint venture in the United Kingdom 
involving Telefónica, Vodafone and Everything Everywhere, the Commission assessed 
whether mobile online (search or non-search) advertising accessed on a mobile handset such 
as a smartphone and a tablet constitutes a product market separate from static online (search 
or non-search) advertising accessed through desktop or laptop computers. The Commission 
argued that these two types of online advertising currently present significant differences, 
which may diminish at some point in the future, but left open whether a distinction should be 
made.
399
 In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission noted that the results of the market 
investigation as regards a possible segmentation between online advertising on PCs and 
mobile devices were mixed. While some respondents highlighted the differences between 
advertising on different platforms in terms of technical characteristics, user experience and ad 
profitability, other respondents submitted that they are essentially substitutable.
400
  
 
4.2.4 Relevant geographic market for online platforms 
ONLINE ADVERTISING - With regard to the geographic market definition for online advertising 
and its possible sub-segments, the Commission concluded in a number of merger decisions 
that the relevant geographic market should be defined as national in scope or alongside 
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linguistic borders within the EEA. Factors pointing to such a market definition included, in 
the Commission’s view, customers’ purchasing preferences and languages, and the presence 
of support and sales networks located at national level.
401
 
SEARCH AND E-COMMERCE - While leaving the exact geographic market definition for internet 
search open in its Microsoft/Yahoo merger decision, the Commission argued that the 
geographic scope of such a potential market could be wider than national or linguistic markets 
because search engines like Google and Yahoo operate on a global basis and strive to index 
the whole internet. In addition, the Commission considered that fluency in English, the 
language of most of the websites, is increasingly extended across the world. From a demand 
side perspective, the Commission acknowledged, however, that many users require access to 
a search engine and to search results in their own language.
402
 Continuing in the latter vein, 
the Commission referred to the European Economic Area (EEA) as the appropriate 
geographic scope of a potential market for web search in the context of the Google Shopping 
case.
403
 Considering that e-commerce platforms can be regarded as vertical search engines, it 
is likely that the Commission will apply a similar reasoning about the geographic market 
definition of these services.  
SOCIAL NETWORKING - In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission concluded that the 
geographic market for online social networking services includes at least the EEA. While 
there were indications that the geographic scope of the market could be worldwide given the 
global scope of the internet, the Commission considered that the relevant geographic market 
for the assessment of the case was EEA-wide in line with a more conservative approach. In 
this perspective, the Commission explained that although respondents to the market 
investigation stated that there are generally no differences in a social networking service 
offered in different geographic regions in terms of price, functionalities, platforms and 
operating systems served, limited geographic adjustments appear to be present relating to 
language and minor functionalities. Other possible geographic differences mentioned by the  
Commission include marketing costs, legal/regulatory requirements and customers’ 
preferences.
404
 
 
4.2.5 Economic tools for market definition on multi-sided platforms 
SSNIP TEST - The economic tools that are used to define relevant markets may have to be 
adapted to the specific features of multi-sided platforms. The so-called ‘SSNIP test’, which 
stands for Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price, is commonly used for 
market definition in one-sided markets. This test seeks to identify the market as the smallest 
set of substitutable products or services within which a hypothetical monopolist can profitably 
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impose a significant (5 to 10%) and non-transitory (one year) increase in price. If such a price 
increase would lead a significant number of customers to switch to another product, the latter 
product can be seen as a substitute and should thus be included in the relevant market. The 
elasticity of demand is central to the application of the SSNIP test. In case the demand 
elasticity cannot be estimated, the SSNIP test is usually performed by way of an analysis of 
the ‘critical loss’. The critical loss is the maximum loss of sales that can be sustained by a 
hypothetical monopolist as a result of a price increase without rendering the price increase 
unprofitable. If the actual loss following the particular price increase is less than the critical 
loss, the price increase is profitable. The relevant market is defined as soon as the profit gains 
from the price increase are equal to the loss of profits from the decrease in sales for the given 
set of products in the market.
405
  
ADAPTING TO MULTI-SIDEDNESS - To account for the multi-sided network effects, the changes 
in demand and profit as a result of a price increase on one side should be considered 
simultaneously on all sides of the platform. Unlike in one-sided markets where the demand of 
only one customer group has to be taken into account, in two-sided markets it must be 
recognised that the demand on one side of the platform is linked with the demand on another 
side. The SSNIP test should therefore not be applied to the different sides of the platform in 
isolation. If it is not acknowledged that a reduction of the number of customers on side A will 
likely lead to a drop in the number of customers on side B too, the competitive constraints 
between the different customer groups are overlooked.
406
 
APPLYING THE SSNIP TEST TO ‘FREE’ SERVICES - The SSNIP test will be difficult to apply to 
online platforms, since users of these services are typically given access free of charge. In that 
situation, it is impossible to determine from which benchmark the price rise of 5 to 10% 
should be calculated. A price increase of a product with zero price would still be zero.
407
 
Because users expect online services to be offered free of charge, the fact that a fee is 
charged, even if it is only a symbolic fee of for example 1 euro cent per search, may drive a 
significant number of users to other platforms that continue to give users access to their 
functionality free of charge.
408
 Price is therefore not a reliable indicator to measure the 
substitutability of services in the online environment where providers compete on the basis of 
non-price dimensions such as quality and innovation. With regard to markets characterised by 
competition for the market where innovation rather than price is the relevant parameter, it has 
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been suggested to apply a 5 to 10% reduction in R&D expenditures instead of an increase in 
price.
409
  
APPLYING THE SSNIP TEST TO ADVERTISING SERVICES - However, it is also important to 
recognise the multi-sided nature of online platforms according to which the free user side is 
financed by advertisers who do pay a price for interacting with users. As regards the 
assessment of substitutability on the advertiser side of online platforms, it has been proposed 
to rely on surveys and interviews in order to assess whether advertisers would still employ the 
advertising services of a particular platform if the number of users on the other side dropped 
with 5 to 10% while advertising prices remained the same.
410
 In the context of the Chinese 
Qihoo/Tencent private competition dispute, the Guangdong Court in its 2013 judgment 
explicitly ignored the advertiser side of an instant messaging service by rejecting the approach 
put forward by the economic expert in the case to conduct a SSNIP test by engaging in a 
reduction in quality or an increase in the display of advertisements to users. Instead, the Court 
focused on evidence related to price even though the service was provided to users free of 
charge. It argued that although quality and advertising are relevant, ‘a more important factor 
to be considered is whether a lot of demand substitution will be generated if a hypothetical 
monopolist charges the service at a small scale continuously’.411 On appeal, the Chinese 
Supreme Court dismissed the approach of the Guangdong Court and stated that the 
application of the SSNIP test in the case at hand was improper because instant messaging 
services were offered free of charge to users and providers instead competed on quality.
412
 In 
the view of the Chinese Supreme Court, a price rise from zero to any amount, however small, 
would imply a major change in the product characteristics or business model and would result 
in a too broad relevant market including many products in the same market that are not 
substitutes.
413
  
QUALITY, NUMBER OF ADS, AMOUNT OF DATA EXTRACTED AND RELEVANCE AS POTENTIAL 
INDICATORS OF SUBSTITUTABILITY - An approach that has been put forward to measure the 
substitutability of the functionality offered to users by online social networks is to apply a 
Small but Significant Non-transitory Decrease in Quality (‘SSNDQ’) by enabling a provider 
to limit its maintenance expenses which would result in users having log in problems, website 
shut-downs, crashes due to user overload or users becoming victims of spam or hacking.
414
 In 
Qihoo/Tencent, the Chinese Supreme Court referred to the SSNDQ test as a possible 
                                                 
409
 P.A. GEROSKI, "Competition in Markets and Competition for Markets", Journal of Industry, Competition and 
Trade 2003, vol. 3, no. 3, (151), p. 159-160 and in particular footnote 13. 
410
 J. VERHAERT, "The challenges involved with the application of article 102 TFEU to the new economy: a case 
study of Google", European Competition Law Review 2014, vol. 35, no. 6, (265), p. 269-270. 
411
 D.S. EVANS AND V. YANHUA ZHANG, "The Qihoo v. Tencent Landmark Decision", Competition Policy 
International 9 April 2013, p. 3. See also T. JIANG, "The Qihoo/Tencent Dispute in the Instant Messaging 
Market: The First Milestone in the Chinese Competition Law Enforcement?", World Competition 2014, vol. 37, 
no. 3, (369), p. 376-377 and 384 who contends that the Guangdong Court merely borrowed the concept of 
SSNIP without properly conducting the underlying economic test. 
412
 Chinese Supreme Court in (2013) C3FJ4, Qihoo/Tencent, 16 October 2014, (B)(3). 
413
 D. STALLIBRASS AND S. PANG, "Clash of Titans: How China Disciplines Internet Markets", Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 2015, vol. 6, no. 6, (418), p. 419. 
414
 A. GEBICKA AND A. HEINEMANN, "Social Media & Competition Law", World Competition 2014, vol. 37, no. 
2, (149), p. 157-159. 
109 
 
instrument for measuring the substitutability of free services. However, the Supreme Court 
also recognised the difficulty in assessing a quality decline and in obtaining relevant data. For 
this reason, the Supreme Court argued that an SSNDQ test is useful for quantitative rather 
than qualitative analysis.
415
 In particular, it would be challenging to simulate a decrease in 
quality that is equivalent to a price increase of 5 to 10% and to quantify the effects of a 
quality degradation on the revenues of the market players in order to determine to 
profitableness of such a degradation. Furthermore, one can doubt whether all users experience 
a decrease in quality of an online service in the same way. Quality is not as objective as price 
as an indicator.
416
 The same can be said of a rise in the display of ads on online platforms. 
The attitude of users towards advertising may differ which makes the number of displayed ads 
an unreliable indicator of the utility experienced by users.
417
 The amount of personal data 
extracted by a provider of an online service also does not seem to be a good proxy for 
assessing substitutability because users may not notice an increase in the quantity of data 
collected especially due to the fact that the privacy policies of online services often lack in 
transparency and accessibility.
418
 As regards search engines, social networks and e-commerce 
platforms, a decrease in the relevance of, respectively, search results, social interactions and 
purchase suggestions may enable competition authorities to measure the degree of 
substitutability of the services provided to users.
419
 The difficulty with this approach is that 
users do not know what the most relevant search results, social interactions or purchase 
suggestions in a particular situation are and therefore cannot assess the level of relevance of 
the results, interactions and suggestions returned by the service. In this perspective, search 
engines, social networks and recommendation systems of e-commerce platforms can be seen 
as credence goods. It therefore seems hard if not impossible to simulate how users perceive a 
small reduction in relevance. In addition, such an approach merely takes the user side of the 
platform into account and disregards the link with advertisers which may lead to an erroneous 
assessment of the competitive dynamics in the market.
420
 In conclusion: whereas economists 
agree that the multi-sided nature of the market has to be taken into account when applying the 
SSNIP test, there is no consensus on how the SSNIP test can be modified in order to 
adequately measure the substitutability of online services offered in a multi-sided 
environment. 
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4.3 Market definition in new economy industries  
As discussed in section 4.2.2, the statements made by the European Commission in the 
context of the Google case and its merger decisions in Microsoft/Yahoo, Microsoft/Skype and 
Facebook/WhatsApp indicate that relevant product markets are still defined on the basis of the 
functionality offered to users. As a result, numerous relatively narrow relevant markets can be 
distinguished on the internet such as a market for horizontal search, a market for consumer 
communications services and a market for social networking. By defining relevant markets 
narrowly on the basis of the features made available to users, the Commission implicitly 
chooses to focus on preserving sustaining innovation within existing markets rather than 
encouraging disruptive innovation in new markets. If the relevant market is defined around 
the specific functionality offered, potential competitive constraints from related or future 
services are not taken into account.
421
 This is all the more relevant in the new economy where 
market players typically compete by introducing new services instead of by substituting or 
improving existing services. Since the preference for one type of competition or innovation 
can be regarded as a policy choice,
422
 it is a valid decision of the Commission to favour 
competition in the market and sustaining innovation over competition for the market and 
disruptive innovation. Nevertheless, it is worth considering how traditional competition 
analysis in general and market definition specifically could be adapted to better take account 
of the predominance of innovation over price as a parameter of competition in new economy 
industries.  
 
4.3.1 US initiative towards a framework for innovation in competition analysis 
INNOVATION PRIOR TO MARKET FORMATION - Traditional competition law analysis relies on an 
assessment of a certain type of behaviour in existing markets. Incentives for disruptive 
innovation may be hard to accommodate, since this type of innovation takes place before a 
market for the new development exists. A starting point for developing a framework for 
taking into account disruptive innovation would be to define markets more loosely and 
impose less strict market boundaries. The current approach towards market definition 
according to which a product either falls within or outside the relevant market may be too 
mechanical and lead to the situation that products which are not perfect substitutes but which 
still impose some degree of competitive pressure, are excluded from the assessment.
423
 For 
new economy industries, this may result in the definition of very narrow relevant markets and 
unjustified findings of dominance.
424
 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR INNOVATION IN US ANTITRUST ANALYSIS - The United States 
pioneered in giving innovation a more prominent place in competition analysis. While 
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holding leadership positions at the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of 
Justice (DoJ), Gilbert and Sunshine
425
 initiated a debate about the role of innovation in merger 
analysis in the 1990s. In a scholarly article, they introduced the concept of ‘innovation 
markets’ which would enable competition authorities to measure the impact of a merger in 
downstream product markets as well as in upstream innovation markets. In their view, the 
latter approach is necessary to assess the effects of a proposed transaction on innovation in 
markets where the merging parties are not actual or even potential competitors prior to the 
merger.
426
 If competition authorities limit their analysis to current product markets, 
competition enforcement may be either too restrictive or too permissive. Firms outside the 
product market that put competitive pressure on the incumbent with regard to innovation 
would be disregarded if the competition authority only looks at existing markets. 
Alternatively, competition concerns may be overlooked in case undertakings are not active on 
the same product market while competing fiercely with respect to innovation.
427
 In order to 
address these issues, Gilbert and Sunshine proposed to drop the focus on product markets and 
to assess the anticompetitive effects of a merger by way of the following five steps: (1) 
identify the overlapping research and development (R&D) activities of the merging firms; (2) 
identify alternative sources of R&D that are reasonable substitutes for the activities of the 
merging firms; (3) evaluate actual and potential competition from downstream products 
which would render a reduction in R&D unprofitable; (4) assess the increase in concentration 
in R&D that would occur as a result of the merger; and (5) assess whether the merger would 
lead to R&D efficiencies offsetting a potential reduction in R&D investments.
428
  
US INNOVATION MARKETS - Although Gilbert and Sunshine described the innovation market 
methodology in the context of merger review, they made clear that it could also be applied to 
evaluate other arrangements such as R&D agreements.
429
 The innovation market concept was 
adopted in the latter field in the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property. The Guidelines specify that in addition to product markets and technology markets, 
innovation markets can be used as a framework for assessing the effect of a licensing 
agreement on competition in developing new or improved goods or processes. An innovation 
market was defined as consisting of ‘the research and development directed to particular new 
or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development. 
The close substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies, and goods
[430]
 that 
significantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the relevant research and 
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development, for example by limiting the ability and incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to 
retard the pace of research and development. The Agencies will delineate an innovation 
market only when the capabilities to engage in the relevant research and development can be 
associated with specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms’.431  
US INNOVATION COMPETITION - In the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the reliance on 
markets was dropped and instead the concept of ‘innovation competition’ was introduced. 
The relevant question is whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation competition by 
encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that would 
prevail in the absence of the merger. According to the 2010 US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, the curtailment of innovation can ‘take the form of reduced incentive to continue 
with an existing product-development effort or reduced incentive to initiate development of 
new products’.432 An example of a US merger case in which the notion ‘innovation 
competition’ has been applied is the acquisition of General Motor’s Allison Transmission 
Division by ZF Friedrichshafen. In addition to the two product markets identified in the 
complaint (the market for automatic transmissions for transit buses and the market for 
automatic transmissions for heavy refuse route trucks), the DoJ also expressed concerns 
regarding a third market that was defined as the market for ‘technological innovation in the 
design, development and production of heavy automatic transmissions’. The definition of this 
market enabled the DoJ to assess the effect of the proposed transaction on the development of 
future technologies.
433
 
 
4.3.2 EU approach towards innovation in competition enforcement 
EU COMPETITION IN INNOVATION - A notion similar to innovation competition has been 
adopted in the EU under the name ‘competition in innovation’ in the 2011 Guidelines on the 
Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (EU Horizontal 
Guidelines). The European Commission acknowledges that competition in innovation in the 
context of R&D co-operation in some cases cannot be sufficiently assessed by analysing 
actual or potential competition in existing product or technology markets.
434
 However, in 
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industries in which the innovation process is not clearly structured so as to allow the 
identification of R&D poles, the Commission sees no other option than to rely on these 
existing markets.
435
 In industries in which the innovative efforts are structured in such a way 
that it is possible to identify competing R&D poles at an early stage, such as the 
pharmaceutical sector where new products have to go through regulatory approval 
procedures, the Commission suggests to analyse whether a sufficient number of R&D poles 
will remain after the agreement takes effect. The following approach is proposed by the 
Commission: ‘The starting point of the analysis is the R&D of the parties. Then credible 
competing R&D poles have to be identified. In order to assess the credibility of competing 
poles, the following aspects have to be taken into account: the nature, scope and size of any 
other R&D efforts, their access to financial and human resources, know-how/patents, or other 
specialised assets as well as their timing and their capability to exploit possible results. An 
R&D pole is not a credible competitor if it cannot be regarded as a close substitute for the 
parties’ R&D effort from the viewpoint of, for instance, access to resources or timing’.436 The 
framework enables competition authorities to take into account incentives for disruptive 
innovation, since it does not merely rely on competition in existing markets.
437
  
R&D INVESTMENT AS BASIS FOR MARKET DEFINITION - Following the approach introduced in 
the area of Article 101 TFEU in the EU Horizontal Guidelines, the European Commission 
could look at R&D investments in the other branches of competition law to assess 
competition in innovation beyond existing relevant product markets. In situations in which it 
is possible to identify competing R&D poles that are aimed at developing substitutable 
products or technology, the Commission suggests in the Guidelines on Horizontal Co-
operation Agreements to analyse whether after the relevant co-operation agreement there will 
be a sufficient number of remaining R&D poles.
438
 A similar approach could be applied to 
market definition in merger and abuse of dominance cases in the online environment where 
market players do not merely compete by lowering prices and improving products in existing 
markets but also by introducing new products which shift demand and create a new market of 
their own. In this context, R&D investment can be seen as input to new products and 
technologies. Instead of relying on a pure product market definition, upstream markets for 
R&D expenditure could be defined.
439
 However, as the Commission argues in the EU 
                                                                                                                                                        
markets’ instead of ‘competition in innovation’. However, the Commission did not define the term innovation 
market. See Commission Notice - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C3/02, par. 60. 
435
 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (EU Horizontal Guidelines) [2011] OJ 
C11/1, par. 122. 
436
 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (EU Horizontal Guidelines) [2011] OJ 
C11/1, par. 120. 
437
 See also J. DREXL, "Anticompetitive Stumbling Stones on the Way to a Cleaner World: Protecting 
Competition in Innovation Without a Market", Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, vol. 8, no. 3, 
(507), p. 520-522. 
438
 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (EU Horizontal Guidelines) [2011] OJ 
C11/1, par. 119-120. 
439
 See also M.L. KATZ AND H.A. SHELANSKI, "'Schumpeterian' Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech 
Markets", Competition 2005, vol. 14, (47), p. 50. 
114 
 
Horizontal Guidelines this method only works if it is possible to identify R&D efforts at an 
early stage. In the ICT sector, companies often do not disclose this type of information as a 
result of which it becomes hard to apply this approach. In addition, it is impossible to know 
which R&D investments will effectively lead to new products  in future markets.
440
 
SPECIALISED ASSETS - Nevertheless, even in case the precise R&D efforts are unobservable it 
could still be possible to identify the assets to which potential competitors need access in 
order to compete with the incumbent. The US 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property already referred to such resources as ‘specialised assets’.441 The notion 
was also incorporated in the EU Horizontal Guidelines which mentions know-how and 
patents as examples.
442
 The application of the notion of specialised assets would make the 
definition of the relevant market dependent on the capabilities and resources that are 
necessary for a firm to have in order to innovate. The proposed acquisition of Northrop 
Grumman by Lockheed Martin in 1998 in the US illustrates this. In the case, the DoJ defined 
a market for the ‘development, production and sale of high performance fixed-wing military 
aircraft for the U.S. military’ while it could not observe on what particular innovations the 
companies were working. In this context, the DoJ stated: ‘Northrop, Lockheed, and Boeing do 
all pursue new ideas and designs for future high performance fixed-wing military aircraft to 
meet specific combat needs, and these firms are the only companies that have the capabilities 
to compete for combined electronics system integration and military airframe upgrades’.443 
BROAD MARKET - Although R&D investments and specialised assets such as patents and 
know-how may be imperfect proxies of the level of innovation in an industry,
444
 the type of 
R&D and assets in which investments are made can give an indication of the direction in 
which innovation will develop and could form a starting point for defining a relevant market 
that is more favourable to innovation as compared to a strict product market definition. As 
more hints become available on what will constitute the technology of the future, it will be 
easier to identify the required inputs and thus the relevant market for innovation. In order to 
make market definition more conducive to disruptive innovation, a very wide relevant market 
should be defined as long as it is not clear which products or technologies will dominate in 
the future. An example of such a broad relevant market for internet services would be a 
market for attention. This market definition is favourable to disruptive innovation, since it 
does not rely on the specific service that is offered to internet users. Instead, a market for 
attention implies that all businesses that attract consumers to their websites or mobile 
applications compete for the limited time that users spend online irrespective of the specific 
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functionalities of the products and services that are offered.
445
 An alternative market 
definition for online platforms that does not take the specific service or functionality offered 
to users and advertisers as object but is based on the input needed to deliver those services 
would be a market for the data used to tailor the services to the specific needs of users and 
advertisers. As discussed above,
446
 such a relevant market for user data cannot be defined 
under current standards for market definition unless the data is sold as a separate product to 
third parties. However, most players like Google and Facebook do not trade user data to third 
parties but use the collected information as an input for the provision of relevant 
functionalities to users and targeted advertising services to advertisers. 
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT MARKET FOR DATA - It is submitted that the definition of an additional 
relevant market for user data is still appropriate in such circumstances even though, strictly 
speaking, there is no supply and demand for data. By regarding data as a specialised asset in 
analogy to the EU Horizontal Guidelines, a hypothetical or potential market for data can be 
defined in addition to the actual relevant markets for the services provided to users and 
advertisers. This will enable competition authorities and courts to take a form of potential 
competition into consideration whereby online platform providers do not only compete in the 
product markets for the specific services offered to users and advertisers but also in a broader 
market for data that can be deployed for improving the quality and relevance of these 
services.
447
 In addition, a more forward-looking stance towards market definition can be taken 
in this way which goes beyond analysing current usages of data in narrowly-drawn relevant 
markets for products and services.
448
 Critics may argue that the number of markets to be 
examined would be endless if relevant markets were to be defined around internally generated 
and used inputs to other products, as is the case with the data-dependent services provided to 
users and advertisers by online platforms.
449
 One should note, however, that data is more than 
just a form of input for the services delivered to users and advertisers on online platforms. By 
collecting data and monitoring the behaviour of users, internet players can also detect changes 
in interests which enables them to adapt to consumer preferences by introducing new services 
following potential trends.
450
 The latter role of data collection and analysis in the development 
of new services is not considered when only relying on relevant markets for current products 
or services. It is argued that this peculiarity of data justifies and even demands a deviation 
from existing competition law standards. By defining and investigating a potential market for 
data in addition to the relevant markets for the services currently offered by a particular 
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provider, competition analysis will better reflect the competitive reality of the environment in 
which online platforms operate.
451
 In addition, it also becomes possible to analyse the 
competitive constraints applicable to the asset to which potential competitors of incumbent 
providers need access in order to compete in future product markets.
452
 
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE COMMISSION NOTICE ON MARKET DEFINITION - However, the 
Commission notice on market definition seems to stand in the way of applying an approach 
that would take account of the role potential competition in online markets. Although the EU 
Horizontal Guidelines recognise that in some cases the level of competition cannot be 
sufficiently assessed by relying on existing markets, the Commission notice on market 
definition states that competitive constraints arising from potential competition should not be 
taken into account in the market definition on the ground that such constraints are generally 
less immediate. According to the Commission notice, these constraints can only be assessed 
in later stages of the competition assessment.
453
 By focusing on business models instead of 
end products and services as a starting point for the competition analysis, it could be assessed 
how a company makes profits and which other market players are able to put pressure on that 
profit stream. In this way, market definition would be better able to capture the dynamic 
nature of fast-moving industries.
454
 Even though such a more forward-looking approach to 
market definition would be desirable to make competition enforcement more conducive to 
disruptive innovation, it thus remains to be seen whether competition authorities and courts 
are willing to move away from strict product market definitions as required by the 
Commission notice in merger and abuse of dominance cases.  
CURRENT APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION - In competition cases in the ICT sector, 
the European Commission still focuses on preserving sustaining innovation within existing 
markets. At the same time, disruptive innovation seems to have played a very important role 
in solving the competition concerns. In Microsoft,
455
 the European Commission intervened in 
the market for PC operating systems. Although the Commission tried to preserve sustaining 
innovation in this market by forcing Microsoft to give competitors access to its technology, it 
seems that the competition concerns were rather solved by disruptive innovation coming from 
Google and others who brought the internet to the forefront diminishing the significance of 
Microsoft’s dominant position in the market for PC operating systems. In the Google 
investigation, the Commission still appears to concentrate on preserving sustaining innovation 
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in the market for search engines,
456
 while disruptive innovation coming from other internet 
platforms such as social networks and mobile applications may reduce the relevance of 
Google’s position in this market. As a result, even though the existing competition tools can 
be adapted to make market definition more conducive to disruptive innovation, it is 
questionable that the Commission will take a different approach in the future. 
 
4.4 Assessing dominance on online platforms 
The multi-sidedness and rapidly changing nature of online platforms also raises questions 
about the appropriate assessment of dominance of providers of search engines, social 
networks and e-commerce platforms. Dominance is defined in case law of the Court of Justice 
as ‘a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of 
its consumers’.457 
 
4.4.1 Room for competition in markets in which multi-sided businesses operate 
MARKET POWER IN MULTI-SIDED BUSINESSES - The multi-sidedness of a business also has 
consequences for the assessment of market power. The interdependencies between the 
customer groups affect the ability of the platform to behave independently of competitors. 
Noel and Evans explain that in principle the link between the different customer groups in a 
multi-sided platform limits the extent to which a price increase on any side of the platform is 
profitable. All else equal, market power would decrease. To illustrate: a price increase on side 
A reduces the number of customers on that side and makes the platform less attractive for 
customers on side B that are interested in interacting with the other group of customers. 
Therefore, an increase in price on side A will lead to a decrease in the number of customers 
on side B as well as in the price they are willing to pay.
458
 However, the multi-sided network 
effects between the different sides of the platform may also give rise to barriers to entry. As 
each side of the platform and the corresponding multi-sided network effect grows, it becomes 
more difficult for new entrants to gain market share.
459
  
FEW WINNERS TAKE ALL - Before a new entrant is able to successfully enter a multi-sided 
market, it needs to acquire a critical mass of customers on all sides of the platform. Without a 
user base, an online platform will not attract advertisers on whom it relies to make the 
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platform profitable. Advertisers will likely join the platform that has the most solid user base, 
since they have an interest in displaying their products or services to as many users as 
possible.
460
 Once one platform has achieved a critical mass, it may be hard for a competitor to 
gain a foothold on the market. It needs a strong user base itself before advertisers will be 
interested in joining, as they can already reach users through the platform that has established 
itself first. However, Lerner argues that multi-sided network effects in online platforms are 
not significant. As users’ demand for a platform is not driven by the availability of 
advertisements, multi-sided network effects do in his view not prevent users from switching 
once a smaller rival or new entrant offers a better service.
461
 Nevertheless, markets in which 
multi-sided businesses compete are typically quite concentrated. Because of the multi-sided 
network effects, these markets are generally characterised by the presence of a few firms that 
have a large market share. Therefore, they can be seen as ‘winner-take-most’ or ‘few-winners-
take-all’ businesses.462 Multi-sided platforms are usually not ‘winner-take-all’ businesses, 
since they evolve relatively slowly as they have to find the right price structure and attract 
customers on all sides of the platform. Because of product differentiation and the existence of 
heterogeneous customers, several platforms are able to coexist to a certain extent.
463
  
MULTI-HOMING AND PRICING - According to Evans & Noel, five factors determine the relative 
size of multi-sided platforms and their competitors. Multi-sided network effects and scale 
economies promote larger platforms with fewer competitors, while congestion, multi-homing 
and platform differentiation limit the size of these platforms and give more room for 
competition.
464
 The extent of multi-homing also affects the pricing strategy of the platform. 
Multi-homing will intensify price competition leading to lower prices on the side on which 
multi-homing is least prevalent. By lowering the prices, customers are discouraged from 
switching to other platforms that may also give them access to the same customers on the 
other side. When buyers, for example, multi-home on e-commerce platforms, sellers have 
several options for reaching them. By charging lower prices to a seller for joining a platform, 
                                                 
460
 However, Lerner argues that advertisers paying on a cost-per-click basis do not necessarily derive more value 
from advertising on a platform with more users because the advertising on such a platform entails 
proportionately higher costs as compared to a platform with less users due to the fact that an ad may obtain more 
user clicks on a larger platform. See A.V. LERNER, "The Role of "Big Data" in Online Platform Competition", 
SSRN Working Paper August 2014, p. 58, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482780. Nevertheless, what is most relevant for advertisers 
is the likelihood that the display of an ad amounts to a purchase. Therefore, the cost of advertising in itself does 
not give a complete picture of the value that an advertisers derives from advertising on a particular platform. In 
general, the number of purchases of an advertised product or service may increase with the number of users that 
are on the platform. If the number of purchases is indeed relatively higher on a larger platform, the higher sales 
may outweigh the higher costs of advertising resulting from the higher number of clicks by users. See also 
footnote 116. 
461
 A.V. LERNER, "The Role of "Big Data" in Online Platform Competition", SSRN Working Paper August 2014, 
p. 60-61, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482780. 
462
 D.S. EVANS, "Competition and Regulatory Policy for Multi-Sided Platforms with Applications to the Web 
Economy", SSRN Working Paper March 2008, p. 13, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090368. 
463
 D.S. EVANS, "The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets", Yale Journal on Regulation 2003, 
vol. 20, no. 2, (325), p. 350; D.S. EVANS, "Competition and Regulatory Policy for Multi-Sided Platforms with 
Applications to the Web Economy", SSRN Working Paper March 2008, p. 17, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090368. 
464
 See D.S. EVANS AND M. NOEL, "Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-Sided Platforms", 
Columbia Business Law Review 2005, vol. 2005, (101), p. 120-124. 
119 
 
the seller may be tempted to abandon other online e-commerce platforms if most buyers can 
be reached through the platform with the lowest price. Lower prices are thus used in an 
attempt to ‘steer’ sellers toward an exclusive relationship. The mere possibility of multi-
homing may also encourage platform providers to lower their prices in order to dissuade 
customers from joining other platforms.
465
  
EXCLUSIVITY - If both sides of a platform single-home it will be relatively hard for new 
entrants to attract customers, since the incumbent platform offers exclusive access to both 
customer groups. Because of first mover advantages, the platform that will get the most 
customers on board first will likely have a strong position on the market. In case of single-
homing the following applies: the more successful a platform is at attracting customers, the 
less successful rivals will be.
466
 By requiring exclusivity from customers, a platform can 
prevent customers from multi-homing and tie them to its business.
467
 However, such 
exclusivity agreements may raise competition issues. One of the concerns that the European 
Commission has expressed in the Google case relates to the agreements that Google 
concludes with websites on which it delivers search advertisements that are displayed 
alongside the search results following a search query of a user in a website’s search box. In 
the Commission’s view, these agreements result in de facto exclusivity requiring websites to 
obtain all or most of their search advertisements from Google and shutting out competing 
providers of search advertising intermediation services.
468
  
ONLINE ENVIRONMENT - The markets for search engines, social networks and e-commerce 
platforms are quite concentrated with a single player maintaining the leading position, 
respectively Google, Facebook and Amazon. Despite the market leadership of these 
undertakings, several smaller competitors are able to successfully operate their business. This 
scenario is in line with the framework established by Evans and Noel as regards the relative 
size of multi-sided platforms and their competitors. Economies of scale and multi-sided 
network effects are inherent to search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms as 
a result of which the markets in which their providers operate are characterised by a certain 
level of concentration. Nevertheless, because of platform differentiation and multi-homing by 
users and advertisers, competitors are able to attract customers to their platform and impose 
competitive pressure on the market leaders. 
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4.4.2 Establishing dominance of online platform providers 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERACTION - Because of the link between the user and 
advertiser side of an online platform, it is important to consider both sides in conjunction with 
each other when assessing dominance. In two cases involving payment cards, the Court of 
Justice made clear that the interaction between the different sides of a multi-sided platform 
has to be taken into account when analysing whether a measure violates Article 101 TFEU. In 
the context of an assessment of whether certain price measures adopted by an economic 
interest grouping within a French payment card system were by nature harmful to the proper 
functioning of normal competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, the Court of Justice argued in 
Cartes Bancaires that it is necessary ‘to take into consideration all relevant aspects [...] of the 
economic or legal context in which that coordination takes place, it being immaterial whether 
or not such an aspect relates to the relevant market’. According to the Court of Justice, that 
must particularly be the case when ‘there are interactions between the two facets of a two-
sided system’ such as those between the activities of the issuing of bank cards to consumers 
and the acquisition of merchants for their acceptance in the case at hand.
469
  
 
In MasterCard, the Court of Justice similarly stated that for assessing whether a measure, in 
casu the setting of multilateral interchange fees in the MasterCard payment system, which in 
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Cartes Bancaires case:  
In October 2007, the European Commission adopted a decision in which it 
concluded that Goupement des Cartes Bancaires, an economic interest grouping 
which managed a French payment card system, infringed Article 101(1) TFEU. 
The decision targeted the price measures implemented by the Groupement which 
were found to hinder the issuing of cards in France at competitive rates by new 
entrants. Although the tariffs were in principle applicable to all members of the 
Groupement, they were found to have been applied in such a way as to hinder the 
issuing of cards by smaller banks who were prepared to offer cards at a price lower 
than that of the large banks. The Commission concluded that the measures were 
anticompetitive by object and by effect.  
The General Court upheld the Commission decision in its judgment of November 
2012. In September 2014, the Court of Justice ruled on the appeal and set aside the 
ruling of the General Court in so far as the latter had held that the tariffs had as 
their object the restriction of competition. The Court of Justice argued that, 
although the General Court had set out the reasons why the measures at issue were 
capable of restricting competition, it in no way had explained in what respect that 
restriction of competition revealed a sufficient degree of harm in order to be 
characterised as a restriction by object. For that reason, the Court of Justice referred 
the case back to the General Court in order to examine whether the price measures 
had the effect of restricting competition.  
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principle infringes the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU can be justified under Article 
101(3) TFEU, ‘it is necessary to take into account the system of which that measure forms 
part, including, where appropriate, all the objective advantages flowing from that measure 
not only on the market in respect of which the restriction has been established, but also on the 
market which includes the other group of consumers associated with that system, in particular 
where, as in this instance, it is undisputed that there is interaction between the two sides of 
the system in question’.470 The Court of Justice dismissed the argument that the General Court 
had wrongly ignored the multi-sided nature of the MasterCard system. In the view of the 
Court of Justice, the General Court had specifically recognised that there was interaction 
between the two sides of the payment system, since it had examined the role of the 
multilateral interchange fees in balancing the issuing and acquiring side.
471
 Although these 
cases did not touch upon the assessment of dominance of multi-sided businesses, the 
statements of the Court of Justice that all relevant aspects of the economic or legal context of 
a two-sided system, and in particular the interaction between the two customer sides, have to 
be taken into account in the context of Article 101 TFEU may have relevance for competition 
analysis in general. When transposing the spirit of the rulings to the fields of merger review 
and Article 102 TFEU, the reasoning of the Court of Justice may be interpreted as indicating 
that the link between the different sides of a multi-sided platform also has to be considered 
when analysing whether an undertaking possesses a dominant position in the relevant market.  
ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATIONS ON MULTI-SIDEDNESS IN MICROSOFT - However, multi-sidedness 
does not always have to be determinative for the assessment of dominance. As explained 
earlier, it is an empirical question whether the multi-sidedness of a business is sufficiently 
pronounced so as to affect the competition analysis in a particular case.
472
 In its 2004 
Microsoft decision, the European Commission did not explicitly consider the multi-sided 
nature of the market for client PC operating systems but based its analysis on the indirect 
network effects that were identified in the market. The fact that the Commission did not apply 
the theory of multi-sidedness to the case is not surprising considering that economic research 
about the issue was still in its early stages at the time of the adoption of the Microsoft 
decision.
473
 In fact, indirect network effects can be considered as the notion closest to multi-
sidedness at that time. A PC operating system is to be regarded as a multi-sided platform 
because it brings users and application developers together. The two groups of customers are 
connected through reciprocal multi-sided network effects since both groups attach value to the 
size of the other group. On the one hand, the utility that a user derives from a PC operating 
system depends on the applications that are and will be available for it. On the other hand, 
application developers are interested in writing applications for the PC operating systems that 
are most popular among users. The Commission summarised the phenomenon as follows: ‘the 
more popular an operating system is, the more applications will be written to it and the more 
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applications are written to an operating system, the more popular it will be among users’.474 
The Commission formalised this mechanism in terms of indirect network effects giving rise to 
an applications barrier to entry according to which potential competing operating systems can 
only be successfully launched if a critical mass of compatible applications was already 
available for them.
475
 By taking into account the indirect network effects in its assessment of 
Microsoft’s dominance, the Commission seems to have succeeded in understanding the 
competitive dynamics of the market for client PC operating systems and in analysing the 
impact of Microsoft’s behaviour. The application of the theory of multi-sidedness in the 
decision would therefore probably not have led to a different outcome.
476
  
ARE MARKET SHARES A RELIABLE PROXY FOR DOMINANCE OF MULTI-SIDED BUSINESSES? - 
Dominance on each side of a multi-sided platform depends on the degree of competition on 
the different sides. In the online intermediary industry, the market position of a provider is 
dependent on its success with users as well as advertisers. Since the competitive dynamics in 
a multi-sided market are best reflected when two different relevant markets are defined 
instead of one relevant market for the platform as a whole,
477
 the market power of, for 
example, a search engine provider, cannot be reliably determined by solely considering 
market shares on either the user or advertiser side of the market. In order to fully take into 
account the link between the user and advertiser side, dominance has to be assessed for the 
platform in its entirety and not for each side in isolation. The identification of different sets of 
market shares for each relevant market does not seem to capture the interaction between the 
user and advertiser side of a multi-sided platform. As a consequence, the question arises 
whether market shares are an adequate proxy for assessing whether a businesses that 
competes in a multi-sided market has a dominant position.
478
  
 
4.4.3 From market shares to potential competition? 
ROLE OF MARKET SHARES - Market shares have always played an important role in the 
assessment of the competitive strength of undertakings in competition enforcement. It follows 
from case law of the Court of Justice that very large market shares are in themselves, and save 
in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position.
479
 While not 
touching upon whether market shares constitute a reliable indicator of dominance of multi-
sided businesses, the European Commission argued in its Microsoft/Skype merger decision 
that market shares only provide a limited indication of competitive strength in the context of 
the market for (single-sided) internet consumer communications services because of the 
nascent and dynamic nature of the sector as a result of which market shares can change 
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quickly within a short period of time.
480
 In its Cisco judgment, the General Court confirmed 
this finding of the Commission and argued that ‘the consumer communications sector is a 
recent and fast-growing sector which is characterized by short innovation cycles in which 
large market shares may turn out to be ephemeral’. In such a dynamic context, ‘high market 
shares are not necessarily indicative of market power and, therefore, of lasting damage to 
competition’ in the view of the General Court.481 The fact that the services are offered free of 
charge was also a relevant factor in assessing market power according to the General Court. 
Since users expect to receive consumer communications services free of charge, the potential 
for providers to set their pricing policy freely is significantly restricted. Any attempt to make 
users pay would run the risk of reducing the attractiveness of the services and of encouraging 
users to switch to other providers continuing to offer their services for free. Given the level of 
innovation on the market, undertakings would also run the risk of reducing the attractiveness 
of their communications services if they decided to stop innovating.
482
 Even though Microsoft 
would post-merger have a market share of 80 to 90% on the narrowest possible relevant 
market for video calls delivered on Windows-based PCs, the Commission and the General 
Court concluded that the concentration would not give rise to competition concerns because 
of the dynamic character of the sector and the existence of sufficient alternative providers to 
which consumers could easily switch.
483
 
MARKET SHARES AND DYNAMIC MARKETS - In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission referred 
to and relied upon the statement of the General Court that high market shares are not 
necessarily indicative of market power in the market for consumer communications services. 
In line with the formulation of the General Court in Cisco, the Commission noted that ‘the 
consumer communications sector is a recent and fast-growing sector which is characterized 
by frequent market entry and short innovation cycles in which large market shares may turn 
out to be ephemeral’.484 In its analysis of the possible consequences of the concentration in 
the market for social networking services the Commission did not pay attention to the level of 
market shares and the extent to which they are determinative for the existence of 
dominance.
485
 Both the Commission and the General Court in the context of the 
Microsoft/Sype merger as well as the Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp confined the 
statement that the value of market shares is limited for measuring the competitive strength of 
undertakings to the consumer communications market and did not consider the validity of this 
statement to other dynamic markets as well. A similar reasoning could be applied to social 
networks, search engines and e-commerce platforms that all form part of a dynamic sector. 
Nevertheless, in earlier merger decisions involving internet services, in particular the 
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acquisition of Yahoo’s search business by Microsoft and the acquisition of DoubleClick by 
Google, the Commission still used market shares to measure the competitive strength of 
undertakings in the markets for internet search and online advertising.
486
 In addition, in the 
Google investigation the Commission referred to the market share of Google as an indication 
that it has a dominant position.
487
 
STABLE MARKETS - One could argue that market shares are still a good proxy for assessing 
market power in established dynamic markets in which market shares have been relatively 
stable for a longer period of time. In Akzo, the Court of Justice referred to a three year period 
as basis for a stable market share.
488
 While social media, online search and e-commerce can 
also be regarded as dynamic sectors that are still evolving, the positions of, respectively, 
Facebook, Google and Amazon, are more stable than that of Skype in the nascent market for 
communications services at the time of the acquisition by Microsoft. According to the 
Commission in Microsoft/Skype, the latter market was anticipated to grow immensely with 
the number of users of instant messaging expected to triple from 2010 to 2016 and the number 
of video calls expected to increase from 3.2 billion in 2011 to 29.6 billion in 2015.
489
  
CALCULATING MARKET SHARES FOR USER MARKETS - If it is considered that market shares 
have to be taken into account for determining the competitive strength of undertakings on the 
user side of online platforms such as social networks, search engines and e-commerce 
platforms, it is important to find an accurate methodology for calculating market shares. The 
Commission argued in Microsoft/Skype that market shares based on volume in terms of 
unique users constitute better indicators for the market power of undertakings in the market 
for consumer communications services than market shares in value as these services are 
provided free of charge. In the Commission decision, a unique user was defined as an 
individual that has actively used a given service for a period of one month.
490
 According to 
the Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp, the user engagement with a communications service 
is best examined by considering whether the service is actually used every month and day or 
by looking at the number of messages exchanged between users. The Commission did not 
consider monthly minutes of use as a reliable metric because the length of communications 
could also depend on exogenous factors such as the relationship between the users of the 
service. For the calculation of market shares in the market for communications services in the 
context of Facebook/WhatsApp, no relevant datasets were available to determine the actual 
use of these services according to the methodology that the Commission considered to be the 
most reliable.
491
 If market shares are deemed important for assessing the competitiveness of 
markets on the user side of online platforms, the question is thus whether relevant information 
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is available on the basis of which the different market positions can be determined in an 
accurate and reliable way.  
POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND ENTRY BARRIERS - Instead of solely relying on market shares, it 
is submitted that competition authorities and courts should look at the strength of potential 
competition in order to assess whether a particular undertaking is able to behave 
independently from its competitors, customers and consumers. Unlike in traditional industries 
where competition takes place in the market on the basis of price and output, in new economy 
industries competition tends to come from subsequent competitors that compete for the 
market and overturn the existing market structure. Although an undertaking may have a high 
market share, it can nevertheless be under significant competitive pressure if new firms are 
able to take over its leading position. As long as entry barriers are low, the market is 
contestable and new entrants may challenge the incumbent’s market power. As discussed in 
section 2.4 above,  the network economy characteristics of online platforms may give rise to 
entry barriers  protecting the position of incumbents and reducing the possibility for potential 
competition to flourish. If entry barriers can be identified, the crucial question to be answered 
is whether they give incumbents a lasting competitive advantage in the factual circumstances 
of the case. 
R&D INVESTMENTS AS A SOURCE OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION - In line with the proposal made 
in section 4.3 to use R&D investments as a basis for market definition, attention could also be 
paid to R&D investments in the assessment of the competitive strength of an undertaking.
492
 
If several undertakings in the market invest heavily in R&D, competition may be substantial 
despite the existence of high market shares. If the precise R&D efforts of a firm cannot be 
identified, regard could be had to the extent to which it has access to specialised assets. For 
instance, the concentration of relevant know-how or user data at one online platform could be 
an indication for dominance. As an alternative to R&D investments and specialised asssets, 
the recent entry of new market participants may be an indication that the market is sufficiently 
competitive.
493
  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
EMERGING APPROACHES - In several perspectives, online platforms raise new challenges for 
competition enforcement. Because of their multi-sided nature and the predominance of 
innovation as a parameter of competition, traditional competition analysis may not be 
sufficiently able to reflect how competition takes place on search engines, social networks and 
e-commerce platforms. Although online platforms have some specific characteristics that 
have to be taken into account in competition law analysis, the tools that are used to define 
relevant markets and to assess dominance are flexible enough to be adapted to these services. 
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While economists agree that competition authorities and courts have to consider the multi-
sided nature of a market when applying the competition rules, there is little consensus on 
how, for example, the SSNIP test has to be modified in order to adequately capture the 
competitive dynamics in online markets where services are provided free of charge on one 
side of the platform.  
ONE OR SEVERAL RELEVANT MARKETS - A critical issue for market definition of multi-sided 
businesses is whether one market for the platform as a whole or several markets 
corresponding with each of the sides of the platform have to be delineated. In previous cases 
involving search engines and social networks, the European Commission defined separate 
relevant markets for the user and the advertiser side of these platforms. Such an approach is 
submitted to be preferable because it enables competition authorities and courts to consider 
the variety of entities from which multi-sided online platforms may experience competitive 
pressure. In order to enable competition authorities and courts to take a more forward-looking 
approach to competition analysis in merger and abuse of dominance cases, it is proposed to 
rely on the notion of competition in innovation and regard user data as a specialised asset in 
analogy to the EU Horizontal Guidelines. Even if user data is not traded to third parties and 
no supply and demand for data can be identified, it is still desirable to define a potential 
market for data in addition to the relevant markets for the services provided to users and 
advertisers. In this way, the significance of data for the development of new products and 
services can be taken into account.  
MOVING AWAY FROM PRICE AND MARKET SHARES - Because of the multi-sided network effects 
present in online platforms, there is a tendency towards ‘winner-take-most’ or ‘few-winners-
take-all’ markets. As competition in new economy markets typically leads to the development 
of new markets, it is argued that benchmarks or proxies other than price and market shares 
have to be used to reliably conduct market definition and assess dominance. Because of the 
fast-moving nature of the sector, market boundaries are fluctuating and online platform 
providers may impose competitive pressure on each other despite offering different 
functionalities to users. In this regard, the current approach towards market definition could 
be adapted in the sense that relevant markets would have to be defined more loosely in order 
to reflect the dynamic process of competition in new economy industries. However, the 
European Commission still relies on narrowly defined and functionality-based relevant 
product markets. With regard to the assessment of dominance, the statements of the European 
Commission and the General Court in the Microsoft/Skype merger, which the Commission 
referred to and relied upon in Facebook/WhatsApp, reveal that both institutions regard 
potential competition as a more relevant indicator than market shares in the dynamic market 
of internet consumer communications services. In order to operationalise potential 
competition, competition authorities could examine the extent of recent entry in the market 
and measure the R&D investments of the different market participants. By relying on 
potential competition as an alternative to market shares in dynamic industries such as the 
online intermediary sector, competition analysis can be made more conducive towards 
innovation.  
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Part II: Data as Essential Facility  
COMPETING WITH DATA - In the online environment, personal information has become a raw 
material or necessary input for companies that are employing business models dependent on 
the acquisition and monetisation of data. Online search engines, social networks and e-
commerce platforms rely on data as an input to provide targeted advertising possibilities and 
to deliver services to users that are of the relevance and quality they expect. By keeping the 
vast quantities of collected data to themselves, incumbent providers like Google, Facebook 
and Amazon are able to foreclose competition from new entrants and companies that would 
like to develop complementary services but do not have access to the required information. 
Against this background, the question can be posed how competition law tools can be applied 
to effectively tackle competitiveness issues involving data on online platforms. 
OUTLINE - While several potential competition problems with regard to access to data can be 
distinguished, the focus of the second part of the PhD lies on refusals to give access to data 
on online platforms. To that end, the application of the so-called essential facilities doctrine is 
analysed in the US and EU decision-making practice and case law to identify the current 
legal standards applicable to refusals to deal. In addition, a more coherent framework for the 
future application of the essential facilities doctrine is set out taking into account the 
underlying economic interests in refusal to deal cases. Afterwards, possible scenarios relating 
to refusals to give access on online platforms are discussed and it is analysed how a relevant 
market for data can be defined, how market power with regard to data can be established and 
how the abusive nature of refusals to deal involving data can be assessed.   
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5 Setting the scene 
 
5.1 Introduction 
DATA AS A KEY COMPETITIVE DIFFERENTIATOR ON ONLINE PLATFORMS - The competitive 
strength of online platforms is increasingly being determined by the amount and the quality of 
the data they hold. Both on the user and the advertiser side of online platforms the use of data 
forms an important means to attract customers. Advertisers benefit from better targeted 
advertising services which increase the probability that an advertised product or service is 
actually purchased by the users to which the ad is displayed. The more detailed the profile is 
that a provider has about its users, the more precise possibilities it can offer its advertisers for 
selecting their intended audience. On the user side of online platforms, the relevance of 
services to users is a key competitive differentiator on the internet. By using data to increase 
the relevance of search results, suggested social network interactions and recommendations 
for future purchases, providers of search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms 
are able to improve the quality of their services and attract users to their platforms. Against 
this background, this chapter looks at several aspects of data in order to set the scene for the 
analysis in the next chapters. 
OUTLINE - In section 2, the importance of data in the digital economy is discussed as well as 
how information about users is collected and used by providers of search engines, social 
networks and e-commerce platforms. Afterwards, section 3 pays attention to the way in which 
the interest of, respectively, users and online platform providers is protected under EU law. 
Given the fundamental role of data for competition on the internet, the scope for competition 
issues in this environment is also growing. In this perspective, limitations on data portability, 
a lack of interoperability of online platforms and potential refusals to give access to user data 
are identified in section 4 as possible areas of concern which may attract scrutiny of 
competition authorities. The last issue is at the heart of the second part of the thesis and is 
analysed in detail in chapter 6. 
 
5.2 Role of data in the digital economy 
DATA AS A NEW CURRENCY - Data is playing an increasingly important role in the digital 
economy. The World Economic Forum has considered personal data to constitute a new 
economic asset class.
494
 Data is also referred to as ‘the new oil’ or ‘the new currency’ of the 
21
st
 century.
495
 The phenomenon of data becoming a type of currency can be illustrated by the 
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fact that companies have started to offer consumers the possibility to replace part of the 
monetary payment for a product or service by giving permission to collect their data. For 
instance, American telecommunications company AT&T gives consumers who agree to be 
tracked online a discount of 29 dollar per month on their broadband subscription and Amazon 
sells Kindle tablets and e-readers at a discounted price to consumers who are willing to accept 
targeted advertisements to be displayed on the device.
496
 The use of data as a currency is also 
reflected in the proposal for a Digital Content Directive that the European Commission 
introduced in December 2015. Article 3(1) of the proposal makes clear that the Digital 
Content Directive would apply to any contract where digital content, such as music or digital 
games, is supplied to a consumer and, in exchange, ‘a price is to be paid or the consumer 
actively provides counter-performance other than money in the form of personal data or any 
other data’.497 For the purposes of the proposal for a Digital Content Directive, ‘a service 
allowing sharing of and any other interaction with data in digital form provided by other 
users of the service’ is also regarded as ‘digital content’.498 A social network or a 
communications app would thus fall within the scope of application of the Digital Content 
Directive. The proposal aims at giving consumers the same rights when they enter into a 
contract for the supply of digital content whether they pay with money or with data. In this 
context, one of the recitals to the proposal states that the introduction of a ‘differentiation 
depending on the nature of the counter-performance would discriminate between business 
models’ and ‘would provide an unjustified incentive for businesses to move towards offering 
digital content against data’.499 By introducing the proposal, the Commission thus explicitly 
recognises that data constitutes a form of payment for digital services and should give rise to 
the same legal protection for consumers. 
UBIQUITY OF DATA COLLECTION - Technological advances enabling the collection, analysis 
and storage of growing amounts of information have strengthened the ability and the 
incentive of companies to gather and use personal data.
500
 Brick-and-mortar companies such 
as shops, supermarkets, banks, insurance, energy and telecommunications companies collect 
information about their customers in the form of, respectively, transactional data, information 
about calls made by consumers and data relating to their financial position or energy 
consumption. Customer information is valuable for any business, but this is even more so for 
online businesses that have developed business models depending on the acquisition and 
monetisation of personal data.
501
 While it is not new for companies to gather information 
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about their customers, the scope of the gathered data, the precision with which a company can 
link an action to a specific customer and the sheer quantity of information collected on the 
internet cannot be compared to the brick-and-mortar world. For example, prior to the advent 
of online shopping, stores did not have access to abandoned shopping carts and complete lists 
of past purchases enabling them to tailor products automatically to the needs and interests of 
consumers.
502
  
BIG DATA VERSUS PERSONAL DATA - The term ‘big data’ is often used to describe the 
exponential growth in the availability and use of data resulting in massive datasets that 
traditional database systems cannot effectively manage and process.
503
 According to a widely 
adopted definition provided by information technology research and advisory company 
Gartner, big data is ‘high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets that 
demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and 
decision making’.504 Big data is thus not only characterised by its volume, but also by its 
complexity in terms of the different types of structured or unstructured data and the need for 
the data to be collected and analysed quickly. Two ‘V’s may be added to this ‘3V’ big data 
definition. One for veracity which is an indicator of the quality and trustworthiness of the 
data.
505
 And another for value which relates to the increasing economic and social value to be 
obtained from the use of data.
506
 It is important to note that big data is not necessarily 
personal data. The current Data Protection Directive and the future General Data Protection 
Regulation define ‘personal data’ as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person’. Under the Data Protection Directive, an identifiable person is defined as ‘one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity’. The General Data Protection Regulation specifies that ‘an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, online 
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identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’.507 
‘FREE’ ONLINE SERVICES - Although not all big data can be traced back to individuals, most of 
the information collected about users by online platforms qualifies as personal data. For 
example, the Article 29 Working Party
508
 concluded that the search history of an individual is 
personal data if the individual to which it relates is identifiable.
509
 In return for free access to 
their functionalities, providers of online services including search engines, social networks 
and e-commerce platforms gather data about the profile of users, their interests and online 
behaviour. The collection of personal data consequently operates as an indispensable currency 
used to compensate the providers for the delivery of their services to users.
510
 One may also 
regard the provision of personal data by users or their exposure to targeted advertisements as 
costs they have to incur in order to be able to use the online functionalities without having to 
pay a monetary fee.
511
 
TYPES OF DATA - The user data held by online platforms encompasses several types of 
information. On the one hand, users provide data themselves in the form of, for example, 
profile information, photos and lists of friends or contacts on social networks and search 
queries inserted in the search box of search engines and e-commerce platforms. On the other 
hand, providers of online platforms obtain or create data by means of analysing the behaviour 
and habits of users. The use of ‘cookies’ typically plays an important role in the collection of 
this type of behavioural data. Information about the user’s interests and preferences is stored 
by the web browser in a text file that is sent back to the server every time the user accesses a 
server’s page using the same web browser.512 Next to cookies, other tracking methods exist 
                                                 
507
 Article 2(a) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (Data Protection Directive) [1995] OJ L 281/31 and Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1. For a further analysis of the concept of personal data, see 
ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data’, WP 136, 20 June 2007. 
508
 The Article 29 Working Party was set up under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive and is composed 
of a representative from the national data protection authority of each EU Member State, a representative of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (the independent supervisory authority that is responsible for ensuring that 
all EU institutions and bodies respect people’s right to personal data protection and privacy when processing 
their personal data) and a representative of the European Commission.  
509
 ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines’, WP 148, 
4 April 2008, p. 8. 
510
 PRELIMINARY OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in 
the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the 
Digital Economy’, March 2014, par. 1. See section 4.2.1 above, for an analysis of the role of data as a currency 
under current market definition standards. 
511
 Newman refers to these costs as, respectively, information and attention costs. See J.M. NEWMAN, "Antitrust 
in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations", SSRN Working Paper July 2014, p. 32-33, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474874&download=yes. 
512
 For the installation of and access to cookies, consent of the user is required. See Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy 
Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (ePrivacy 
Directive) [2002] OJ L 201/37) as amended by the Citizens’ Rights Directive (Directive 2009/136/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 [2009] OJ L 337/11). For a discussion on the 
introduction of the requirement for consent and its practical implementation, see E. KOSTA, "Peeking into the 
133 
 
such as fingerprinting and social plugins. Fingerprinting enables unique identification of a 
device or application without the use of cookies. The most well-known forms of 
fingerprinting are ‘device fingerprinting’ and ‘browser fingerprinting’. Fingerprints are 
generated by combining a set of information elements that can be used to single out, link or 
infer a user or device over time.
513
 Social plugins are website components, such as 
Facebook’s ‘Like’ button and Google+’s ‘+1’, that are integrated into many websites outside 
a social network. They facilitate the sharing of third-party content within social networks, but 
also enable social network providers to track users outside the social network and to collect 
additional information about their preferences.
514
 In addition to, what it refers to as, 
‘volunteered data’ explicitly shared by users and ‘observed data’ obtained by recording the 
actions of users online, the World Economic Forum distinguishes a third type of data: so-
called ‘inferred data’ which can be derived from the analysis of volunteered or observed 
information.
515
 The last category may also be regarded as ‘metadata’ which is data that 
describes other data or, in other words, data about data. 
USE OF DATA - Online intermediaries can employ the collected user data as an input of 
production to improve their services by offering better targeted advertising services and by 
increasing the relevance and quality of the functionalities provided to users. User data may 
also form an additional revenue stream for online platforms if they sell it as a commodity or a 
raw material to third parties.
516
 For example, Twitter licenses data to companies using Twitter 
data to build products, to analyse internally or to serve other commercial purposes.
517
 
Amazon, Facebook and Google all clarify in their privacy policies that they do not sell 
personal data to third parties.
518
 They do not share data with advertisers and only use the 
information that they have collected about their users in order to provide advertisers the 
possibility to target their ads to particular categories of users.  
PARTNERSHIPS WITH THIRD PARTIES - At the same time, social network providers are 
increasingly teaming up with third parties in order to be able to offer better targeted 
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advertising services. For example, Facebook entered into two new partnerships in 2015. In 
March 2015, Facebook announced its collaboration with DataSift, a leading social data 
platform that provides real-time, human-generated data enabling companies to aggregate, 
filter and extract insights from data on social networks, blogs and news websites. With the 
help of DataSift, Facebook introduced so-called ‘topic data’ which shows marketers what 
audiences are saying on Facebook about events, brands, subjects and activities enabling them 
to make better decisions about how they market on Facebook.
519
 Facebook relies on 
DataSift’s technology to aggregate and deliver summary results from topic data. All the 
information used for topic data is anonymised and aggregated. Topic data only provides 
guidance for marketers and cannot be used to targets ads directly. In addition, marketers do 
not get the actual topic data from DataSift but only the analyses and interpretations of the 
information.
520
 In May 2015, Facebook entered into a partnership with IBM with the goal of 
integrating Facebook’s targeted advertising technology into IBM’s own marketing services 
for retailers enabling them to combine data they have about their customers with Facebook 
data. IBM has access to Facebook’s anonymised and aggregate audience insights in order to 
give marketers a better picture of their target audiences.
521
 IBM had already established a 
similar partnership with Twitter in October 2014.
522
  
ROLE OF DATA BROKERS - Apart from partnerships with specific third parties and Twitter’s 
data licensing activities, the prevailing online platform providers do not sell or actively 
disclose data. So-called data brokers do sell data to third parties and are thus active on a 
market for data. Data brokers collect information from publicly available websites such as 
social networks single-handedly and combine this with data from public records in order to 
create profiles of consumers that they can resell to companies who in their turn may use it for 
various purposes such as identity verification, fraud prevention or marketing.
523
 Facebook 
has, without sharing any personal data, partnered with data brokers including Acxiom, 
Datalogix and Epsilon enabling advertisers to target their advertisements to Facebook users 
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not only on the basis of their expressed interests on the social network but also based on the 
products and brands they buy across both desktop and mobile as revealed by the data held by 
these third parties.
524
 
EXISTENCE OF A MARKET FOR DATA - Even though these partnerships do not give the third 
parties involved access to the personal data on Facebook’s social network, they come very 
close to the situation in which Facebook discloses or shares data to or with third parties. In 
such a case, one could argue that Facebook, or other providers that have similar partnerships, 
is active on a market for data. As proposed in section 4.3.2 above, competition authorities and 
courts could define a potential market for data in addition to the relevant markets for the 
existing services offered on the platform. This would make competition analysis more 
forward-looking and better reflect the competitive constraints under which providers of online 
platforms are currently operating. In particular, mergers and conduct of incumbent providers 
in the online environment may have as objective the accumulation of additional data to be 
used to improve existing services or to develop new ones.
525
 The partnerships that providers 
increasingly enter into with third parties provide support for the existence of a (potential) 
market for data.  
DATA IS MORE THAN A CURRENCY - The fact that data operates as a type of currency for ‘free’ 
digital services, as recognised by the European Commission in its proposal for a Digital 
Content Directive, forms another argument in favour of the definition of such a potential 
market. Even though the focus of market definition under existing competition law standards 
is on the type of product or service instead of on the means of payment,
526
 an additional 
analysis of the competitive constraints relating to data would be desirable in order to complete 
the interaction of a provider with consumers on the user side of its platform. At the same time, 
one should note that the role of data in online platforms goes beyond constituting a currency 
used by consumers to pay for otherwise free services. Even if Google, for example, would 
starting charging users for making a search, it would still need to collect information on the 
queries that users have looked for and the links that are subsequently clicked on in order to be 
able to continue to deliver relevant search results to users. While the provision of data by 
users may not qualify as an economic exchange under existing decision-making practice, its 
significance as an input to improve the relevance of existing services and to monitor possible 
trends which could result into successful new products would justify a deviation from current 
competition law standards.
527
  
 
5.3 Protection of user data under data protection and intellectual property regimes 
With regard to the protection of data, a distinction can be made between users, who have a 
personal interest in the protection of the information they have provided to online platforms, 
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and providers, who have an interest in user data for commercial reasons because they rely on 
data for the delivery of good quality services to users and advertisers. While the interests of 
users are protected in particular under the European data protection regime, online platform 
providers may invoke copyright, sui generis database protection and trade secret laws to 
protect the datasets they have built around user data. 
 
5.3.1 Protection of personal data under the European data protection regime 
PROPERTISATION OF PERSONAL DATA - Throughout the years, a number of scholars has been 
calling for the introduction of property rights in personal information with the goal of 
achieving a better protection of personal data.
528
 Ownership of personal information is argued 
to enable individuals to negotiate with firms about an adequate compensation and the uses to 
which they are willing to have their data put. However, scholars have also identified 
difficulties with granting property rights in personal data and have raised doubts about 
whether such a bargaining process would indeed lead to a higher level of protection.
529
 
Instead of vesting property rights in personal data and enabling individuals to bargain for their 
interests by way of a market-oriented mechanism, the EU legislature decided to take a human 
rights-based approach and to provide for a minimum level of data protection in legislation.
530
 
HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH - In 1995, the Data Protection Directive was adopted in 
order to harmonise the existing national data protection laws of the EU Member States. The 
Data Protection Directive aims to ensure that personal data is processed fairly, lawfully and in 
accordance with a specified purpose.
531
 In January 2012, the European Commission 
introduced a proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation that will replace the Data 
Protection Directive which was said to be in need for an update in order to be able to 
adequately deal with technological developments that have brought new challenges for the 
protection of personal data.
532
 The General Data Protection Regulation is based on Article 16 
TFEU, which establishes the principle that everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning them and was introduced as the new legal basis for the adoption of data 
protection rules by the Lisbon Treaty. Following its final adoption in April 2016, the General 
Data Protection Regulation will enter into force on 25 May 2018 after which the Data 
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Protection Directive will be repealed and cease to have legal effect.
533
 In the area of electronic 
communications, the ePrivacy Directive complements the current Data Protection Directive 
and the future General Data Protection Regulation. The ePrivacy Directive is specifically 
applicable to the processing of personal data as well as the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector.
534
 In addition to these instruments of secondary EU law, 
personal data is protected in the framework of the Council of Europe under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights
535
 which guarantees the right to respect for private 
and family life of which the right to protection of personal data is considered to form part.
536
 
Furthermore, the European Union proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union
537
 in 2000 which became legally binding as a source of primary EU law in 
December 2009 with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
538
 The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights does not only comprise a right to respect for private and family life in Article 7, but 
also establishes a right to data protection in Article 8 giving data protection, already enshrined 
in Article 16 TFEU, the status of a fundamental right in EU law.
539
 
 
5.3.2 Copyright and sui generis database protection for user data 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR MATERIAL POSTED BY USERS - Although no specific property 
rights have been created for personal data as such, this type of information may in some 
circumstances fall under the scope of protection of any of the existing intellectual property 
rights. Copyright and sui generis database protection are of relevance in this respect. 
Copyright law protects the expression of an original idea by granting the authors temporary 
exclusive rights, including the right of reproduction and the right of communication to the 
public.
540
 Ideas, facts or data in itself do not qualify for copyright protection. Personal data 
such as name, age and occupation is factual information and therefore not copyrightable. 
However, users may hold copyright over posts, photos and videos that they have uploaded on 
online social networks if such content meets the originality requirement. It is important to 
note that most social networks have a provision in their general conditions by which users 
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agree to grant the provider a license to use any intellectual property protected content 
uploaded on the platform. In Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, for 
example, it is stated that: ‘For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like 
photos and videos (IP content), [...] you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-
licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in 
connection with Facebook (IP License). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content 
or your account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted 
it’.541 This implies that users give Facebook a right to use any intellectual property protected 
material posted on the social network in either non-commercial or commercial way. 
Irrespective of whether such a wide-ranging clause is legally valid, users retain the right to 
continue to use and exploit their copyrighted content themselves because the license granted 
to Facebook is non-exclusive.
542
  
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR DATABASES SET UP BY PROVIDERS - While users hold copyright 
over original posts, photos and videos, providers of online platforms may be able to claim 
copyright protection over the databases they have created on the basis of the data collected 
about users. Under the Database Directive, a database is defined as ‘a collection of 
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
individually accessible by electronic or other means’.543 The Database Directive provides for 
a dual regime of protection of databases by granting copyright protection to the structure of 
original databases and by establishing a newly created sui generis right protecting the content 
of databases in general. Under Article 3(1) of the Directive, ‘databases which, by reason of 
the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual 
creation’ are protected by copyright. The copyright protection of a database only covers the 
structure of the data and does not extend to its content.
544
 In Football Dataco, a preliminary 
reference case involving football league fixture lists in the United Kingdom, the Court of 
Justice clarified that the notion of the author’s own intellectual creation refers to the criterion 
of originality. In the view of the Court, a database meets the requirement of originality ‘when, 
through the selection or arrangement of the data which it contains, its author expresses his 
creative ability in an original manner by making free and creative choices and thus stamps 
his “personal touch”’.545 The Court also made clear that the originality requirement is not 
satisfied ‘when the setting up of the database is dictated by technical considerations, rules or 
constraints which leave no room for creative freedom’.546 Furthermore, the intellectual effort 
and skill of creating data is irrelevant as well as whether the selection or arrangement of the 
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data includes the addition of important significance to that data.
547
 Lastly, the Court argued 
that the significant labour and skill required for setting up a database does not as such justify 
copyright protection if that labour and that skill do not express any originality in the selection 
or arrangement of the data which that database contains.
548
 
SUI GENERIS PROTECTION FOR DATABASES - Irrespective of the eligibility of a database for 
copyright protection with regard to the selection or arrangement of the data, a database as a 
whole may qualify for protection under the sui generis database right created by Article 7(1) 
of the Database Directive
549
 if ‘there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial 
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents’. Both 
copyright and sui generis protection under the Database Directive are without prejudice to any 
rights subsisting in the underlying elements or data that make up the database such as 
copyright but also data protection and privacy.
550
 Whereas copyright requires an original 
expression of the creative freedom of the author, investment is the relevant criterion for sui 
generis database protection. A database that does not meet the originality requirement of 
copyright may therefore still benefit from protection under the sui generis right as long as 
considerable human, technical or financial resources are invested in its creation.
551
 In four 
related preliminary rulings delivered in November 2004, the Court of Justice made clear that 
the substantial investment required for a database to be protected under the sui generis right 
must relate to the creation of a database as such and that investment in creating the materials 
which make up the contents of the database cannot be taken into account. The Court justified 
the exclusion of the mere creation of materials from sui generis protection by arguing that the 
latter’s purpose is ‘to promote the establishment of storage and processing systems for 
existing information and not the creation of materials capable of being collected subsequently 
in a database’.552 Only investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of pre-
existing contents may be considered. In the Court’s view, investment in obtaining the contents 
of a database must be understood ‘to refer to the resources used to seek out existing 
independent materials and collect them in the database’ and investment in the verification of 
the contents of a database concerns ‘the resources used, with a view to ensuring the reliability 
of the information contained in that database, to monitor the accuracy of the materials 
collected when the database was created and during its operation’. For its part, investment in 
the presentation of the contents of the database must be understood to refer to ‘the resources 
used for the purpose of giving the database its function of processing information, that is to 
say those used for the systematic or methodical arrangement of the materials contained in 
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that database and the organisation of their individual accessibility’.553 With regard to the 
distinction between creating and obtaining data, the Court of Justice argued that activities 
which are ‘indivisibly linked’ to the creation of data cannot be taken into account for the 
purposes of assessing substantial investment in the obtaining of the contents of the 
database.
554
 
SCOPE OF PROTECTION UNDER THE COPYRIGHT AND SUI GENERIS REGIME - While the term of 
protection for copyright is 70 years,
555
 the sui generis database right is only valid for 15 
years.
556
 However, any substantial change to the contents of the database which would result 
in the database being considered to be a substantial new investment will lead to the start of a 
new term of protection of the renewed database.
557
 The author of a database protected under 
the sui generis right is entitled ‘to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a 
substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that 
database’.558 In addition, the sui generis database right protects against the ‘repeated and 
systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the 
database implying acts which conflict with a normal exploitation of that database or which 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database’.559 The rights to 
prevent extraction and re-utilisation correspond with the rights of reproduction and 
communication to the public as granted to authors of copyright protectable databases.
560
 
Extraction is defined as the transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to 
another medium and re-utilisation means the making available to the public of all or a 
substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by 
online or other forms of transmission.
561
  
PROTECTION AGAINST EXTRACTION AND RE-UTILISATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF A 
DATABASE - In The British Horseracing Board case, the Court of Justice argued that, in the 
light of the objective of the sui generis right to protect the maker of the database against acts 
by the user which go beyond the legitimate rights and thereby harm the investment of the 
maker,
562
 those terms have to be interpreted ‘as referring to any act of appropriating and 
making available to the public, without the consent of the maker of the database, the results of 
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his investment, thus depriving him of revenue which should have enabled him to redeem the 
cost of the investment’.563 It is irrelevant whether the act of extraction or re-utilisation is for 
the purpose of creating a competing database or not, for a commercial or non-commercial 
purpose, or forms part of an activity other than the creation of a database.
564
 In addition, the 
concepts of extraction and re-utilisation do not imply direct access to a database in the sense 
that acts carried out from a source other than the database concerned are liable just as much as 
acts carried out directly from that database.
565
 However, the protection does not cover mere 
consultation of a database.
566
 In the same judgment, the Court of Justice also clarified the 
term ‘substantial part’ of the contents of the database concerned that has to be affected by the 
extraction and re-utilisation in order to be prohibited under Article 7(1) of the Database 
Directive. Whereas the substantial part evaluated quantitatively refers to the volume of the 
data extracted or re-utilised and has to be assessed in relation to the volume of the contents of 
the database as a whole, the substantial part evaluated qualitatively concerns the scale of the 
investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents of the subject of the 
act of extraction or re-utilisation, regardless of whether that subject represents a quantitatively 
substantial part of the general contents of the protected database. Furthermore, the intrinsic 
value of the materials affected by the act of extraction or re-utilisation does not constitute a 
relevant criterion for the assessment of whether the part at issue is substantial in the Court’s 
view.
567
 
DO DATASETS OF ONLINE PLATFORM PROVIDERS QUALIFY AS DATABASES? - In order for 
providers of online platforms such as Google, Facebook and Amazon to be able to rely on 
database protection, it first has to be determined whether their respective datasets can be 
regarded as ‘a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a 
systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means’ which 
is the definition given to a database by Article 1(2) of the Database Directive. As made clear 
by the Court of Justice, the reference to the independence of the materials making up the 
collection has to be understood in such a way as to require the materials to be ‘separable from 
one another without their informative, literary, artistic, musical or other value being 
affected’.568 In line with recital 17 of the Database Directive, a recording of an audiovisual, 
cinematographic, literary or musical work as such therefore does not fall within the scope of 
the Directive. With respect to the datasets of providers of online platforms, the question rises 
whether individual pieces of information about users have value of their own. While the 
dataset of a provider of an online platform becomes more useful as the amount of information 
that it contains increases, separate parts of information, such as the age, occupation, location 
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etc. of a particular user, can still be considered to carry value in their own right. Unlike the 
recording of a musical or literary composition which only has value as a complete work, a 
dataset of an online platform provider can be divided in separate items which each have 
individual value. Once the existence of a collection of independent materials has been 
established, classification of a collection as a database also requires that the independent 
materials making up that collection be systematically or methodically arranged and 
individually accessible in one way or another. According to the Court of Justice, this implies 
that the collection has to be contained in a fixed base of some sort and must include means 
such as an index, table of contents or particular plan or method of classification to allow the 
retrieval of any independent material contained within it.
569
 Search engine, social network and 
e-commerce platform providers are likely to use a particular method for classifying data and 
to be able to retrieve individual pieces of information about a particular user as a result of 
which their datasets also meet this part of the definition of databases as contained in Article 
1(2) of the Database Directive. The next question is whether their databases qualify for 
copyright and/or sui generis protection. 
COPYRIGHT AND SUI GENERIS PROTECTION FOR DATASETS OF ONLINE PLATFORM PROVIDERS -
Under Article 3(1) of the Database Directive, the structure of a database can be protected 
under copyright if the selection or arrangement of its contents constitute the author’s own 
intellectual creation. As made clear by the Court of Justice in Football Dataco, this has to be 
understood as requiring that the database be original in the sense that ‘through the selection or 
arrangement of the data which it contains, its author expresses his creative ability in an 
original manner by making free and creative choices and thus stamps his “personal 
touch”’.570 The setting up of datasets by providers of search engines, social networks and e-
commerce platforms is not solely dictated by rules or technical considerations in the sense 
that there is room for their providers to make free and creative choices with regard to the 
selection or arrangement of the data. Therefore, the datasets of online platform providers are 
capable to qualify for copyright protection under the Database Directive.
571
 Irrespective of 
whether the structure of their datasets can be copyright protected, the providers may rely on 
the sui generis database right to protect their datasets as a whole if there has been a substantial 
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents of the database. 
The Court of Justice argued that investment in data-generating activities have to be 
disregarded when assessing whether the dataset qualifies for sui generis protection.
572
 The 
fact that a database producer creates data itself, as is the case for online platform providers 
that create so-called inferred data by analysing the information collected about users, does 
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not, in the Court’s view, in itself preclude the producer from claiming protection under the sui 
generis right as long as it can establish that the obtaining, presentation or verification of the 
data required substantial investment ‘which was independent of the resources used to create 
those materials’.573  
SPIN-OFF DATABASES - By making this statement the Court of Justice also seems to have 
rejected the approach originating in the Netherlands where courts had in some instances 
denied sui generis protection on the sole ground that the databases were mere by-products of a 
main activity without checking whether, nevertheless, a substantial investment had been made 
in the obtaining, presentation or verification of the contents of the database.
574
 This implies 
that the mere fact that the datasets built by search engine, social network and e-commerce 
platform providers form a ‘spin-off’ of their main activity, namely the delivery of services to 
users and advertisers, does not prevent them from benefiting from sui generis database 
protection insofar as they can establish that a substantial investment has been made in the 
obtaining, presentation or verification of data that is not indivisibly linked to its creation. This 
is likely to be the case since significant resources are required to set up a tool for collecting 
pre-existing information about the profile and interests of users that is not generated by online 
platform providers as such.
575
 Investment in the obtaining of user data in terms of the 
resources employed to seek out independent items of information about users and collect 
them in a database would thus be most relevant for assessing whether a dataset of a provider 
of a search engine, social network or e-commerce platform qualifies for protection under the 
sui generis right. In this light, the European Commission noted in its Microsoft/Yahoo merger 
decision that Microsoft had explained that ‘there are very significant costs that a new entrant 
would have to bear related to the necessity to have a large database’.576 Online platform 
providers would thus be able to rely on sui generis protection for their datasets provided that 
they can show that substantial investments are required to obtain, verify or present user data.  
 
5.3.3 Trade secret protection for datasets 
HARMONISATION OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION - Providers of 
search engine, social network and e-commerce platforms may also benefit from trade secret 
protection for their datasets. Contrary to the situation of copyright and sui generis protection, 
there is not yet a harmonised system for the protection of trade secrets in the European 
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Union.
577
 In November 2013, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Directive on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information with the objective of aligning 
the laws dealing with trade secrecy in the EU Member States though the introduction of 
common definitions, procedures and sanctions.
578
 The Trade Secrets Directive will enter into 
force twenty days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, 
following its adoption by the Council at the end of May 2016.
579
 Member States will have two 
years to implement the provisions of the Trade Secrets Directive into national law.
580
 At the 
national level, more far-reaching protection may be offered against the unlawful acquisition, 
use or disclosure of trade secrets than that required in the Trade Secrets Directive provided 
that compliance with certain articles is ensured.
581
 
SCOPE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION - With regard to the scope of protection of trade secrets, 
the Directive follows the three requirements set out in Article 39(2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement
582
: (1) the information is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the 
precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily 
accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in 
question; (2) the information has commercial value because it is secret; and (3) the 
information has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
583
 Unlike copyright and sui generis 
database protection which grant right holders an exclusive right to prevent third parties from 
using the subject matter of protection, a trade secret is only protected against unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure.
584
 Trade secret protection cannot be invoked against the use of 
information obtained through legitimate means such as independent discovery or creation.
585
 
Commercially valuable business information or know-how may thus be protected as long as it 
is kept secret by the holder by way of, for example, non-disclosure or confidentiality 
agreements.  
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION FOR USER DATA COLLECTED BY ONLINE PLATFORM PROVIDERS - By 
keeping their datasets secret, providers of online platforms may be able to protect the 
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information that they have collected about users under trade secret laws.
586
 The recitals of the 
Directive on trade secrets and the accompanying impact assessment, respectively, state that 
undisclosed know-how and business information as protected under the Directive may cover 
‘a diverse range of information that extends beyond technological knowledge to commercial 
data such as information on customers and suppliers’587 and that ‘[i]nformation kept as trade 
secrets (such as list of clients/customers; internal datasets containing research data or other) 
may include personal data’588 thereby confirming that user data falls within the ambit of trade 
secret protection. Since the success of an online platform is largely determined by its control 
over user data and other data that is relevant for improving the quality of its services, this 
information has considerable commercial value when it is shielded from competitors.
589
 
While factual data about users such as their age, gender and occupation can hardly qualify as 
secret information, data relating to the interests they have expressed on a particular online 
platform, information about their online behaviour or the online purchasing history of users 
may not be generally known and thus qualify for trade secret protection.
590
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE SECRET AND DATA PROTECTION - As they are dependent on 
their user base, providers of online platforms are typically not willing to give competitors 
access to the information they have gathered about users. For example, Facebook’s general 
conditions prohibit third-party websites from acquiring content and information of users on its 
platform without its prior permission.
591
 Furthermore, Facebook has already invoked trade 
secret protection as a justification for not disclosing all personal data in response to an access 
request of an individual user. The social network provider claimed that one of the sections of 
the Irish Data Protection Acts, to which Facebook is subject because its international 
headquarters are located in Ireland, ‘carves out an exception to subject access requests where 
the disclosures in response would adversely affect trade secrets or intellectual property’.592 In 
its opinion on the proposal for a Directive on trade secrets, the European Data Protection 
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Supervisor (EDPS)
593
 referred to this claim of Facebook as an illustration of the fact that trade 
secret protection may interfere with the rights of data subjects in the field of data protection. 
Next to the right of data subjects to have access to personal data under Article 12 of the Data 
Protection Directive, the right to data portability as introduced in Article 20 of the General 
Data Protection Regulation
594
 may also be affected in case personal data forms part of a trade 
secret. The EDPS therefore recommends acknowledging the relevance of personal data to the 
concept of trade secrets more explicitly in the proposal for a Directive on trade secrets by 
including a clarification that the proposed Directive will in no way restrict the rights of the 
data subject under the Data Protection Directive. In addition, the EDPS suggests providing for 
an adjudication process in the event of a conflict between the protection of trade secrets and 
the right to access to personal data involving the relevant supervisory authorities including the 
national data protection authority.
595
 As a result, in addition to copyright and the sui generis 
database right, trade secret laws are of relevance with respect to the protection of the datasets 
of online platform providers. 
 
5.4 Potential competition problems involving access to data and online platforms 
Against the background of the fundamental role of data in the digital economy, access to data 
as collected by providers of online services is mentioned by scholars as one of the issues 
likely to attract scrutiny of competition authorities and courts worldwide.
596
 Providers of 
online platforms have an interest in keeping their systems closed because they depend on their 
user base for monetising their business. In this perspective, three specific competition 
concerns can be identified relating to possible limitations on data portability (section 5.4.1), a 
lack of interoperability of online platforms (section 5.4.2) and potential refusals to give access 
to user data (section 5.4.3). 
 
5.4.1 Data portability 
ADVERTISING PORTABILITY - Restrictions on portability of data are one of the issues with 
regard to access to online platforms that may give rise to competition problems. One of the 
concerns that the European Commission expressed in the Google case concerns the 
limitations that the search engine provider allegedly imposed on the portability of advertising 
campaigns on its AdWords advertising platform. The Commission entered into negotiations 
with Google about commitments to end the imposition of obligations on advertisers 
preventing them from moving their advertising campaigns to competing platforms.
597
 In the 
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US, the Federal Trade Commission closed its investigation when Google offered voluntary 
concessions to remove restrictions on AdWords that make it difficult for advertisers to 
manage advertising campaigns across multiple platforms.
598
 By restricting the possibility of 
advertisers to move their campaigns to another advertising platform, providers create 
switching costs that may let advertisers decide to stay with their current provider for the sole 
reason that they find it too cumbersome to manually re-insert their advertising campaign in a 
new platform.
599
 The fact that the European Commission as well as the US Federal Trade 
Commission took action to redress the switching costs of advertisers in a competition 
investigation demonstrates that portability can form a competition issue.  
RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY - Users may also experience switching costs if their provider 
does not enable them to move their personal information, for example a social network 
profile, to a competing service. With the increasing use of a particular online service, the 
amount of personal data collected in this service becomes an obstacle for moving to another 
provider, even if better or more privacy-friendly alternatives are available.
600
 Against this 
background, Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation introduces the so-called 
right to data portability which gives a data subject
601
 the right to receive his or her personal 
data that he or she has provided to a controller
602
 in a structured, commonly used and 
machine-readable format and to transmit this data to another controller. Where technically 
feasible, the data subject also has the right to have the data transmitted directly from one 
controller to another.
603
 Looking at the Impact Assessment report as drawn up by the 
Commission, it seems that the right to data portability is mainly targeted at social networks. In 
the Impact Assessment report, the personal data that may be transferred under the right to data 
portability is described as ‘photos or a list of friends’ and ‘contact information, calendar 
history, interpersonal communications exchanges and other kinds of personally or socially 
relevant data’.604 When the General Data Protection Regulation enters into force, the right to 
data portability will thus enable users of social networks to transfer their profile, contacts, 
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photos and videos to another social networking platform. A Facebook user will, for instance, 
be entitled to receive her personal data which she has provided to Facebook in a reusable 
format and to transmit this data to Google+. If technically feasible, she will also have the right 
to obtain that this data is transmitted directly to Google+, instead of receiving the data from 
Facebook and transmitting it herself to Google+.
605
 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY - The scope of application of the 
right to data portability is not limited to social networks. According to Article 20(1) of the 
General Data Protection Regulation, the new right will apply to any type of processing of 
personal data carried out by automated means and based on consent or on a contract. It will 
therefore address other forms of cloud computing and web services as well.
606
 The question 
rises whether the right to data portability will also apply to search engines and e-commerce 
platforms enabling users to take their search history and purchasing history with them when 
switching to a new platform. Because of the personalisation of search results on search 
engines and purchase suggestions on e-commerce platforms, users may feel bound to stay 
with their current platform that has collected data about their interests and search or 
purchasing behaviour and is consequently able to return more relevant search results or 
purchase suggestions. The wording of Article 20(1) makes clear that the right to data 
portability only covers personal data that the data subject has provided to a controller. But 
providers do not only possess information that has been provided by users themselves. They 
also obtain information about the behaviour of users on their platform (observed data) and 
create data for analytical purposes (inferred data). The latter type of data will most likely fall 
outside the scope of the right to data portability, but the situation with regard to observed data 
is less clear.  
APPLICATION TO SEARCH AND PURCHASING HISTORY - Since the search or purchasing history of 
a user consists of information provided by the user as well as data generated by the provider, 
this type of data lies between the two extremes. While the user enters search queries into a 
search engine and provides transaction or payment information to an e-commerce platform, 
the respective providers create a profile on the basis of the actions that a particular user 
undertakes on their platform. The General Data Protection Regulation does not clarify the 
status of this type of profiles which consist of a combination of data provided by the user and 
data created by the provider. A similar situation can be observed with regard to the profile of 
sellers on e-commerce platforms. Whereas the contact information and the advertisements are 
provided by the seller him- or herself, the provider adds feedback scores to the seller’s profile 
on the basis of the number of positive or negative ratings the seller has received. It is not clear 
whether the part of the seller’s profile that involves the reputation that a seller has built on a 
particular e-commerce platform will also be portable under the right to data portability, since 
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strictly interpreted it is not provided by the data subject.
607
 A clarification of the exact scope 
of application of the right to data portability in these cases is therefore welcome. 
ADDITIONAL VALUE-ADDED SERVICES - The right to data portability will not only enable data 
subjects to switch between providers offering similar services but, as made clear by the 
EDPS, will also allow them to take advantage of additional value-added services developed 
by third parties. Upon the request and based on the consent of data subjects, these third parties 
will be able to get access the necessary data for providing their own services. For example, if 
applied to smart metering, the right to data portability will enable data subjects to transmit 
data on their energy usage to a third party who can advise them whether an alternative 
supplier could offer a better price, based on their patterns of electricity consumption.
608
 Such 
an application of the right to data portability may help data subjects to exercise their other 
data protection rights, such as the right to rectify personal data, and may lower entry barriers to 
markets that require access to personal data.609 
ENFORCEMENT OF DATA PORTABILITY UNDER COMPETITION LAW - While its main policy 
objective is to ensure that individuals are in control of their personal data and trust the online 
environment,
610
 the right to data portability may also reduce lock-in by enabling users to 
switch easily between services. In this light, the previous Competition Commissioner argued 
in a speech that the proposed right to data portability ‘goes to the heart of competition policy’ 
and that ‘portability of data is important for those markets where effective competition 
requires that customers can switch by taking their own data with them’. By stating ‘[w]hether 
this is a matter for regulation or competition policy, only time will tell’, he acknowledged the 
right to data portability as a new tool under data protection law but at the same time did not 
eliminate competition law intervention for facilitating data portability. In this regard, the 
previous Competition Commissioner also explicitly noted that ‘[i]n time, personal data may 
well become a competition issue; for instance, if customers were prevented from switching 
from a company to another because they cannot carry their data along’.611 It therefore cannot 
be excluded that the European Commission will also intervene on the basis of competition 
law if a dominant firm does not allow users to take their data with them when switching 
services.
612
 In this regard, the Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision in which the European 
Commission assessed whether data portability issues constituted a barrier to consumers’ 
switching in the context of consumer communications apps is instructive. Even though the 
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European Commission did not find any evidence that this was indeed the case,
613
 the fact that 
these issues were investigated under merger review indicates the potential of competition law 
to address data portability. In particular, a refusal of a dominant firm to facilitate data 
portability may constitute a form of abuse by exploiting consumers or excluding competitors. 
In the latter fashion, a lack of data portability may lead to entry barriers for competitors and 
violate Article 102(b) TFEU by limiting markets and technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers.
614
 
ADDITIONAL PROTECTION UNDER THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIGITAL CONTENT DIRECTIVE - Finally, 
it is instructive to note that the proposal for a Digital Content Directive includes a provision 
enabling a form of data portability. Article 13(2)(c) of the proposal requires a supplier to 
provide a consumer who terminates a contract for the supply of digital content ‘with technical 
means to retrieve all content provided by the consumer and any other data produced or 
generated through the consumer’s use of the digital content to the extent that data has been 
retained by the supplier’. The provision goes on to state that the consumer is ‘entitled to 
retrieve the content free of charge, without significant inconvenience, in reasonable time and 
in a commonly used data format’.615 Considering that, as explained in section 5.2 above, a 
social network or a communications app would also fall within the scope of application of the 
proposed Directive, this provision provides additional protection to consumers going beyond 
the right to data portability as contained in the General Data Protection Regulation. Unlike the 
latter right which only covers personal data provided by the data subject, Article 13(2)(c) of 
the proposal for a Digital Content Directive also enables a consumer to retrieve any other 
data, to the extent that it has been retained by the supplier, generated through the use of the 
digital content which is not as such provided by the consumer. In addition, the latter provision 
makes explicit that consumers are entitled to retrieve the content free of charge and in a 
reasonable time whereas no such specific requirements apply under the right to data 
portability. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the proposal for a Digital 
Content Directive does not entitle consumers to have their digital content directly transmitted 
to a new provider. This while Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation provides 
data subjects with a right to ask for a direct transfer of provided personal data where this is 
technically feasible. These differences in scope can be explained by the distinct underlying 
objectives of the two instruments. While the right to data portability aims to give data subjects 
more control over their personal data, the relevant provision in the proposal for a Digital 
Content Directive aims to ensure that consumers benefit from effective protection in relation 
to the right to terminate the contract.
616
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5.4.2 Interoperability of online platforms 
DATA PORTABILITY ALREADY REQUIRES SOME LEVEL OF INTEROPERABILITY - The lack of 
interoperability of online platforms may also become an area of interest for competition 
authorities. Interoperability can be defined as ‘the ability to transfer and render useful data 
and other information across systems, applications or components’.617 Under the Computer 
Programs Directive, interoperability is regarded as a form of functional interconnection or 
interaction and described as ‘the ability to exchange information and mutually to use the 
information which has been exchanged’.618 It is important to note that interoperability has to 
be seen as a matter of degree.
619
 The enforcement of data portability would already require a 
certain level of interoperability between online services.
620
 In order to establish an effective 
form of data portability, there should be a technical measure that makes it possible to 
seamlessly transfer user data from one online service, for example a social network, to 
another. This implies that the ‘receiving’ social network is able to process the data extracted 
from another platform in an efficient manner. To some extent, this would require a standard 
format for data storage to enable providers to exchange user data and mutually use the 
information exchanged. Considering the differences as to how content and messages are 
displayed on the personal page of users in different social networks, this might require some 
platforms to change part of their design.
621
 As a result, the implementation of the right to data 
portability may have an impact on innovation by requiring some form of standardisation 
between different market players. 
FOCUS ON SOCIAL NETWORKS - Since communication and interaction among users is at the 
core of the functionality that social networks offer to users, interoperability is particularly 
relevant for these online services that currently still operate as closed systems. Interoperability 
of online social networks would enable users to connect with each other regardless of their 
social network provider. Full social network interoperability therefore goes further than 
enabling data portability between social networks. Data portability permits users to move 
their profile to another social network and requires a certain level of interoperability in order 
to facilitate the transmission of user data between platforms, but does not allow users to reach 
someone that is not on the same social network. While Facebook, for instance, enables users 
to send messages to ‘traditional’ email systems such as Hotmail, Yahoo! or Gmail and vice 
versa, it is not possible to post materials on someone’s Facebook page without having a 
Facebook profile. Full social network interoperability would thus, for example, enable a 
Google+ user to upload pictures or post messages on someone’s Facebook page directly 
without having to create a profile on Facebook. In a report of a workshop organised by the 
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EDPS in the European Parliament in June 2014, it was questioned in this regard whether data 
portability could be effective without dominant networks being compelled to interconnect.
622
 
REDRESSING DIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS AND SOCIAL LOCK-IN - The imposition of 
interoperability requirements on social network providers under competition law would 
redress the direct network effects that are present in the market.
623
 If social networks would be 
interoperable, the direct network effects would not be limited to a specific social network 
anymore in the sense that the users of the social networks at issue benefit from the combined 
user base. Enabling interoperability of social networks could therefore be a way to remedy the 
direct network effects and to stimulate competition in the market. In addition, switching costs 
and the degree of user lock-in would be reduced. In particular, the social lock-in of users 
would be addressed, since the number of people that a user can reach is not limited anymore 
to the number of users on the social network that the user decided to join. Social network 
interoperability enables users to switch services without losing their social network 
connection with the users of the platform they joined first. In the presence of interconnection 
between social networks, users that switched to another platform are still able to contact their 
friends who decided to stay with the former service. For example, when a user would leave 
Facebook for a smaller and less well-known social network he or she can still remain in touch 
with his or her Facebook friends through the new platform. As a result, it would not be 
necessary for users anymore to join the social network of their friends or more generally, the 
social network that has the most users once social networks are interoperable. Instead, users 
would be able to join the social network of their preference.
624
 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTEROPERABILITY UNDER COMPETITION LAW - The Microsoft case 
illustrates that a lack of interoperability can constitute a competition problem. In its 2004 
decision,
625
 which was confirmed by the General Court in 2007,
626
 the European Commission 
found that Microsoft abused its dominant position on the market for client PC operating 
systems by denying to share interoperability information with competitors in the derivative 
market for work group server operating systems.
627
 With regard to the social networking 
environment, scholars have already called upon the European Commission to impose 
interconnection requirements on social network providers.
628
 However, competition 
authorities can only intervene on an ex post basis (with the exception of merger review). 
Before the European Commission, or a national competition authority, would be entitled to 
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impose interoperability remedies on the basis of EU competition rules, it would need to 
establish that the social network provider at issue is abusing its dominant position on a given 
market by denying interoperability with other social networks. 
LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT FOR ESTABLISHING 
INTEROPERABILITY OF SOCIAL NETWORKS - Irrespective of whether incumbent social network 
providers like Facebook can be found dominant and abuse their market power by denying 
interoperability with competing platforms, one can doubt whether competition law is the most 
suitable instrument to ensure interoperability of social networks. Article 102 TFEU only 
empowers competition authorities to intervene in situations of abuse of dominance as a result 
of which interconnection requirements may only be imposed on the dominant social network 
provider to remedy abusive behaviour. For enabling effective interaction between social 
networking sites, interconnection requirements should be imposed in general on all social 
networks and in all situations. If interconnection obligations are applied to the dominant 
social network provider exclusively, interoperability would only be available between the 
leading social network and the other networking sites in the market. No interconnection 
would exist among the non-dominant social networks. Therefore, ‘real’ interoperability can 
only be established when all social network providers are obliged to participate in the process.  
REGULATION OF INTEROPERABILITY IN THE TELECOM SECTOR - In this regard, a comparison can 
be made with the telecommunications sector where interoperability was imposed on all 
providers by way of regulation on EU level. In the 1997 Open Network Provision Directive, 
which formed part of the regulatory framework on the basis of which the telecommunications 
market in the European Union was liberalised in January 1998, a provision was included that 
obliged operators of public electronic communications networks to ensure interconnection of 
their networks in order to enable users on different networks to communicate with each other. 
The regulatory framework for interoperability in telecommunications is based on the principle 
that undertakings receiving requests for interconnection to their network should negotiate and 
conclude agreements on a commercial basis for the purpose of ensuring the provision of 
communication services throughout the European Union. Operators of public electronic 
communications networks have a right, and when requested by other undertakings, an 
obligation to negotiate interconnection with each other.
629
 
NEED FOR SOCIAL NETWORK INTEROPERABILITY - In the Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe that the European Commission adopted in May 2015, reference is made to the lack of 
data portability between services and the lack of open and interoperable systems in general as 
representing a barrier for the cross-border flow of data and the development of new services. 
The Commission indicated that it is planning to propose a European ‘Free flow of data’ 
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initiative in 2016 which may also address these issues.
630
 When considering the desirability of 
imposing interconnection requirements similar to the ones adopted in the telecommunications 
sector on social networks or other services, one should look at the public interest underlying 
this part of the telecommunications regulation and compare the respective market situations. 
In this regard, the need for interoperability of social networks seems to be less compelling 
than interconnection between public electronic communications networks. One of the recitals 
to the 1997 Open Network Provision Directive states that ‘it is necessary to ensure adequate 
interconnection within the Community of certain networks and interoperability of services 
essential for the social and economic well-being of Community users’.631 Considering the 
numerous alternatives that people these days have at their disposal to communicate with each 
other, interoperability of social networks does not seem to be necessary for ensuring the social 
and economic well-being of users in the European Union. Instead, interconnection between 
social networks may serve a different goal namely the advancement of effective competition 
in the online social networking environment.
632
 This was also one of the objectives of the 
obligation to interconnect public electronic communications networks. Recital 2 of the 1997 
Open Network Provision Directive notes in this regard that ‘fair, proportionate and non-
discriminatory conditions for interconnection and interoperability are key factors in fostering 
the development of open and competitive markets’. When interconnection between public 
electronic communications networks was mandated, no alternative means were available on 
the market for enabling end-users to interact with each other at a distance. The need for 
interoperability between social networks with the aim of stimulating effective competition 
does therefore not seem to be equally compelling when comparing the current market 
situation with the electronic communications sector in the 1990s. In the light of the current 
dynamic nature of the social network environment, it can thus be doubted whether it would be 
desirable for the Commission to introduce regulation to ensure interoperability of social 
networks. In addition, considering the possible innovation implications of such an 
interventionist approach, the imposition of interconnection requirements in the social network 
sector does not seem proportionate at this point in time. 
 
5.4.3 Refusals to give competitors access to user data  
DATA AS NECESSARY INPUT - The potential competition issue to which the remainder of this 
part of the thesis is devoted concerns the situation whereby competitors or new entrants 
become dependent on the user data gathered by incumbent online platforms for developing 
their own products or services. Given the importance of data in the digital economy, the 
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information that providers of search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms 
collect about their users may form a necessary input of production for other market 
participants. It is instructive in this regard how an ecosystem has started to develop around the 
personal data that online platforms collect. For example, Twitter has established certified data 
resellers that sell access to its tweets to companies that analyse Twitter data for providing 
social analytics services to clients.
633
 In these circumstances, potential competitors may 
request incumbent providers access to the data accumulated on their platforms in order to 
introduce competing or complementary services.  
TARGETING THE SITUATION BETWEEN COMPETITORS - While the right to data portability as put 
forward in the General Data Protection Regulation will give users in certain circumstances the 
possibility to transfer their data between online platforms, it does not entitle the providers to 
claim access to this data. The new right thus only affects the relationship between users and 
their provider, and does not change the situation between providers themselves.
634
 Similarly, 
providers do not get access to the information about users collected on a rival platform if 
interoperability of social networks would be established. Although the level of competition in 
the market would increase if data portability and interoperability are to be enforced, 
competitors and new entrants will still have to rely on competition law in order to get access 
to user data as an input for developing their own products or services.  
APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE TO DATA - By refusing rivals access to 
their datasets, dominant providers may foreclose competition and engage in abusive 
behaviour under Article 102 TFEU. In this context, the question rises whether the denial of a 
dominant platform provider to grant competitors access to user data could constitute a refusal 
to deal and lead to liability under the so-called ‘essential facilities doctrine’.635 This doctrine 
attacks a particular form of exclusionary anticompetitive conduct by which a dominant 
undertaking refuses to give access to a type of infrastructure or other form of facility to which 
rivals need access in order to be able to compete. As will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter, the essential facilities doctrine has already been applied to physical 
infrastructures including ports and tunnels but also to intangible assets protected by 
intellectual property rights.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF USERS AND PROVIDERS IN DATA - Providers of search engines, 
social networks and e-commerce platforms are increasingly dependent on access to data for 
the provision of services to users and advertisers that are of the quality these customers 
expect. By being active on online platforms, users enable providers to gather data about their 
profile, interests and online behaviour. A distinction can be made between data voluntarily 
shared by users, data obtained by observing the actions of users and data derived from the 
analysis of this volunteered or observed information. In order to prevent third parties from 
using the collections of data on which they have based their business model, providers of 
online platforms can in certain circumstances rely on copyright, sui generis database and trade 
secret protection. The personal interest of users in their information is protected under Article 
16 TFEU and EU secondary data protection legislation. In addition, data protection has the 
status of a human right under the European Convention on Human Rights and of a 
fundamental right in EU law under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
ACCESS-RELATED COMPETITION ISSUES - Since the success of their business largely relies on 
the acquisition and monetisation of user data, online platform providers have an incentive to 
keep their systems closed. This may lead to foreclosure of competitors and give rise to 
competition problems. Restrictions on the portability of online advertising campaigns have 
already attracted the attention of the European Commission in the Google case. In the area of 
data protection, the General Data Protection Regulation will introduce a new right to data 
portability giving individuals more control over their personal data. Once entered into force, 
the right to data portability will not only serve a data protection purpose but will also address 
competition-related access issues by diminishing switching costs and lock-in of users. At the 
same time, as evidenced by the statements of the previous Competition Commissioner, the 
implementation of the right to data portability will not exclude interventions for facilitating 
data portability on competition law grounds. Secondly, interoperability concerns may be 
identified, in particular on social networks which currently still operate as closed platforms. 
However, considering the many possibilities that users currently have to interact, it does not 
seem to be necessary or desirable to mandate interconnection between social networks by way 
of regulation as has happened in the telecommunications sector. The third competition 
concern relates to potential refusals of dominant providers to give competitors and new 
entrants access to the user data they have gathered on their platforms. This issue forms the 
focus of the second part of the thesis. Before analysing possible scenarios relating to data 
access refusals on online platforms, the current legal standards of the essential facilities 
doctrine in the European Union and the United States are discussed and a possible framework 
for its future application is set out taking into account the underlying economic interests in 
refusal to deal cases.  
157 
 
6 Normative analysis of the essential facilities doctrine 
 
6.1 Introduction 
NO FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE - The essential facilities 
doctrine can be considered to form an important part of current EU and US competition or 
antitrust law. However, as will become clear in this chapter, the United States Supreme Court 
and the EU Courts have never formally recognised the existence of the doctrine. The US 
Supreme Court explicitly referred to the essential facilities doctrine in its Trinko
636
 judgment 
but neither approved nor refuted the doctrine. In the EU, the General Court and the Court of 
Justice have never even mentioned the term ‘essential facilities doctrine’ in their judgments. 
The European Commission only expressly used the word ‘essential facility’ in four decisions 
involving access to port and railway infrastructures in the 1990s.
637
  
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY - Lower US courts appear to have developed an essential facilities 
doctrine, dealing with situations in which existing as well as new customers can claim access 
to an input that is necessary for competition, separate from or in addition to the concept of 
refusal to deal according to which only the disruption of supply to existing customers 
(irrespective of the indispensability of the input) may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Such a differentiation is, however, currently not apparent in the EU. In European competition 
law, the difference between the two notions merely seems to be a matter of semantics.
638
 
Although in the early cases of Commercial Solvents
639
 and United Brands
640
 which involved 
terminations of existing levels of supply less strict standards have been used to establish a 
duty to deal than in later cases dealing with access requests from new customers, the General 
Court assessed the disruption of supply that was in stake in Microsoft
641
, the latest essential 
facilities case on the EU level,
642
 under the stringent exceptional circumstances test set out in 
Magill
643
 and IMS Health
644
. This implies that a refusal to deal can only be held abusive under 
the current standards of Article 102 TFEU if it relates to an indispensable or essential input. 
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The concepts of refusal to deal or supply on the one hand and essential facilities on the other 
hand therefore both require ‘essentiality’. For this reason, the two terms are used 
interchangeably in this thesis in the context of EU competition law. Where specific reference 
is made to instances in which a dominant undertaking discontinues existing levels of supply, 
the term ‘disruption of supply’ is used.  
OUTLINE - In section 2, the current legal standards applicable to refusals to deal in the US and 
EU are analysed. Afterwards, the difference in approach on both sides of the Atlantic is 
explained by discussing the schools of economic thought that have influenced the 
development of the essential facilities doctrine in the US and EU in section 3. Before setting 
out a proposed framework for the application of the essential facilities doctrine in future cases 
in section 8, attention is paid, respectively, to the economic trade-off to be made in refusal to 
deal cases in section 4, to the need for a more coherent framework in section 5, to the 
principles underlying the proposed framework in section 6, and to the role of intellectual 
property rights in essential facilities cases in section 7.  
 
6.2 Unravelling the legal standards for refusals to deal in the United States and the 
European Union 
In order to fully understand the current legal standards for refusals to deal, it is necessary to 
look at the evolution of the essential facilities doctrine. The doctrine originated in the United 
States but is also applied in the European Union where it has developed along a different line. 
While the US Supreme Court made clear in its Trinko judgment
645
 that antitrust liability for 
refusals to deal should remain very limited, the European Commission and the Court of 
Justice seem to favour a more extensive interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine. The 
analysis below consists of a discussion of the most relevant US and EU refusal to deal cases. 
It should be noted that this section does not intend to give a complete overview of these cases. 
Since it is the aim of this section to discuss the evolution of the essential facilities doctrine in 
the US and the EU, only the most influential cases are analysed that have impacted on the 
development of the current legal standards for  refusals to deal in US antitrust and EU 
competition law. 
 
6.2.1 Development of the essential facilities doctrine in the United States 
ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE - The essential facilities doctrine emerged in the United States under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act which deals with monopolisation and is the US equivalent of 
Article 102 TFEU.
646
 The doctrine is said to have originated in the judgment of the US 
Supreme Court in Terminal Railroad in 1912. The case concerned an association of railroad 
companies which had acquired all existing railroad bridges and terminal facilities over the 
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Mississippi River into and out of Saint Louis. The Supreme Court found that the conditions of 
the arrangement between the members of the association were so as to prohibit any other 
reasonable means of entering the city and therefore amounted to a violation of both Section 1 
(corresponding to Article 101 TFEU) and 2 of the Sherman Act. Instead of ordering a 
dissolution of the association as the government had requested, the Supreme Court imposed a 
duty on the members of the association to provide any competitor with joint ownership and 
control of the terminal properties or, in case a competing railroad company chose not to 
become a joint owner, give access to the infrastructure under reasonable terms.
647
 Although 
the case may not have clearly set out a rule that a denial of access is anticompetitive once it 
involves a facility that is not duplicable and to which a firm needs access in order to enter the 
market, the Supreme Court did hold that the association of railroad companies possessed a 
facility essential for competition in the railroad industry in Saint Louis and adopted a remedy 
that forced the members of the association to deal with their competitors.
648
 
FURTHER USE BY THE US SUPREME COURT - Later cases decided by the US Supreme Court 
that are associated with the essential facilities doctrine include: Associated Press
649
 in which 
the bylaws of the news agency limiting membership and access to news for competitors were 
found to violate the Sherman Act; Lorain Journal
650
 concerning a local newspaper which was 
found to have engaged in anticompetitive behaviour by refusing to publish announcements 
from businesses who advertised through the local radio station; Otter Tail
651
 involving a 
vertically integrated power company which was found to have breached the Sherman Act by 
refusing to supply electricity on the wholesale level to municipalities wishing to resell the 
energy to consumers and to compete with Otter Tail on the retail market; Aspen Skiing
652
 in 
which antitrust liability was established for the unilateral termination of a joint ticket giving 
access to all four ski facilities in Aspen three of which were operated by Aspen Skiing; and 
Kodak
653
 in which a manufacturer of copying and micrographic equipment who started to 
refuse to sell replacement parts to companies servicing Kodak equipment was denied its 
motion for having the case decided on the basis of summary judgment (without a full trial). 
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While the Supreme Court never mentioned or recognised the essential facilities doctrine in 
these cases,
654
 lower courts applied the concept in their judgments.
655
 
APPLICATION BY US LOWER COURTS - In Hecht,
656
 the term ‘essential facilities’ was used for 
the first time in the context of a dispute concerning a restrictive covenant in the stadium lease 
contract of the Washington Redskins. A potential franchisee of the American Football League 
challenged the covenant that prohibited leasing the stadium to any other professional football 
team. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit explicitly stated that the 
essential facilities doctrine was applicable to the case and quoted the classification given by 
Neale who is the first commentator articulating the doctrine:
657
 ‘where facilities cannot 
practically be duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow 
them to be shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the scarce 
facility’.658 According to the Court: ‘[t]o be “essential” a facility need not be indispensable; 
it is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and if denial of its 
use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market entrants’. However, ‘the antitrust laws do 
not require that an essential facility be shared if such sharing would be impractical or would 
inhibit the defendant’s ability to serve its customers adequately’.659 In the later MCI case660 
concerning AT&T’s refusal to let MCI interconnect with its local distribution network 
preventing MCI to compete with AT&T in the long-distance telephone market, the Seventh 
Circuit Court established that a firm with monopoly power is liable under the essential 
facilities doctrine when: (1) the monopolist controls an essential facility; (2) a competitor 
cannot practically or reasonably duplicate the facility; (3) the monopolist denies the use of the 
facility to a competitor; and (4) it was feasible to provide (access to) the facility.
661
 This test 
has been widely applied by lower courts in the United States until the Supreme Court 
delivered its judgment in Trinko.
662
 
ASSESSMENT OF REFUSALS TO LICENSE IN DATA GENERAL - While the Supreme Court has not 
yet had the opportunity to rule on the scope of antitrust liability for refusals to license 
intellectual property rights, the US Courts of Appeals of different circuits have been 
confronted with the issue. Three cases are of particular importance, because they set out the 
main approaches used by lower courts. Data General concerned a refusal of a computer 
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manufacturer to continue to license its copyrighted diagnostic software to third party 
maintainers with whom it competed in the aftermarket for maintenance and repair of  its 
computers. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that ‘in passing the Copyright 
Act, Congress itself made an empirical assumption that allowing copyright holders to collect 
license fees and exclude others from using their works creates a system of incentives that 
promotes consumer welfare in the long term’ as a result of which antitrust defendants cannot 
be required ‘to prove and reprove the merits of this legislative assumption in every case 
where a refusal to license a copyrighted work comes under attack’. Nevertheless, the First 
Circuit also recognised that the Copyright Act did not explicitly aim to limit the scope of the 
Sherman Act.
663
 In an attempt to harmonise the two legislative acts, the Court argued that 
while exclusionary conduct may include a monopolist’s refusal to license a copyright, the 
‘author’s desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid 
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers’. In the Court’s view, this 
presumption could only be rebutted in ‘rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is 
unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act’.664 This would particularly be the 
case if there was evidence that the copyright was acquired in an unlawful manner. However, 
in the factual circumstances at issue the Court found that there was insufficient proof to rebut 
the presumption of legality of the refusal to license copyrighted software.
665
  
ASSESSMENT OF REFUSALS TO LICENSE IN KODAK AND XEROX - In Kodak, the case mentioned 
above that the Supreme Court sent for a full trial,
666
 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
applied the presumption of legality established in Data General also to patents and extended 
the possible means of rebutting the presumption to include evidence of anticompetitive intent 
on the part of the right holder in refusing to license. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
presumption of legality of Kodak’s refusal to continue to sell replacement parts, some of 
which were patented and copyrighted, to companies competing with Kodak in the service 
market for its copying and micrographic equipment, could be rebutted by evidence of pretext 
which masked Kodak’s anticompetitive conduct and enabled the Court to establish a violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
667
 The reliance of the Ninth Circuit in Kodak on evidence of 
pretext as a means to rebut the presumption of legality of a refusal to license was not followed 
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Xerox. The case involved a refusal of 
Xerox, a leading manufacturer of copiers and printers, to continue to license patented 
equipment parts and copyrighted manuals and diagnostic software to independent service 
organisations competing with Xerox in the service market. The Federal Circuit held that 
inventions protected by patent law were free from liability under US antitrust laws as long as 
there was no indication of illegal tying, fraud and sham litigation.
668
 The Federal Circuit also 
explicitly declined to take into account evidence of pretext in assessing a potential rebuttal of 
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the presumption of legality of a refusal to license copyrighted material. Since there was no 
evidence in the case that the patents and copyrights at issue were obtained by unlawful means 
or were used to gain monopoly power beyond the statutory patent and copyright grants, the 
Court concluded that Xerox’s refusal to license did not constitute a violation of the US 
antitrust laws.
669
 
LIMITING PRINCIPLES IMPOSED BY THE US SUPREME COURT - In Trinko, the US Supreme Court 
also applied a restrictive approach to refusals to deal in general (the case did not involve 
intellectual property rights). The Supreme Court referred to the essential facilities doctrine in 
its judgment as a concept having been ‘crafted by some lower courts’.670 Without taking a 
position on whether the doctrine should be considered as established law, the Court made 
clear that it refused to extend antitrust liability for refusals to deal beyond the circumstances 
present in Aspen Skiing
671
 which is the leading Supreme Court case in which an antitrust 
violation was established for this type of behaviour.
672
 In its Trinko judgment, the Supreme 
Court stated that Aspen Skiing is ‘at or near the outer boundary’ of liability under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act and constitutes a limited exception upon which can only be relied in 
situations where a monopolist terminates a voluntary and profitable prior course of dealing.
673
 
In Aspen Skiing, the monopolist was unwilling to renew the joint ski ticket that it had offered 
together with its competitor for many years and decided to forego short-term profits by 
refusing to deal which formed an indication of the anticompetitive character of its 
behaviour.
674
 The facts in Trinko were different in several ways.  
TRINKO VERSUS ASPEN SKIING - The 1996 Telecommunications Act imposed a duty upon 
Verizon as the incumbent local exchange carrier in New York to share its telephone network 
with competitors. Part of the statutory obligation involved the provision of access to 
operations support systems without which a rival cannot fill its customers’ orders. Some of 
Verizon’s competitors in the local telecommunications market dependent on access to these 
systems claimed that Verizon was not fulfilling its obligation and that it had filled rivals’ 
orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers 
from becoming or remaining customers of Verizon’s competitors in violation of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act.
675
 Since Verizon did not voluntarily engage in a course of dealing with its 
rivals and it was not clear that it would have ever done so absent the duty contained in the 
Telecommunications Act, the Supreme Court considered that in this situation Verizon’s prior 
conduct could shed no light upon whether the refusal to deal was ‘prompted not by 
competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice’.676 There was also a difference in pricing 
behaviour between the two cases. While in Aspen Skiing the monopolist refused to sell at its 
own retail price suggesting a calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be higher, 
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no such conclusion could be drawn from Verizon’s reluctance to interconnect at the cost-
based rate of compensation available under the Telecommunications Act. Furthermore, 
whereas in Aspen Skiing the monopolist refused to provide its competitor with a product it 
already sold at the retail level, the systems to which Verizon had to offer its rivals access were 
not available to the public.
677
 On the basis of these arguments, the Supreme Court decided 
that the Trinko case did not fit with the limited exception of Aspen Skiing to the principle 
established in Colgate that the Sherman Act as a general matter ‘does not restrict the long 
recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely 
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal’.678 
LIABILITY FOR REFUSALS TO DEAL AFTER TRINKO - By qualifying the essential facilities 
doctrine as a concept crafted by lower courts and by referring to Areeda’s seminal article 
criticising the doctrine,
679
 the Supreme Court seems to have aimed to restrain further 
expansion of the circumstances in which US antitrust law accepts liability for refusals to deal. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also stated that it finds ‘no need either to recognize […] or 
to repudiate’ the essential facilities doctrine.680 After the Trinko case, a duty to deal can still 
be imposed in the United States in case the following two cumulative conditions are met: (1) 
the monopolist entered into a pre-existing voluntary course of dealing; and (2) the monopolist 
is willing to sacrifice short-term profits in order to achieve an anticompetitive end.
681
  
ROOM FOR NEW EXCEPTIONS BEYOND ASPEN? - By stating that ‘traditional antitrust principles 
[do not] justify adding [Trinko] to the few existing exceptions from the proposition that there 
is no duty to aid competitors’,682 the Supreme Court did not exclude the possibility that 
liability for a refusal to deal under US antitrust law could be accepted in situations other than 
Aspen. It merely noted that the facts of Trinko did not justify the establishment of a new 
exception to the principle that undertakings are free to choose their own trading partners. 
However, the scope for such a new exception seems limited considering that the Supreme 
Court affirmed its Trinko reasoning in its 2009 judgment in linkLine. The case involved an 
action brought by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) alleging that incumbent telephone 
companies that owned infrastructure and facilities necessary to provide digital subscriber line 
(DSL) service monopolised the regional DSL market by squeezing the ISP’s profits by 
charging them a high wholesale price for DSL transport and charging consumers a low retail 
price for DSL service. The Supreme Court argued that for such a price squeeze to violate 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act there must be proof that the monopolist either refused to deal 
under circumstances that created an antitrust duty to deal or engaged in predatory pricing 
under the standards established in relevant precedents.
683
 In the view of the Supreme Court, it 
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was clear from Trinko that ‘if a firm has no antitrust duty to deal with its competitors at 
wholesale, it certainly has no duty to deal under terms and conditions that the rivals find 
commercially advantageous’.684 In its discussion of the ‘limited circumstances in which a 
firm’s unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability’, the Supreme 
Court kept to the exception of Aspen and did not refer to the broader essential facilities 
doctrine as applied by lower courts before Trinko.
685
 The restrictive approach towards US 
antitrust liability for refusals to deal that the Supreme Court set out in Trinko has thus been 
confirmed in linkLine. With regard to the factual scenario of the case, the Supreme Court 
argued that in linkLine, as in Trinko, there was no antitrust duty to deal considering that the 
duty of the incumbent telephone companies to lease wholesale DSL transport service to the 
ISPs arised from regulations of the Federal Communications Commission and not from the 
Sherman Act.
686
 The Supreme Court concluded that the price squeeze in linkLine did not 
amount to a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act on the ground that the ISPs had neither 
established a duty-to-deal claim nor a predatory pricing claim.
687
 
 
6.2.2 Development of the essential facilities doctrine in the European Union688 
FIRST APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE EU - The essential facilities doctrine is also 
applied in competition cases in the European Union. Commercial Solvents is the first 
European case in which a refusal to deal was at stake.  
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The Court of Justice agreed with the Commission that the conduct of Commercial Solvents 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position and upheld the imposition of a fine. The Court 
argued that a dominant supplier abuses its dominant position when it refuses to supply to a 
customer which is at the same time a competitor in the derivative market ‘with the object of 
reserving such raw material for manufacturing its own derivatives’ and ‘therefore risks 
eliminating all competition on the part of this customer’.689  
REFUSAL TO SUPPLY CUSTOMERS AS OPPOSED TO COMPETITORS - Subsequently, two cases 
followed in which the refusal to supply, unlike the factual situation in Commercial Solvents, 
was not targeted at a competitor but at a customer of the dominant undertaking. United 
Brands concerned a refusal of UBC, a dominant banana wholesaler, to continue to supply 
Olesen, one of its distributors in Denmark, with its ‘Chiquita’ bananas because Olesen had 
participated in an advertising campaign for the competing ‘Dole’ bananas. The Court of 
Justice endorsed the conclusion of the Commission and found that the interference in the 
management of Olesen’s business which was designed to dissuade UBC’s distributors from 
advertising or selling bananas bearing competing brand names amounted to abuse of 
dominance. In the Court’s view, an undertaking in a dominant position ‘cannot stop supplying 
a long standing customer who abides by regular commercial practice, if the orders placed by 
that customer are in no way out of the ordinary’690 on the ground that such conduct is 
inconsistent with Article 102 TFEU (at that time Article 86 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (TEEC)) ‘since the refusal to sell would limit markets to the 
prejudice of consumers and would amount to discrimination which might in the end eliminate 
a trading party from the relevant market’691. Although the Court held that a dominant 
undertaking should in principle be entitled to protect its own commercial interests if they are 
attacked, a refusal to deal cannot be tolerated if its purpose is to strengthen and abuse a 
dominant position.
692
 With regard to the facts in the case, the Court argued that UBC’s 
conduct amounted to a serious interference with the independence of small and medium-sized 
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Commercial Solvents decision:  
Commercial Solvents was the manufacturer of aminobutanol, a raw material 
necessary for the production of ethambutol which is used in the treatment of 
tuberculosis. Commercial Solvents stopped to supply the raw material to Zoja, its 
regular customer and competitor on the derivative market for the pharmaceutical 
substance ethambutol. Zoja was dependent on the supply of aminobutanol and 
complained to the European Commission that Commercial Solvents was abusing its 
dominant position as world leader in the production of the raw material to eliminate 
Zoja from the market place in Europe as a producer of ethambutol. As there was no 
valid reason why Zoja could not be supplied anymore, the Commission imposed a 
fine on Commercial Solvents and ordered it to resume the supplies to Zoja. 
 
Case IV/26.911 - Zoja/C.S.C. - I.C.I. [1972] OJ L 299/51. 
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firms which implies the right to give preference to competitors’ goods and was ‘designed to 
have a serious adverse effect on competition on the relevant banana market by only allowing 
firms dependent on the dominant undertaking to stay in business’.693 A few months after the 
delivery of its United Brands judgment, the Court of Justice had to decide in the BP case 
whether the decision of BP, a dominant supplier of petroleum products in the Netherlands, to 
reduce the delivery to one of its occasional customers, namely ABG, in the period of shortage 
during the oil crisis in the 1970s with a rate different from that applied to its long-term 
contractual customers qualified as an abuse of a dominant position. Unlike the Commission 
which had held that a dominant undertaking ‘must distribute “fairly” the quantities available 
amongst all its customers’,694 the Court found that BP could not be accused of having applied 
a less favourable treatment to an occasional customer than that which it reserved for its 
traditional customers during the oil crisis.
695
 One of the factors that the Court took into 
account for reaching its conclusion that BP did not abuse its dominant position was the fact 
that ABG found supplies other than those coming from BP and was able to stay in the market 
during the crisis.
696
 While the essentiality of the requested input was not considered in 
Commercial Solvents and United Brands,
697
 the relevance that was attached to the availability 
of alternative means of supply in BP may be seen as preceding the introduction of the 
indispensability requirement in Télémarketing. 
EXPANSION OF THE COMMERCIAL SOLVENTS REASONING - The Court of Justice developed its 
reasoning set out in Commercial Solvents in the Télémarketing case in the context of a refusal 
to deal with a competitor active in a different market.  
 
The Court held that the Commercial Solvents ruling also applied to the case of an undertaking 
with a dominant position on the market in a service which is indispensable for the activities of 
another undertaking on a different market. In the Court’s view, RTL’s behaviour amounted in 
practice to a refusal to supply the services of its television station to any other telemarketing 
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Télémarketing case:  
The case involved a preliminary reference of a Belgian court with regard to the 
refusal of RTL, at that time a statutory monopolist in the Belgian television 
advertising market, to continue to permit a third party to provide telemarketing 
services (i.e. advertisements carrying a telephone number which invite consumers 
to make a phone call to obtain information on the product offered) on its television 
channel unless it would display the telephone number of RTL’s exclusive agent for 
television advertising. 
 
Judgment in CBEM v. CLT & IPB (Télémarketing), Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394. 
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undertaking. The Court argued that such conduct has to be considered as abuse of dominance 
if the ‘refusal is not justified by technical or commercial requirements relating to the nature 
of the television, but is intended to reserve to the agent any telemarketing operation broadcast 
by the said station, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from another 
undertaking’.698 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS ESSENTIAL FACILITY - In two other preliminary ruling cases, the 
Court of Justice started to apply the essential facilities doctrine to intellectual property. In 
Renault
699
 and Volvo
700
, the two respective car manufacturers refused independent repairers a 
license to use the protected design of their cars to make spare parts. As the very subject matter 
of the right of the holder of a protected design is to prevent third parties from using its design, 
the Court of Justice held that a refusal to grant a license cannot in itself constitute an abuse. 
However, the Court made clear that the exercise of an exclusive right by its holder may be 
prohibited by Article 102 TFEU (at that time Article 86 TEEC) if it involves ‘certain abusive 
conduct such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers’.701 The 
distinction that the Court made in these two cases between the existence and exercise of 
intellectual property rights has been followed in later intellectual property licensing cases. 
Whereas the existence of intellectual property rights validly granted under the law of the EU 
Member States including the right to exclude others from using the protected subject matter is 
not subject to EU competition rules, their exercise may in certain circumstances violate 
Article 102 TFEU.
702
 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN MAGILL - The Court of Justice relied on its Volvo 
and Renault judgments in Magill
703
 where it upheld the judgment of the General Court and 
the decision of the European Commission ordering three Irish broadcasting companies to 
provide the publishing company Magill with a copyright license for the weekly listings of 
their television programmes.  
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The Court of Justice followed its statement in Volvo that in exceptional circumstances the 
exercise of an exclusive right may involve abusive behaviour.
704
 The Court then listed three 
circumstances which led to the conclusion that the conduct of the broadcasting companies 
amounted to abuse of dominance. Firstly, considering that the broadcasting companies were 
the only sources of the basic information on programme listings which is the indispensable 
raw material for compiling a comprehensive weekly television guide, they were able to 
prevent the appearance of a new product for which potential consumer demand existed. 
Secondly, there was no justification for the refusal to license either in the activity of television 
broadcasting or in that of publishing television magazines. Thirdly, the broadcasting 
companies reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by 
excluding all competition on that market through their denial of access to the basic 
information indispensable for the compilation of such guides.
705
 The Magill case left 
unanswered whether the prevention of the appearance of a new product as mentioned under 
the first circumstance forms a necessary condition for the imposition of a duty of deal or 
whether it is sufficient that the input to which access has been requested is indispensable for 
the provision of the product or service of the access seeker.  
STATUS OF THE NEW PRODUCT CONDITION - In Tiercé Ladbroke, the General Court considered 
that the television broadcasting of horse races, although constituting an additional and suitable 
service for bettors, was not in itself indispensable for the provision of the main activity of 
bookmakers.
706
 On this ground the Court held that the refusal of a transmission license for 
sound and pictures of French horse races to a Belgian company providing betting services on 
the Belgian market could not be regarded as abusive conduct. In this context, the General 
Court stated that a refusal to license could fall within the prohibition of Article 102 TFEU if it 
‘concerned a product or service which was either essential for the exercise of the activity in 
question, in that there was no real or potential substitute, or was a new product whose 
introduction might be prevented, despite specific, constant and regular potential demand on 
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Magill case:  
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introducing such a comprehensive television guide. 
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the part of consumers’.707 This statement from the General Court suggesting that the new 
product condition as introduced in Magill is alternative to the indispensability test has not 
been followed by the Court of Justice in IMS Health.  
FOUR-PRONG EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TEST AS SET OUT IN IMS HEALTH - The latter case 
involved the refusal of IMS, a company active in providing data on regional sales of 
pharmaceutical products in Germany, to grant a license to its competitor NDC for the use of 
the copyrighted brick structure that IMS had developed consisting of 1860 bricks, each 
corresponding with a certain geographical area.  
 
In the proceedings on the merits, the German court decided to stay proceedings and to refer 
preliminary questions to the Court of Justice on whether the refusal to license of IMS 
constituted abusive behaviour.
708
 In its answer, the Court referred to the Volvo and Magill 
judgments in its statement that ‘exercise of an exclusive right by the owner may, in 
exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct’.709 On the legal test to be applied, the 
Court argued: ‘[i]t is clear from that case-law that, in order for the refusal by an undertaking 
which owns a copyright to give access to a product or service indispensable for carrying on a 
particular business to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient that three cumulative conditions be 
satisfied, namely, that that refusal is preventing the emergence of a new product for which 
there is a potential consumer demand, that it is unjustified and such as to exclude any 
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IMS Health case:  
On application of IMS, a German court had imposed an interlocutory order on 
NDC prohibiting it from using the 1860 brick structure on the basis of the finding 
that the structure was a database protected under German copyright law. Since the 
1860 brick structure had become a de facto industry standard, the interlocutory 
order had the effect of preventing NDC from competing on the German market for 
the provision of regional sales data of pharmaceutical products. 
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competition on a secondary market’.710 The Court of Justice thus made clear that the 
requirements of indispensability, which is mentioned in the introductory part of the sentence, 
and prevention of the emergence of a new product are cumulative. In the context of the last 
condition calling for the exclusion of any competition on a secondary market, the Court stated 
that for the determination of the primary market ‘it is sufficient that a potential market or even 
hypothetical market can be identified’ and that ‘it is determinative that two different stages of 
production may be identified and that they are interconnected, inasmuch as the upstream 
product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream product’.711 With regard to the 
interpretation of the indispensability requirement, the Bronner
712
 case is instructive.  
INDISPENSABILITY AS EXPLAINED IN BRONNER - Bronner concerned a preliminary reference 
from an Austrian court and preceded the judgment of the Court of Justice in IMS Health. 
Bronner did not deal with a refusal to license an intellectual property right but involved a 
denial of access to a newspaper home-delivery scheme.  
 
The Court of Justice concluded that this behaviour of Mediaprint did not amount to abuse of 
dominance. In the Court’s view, in order to establish a violation of Article 102 TFEU it is 
necessary ‘not only that the refusal of the service comprised in home delivery be likely to 
eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person requesting 
the service and that such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified, but also that the 
service in itself be indispensable to carrying on that person's business, inasmuch as there is 
no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home-delivery scheme’.713 The Court 
indicated that although it had qualified the refusal to deal in Commercial Solvents as abuse of 
dominance, it did so to the extent that the refusal was likely to eliminate all competition on 
the part of the undertaking dependent on access to the requested input.
714
 This was not the 
case in Bronner. According to the Court, several alternatives were available for the 
distribution of Oscar Bronner’s daily newspaper, such as delivery by post and sales in shops 
and at kiosks, even though they might be less advantageous. Furthermore, the Court noted 
that it was not enough for Oscar Bronner to argue that it is not economically viable to set up 
its own system due to the small circulation of its own newspaper. For such access to be 
capable of being regarded as indispensable, it would be necessary, in the Court’s view, to 
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Bronner case:  
Mediaprint and Oscar Bronner were both newspaper publishers in Austria. Only 
Mediaprint had a nationwide home-delivery scheme for newspapers in which it did 
not want to include the newspaper published by Oscar Bronner. 
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establish at the very least that it is not economically viable to create a second home-delivery 
scheme with a circulation comparable to that of the newspapers distributed by the existing 
scheme.
715
 Although the Court of Justice relied on its Magill judgment, the new product 
condition introduced there was not applied in Bronner. An explanation for this could be that 
the Court is of the opinion that this requirement only has to be met in cases involving 
intellectual property rights. The General Court in Microsoft also noted that the new product 
condition is found only in the case law on the exercise of an intellectual property right.
716
 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IDENTIFIED IN THE MICROSOFT DECISION - Microsoft involved 
two separate types of abusive behaviour. In addition to a refusal to license interoperability 
information necessary for non-Microsoft work group server operating systems to 
communicate with Microsoft’s dominant client PC operating system Windows, the case 
involved the integration of Microsoft’s Windows Media Player to its client PC operating 
system. Both types of conduct were deemed abusive by the European Commission in its 2004 
decision
717
 which was made public a week before the Court of Justice delivered its judgment 
in IMS Health. Whereas the Court in the latter judgment interpreted the circumstances 
identified with regard to the refusal to license in Magill as exhaustive, the European 
Commission took a different approach in its Microsoft decision. On the basis of its own 
assessment of the previous case law, the Commission concluded that there was no ‘exhaustive 
checklist of exceptional circumstances [which] would have the Commission disregard a 
limine other circumstances of exceptional character that may deserve to be taken into account 
when assessing a refusal to supply’.718 Instead of confining itself to the exceptional 
circumstances present in Magill, the Commission stated that it had analysed ‘the entirety of 
the circumstances surrounding’ Microsoft’s refusal to license.719 An additional circumstance 
considered by the Commission was that Microsoft’s conduct involved a disruption of previous 
levels of supply. With the development of Windows 2000, Microsoft lessened the level of 
disclosures of interoperability information to Sun, the competitor in the market for work 
group server operating systems that filed a complaint to the Commission about Microsoft’s 
behaviour. The Commission found that many of the already limited disclosures undertaken by 
Microsoft with respect to Windows NT had been discontinued after the introduction of 
Windows 2000.
720
 In the Commission’s view, Microsoft’s disruption of previous levels of 
supply was part of a strategy. Until Microsoft did not have a credible alternative for the work 
group server operating systems developed by its competitors, it had incentives to have its 
client PC operating system interoperate with non-Microsoft work group server operating 
systems. While entering the work group server operating market, it was important for 
Microsoft to pledge support for already existing technologies in order to gain market share 
and confidence of customers. Once its own work group server operating system became 
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accepted in the market, Microsoft’s incentives changed and holding back access to the 
interface information started to be the right strategy.
721
  
LOWER STANDARDS FOR FULFILMENT OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TEST IN  
MICROSOFT - While the Commission made clear in its decision that it did not consider the 
criteria developed in previous case law as exhaustive, the General Court kept to the 
exceptional circumstances as established in IMS Health in its judgment. The Court argued that 
it would only assess the additional circumstances invoked by the Commission if one of the 
four conditions set out in that case were not present.
722
 Since the Court came to the conclusion 
that Microsoft’s refusal to license met the exceptional circumstances test, there was no need 
to proceed to the assessment of the circumstances identified by the Commission. The General 
Court thereby left open the issue of whether other exceptional circumstances can also be 
relevant in essential facilities cases. Although the Court relied on the same exceptional 
circumstances as taken into account in earlier cases,
723
 it followed the Commission in 
applying lower standards for the fulfilment of the conditions. With regard to the 
indispensability requirement, the Court explained that in order to compete viably on the 
market it is necessary for competitors to be able to interoperate with Windows on an equal 
footing whereas the Court of Justice made clear in Bronner that access is not indispensable if 
alternatives are available even though they are less advantageous.
724
 The Court also stated that 
it is not required for the Commission to demonstrate that all competition on the market is 
eliminated as a result of a refusal to license. What matters, in the view of the Court, is that the 
refusal is liable or likely to eliminate all effective competition.
725
  
NEW PRODUCT CONDITION AS APPLIED IN MICROSOFT - Concerning the new product condition, 
the General Court confirmed the finding of the Commission that the prevention of the 
appearance of a new product cannot be the only parameter for determining whether a refusal 
to license is capable of causing prejudice to consumers in the context of Article 102(b) TFEU. 
The fact that the Commission did not apply the new product condition as such can be 
explained by considering that at the time of the adoption of the Microsoft decision the IMS 
Health judgment, which clarified the status of this requirement, was not yet delivered.
726
 The 
General Court thus had to decide in Microsoft whether the Commission’s approach that relied 
on the text of Article 102(b) TFEU instead of on a strict new product condition was in line 
with  the statement of the Court of Justice in IMS Health that the prevention of the appearance 
of a new product is a necessary requirement for the imposition of a duty to license. The Court 
decided to follow the Commission in adopting a flexible stance on what can constitute a new 
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product and argued that prejudice to consumers under Article 102(b) TFEU may occur ‘where 
there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical development’.727 
This is a considerably broader standard than the one applied by the Court of Justice in IMS 
Health where it was held that a refusal to license ‘may be regarded as abusive only where the 
undertaking which requested the license does not intend to limit itself essentially to 
duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the 
intellectual property right, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the 
owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand’.728 Despite the fact 
that Sun could not identify a new product that it would offer once given access to the 
interoperability information, the new product circumstance was considered present on the 
ground that the refusal of Microsoft restricted technical development.
729
  
OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION INVOKED BY MICROSOFT - As an objective justification for its 
refusal to license, Microsoft argued that the provision of interoperability information would 
have a negative effect on its incentives to innovate. However, the General Court concluded 
that the Commission had correctly dismissed this justification considering that Microsoft had 
not sufficiently established the negative impact on its innovation incentives but merely put 
forward vague, general and theoretical arguments without specifying the technologies or 
products in which its future incentives to invest would be eliminated.
730
  
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS AFTER MICROSOFT - Since 
Microsoft decided not to appeal the judgment, the Court of Justice did not get the chance to 
express its view on the case and on whether it endorses the application of the lower standards 
for the establishment of abuse for a refusal to license. For this reason, it remains uncertain if 
the Microsoft judgment sets out a new and more expansionist approach to refusals to deal or 
whether the reasoning of the European Commission and the General Court cannot be 
transposed to other cases considering the superdominant position of Microsoft in the market 
for client PC operating systems which may have led the two institutions to adapt the legal 
requirements to the peculiar factual circumstances of the Microsoft case.  
 
6.2.3 Comparison between the US and EU standards applicable to refusals to deal 
DIVERGENCE IN THE APPROACH TO ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES - What is clear from this 
overview of cases that have been most influential in the development of the current legal 
standards for refusals to deal in the United States and the European Union is that the scope of 
application of the essential facilities doctrine on the two sides of the Atlantic differs 
considerably. Whereas the room for antitrust liability for refusals to deal in the United States 
remains very limited after the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trinko, the European 
Commission and the General Court have expanded the reach of the essential facilities doctrine 
in Microsoft as compared to previous EU refusal to deal cases. The most apparent difference 
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is the fact that absolute refusals to deal, where no prior course of dealing for the requested 
input exists, cannot give rise to a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act while the 
disruption of previous levels of supply is not a necessary requirement of the essential facilities 
doctrine in the European Union. In other words, cases involving a termination of supply may 
lead to liability under both United States and European Union competition rules whereas only 
European competition authorities can intervene in situations involving absolute refusals to 
deal provided that the four exceptional circumstances of the essential facilities doctrine are 
present. 
CONFLICTING INTERESTS - Even though the approach towards the essential facilities doctrine 
differs substantially across the Atlantic, the principle on which EU and US competition 
authorities as well as courts agree is that a duty to deal imposed on the basis of competition 
law should be the exception to the rule. However, there is no agreement on the appropriate 
scope of such an exception under which intervention of a competition authority or court is 
appropriate. Different interests are at stake in essential facilities cases. The imposition of a 
duty to deal with the objective of promoting free competition affects the interests of the 
dominant firm consisting of the generally recognised principles of freedom to contract,
731
 
including the right to choose one’s trading partners,732 and freedom to dispose of one’s 
property.
733
 The decision of a competition authority or court to interfere with the interests of a 
dominant undertaking for the purpose of protecting effective competition therefore requires a 
careful balancing exercise.
734
 However, this weighing of interests is not as straightforward as 
it may seem. Contrary to what the balancing test between the two sets of interests suggests, a 
duty to deal may not always be beneficial to competition. As Advocate General Jacobs made 
clear in Bronner, a duty to deal will increase competition in the short term but may put 
incentives for competitors to develop competing facilities in the long term at risk. In addition, 
the incentives of dominant undertakings to invest in new facilities may be reduced if 
competitors are given access too easily. On the long run, it therefore seems procompetitive to 
allow a dominant undertaking to keep facilities developed for its own business to itself.
735
 
Similarly, the US Supreme Court argued in Trinko that compulsory sharing conflicts with the 
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underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen incentives for the monopolist, the 
rival, or both to invest in economically beneficial facilities.
736
 As a result, the protection of 
free competition as such involves conflicting considerations.  
 
6.3 Influence of American and European schools of economic thought on the 
development of the essential facilities doctrine 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC - The development of the essential 
facilities doctrine in the United States and the European Union can be seen against the 
background of different schools of economic thought that have informed competition policy 
over the last decades. While EU competition policy and case law has been predominantly 
influenced by the ordoliberal school of thought that emerged in Germany, the pre-Chicago 
(also referred to as the Harvard school), Chicago and post-Chicago schools having their origin 
in the United States inspired the application of competition principles at that side of the 
Atlantic.
737
  
FROM PRE-CHICAGO TO POST-CHICAGO IN THE US - The traditional pre-Chicago concern in 
essential facilities cases revolves around the vertical leveraging of market power. In the view 
of the pre-Chicago school, a vertically integrated undertaking refusing to supply an input, 
which is the classic scenario of an essential facilities case, restricts competition in the 
downstream market by extending its market power in the upstream market for the input to the 
downstream market for the complementary product or service. By denying non-integrated 
competitors and new entrants access to the necessary input, the monopolist is able to drive 
them off or keep them out of the downstream market.
738
 Chicago school economists 
denounced this reasoning by arguing that a firm with a monopoly in an upstream market 
cannot gain additional power by becoming the sole player in the downstream market. 
According to the Chicago school, there is only one monopoly profit to be reaped. Under the 
single monopoly profit theory, a monopolist can extract the entire monopoly profit in the 
upstream market by charging the monopoly price for the input and therefore does not have 
any anticompetitive incentives to engage in leveraging.
739
 Chicago school economists 
concluded that, as a consequence, the decision of a monopolist to integrate into a downstream 
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market must necessarily have procompetitive effects.
740
 Economists of the subsequent post-
Chicago school began to question the single monopoly profit theory and identified situations 
in which leveraging of market power is anticompetitive.
741
 In particular, the post-Chicago 
economic analysis suggests that the assumptions required for the single monopoly profit 
theory to apply do not hold in regulated industries in which the monopolist cannot freely set 
its price and may refuse competitors access to unregulated downstream markets in order to 
raise its downstream prices and avoid the price regulation in the upstream market,
742
 in 
markets having multiple types of buyers,
743
 and if the monopolist can raise entry barriers in 
the upstream market by way of leveraging its market power to a downstream market
744
.
745
  
IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENT CHICAGO SCHOOLS ON US ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES - Early US 
cases associated with the essential facilities doctrine such as Terminal Railroad and Otter 
Tail, in which the Supreme Court held the vertically integrated monopolists in the two cases 
liable for refusing to deal, seem to be influenced by the pre-Chicago leveraging theory 
according to which monopolists have an incentive to extend their market power in the 
upstream market to a market for a complementary product.
746
 The Trinko judgment in which 
the Supreme Court made clear that the scope of antitrust liability for refusals to deal should be 
limited, seems to be informed by Chicago school economics which strives for per se legality 
of monopoly leveraging.
747
 Traces of the post-Chicago school are said to have appeared in 
Kodak in which the Supreme Court held that the right to refuse to deal is not absolute but 
exists only in case of legitimate business justifications.
748
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ORDOLIBERAL SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN THE EU - The development of European 
competition law has been influenced by the ordoliberal school of thought that originated in 
Germany at the University of Freiburg. At the heart of ordoliberalism lies the belief that the 
‘treatment of all practical politico-legal and politico-economic questions must be keyed to the 
idea of the economic constitution’.749 Under the ordoliberal school of thought, there is a need 
for the state to prevent and constrain the concentration of private power which could endanger 
the competitive process. The aim of competition policy, in the view of the ordoliberalists, is to 
spur market participation by defending the economic freedom of individual market actors and 
to protect competition as an institution.
750
  
ORDOLIBERAL INFLUENCES ON EU ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES - The emphasis on the need for 
the protection of the competitive process in itself is apparent in the early EU essential 
facilities cases Commercial Solvents, United Brands, Télémarketing and even in Bronner. In 
these cases, the Court of Justice seems to have protected the economic freedom of individual 
downstream competitors of the dominant undertakings by concluding that the elimination of a 
single competitor amounts to abuse of dominance.
751
 In Commercial Solvents, the Court of 
Justice argued that the refusal to supply the competitor in the derivative market ‘risks 
eliminating all competition on the part of this customer’.752 The Court similarly stated in 
United Brands that ‘the refusal to sell would limit markets to the prejudice of consumers and 
would amount to discrimination which might in the end eliminate a trading party from the 
relevant market’.753 Although the Court of Justice added the indispensability of the requested 
input to the requirements that have to be met for the imposition of a duty to deal in 
Télémarketing, the Court still argued that a refusal to supply ‘with the possibility of 
eliminating all competition from another undertaking’ amounts to abuse.754 In later refusal to 
deal cases, the focus seems to have shifted from the protection of the economic freedom of 
individual market actors to the protection of competition on the market in general.
755
 In his 
Opinion in Bronner, Advocate General Jacobs stated that in this regard that when assessing 
refusals to deal ‘it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose of Article 
[102 TFEU] is to prevent distortion of competition - and in particular to safeguard the 
interests of consumers - rather than to protect the position of particular competitors’.756 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice still noted that in order to find an abuse in the Bronner case 
it would be necessary for the refusal to ‘be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily 
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newspaper market on the part of the person requesting the service’.757 In Magill and IMS 
Health, the Court of Justice referred to the exclusion of all or any competition on the market 
instead of the elimination of a single competitor as the relevant standard for assessing the 
abusive nature of a refusal to deal.
758
 In Microsoft, the General Court has lowered this 
standard by accepting that it is not necessary to demonstrate that all competition on the 
market would be eliminated as long as the refusal at issue is liable or likely to eliminate all 
effective competition on the market.
759
 Nevertheless, the emphasis still lies on the elimination 
of competition on the entire market and not of an individual competitor.  
FORM- VERSUS EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH - Although the most recent European Union case 
law on refusals to deal has left the ordoliberal tradition behind and the European Commission 
has started to implement a less formalistic and more economic, effects-based approach to the 
application of the European competition rules,
760
 EU competition policy in general still seems 
to be characterised by its emphasis on the importance of keeping markets open.
761
 In the 
context of the Europe 2020 strategy, the European Commission argued in this connection: 
‘given that undistorted competition and well-functioning competitive markets are key for 
innovation, a strict enforcement of competition rules that ensure market access and 
opportunities for new entrants is a necessary condition’.762 Furthermore, the effects-based 
approach introduced by the Commission in the Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct does 
not seem to gain traction at the EU Courts, in particular when it comes to the assessment of 
loyalty or exclusivity rebates under Article 102 TFEU. In 2012, the Court of Justice held on 
appeal in Tomra with regard to exclusivity rebates that, for the purposes of proving abuse of 
dominance, it is sufficient to show that the abusive conduct of the dominant firm tends to 
restrict competition or that the conduct is capable of having that effect.
763
 In other words, the 
Court of Justice did not require proof of actual anticompetitive effects of Tomra’s rebates on 
competition.
764
 In its 2014 Intel judgment, the General Court even held that exclusivity 
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rebates have to be regarded as quasi-per se illegal under Article 102 TFEU. In particular, the 
General Court argued that it was not necessary to engage in an economic analysis of the 
capability of the rebates to foreclose a hypothetical competitor as efficient as Intel (the ‘as 
efficient competitor test’) as required under the Guidance Paper765 introduced by the 
Commission.
766
 The Intel judgment spurred intense debates in scholarship about the goals of 
Article 102 TFEU and about the future of the effects-based approach.
767
 The judgment from 
the Court of Justice on appeal is eagerly awaited and hoped to provide more clarity in this 
regard.  
POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DIVERGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFUSALS TO DEAL - In the 
United States, competition authorities and courts tend to be less interventionist than their 
European counterparts and rely on the strength of the self-correcting mechanism of the 
market.
768
 This difference in belief, despite an overall agreement on the insights from 
economics, may explain the divergent approaches that are currently applied to refusals to deal 
on the two sides of the Atlantic.
769
 In addition, unlike the role of the antitrust rules in the US, 
EU competition policy is seen as one of the means for achieving the integration of the EU 
internal market.
770
 In this regard, former Director-General for Competition Italianer stated: 
‘What we aspire to in Europe – a true single market – already exists in the US, with all the 
benefits it entails. Competition forces in the US may therefore be better able to rectify 
competition problems that occur, whereas in the EU the self-healing force of competition may 
not yet be as fully developed’.771 
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6.4 Economic trade-off in essential facilities cases 
STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC COMPETITION - Although the evolution of different schools of 
economic thought can explain the development of the essential facilities doctrine in the US 
and EU, the question remains how economic considerations should be adequately transformed 
into a legal framework for assessing essential facilities cases. The trade-off that has to be 
made in these cases is often referred to as one between ex post static and ex ante dynamic 
efficiency or as a balancing exercise between short and long term interests.
772
 In the short run, 
obliging a dominant firm to share its facility with competitors will stimulate competition on 
the basis of price and output (static competition) in downstream markets. In the long run, 
however, the imposition of a duty to deal may reduce the incentives of the dominant firm, its 
competitors and market participants in general to invest in innovation (dynamic 
competition).
773
 As a result, there is a need to balance the short term benefits from static 
competition with the long term gains from dynamic competition.
774
 
COMPETITION IN VERSUS FOR THE MARKET - While the balancing exercise is often phrased in 
this way, it is submitted that it is more precise to speak of a trade-off between competition in 
the market and competition for the market. Indeed, the imposition of a duty to deal does not 
only stimulate static competition on the basis of price and output but also enables competitors 
of the dominant firm to introduce complementary products or follow-on innovation. The term 
competition in the market encompasses static competition as well as the introduction of 
sustaining innovations and therefore better captures the different interests that are at stake in 
this context. Although innovation is a complex process that may have unpredictable 
outcomes, competition in and for the market each typically lead to a different type of 
innovation. On the basis of the review of the economic and business literature conducted in 
part I,
775
 it is assumed for the purposes of the further analysis of the essential facilities 
doctrine that competition for the market generally provides stronger incentives for disruptive 
innovation whereas competition in the market primarily stimulates sustaining innovation. 
Since one type of competition typically takes precedence over the other, a market is 
characterised by either competition for or in the market at a certain point in time. Considering 
that both types of competition and innovation bring value to society, the decision to give 
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preference to one over the other amounts to a policy choice. When determining whether or not 
to intervene in a market, competition authorities often have to make a choice between 
encouraging competition in or for the market. Such a trade-off is present in essential facilities 
cases too, although it remains implicit in most instances. 
POLICY CHOICE IN ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES - The Microsoft case can be used to illustrate 
the balancing exercise in essential facilities cases. By way of a refusal to license 
interoperability information, Microsoft prevented its competitors in the market for work group 
server operating systems from developing their own products which would be able to run on 
the dominant Windows client PC operating system. By finding that Microsoft’s refusal to deal 
amounted to abuse of dominance, the Commission forced Microsoft to provide its competitors 
in the market for work group server operating systems with the necessary interoperability 
information. In so doing, the Commission chose to favour competition in the market over 
competition for the market. Indeed, by entitling competitors in the market for work group 
server operating systems access to Microsoft’s technology, the Commission stimulated 
competition on the basis of price and output but also created room for follow-on innovation to 
flourish. If the Commission alternatively had declined to intervene in the market and had 
decided that Microsoft’s behaviour was not abusive, competitors would not have been able to 
compete on static parameters or to introduce sustaining innovations in the form of 
complementary or substitutable products for Windows. Rather, the incentives to invest in 
innovation of Microsoft’s competitors would be directed at developing a new technology 
disrupting the market for client PC operating systems. By keeping the market for work group 
server operating systems open, the Commission thus decided to give priority to static 
competition and sustaining innovation in existing markets over disruptive innovation in new 
products or services having the potential to make current market structures obsolete and in 
particular Microsoft’s dominance in client PC operating systems. Nevertheless, the 
Commission nor the General Court explained why static competition and sustaining 
innovation should prevail over disruptive innovation in this case.
776
 
TWO SCENARIOS - In conclusion, the trade-off to be made by competition authorities and 
courts in essential facilities cases amounts to a choice between giving competitors access to 
the required input which would enable them to create products complementary to that of the 
dominant firm or denying access as a result of which competitors would be incentivised to 
develop substitutes competing with the product of the dominant firm. While the first scenario 
provides stronger incentives for competition in the market and sustaining innovation, the 
second scenario will primarily stimulate competition for the market and disruptive innovation. 
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Scenario 1: access Scenario 2: no access 
Provides stronger incentives Provides stronger incentives 
for competition in the market and  for competition for the market and 
sustaining innovation disruptive innovation 
 
 
6.5 Need for a more coherent application of the essential facilities doctrine 
MAKING THE TRADE-OFF VISIBLE - As can be concluded from part I, current competition 
policy, in particular market definition and the assessment of dominance, is equipped to deal 
with short term concerns. Incentives for competition for the market are hard to accommodate 
in competition analysis, because they involve long term considerations about market 
developments that are by their nature difficult to predict. Since both competition in and for the 
market contribute, albeit in a different manner, to societal welfare, the decision which type of 
competition should receive preference amounts to a policy issue.
777
 It is therefore a valid 
policy option for competition authorities and courts to favour competition in the market which 
is easier to anticipate and leads to observable results on the short run in the form of increased 
competition in downstream markets, lower prices and more product variety.
778
 Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that incentives for competition for the market should be disregarded. In 
order to make the trade-off transparent, it is submitted that incentives for competition for the 
market should be explicitly considered in essential facilities cases even if preference is given 
to competition in the market.   
LACK OF ATTENTION FOR COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET - The application of the essential 
facilities doctrine in Commission decisions and judgments of the EU courts is focused on 
stimulating competition in the market considering that incentives for competition for the 
market are not openly analysed. The only explicit reference to the trade-off between the two 
types of competition is made by Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Bronner where he 
argued that: ‘In the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of consumers 
to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has developed for the purpose 
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of its business. For example, if access to a production, purchasing or distribution facility 
were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing 
facilities. Thus while competition was increased in the short term it would be reduced in the 
long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities 
would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the benefits’.779 The 
lack of analysis of the effect of a duty to deal on incentives for competition for the market is 
most apparent in the Microsoft case where the European Commission and the General Court 
assessed the impact of a compulsory license on the innovation incentives of Microsoft and the 
industry in general.  
INCOMPLETE ANALYSIS OF INNOVATION INCENTIVES IN MICROSOFT - Microsoft tried to 
objectively justify its refusal to license by arguing that an obligation to disclose the 
interoperability information would have a significant negative impact on its incentives to 
innovate. With respect to this claim, the Commission concluded that a detailed examination of 
the scope of the duty to license at stake indicated that ‘on balance, the possible negative 
impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is outweighed by its 
positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole industry (including Microsoft)’.780 
Because the Commission found that Microsoft’s innovation incentives would not be 
negatively affected as a result of the duty to license, there was no need to assess the positive 
impact on the entire industry and to engage in a balancing exercise.
781
 In the Commission’s 
view, Microsoft’s incentives to innovate were dependent on the competitive pressure that it 
experienced in the market for work group server operating systems. The Commission argued 
that Microsoft’s innovation incentives would not diminish but rather increase once being 
required to share the interoperability information with competitors on the ground that its work 
group server operating system products would be subject to more competition from rivals.
782
 
The General Court endorsed the Commission’s conclusion and considered that ‘Microsoft 
merely put forward vague, general and theoretical arguments [...] without specifying the 
technologies or products’ in which its incentives to innovate would be significantly 
reduced.
783
 As regards Microsoft’s argument that its incentives to invest in client PC and 
work group server operating systems in general would decline, the Court noted that the 
Commission rightly refuted this claim by showing that a duty to license would not enable 
competitors to clone Microsoft’s products.784 The assessment conducted by the Commission 
and the Court thus only takes account of potential changes in incentives to invest in client PC 
and work group server operating system products. By merely devoting attention to how the 
situation in the existing markets would change once Microsoft would be required to give 
access to its interoperability information, the two institutions disregarded the effect that a duty 
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to license may have on long term incentives to invest in new products and technology 
overthrowing the dominance of Microsoft.
785
 
NEED FOR A MORE COHERENT APPLICATION THAT IS IN LINE WITH ECONOMICS - As evidenced 
by the description of the development of the essential facilities doctrine in the European 
Union in section 6.2.2 above, the application of the doctrine in the decision-making practice 
of the European Commission and case law of the EU courts has not been coherent. While new 
Commission decisions and court judgments have always referred to and relied upon the 
reasoning applied in earlier essential facilities cases, every case gave rise to new issues and 
the exceptional circumstances test was adapted accordingly. In its Guidance Paper on 
exclusionary conduct, the Commission indicated that it regards refusal to deal practices as an 
enforcement priority if: (1) the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively 
necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market; (2) the refusal is likely 
to lead to elimination of effective competition on the downstream market; and (3) the refusal 
is likely to lead to consumer harm.
786
 However, the Guidance Paper is a soft law instrument 
and does not impose binding standards on the Commission, let alone the EU courts. In 
addition, the document only aims to set out the enforcement priorities of the Commission and 
is not intended to constitute a statement of the law with regard to exclusionary conduct.
787
 For 
that reason, it cannot be assumed that the Commission will apply the same conditions for 
examining the abusive nature of a refusal to deal once it has decided to launch a formal 
investigation into a certain case. The establishment of a more coherent framework for the 
application of the essential facilities doctrine would enable competition authorities and courts 
to assess new cases more consistently and predictably. It is submitted that, for transparency 
reasons, explicit account should be taken of the trade-off between competition in and for the 
market in order to better align the application of the essential facilities doctrine with the 
underlying economic interests in refusal to deal scenarios. 
 
6.6 Principles underlying the proposed framework 
Instead of phrasing essential facilities cases in terms of a balancing exercise between the 
interests of individual undertakings and the interest in the protection of free competition, 
refusals to deal can also be considered from an economic perspective as the analysis of the 
policy choice between protecting competition in and for the market in section 6.4 indicates. 
An economic approach to refusal to deal cases would allow for the translation of such 
considerations into an appropriate legal test. To that end, several insights can be drawn from 
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the economic trade-off between competition in and for the market which form the principles 
on which the proposed framework for essential facilities cases is built.  
 
6.6.1 Balance between competition in and for the market is established over time 
CONFLICTING INCENTIVES - Incentives to invest in disruptive innovation can be negatively 
affected due to a too interventionist policy of competition enforcement. The prospect of a 
dominant position may be necessary for incentivising investment in new types of disruptive 
innovation. The imposition of far-reaching competition remedies could curb those incentives. 
Nevertheless, in order to keep the price level and the product variety at a competitive level, 
competition authorities should intervene when necessary to ensure a certain degree of 
competition in the market. This will also put the incumbent under pressure to fight for 
maintaining its leading position in line with its incentive to pre-empt the entry of potential 
competitors.
788
 In the words of former Director-General for Competition Italianer: ‘history 
tells us that competition for the market, as exemplified by disruptive innovations which 
introduce totally new business models in high tech markets, may happen slower than 
predicted. Take mainframes or PC operating systems as examples: they have had stable 
market presence for decades. There is therefore a need to foster competition not only for the 
market but also in such markets’.789 
ESTABLISHING A BALANCE - In sum, the presence of competition in and for the market has to 
be in balance in order to have a healthy competitive environment. Since the two types of 
competition cannot be equally present in a market at the same point in time, the balance 
should rather be seen as one that is established over time.  
 
A market where competition for and in the market are in perfect balance: 
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Whereas in sectors predominantly characterised by competition for the market a temporary 
form of market power is inevitable, the market can still be considered competitive as long as 
new entrants are able to attack the dominant position of the incumbent. However, the winner 
of a race for the market should be prevented from extending its gained dominance and from 
delaying the start of a new round of competition for the market. Competitive pressure can be 
considered vital in this perspective.
790
 When market dynamics have failed to exert sufficient 
competitive pressure, competition authorities should intervene in order to restore the level of 
competition in the market. 
 
A market where new processes of competition for the market are delayed: 
 
 
6.6.2 Competition enforcement can only restore the process of competition in the market, 
not that of competition for the market  
EFFECT OF COMPETITION INTERVENTIONS ON COMPETITION IN AND FOR THE MARKET - 
Competition for the market, in principle, cannot be revitalised by way of an intervention of a 
competition authority. This is because this type of competition and the disruptive innovation 
that it generates is by nature hard to foresee. The business literature discussed in part I
791
 
indicates that new products or services that render existing market structures obsolete are 
typically developed by new entrants instead of by current market players which are more 
inclined to stay close to their existing customers. Indeed, many of the disruptive inventions 
present in the technology industry today come from small start-ups which were initially run 
by only a few people. Examples include companies such as Skype and WhatsApp (now 
acquired by respectively Microsoft and Facebook) which started to attack the business model 
of telecommunications operators by enabling users to make free calls and send free messages 
over the internet without having to rely on the telephone network of their telecom provider. In 
order to preserve incentives for competition for the market and disruptive innovation, the best 
approach for competition authorities is to refrain from intervening in order to ensure that the 
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prospect of dominance for new entrants is maintained. The only type of innovation that a 
competition law intervention can directly stimulate is sustaining innovation which results 
from competition in the market. The imposition of a duty to deal in essential facilities cases 
enables competitors to introduce complementary products and follow-on innovation, whereas 
in the absence of a competition law intervention no sustaining innovation can occur and 
competitors will instead invest in disruptive innovation. Nevertheless, the creation of 
competition in the market by way of competition enforcement may indirectly create room for 
the disruptive inventions of competitors to gradually take over the leading position of the 
incumbent by making its dominance in the existing market less significant.
792
 The effects of 
the enforcement actions of the United States Department of Justice and the European 
Commission against the integration of Microsoft’s web browser Internet Explorer in its client 
PC operating system may serve as an example. 
POTENTIAL INDIRECT EFFECT OF US AND EU ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN BROWSER MARKET ON 
COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET - Both institutions entered into a settlement with Microsoft in 
order to bring the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows to an end. In the US settlement 
concluded in 2002, Microsoft committed that it would not retaliate against original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) distributing non-Microsoft middleware including Internet Explorer.
793
 
The commitment decision adopted by the European Commission in 2009 did not only require 
Microsoft to let OEMs free in deciding which web browser to pre-install on PCs they shipped 
but also obliged the company to display a so-called browser choice screen to users. By way of 
a Windows software update, users who had Internet Explorer set as their default web browser 
were provided with the opportunity to choose to install a competing browser.
794
 The US and 
EU competition law interventions targeted the market for web browsers (although the US 
settlement had a broader scope and did not merely focus on the market for web browsers). 
While the actions had as their objective to restore competition in the market for web browsers, 
the commitments arguably also had as their effect that scope was created for competition for 
the market in the form of a market shift to Google and other internet players which has made 
the dominance of Microsoft in the market for client PC operating systems less important. One 
can only speculate about what would have happened absent the EU and US interventions. If 
the two jurisdictions would have allowed Microsoft to integrate its web browser into the 
Windows operating system, Microsoft might also have set Bing as the default search engine 
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in Internet Explorer thereby using its dominance in the market for client PC operating systems 
to prevent or delay the rise of Google and other internet companies which have moved 
consumer demand in client PC hardware and software to mobile devices and online 
platforms.
795
 By opening up the market for web browsers, the US DOJ and the European 
Commission imposed competitive pressure on Microsoft which possibly distracted the 
company and enabled the start of a new race of competition for the market. 
TWO MARKETS AFFECTED IN MICROSOFT DUE TO THE PECULIAR NATURE OF INTEROPERABILITY 
INFORMATION - In the context of Microsoft’s refusal to license interoperability information in 
the European Union, it has been argued that the duty imposed by the European Commission 
in its 2004 decision and upheld by the General Court in 2007 did not only stimulate 
competition in the market for work group server operating systems but also for the client PC 
operating system market.
796
 This is because of the peculiar nature of interoperability 
information. Unlike in earlier European essential facilities cases where two markets in a 
vertical relationship were at stake, Microsoft involved two neighbouring markets. The 
interoperability information that Microsoft was obliged to supply did not only assist 
undertakings in the derivative market in introducing competing work group server operating 
systems that were compatible with the Windows client PC operating system but also enabled 
firms to attack Microsoft’s dominance in the latter market by developing their own client PC 
operating systems which were interoperable with Microsoft’s dominant work group server 
operating system and as a result directly competed with Windows in the main market.
797
 The 
duty to license in the Microsoft case thus affected both markets, since the interoperability 
information could be implemented in non-Microsoft work group server operating systems in 
the derivative market as well as in non-Microsoft client PC operating systems in the main 
market.
798
 In previous essential facilities cases, only the derivative market was targeted by the 
competition law intervention. For example, in IMS Health the effect of a potential duty to 
license would only be felt in the derivative market for the provision of data on the sale of 
pharmaceutical products in Germany and did not permit competitors to introduce a competing 
brick structure in the main market. The same goes for Magill where the publishing company 
was able to enter the derivative market for weekly television guides whereas the main market 
for programme listings remained unaffected as a result of the duty to deal.  
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COMPETITION FOR AND IN THE MARKET IN MICROSOFT - Microsoft should thus be seen as an 
exception where the duty to license had an impact on both the main and derivative market 
because of the special character of interoperability information which connects systems in 
different levels of the value chain and thus also different markets. Nevertheless, if firms 
would have started to develop their own client PC operating systems implementing the 
interoperability information in the main market, this form of competition would still have 
qualified as competition in the market considering that the new client PC operating systems 
would have been substitutable to Microsoft’s Windows operating system. Non-Microsoft 
client PC operating systems should therefore be considered as sustaining innovations. As 
noted above, the disruptive innovation that has overthrown Microsoft’s dominance in client 
PC operating systems is the advancement of the internet in the form of the rise of internet 
players like Google and Facebook. Therefore, the direct competition that was made possible 
in the main market for client PC operating systems as a result of the imposition of the duty to 
license in the Microsoft case cannot be regarded as a form of competition for the market. With 
regard to the possible effect of the duty to license on competition for the market, the 
Commission stated in its decision that it found evidence that Microsoft’s leveraging of 
dominance from the client PC operating system market to the market for work group server 
operating systems was not a goal in itself. In the Commission’s view, internal communication 
between executives indicated that Microsoft aimed to capture the work group server operating 
system market so that it could take the leveraging strategy from there to the internet where 
players such as Sun, Oracle and Netscape were launching new services which Microsoft 
feared might strip its dominance in client PC operating systems of its competitive importance 
in the long term.
799
 However, even if the imposition of the duty to license prevented 
Microsoft from launching a similar leveraging strategy onto the internet, a possible effect on 
the process of competition for the market could only occur indirectly through the renewed 
competitive pressure on the market for work group server operating systems. In this context, 
one of Microsoft’s executives at the time stated: ‘What we are trying to do is use our server 
control to do new protocols and lock out Sun and Oracle specifically [...]. Now, I don’t know 
if we’ll get to that or not, but that’s what we are trying to do’.800 
COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET CAN MERELY INDIRECTLY BE STIMULATED BY COMPETITION 
ENFORCEMENT - Competition law interventions can only have an indirect impact on 
competition for the market as the effects of the US and EU enforcement actions against 
Microsoft’s tying of Internet Explorer to Windows have illustrated. It is impossible for a 
competition authority or court to directly reestablish the process of competition for the 
market. This is because this type of competition and the disruptive innovation that it generates 
is by nature difficult or even impossible to predict. The best approach for competition 
authorities to incentivise competition for the market may be to abstain from acting so that the 
prospect of dominance for new entrants is preserved. In Trinko, the US Supreme Court stated 
that the possession of monopoly and the charging of monopoly prices is an important element 
of the free-market system: ‘The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short 
period-is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that 
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produces innovation and economic growth’.801 A competition law intervention may thus 
lower incentives for competition for the market. In order to determine whether market forces 
have failed to keep an appropriate balance between competition in and for the market over 
time, competition authorities can take into account the stage of development and the specific 
characteristics of the market in order to assess whether a competition law intervention with 
the aim of restoring competition in the market is appropriate. 
 
6.6.3 Stage of development and specific characteristics of the market are instrumental in 
determining whether a competition law intervention for restoring competition in the 
market is appropriate 
DETERMINING THE SCOPE FOR COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT - At the beginning of a market 
cycle, a competition law intervention is only appropriate in very limited circumstances 
considering that the market is still developing and market dynamics are likely to be vigilant. 
Once an incumbent establishes itself and continues to dominate the market, the need for 
competition enforcement increases. Competition authorities may therefore intervene on a 
more general basis in later stages of market development.
802
 The stability of market shares or 
the absence of recent entry of new firms can form indications that the market is in a mature 
stage of development.
803
 With regard to the specific market characteristics to be taken into 
account, an issue that can play a crucial role is whether external market failures materialise. In 
the presence of external market failures, the fact that the incumbent remains dominant may 
not result from its competitive success but merely be a consequence of the market situation 
grown around the incumbent’s dominance. The scope for competition enforcement is wider in 
those cases because a competition law intervention may re-establish the level of competition 
in the market which market forces itself are unable to achieve. In such situations, it may be 
reasonable for competition authorities and courts to continue to guarantee competition in the 
market and protect consumers against abuse of dominance as long as a new wave of 
competition for the market does not arise. Competition enforcement in markets not 
characterised by external market failures, on the other hand, should be subject to stricter 
conditions considering that the self-correcting mechanism of the market to adequately address 
possible competition problems of itself is stronger in the absence of such market failures. In 
these circumstances, a competition law intervention to stimulate competition in the market 
may not be needed and carries a higher risk of unnecessarily reducing incentives for 
competition for the market by taking away the prospect of dominance for new entrants. 
INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES - Although the presence of strong network 
effects, switching costs and entry barriers may form an indication that external market failures 
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are present, these economic characteristics do not necessarily result into market failures. The 
critical issue is whether market characteristics enable an incumbent to artificially extend its 
dominance in time. External market failures can particularly occur in the context of 
standardisation or in cases where network effects and lock-in prevent competitors from 
entering the market and from introducing their own products or services due to the fact that 
consumers are not interested in switching to a new system.
804
 In such circumstances, a 
competition law intervention is desirable in order to correct the market situation grown 
around the dominant position of the incumbent.
805
  
MICROSOFT AS AN EXAMPLE - In the Microsoft case, indirect network effects were identified 
which gave rise to an applications barrier to entry due to which a competitor could only 
launch a new operating system if a sufficient number of compatible applications was already 
available.
806
 In addition, because of the lack of interoperability between non-Microsoft work 
group server operating systems and the Windows client PC operating system, users were 
locked-in to Microsoft’s work group server operating systems and could not benefit from 
competing work group server operating systems which differed from those of Microsoft on 
important parameters such as security, reliability, processing speed and the innovative nature 
of certain functionalities.
807
 The network effects and user lock-in made Microsoft’s position 
in the market for client PC operating systems sustainable and turned Windows in a de facto 
industry standard. In such circumstances, the imposition of a duty to deal seems appropriate in 
order to open up the market and put the incumbent under pressure to continue to compete on 
price and product variety. The latter played a role in Microsoft since the results from a survey 
had indicated that competing work group server operating systems functioned better than 
those of Microsoft with respect to a number of features that were valued by consumers such 
as reliability, availability and security.
808
 As a result, the lead of Microsoft in the market for 
work group server operating systems had ‘to be explained not so much by the merits of its 
products as by its interoperability advantage’.809 The market situation grown around the 
interoperability information thus protected Microsoft from being attacked by competitors in 
the work group server operating system market which had introduced products that were 
considered of better quality than those of Microsoft. By way of ordering Microsoft to give 
these competitors access to the interoperability information, the market situation could be 
corrected and competition in the market was restored.  
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A PROPOSED APPROACH - Although the decision to intervene in a market amounts to a policy 
choice, the specific characteristics and stage of development of the market may inform 
competition authorities about the appropriate approach in a particular situation. When the 
market is locked-in due to switching costs and network effects, and the incumbent has had a 
stable dominant position for some time, it seems justified for a competition authority to 
intervene on the basis of looser conditions in order to open up the process of competition in 
the market through the imposition of a duty to deal. By lowering the standards for holding a 
refusal to license abusive under Article 102 TFEU in Microsoft, the European Commission 
and the General Court may have deliberately tailored the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine to the particular market situation in the case. In that light, one could argue that the 
higher standards established in Magill and IMS Health are still valid for cases in which no 
external market failures are present.
810
 In markets not characterised by the existence of 
external market failures, a duty to deal should indeed be imposed on the basis of stricter 
conditions because of the stronger self-correcting mechanism of the market and to ensure that 
incentives for competition for the market are not put at risk.  
 
6.7 Role of intellectual property and trade secret law 
Under Article 102 TFEU, a different legal standard applies to refusals to license intellectual 
property rights as compared to refusals to deal in general. In addition to the requirements of 
indispensability, exclusion of competition on a secondary market and the absence of an 
objective justification, the new product condition has to be met in order to hold a refusal to 
license abusive under EU competition law. However, as is discussed below, the new product 
condition does not seem capable of addressing all situations in which a competition law 
intervention is necessary in order to restore competition in markets where intellectual property 
rights are present. Furthermore, there is no clear economic rationale for treating intellectual 
property rights differently than other types of assets under the essential facilities doctrine. 
Some forms of protection may even pose competition problems of themselves in case 
information is shielded that competitors need in order to enter a market.  
 
6.7.1 Analysing refusals to license in the light of the interface between competition and 
intellectual property law 
DIFFERENT WAYS TO REACH A COMMON GOAL - The application of the essential facilities 
doctrine to intellectual property rights is controversial because it lies at the heart of the 
interface between competition and intellectual property law. The modern view of the 
relationship between the two areas of law is that they are not in conflict but rather share the 
same objective of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.
811
 While 
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competition law tries to protect consumer welfare by putting pressure on firms to compete and 
innovate, intellectual property law aims to encourage creativity and inventiveness by granting 
protection in the form of exclusive rights.
812
 Through exclusivity the right holder is given an 
opportunity to reap the rewards of his or her creation on the market. It is therefore not the 
grant of the intellectual property right in itself which gives rise to incentives for innovation, 
but the competitive process which determines the value of the subject matter underlying the 
exclusive right and the reward for its creation in accordance with market demand. In the 
words of Ullrich: ‘competition is a prerequisite to the well functioning of the intellectual 
property system’ and ‘intellectual property, indeed, represents nothing else than a means of 
competition, an opportunity to act in competition according to the market rules of profit 
maximization’.813 As a result, both intellectual property rights and competition are necessary 
in order to promote innovation. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES - By establishing a duty to 
deal in the form of a compulsory license, competition enforcement limits the scope of 
protection that is offered to right holders by intellectual property law. In particular, the 
imposition of a compulsory license on the basis of competition law takes away the right to 
exclude third parties from using the subject matter underlying the intellectual property 
right.
814
 Nevertheless, in the light of the complementary goals of competition law and 
intellectual property law it is appropriate for competition authorities to intervene in certain 
circumstances to promote innovation when the intellectual property system is unable to do so. 
To identify these situations, Drexl relies on the difference between competition by 
substitution and competition by imitation as an analytical tool.
815
 Intellectual property rights 
restrict static competition, which amounts to competition on the basis of price and output, in 
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order to encourage dynamic competition or, in a simpler term, innovation.
816
 By granting 
exclusive rights to inventors and creators, intellectual property law prevents third parties from 
copying the protected subject matter by competing on static parameters (competition by 
imitation). But intellectual property protection does not exclude third parties from the process 
of dynamic competition which concerns the development of a different or superior product 
that would compete with the product of the right holder in the same market (competition by 
substitution). Intellectual property law thus relies on the exclusion of competition by imitation 
to encourage competition by substitution.
817
 
FIRST SCENARIO: IP LAW PROVIDES TOO BROAD SCOPE OF PROTECTION - Drexl identifies two 
situations in which competition authorities should intervene by imposing a compulsory 
license on the ground that the assumption that an intellectual property right contributes to 
dynamic competition does not hold in those circumstances. The first scenario relates to 
situations in which the intellectual property system provides such a broad scope of protection 
that the intellectual property right not only excludes competition by imitation but also 
competition by substitution. An example of such a situation can be found in the Magill case 
where it was argued by commentators that the programme listings were not worthy of 
copyright protection.
818
 As a result of the fact that the Irish broadcasting stations were granted 
copyright over basic information not available from another source, the protection 
automatically excluded dynamic competition in the market for weekly television guides. 
Whereas these kind of problems may be best solved within the intellectual property system 
itself, the second situation identified by Drexl can only be addressed by way of competition 
enforcement.  
SECOND SCENARIO: PRESENCE OF EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES - The presence of external 
market failures constitutes the second scenario in which intellectual property law may not 
reach its objective of encouraging innovation. An intellectual property right that usually 
would not affect competition by substitution may do so due to specific market circumstances 
lying outside the intellectual property system. IMS Health and Microsoft form illustrations of 
this. In IMS Health, the pharmaceutical companies were locked-in to the 1860 brick structure 
of IMS which had become a de facto standard. Since they had been involved in the 
development of the brick structure by making suggestions for optimising the segmentation in 
geographical areas, the pharmaceutical companies were accustomed to the system of IMS and 
did not want to work with different brick structures. PII, a competitor of IMS, tried to market 
structures consisting of 2201 bricks but this was met with reticence on the part of potential 
                                                 
816
 See M.-O. MACKENRODT, "Assessing the effects of intellectual property rights in network standards" in J. 
DREXL (ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Edward Elgar, 2008, (80), p. 
81-82. 
817
 J. DREXL, "IMS Health and Trinko - antitrust placebo for consumers instead of sound economics in refusal-to-
deal cases", International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2004, vol. 35, no. 7, (788), p. 
805. 
818
 See, among others, R. GREAVES, "Magill Est Arrivé…RTE and ITP v Commission of the European 
Communities", European Competition Law Review 1995, vol. 16, no. 4, (244), p. 246; Opinion of Advocate 
General Jacobs in Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, par. 
63; B. DOHERTY, "Just What are Essential Facilities", Common Market Law Review 2001, vol. 38, no. 2, (397), 
p. 429; M. MOTTA, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 68. 
195 
 
clients.
819
 As a result, competition by substitution could not occur in IMS Health due to the 
market characteristics grown around the copyright protection of the 1860 brick structure.
820
 A 
similar situation was at stake in Microsoft. Due to network effects and user lock-in, 
Microsoft’s PC operating system Windows had become a de facto industry standard. Due to 
these external market failures, undertakings could only compete in the market for work group 
server operating systems by making their products interoperable with Windows. Because 
Microsoft refused to disclose the interoperability information, which was assumed to be 
protected by intellectual property rights,
821
 competitors were prevented from doing so. 
 
6.7.2 Limits of the new product condition 
LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO REFUSALS TO LICENSE IN THE US AND EU - In the United 
States, Courts of Appeals have expressed conflicting views on the appropriate treatment of 
refusals to license intellectual property rights under antitrust law. Whereas the Ninth Circuit 
Court argued in Kodak that proof of anticompetitive intent on the part of right holder could be 
invoked to rebut the presumption of legality of a refusal to license, the Federal Circuit held in 
Xerox that inventions protected by patent law were immune from antitrust liability except in 
the case of illegal tying, fraud and sham litigation.
822
 The US Supreme Court has not yet 
rendered judgment on the legal test that should be applied to refusals to license. The Kodak 
and Xerox cases preceded the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trinko, but since the latter 
case did not concern intellectual property rights it is unclear to what extent the reasoning in 
Trinko is also valid for refusals to license.
823
 Unlike in the United States where it remains 
ambiguous whether and in which circumstances a refusal to license an intellectual property 
right may violate antitrust law, it is clear that intellectual property rights are not immune from 
competition law intervention in the European Union.
824
 Under the essential facilities doctrine 
in Europe, a different standard applies to refusals to deal involving intellectual property rights 
as compared to refusals to deal in general. As the General Court observed in Microsoft, the 
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new product condition is only apparent in the case law on the exercise of an intellectual 
property right.
825
 As a consequence, in order to hold a refusal to license abusive under Article 
102 TFEU the new product requirement has to be met in addition to the conditions of 
indispensability, exclusion of competition on a secondary market and the absence of an 
objective justification which constitute the three relevant criteria to assess refusals to deal 
involving non-intellectual property protected assets.  
RATIONALE OF THE NEW PRODUCT CONDITION - According to the Court of Justice in IMS 
Health, the requirement of the prevention of the emergence of a new product is applied to 
determine whether the refusal to license at issue ‘prevents the development of the secondary 
market to the detriment of consumers’.826 It is only in that case that the interest in protection 
of the intellectual property right and the economic freedom of its owner can prevail over the 
interest in protection of free competition in the view of the Court. The new production 
condition reflects how intellectual property law aims to stimulate innovation: by excluding 
third parties from copying protected subject matter, the development of different or improved 
products is encouraged. The logic behind the introduction of the requirement may lie in the 
fact that an intellectual property right does not fulfil its function of promoting innovation 
when it is used to prevent the emergence of a new product. Such an exceptional circumstance 
may for that reason be considered relevant for assessing whether a refusal to license is 
abusive under competition law. In accordance with the scope of protection offered by an 
intellectual property right, a competitor who would like to have a license in order to duplicate 
the product of the right holder cannot successfully rely on Article 102 TFEU whereas a 
competitor who aims to introduce a new product can expect to get a license on the basis of the 
essential facilities doctrine (provided that the other three exceptional circumstances are also 
present). This would mean that a competition law intervention for a refusal to license is only 
justified if competition by substitution is constrained.
827
 However, as argued by Drexl, the 
imposition of a compulsory license on the basis of competition law may also be appropriate to 
restore competition by imitation when competition by substitution cannot occur due to 
external market failures. These situations are not captured by the new product condition. 
NEW PRODUCT CONDITION INADEQUATE TO ADDRESS CASES OF EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES -  
If the new product condition is applied as a necessary requirement for the imposition of a 
compulsory license, only cases in which the intellectual property system itself fails by 
providing such an extensive scope of protection that competition by substitution is 
automatically excluded (first scenario identified by Drexl) can be held abusive under EU 
competition law. Cases involving refusals to license in which the intellectual property right at 
issue does not promote innovation due to external market failures (second scenario identified 
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by Drexl) escape liability under Article 102 TFEU.
828
 Under the new product requirement, the 
access seeker has to show that it will not merely imitate the product of the right holder.  
MAGILL AND IMS HEALTH AS ILLUSTRATIONS - In Magill, which forms an example of the first 
scenario, the copyright was so broad as to cover the basic information that Magill needed to 
introduce the new product, namely the comprehensive weekly television guide. In this case, 
the new product requirement could be adequately applied to restore competition by 
substitution through obliging IMS to grant Magill a copyright license. However, in situations 
where market characteristics such as network effects and lock-in are present, competitors 
cannot compete by substitution because their customers are not interested in a new product. In 
IMS Health, the pharmaceutical companies did not have an interest in the availability of a 
different brick structure on the market because they had become locked-in to the system of 
IMS. The switch to a new brick structure was therefore considered too costly. In contrast to 
the situation in Magill, the pharmaceutical companies in IMS Health did not benefit from the 
judgment because they were not interested in having a new brick structure. Unlike the 
television viewers in Magill who were willing to buy a comprehensive television guide, the 
competitors of IMS would not have been able to convince the pharmaceutical companies to 
switch to their system even if they were in a position to introduce a new brick structure. 
Instead, the pharmaceutical companies would have benefited from having a brick structure 
similar to that of IMS on the market so that there would at least be competition on the basis of 
price or variety.
829
  
MICROSOFT AS AN ILLUSTRATION - Similarly, in Microsoft Windows had become the de facto 
industry standard as a result of which consumers were only interested in using work group 
server operating systems that were compatible with the Windows client PC operating system. 
In order to viably remain on the market for work group server operating systems, competitors 
thus had to ensure that their own work group server operating systems were interoperable 
with Windows. The General Court held in its Microsoft judgment that a restriction of 
technical development was sufficient for fulfilling the new product requirement. Indeed, due 
to the external market failures present in the case a mere technical development of 
Microsoft’s product would arguably have been more beneficial to consumers who were 
locked-in to Windows and as a result preferred competition on the basis of price or variety 
over having an entirely new work group server operating system in the market that was 
incompatible with Windows. 
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APPROPRIATENESS OF A COMPULSORY LICENSE IN THE ABSENCE OF A NEW PRODUCT - While the 
new product condition introduced in Magill was adequate to solve the competition problem in 
that case and to restore competition by substitution, the market characteristics in IMS Health 
and Microsoft made it commercially unviable for the competitors of, respectively, IMS and 
Microsoft to introduce a new product. The new product requirement is therefore not suitable 
to address cases where external market failures exclude competition by substitution. It does 
not make sense to require access seekers to intend to offer a new product when the market 
will not accept such a form of innovation due to the existence of external market failures. The 
consequence of allowing competitors to imitate the creation or invention of the right holder is 
that the core of the intellectual property right which restricts third parties from engaging in 
copying activities is affected. However, one should recognise that the promotion of 
innovation is not the only way in which consumer welfare can be protected under competition 
and intellectual property law. Considering that both legal fields aim to enhance consumer 
welfare, a competition law intervention that affects the exclusivity of an intellectual property 
right should be accepted in situations where a duty to deal cannot restore dynamic 
competition in the form of innovation. By doing so, consumers can at least benefit from static 
competition on the basis of price and output in these cases. Even though the intellectual 
property right itself is not the cause of the dominant position, its exercise enables the right 
holder to continue to exploit its dominance in a way which is not in line with the rationale 
behind intellectual property law to encourage dynamic competition through the restriction of 
static competition. By limiting the exercise of the intellectual property right on the basis of 
competition law, it can be prevented that the right holder is overcompensated for its 
investments which would not have met with a similar degree of success in the absence of the 
external market failures. At the same time, no adverse incentives to invest in innovation 
should be created by allowing imitation to take place on a too general basis and without 
providing an adequate reward to the right holder. As made clear by Drexl, a balance could be 
found by applying Article 102 TFEU to limit the exercise of the intellectual property right but 
also to entitle the right holder to ask licensees for a reasonable royalty rate allowing for the 
recovery of its investments.
830
 
ONLY THE EXERCISE OF AN IP RIGHT IS AFFECTED BY A COMPULSORY LICENSE - Although the 
imposition of a compulsory license in order to enable imitation puts more far-reaching limits 
on the exercise of an intellectual property right than in case the access seeker is required to 
introduce a new product, the existence of the exclusive right in itself remains untouched. The 
distinction between the existence of intellectual property rights, which should not be subject 
to EU competition rules, and their exercise, which may violate Article 102 TFEU, as 
introduced by the Court of Justice in the early cases of Volvo and Renault is thus upheld. 
Since the new product condition, as currently interpreted and applied by the Commission and 
the EU Courts, is incapable of enhancing consumer welfare in cases where market 
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circumstances prevent competitors from competing by introducing novel products, it is 
inconsistent with the complementary nature of intellectual property and competition law.  
UNCLEAR NATURE OF THE NEW PRODUCT CONDITION - The adequacy of the new product 
requirement has also been questioned on other grounds. It has been noted that, contrary to 
what the new product condition implies, consumer demand does not depend on the product 
itself but on its characteristics and its performance on each characteristic. As a result, it would 
be more accurate from an economic perspective to look at the individual characteristics of a 
product instead of at the product as a whole. In addition, the new product condition only 
requires the intent to introduce a new product and therefore does not assess whether actual 
consumer demand will exist for the product once it has been brought to the market. In that 
context, it is claimed that the new product condition is unable to serve as a proxy for what is 
most relevant to test: the loss for consumers if the improvement of the product is blocked due 
to the refusal to license.
831
 Commentators have also argued that the concept of ‘novelty’ is 
difficult to apply because it is not a well-established and clearly definable notion.
832
 It is still 
uncertain how different a product should be in comparison with existing ones and to what 
extent it should already be clearly identifiable in order to be considered ‘new’ under the legal 
standards of the essential facilities doctrine. Whereas the Court of Justice held in IMS Health 
that a refusal to license ‘may be regarded as abusive only where the undertaking which 
requested the license does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or 
services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the intellectual property 
right, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and 
for which there is a potential consumer demand’,833 the General Court in Microsoft followed 
the approach of the European Commission that prejudice to consumers under Article 102(b) 
TFEU may occur ‘where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also of 
technical development’.834 Under the latter standard, the burden of proof is much lower and it 
merely suffices for competitors to argue that the refusal to license prevents them from 
introducing a product differentiation without the need to specify a concrete form of 
innovation that they will generate. In other words, anything other than mere imitation is 
sufficient to constitute a new product. It remains to be seen if this definition of the new 
product condition will be upheld in future cases. 
NEW MARKETS AND THE NEW PRODUCT CONDITION - Although the degree of novelty required 
in the IMS Health and Microsoft cases differs considerably, the two cases reach the same 
conclusion on the fact that the new product or technical development which the access seeker 
intends to introduce has to compete with that of the right holder in the derivative market. In 
that sense, the new product or technical development has to be substitutable to that of the 
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right holder and fall within the same relevant market.
835
 In both IMS Health and Microsoft, it 
was made clear that the prevention of the emergence of a new product should have occurred 
on the secondary market in which the dominant undertaking was present and in which it tried 
to foreclose competition by refusing to license (in IMS Health the German market for the 
provision of regional sales data of pharmaceutical products and in Microsoft the market for 
work group server operating systems). A different interpretation of the new product 
requirement would be incompatible with the condition relating to the exclusion of competition 
on a secondary market which requires that the dominant undertaking reserves the derivative 
market to itself by denying a competitor access to an essential facility. It would not make 
sense to hold the new product requirement applicable to situations where access seekers aim 
to launch a new product on a market on which the dominant undertaking is not active, 
because in such cases there is no leveraging of market power while this is necessary for a 
refusal to licence to be considered abusive under current standards. As a result, the essential 
facilities doctrine currently does not support competitors who would like to introduce a new 
product on a new market different from that on which the dominant undertaking is present.
836
 
 
6.7.3 Do intellectual property rights and trade secrets require a different treatment under 
the essential facilities doctrine? 
ASSESSING REFUSALS TO LICENSE IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY  BETWEEN COMPETITION 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW - The various limits of the new product condition raise 
doubts about its reliability to distinguish situations in which the imposition of a compulsory 
license is appropriate from those in which a competition authority should not intervene. As a 
consequence, the question rises whether a different legal standard should at all apply to 
intellectual property rights or whether they should be treated in the same way as other forms 
of property in refusal to deal cases. The need for a more demanding test to hold refusals to 
license abusive under Article 102 TFEU seems to be based on the premise that there is an 
inherent conflict between intellectual property and competition law. However, as recognised 
by the European Commission,
837
 the two fields of law share the objective of encouraging 
innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. It therefore seems inconsistent with the modern 
view of the complementary relationship between intellectual property and competition law to 
apply a higher legal threshold to refusals to license intellectual property rights as compared to 
refusals involving non-intellectual property protected goods and services.  
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JUSTIFYING A HIGHER LEGAL HURDLE - Indeed, proponents of a distinct approach to intellectual 
property in the context of the essential facilities doctrine do not provide reasons for why 
intellectual property rights should be treated with special care other than the claim that 
competition law interventions will impede on the exclusivity of the right and will negatively 
affect future investment in intellectual property.
838
 A restriction on the exclusivity of an 
intellectual property right is not problematic if one regards the fields of competition and 
intellectual property law as complementary instruments that are working towards the same 
goal of protecting consumer welfare. According to the modern view of the relationship 
between the two areas of law, it would be appropriate for competition authorities to step in 
and preserve consumer welfare by encouraging competition on static parameters when an 
intellectual property right does not achieve its objective of promoting innovation.
839
 With 
regard to the effect of a duty to license on innovation incentives, Advocate General Jacobs 
stated in Bronner: ‘particular care is required where the goods or services or facilities to 
which access is demanded represent the fruit of substantial investment. That may be true in 
particular in relation to refusal to license intellectual property rights. Where such exclusive 
rights are granted for a limited period, that in itself involves a balancing of the interest in free 
competition with that of providing an incentive for research and development and for 
creativity’.840 It is claimed that intellectual property rights require special protection because 
they are more vulnerable to free-riding and duplication than other types of property.
841
 
However, in practice a lot of time and effort may be needed to gather the know-how necessary 
for copying, for instance, a patented invention.
842
 Furthermore, intellectual property rights are 
not the only type of asset whose development requires significant investment. Similar levels 
of investments may be necessary for the construction of tunnels, ports, telephone networks 
and other physical infrastructures.
843
 It should also be noted that not all investment in 
intellectual property necessarily promotes innovation or consumer welfare. Many patents are 
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not practiced or enforced and may even be used to block competition instead of to protect 
returns to innovation. It therefore does not seem correct to assume that the innovations which 
are most valuable to society are protected by some form of intellectual property. A more 
lenient approach towards refusals to license is thus hard to justify on the ground that 
investment in intellectual property needs more protection than investment in other assets.
844
  
DIFFERENTIATION AMONG DIFFERENT FORMS OF PROTECTION IN MICROSOFT - There does not 
seem to be a solid economic rationale for applying a different legal test to refusals to license 
than to refusals to deal involving non-intellectual property protected assets. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that all forms of intellectual property protection or protected information are 
similar and should be treated in the same way. The Microsoft case raised the issue of whether 
trade secret protection should be equated with intellectual property rights such as patents and 
copyrights. Microsoft had argued before the European Commission that its interoperability 
information was protected by patent, copyright and trade secret law.
845
 The Commission did 
not assess whether Microsoft was indeed able to invoke any of these forms of protection but 
merely stated that it could not be excluded that ordering Microsoft to disclose its protocols 
and to allow use of them by third parties would restrict the exercise of Microsoft’s intellectual 
property rights.
846
 It is not clear from its decision whether the Commission regarded trade 
secret protection as equivalent to intellectual property. The Commission simply noted: ‘It is 
possible that such a use [referring to the implementation of the interoperability information in 
third party products] could be prevented by Microsoft relying on intellectual property rights. 
Furthermore, the specifications at issue may constitute innovations that are currently not 
disclosed and are protected by trade secrecy’ and ‘Microsoft in fact invokes such intellectual 
property rights over the relevant information to resist disclosure and the subsequent use that 
could be made of it’.847 Whereas the Commission mentioned trade secret protection in 
addition to intellectual property in the first quote, it referred to a general form of intellectual 
property protection against disclosure in the latter sentence.
848
 The General Court pointed out 
that it was not necessary to analyse Microsoft’s claim that its interoperability information was 
protected by intellectual property law, because the Commission had based its decision on the 
assumption that the conduct at issue was not a mere refusal to supply a product or service but 
a refusal to license intellectual property rights. In so doing, the Commission, in the words of 
the Court, ‘chose the strictest legal test and therefore the one most favourable to Microsoft’. 
On this ground, the General Court stated that the arguments of Microsoft derived from the 
alleged intellectual property rights could not affect the lawfulness of the Commission 
decision.
849
 The General Court made a more clear statement than the Commission on the 
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relationship between trade secret protection and intellectual property by noting that it would 
proceed on the presumption that Microsoft’s interoperability information was ‘covered by 
intellectual property rights or constitute trade secrets and that those secrets must be treated 
as equivalent to intellectual property rights’.850 
ARE TRADE SECRETS DIFFERENT? - It is not clear from the outset that trade secrets can be 
equated with intellectual property rights. In fact, trade secret protection has several 
characteristics that distinguish it from intellectual property law. Firstly, trade secret protection 
is not yet harmonised in the European Union unlike many other forms of intellectual property 
protection. As discussed in section 5.3.3 above, the entry into force of the national provisions 
to be adopted in implementation of the Trade Secrets Directive will change this situation. 
Secondly, the secret character of a trade secret stands in contrast to the disclosure of the 
invention that is required for obtaining patent protection. Since trade secret laws only protect 
information from being acquired by, disclosed to or used by others in an unlawful manner,
851
 
the protection cannot be invoked against the use of information or know-how obtained 
through legitimate means such as independent discovery or creation.
852
 Unlike intellectual 
property rights which grant right holders an absolute exclusive right to prevent any third party 
from using the subject matter of protection without authorisation, trade secrets are only 
protected against unfair conduct.
853
 The trade secret is not owned by its holder but merely 
offers a form of protection against conduct that affects its secrecy in an unlawful manner. For 
this reason, trade secrecy is regulated under unfair competition law in most countries and does 
not belong to the field of exclusive protection of intangible property.
854
 An additional 
difference between trade secret and intellectual property protection is that trade secrets do not 
necessarily involve innovation. As opposed to, for example, patent and copyright law which 
require, respectively, an inventive step and originality for an invention or creation to be 
protected, trade secret law does not guarantee that the underlying information is innovative. 
The main condition for trade secret protection is that the information is kept secret. As a 
result, the economic value of a trade secret does not necessarily lie in the technological 
superiority of the underlying information but may also relate to the monopoly position that 
can be created and secured by keeping the information secret.
855
  
ROLE OF TRADE SECRECY IN MICROSOFT - The latter scenario seems to have occurred in the 
Microsoft case. Although Microsoft invoked patent and copyright protection for its 
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interoperability information, those claims can be considered as doubtful. Microsoft identified 
at least one patent that its competitors would be infringing when implementing the 
interoperability information.
856
 However, the fact that the relevant protocols remained 
unavailable to Microsoft’s competitors in the work group server operating system market 
excludes the possibility that all the interfaces were covered by the patent. If the 
interoperability information was protected by the patent, it would have been publicly 
accessible considering that the patent process requires disclosure of the underlying 
invention.
857
 Copyright protection for software only extends to the expression of a computer 
program and does not cover the underlying ideas and principles, including those underlying 
its interfaces.
858
 Beyond the unprotected ideas and principles, interoperability information is 
copyrightable as long as it can be regarded as original in the sense that it is the author’s own 
intellectual creation.
859
 Even if Microsoft’s interfaces could be protected by copyright, it is 
unclear whether the introduction of non-Microsoft work group server operating systems 
compatible with Windows involved a reproduction of Microsoft’s interoperability 
information. In the absence of such a reproduction, a copyright infringement cannot be 
established. In this regard, the Commission argued: ‘[n]ot only is it [...] possible to provide 
interface specifications without giving access to all implementation details, but it has been 
outlined above that it is common practice in the industry to do so’860 and ‘the specifications 
should [...] not be reproduced, adapted, arranged or altered, but should be used by third 
parties to write their own specification-compliant interfaces’861. The General Court shared the 
Commission’s view on the questionability of Microsoft’s copyright claim.862 Microsoft’s own 
conduct of withholding the interoperability information from competitors indicates that its 
key intention was to secure the secrecy of the interfaces rather than to prevent or redress an 
infringement of patent and copyright law.
863
 In that context, Microsoft contested the argument 
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of the Commission that ‘an undertaking suffers less damage when it discloses a business 
secret than when it is required to allow infringement of its patents or copyright’.864 It also has 
to be noted that interoperability information does not necessarily involve innovation. 
Interfaces may even be seen as a mere by-product of computer programming. As such, the 
trade secret protection at issue in the Microsoft case did not seem to promote innovation but 
rather gave Microsoft the opportunity to build a dominant position in the market for work 
group server operating systems by keeping its protocols to itself once it had gained a stable 
position in that market.
865
  
SHOULD THERE BE A LOWER LEGAL THRESHOLD FOR REFUSALS TO DISCLOSE TRADE SECRETS? - 
Intellectual property rights such as a patent or copyright encourage innovation by preventing 
third parties from copying the underlying subject matter. While the exclusivity of these 
intellectual property rights stimulates competitors to invent around the right holder’s 
invention or creation, trade secret protection may rather encourage imitation because it allows 
third parties to copy the underlying subject matter in case they have unravelled the secret by 
way of, for example, independent discovery or reverse engineering.
866
 Since trade secret 
protection does not depend on the fulfilment of qualitative requirements concerning the 
subject matter of protection but only requires that commercially valuable information is kept 
secret, it may more easily lead to competition problems in the sense that a trade secret holder 
can rely on trade secrecy to protect its dominance in a market by refusing to share or disclose 
know-how with competitors. If independent discovery or reverse engineering is not 
successful, this may lead to non-innovative information being protected under trade secret law 
and shielded from competition for an infinite period of time. In these circumstances, there 
seems to be more room for competition law intervention.  
STATEMENTS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE GENERAL COURT ON TRADE SECRET PROTECTION - 
In its Discussion Paper on the application of Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary abuses, the 
Commission indeed argued that it may not be appropriate to apply to refusals to give access to 
trade secrets the same high standards for intervention as those which are developed for 
refusals to license intellectual property rights.
867
 In the appeal procedure before the General 
Court, the Commission also stated that Microsoft may not be correct to equate trade secrets 
with intellectual property rights considering that ‘the protection that such secrets enjoy under 
national law is normally more limited than that given to copyright or patents’. With regard to 
the factual scenario of Microsoft, the Commission pointed out that ‘the value of the 'secret' 
concerned lies not in the fact that it involves innovation but in the fact that it belongs to a 
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dominant undertaking’.868 Despite these statements of the Commission, the General Court 
treated trade secrets as equivalent to intellectual property rights. In the Guidance Paper on 
exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU that was adopted after the public consultation 
following the issuance of the Discussion paper and after the General Court delivered its 
judgment in Microsoft, the Commission did not separately mention trade secrets anymore and 
merely referred to refusals to give access to interoperability information as a subcategory of 
refusals to license intellectual property rights.
869
 Although there does not seem to be a need 
for a different or lower standard of intervention for refusals to give access to trade secrets, the 
characteristics of trade secret protection should be taken into account when applying the 
conditions of the essential facilities doctrine to a refusal to disclose a trade secret. In 
particular, it must be kept in mind that the information underlying a trade secret does not 
necessarily involve innovation and that trade secret protection may lead to the control of 
information on which competitors are dependent for being able to enter a market.
870
 While the 
European Commission and the General Court have not explicitly taken into account the 
effects of trade secret protection in the Microsoft case, an adequate outcome was reached by 
recognising the importance of interoperability information for competition in the market for 
work group server operating systems. 
WHAT ABOUT SUI GENERIS DATABASE PROTECTION? - Another form of protection which does 
not in itself promote innovation is the sui generis database right introduced by the Database 
Directive. As discussed in section 5.3.2 above, the Directive has created an exclusive right for 
producers of databases, valid for 15 years, to protect their investment in terms of time, effort, 
energy and financial resources irrespective of whether the database is innovative in character. 
These so-called non-original databases benefit from sui generis protection as long as the 
database maker can show that ‘there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial 
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents’.871 Unlike 
patents and copyrights which protect inventiveness and creativeness by requiring, 
respectively, an inventive step or originality to qualify for protection, the sui generis database 
right does not provide incentives for innovation but rather protects the investments of 
database producers against free-riding by third parties. To that end, the Database Directive 
provides for a right for the maker of the database ‘to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization 
of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the 
contents of that database’.872 By excluding third parties from extracting and re-utilising data, 
the sui generis database right may give rise to competition problems in cases where a database 
is the only possible source of the information contained therein. Whereas copyright protects 
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the original expression of an idea and leaves untreated facts and ideas in the public domain, 
the sui generis database right entitles a database maker to exclude others from re-utilising 
mere factual information and data.
873
 To mitigate this risk, recital 47 of the Database 
Directive makes clear that ‘protection by the sui generis right must not be afforded in such a 
way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant position’ and that ‘the provisions of this Directive 
are without prejudice to the application of Community or national competition rules’.874 In 
addition, the Court of Justice interpreted the sui generis right restrictively by excluding 
investment in the creation of data from the scope of protection.
875
 The Court argued that only 
investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of pre-existing contents can be taken 
into account when assessing whether the required substantial investment has been made.  
SCOPE FOR SUI GENERIS PROTECTION OF SINGLE-SOURCE DATABASES - By ruling that the 
creation of data cannot count towards substantial investment, the Court reduced the likelihood 
that so-called single-source databases where the data is created by the same entity as the entity 
that establishes the database attract sui generis protection.
876
 Because of the restrictive 
interpretation that the Court has given to the scope of the sui generis database right, potential 
competition problems relating to situations where a database maker can prevent others from 
re-utilising self-generated information contained in a database have also been mitigated.
877
 
Nevertheless, a database consisting of self-created data can still obtain protection under the 
sui generis database right if a substantial investment has been made in either the verification 
or the presentation of its content. A database maker creating its own data may get around the 
restrictive interpretation of the scope of protection of the sui generis database right by the 
Court of Justice by clearly differentiating investment in creating data from subsequent 
investment in the verification or presentation of the data through the introduction of separate 
procedural systems.
878
 Therefore, competition issues are not completely excluded. The fact 
that the sui generis database right protects investment and not innovation should be taken into 
account when assessing refusals to license such rights as well as the higher probability of 
anticompetitive effects as compared to intellectual property rights that promote innovation.  
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CONCLUSION ON THE COMPARISON BETWEEN REFUSALS TO DEAL AND REFUSALS TO LICENSE - 
As a conclusion of this section, it is submitted that there is no convincing economic basis for 
treating refusals to license intellectual property rights or trade secrets differently than refusals 
to deal in general. Nevertheless, one should take into account the peculiarities of the 
respective form of protection in a specific case, in particular when trade secret or sui generis 
database protection are involved considering that both do not necessarily encourage 
innovation and may in some circumstances even give rise to competition problems of 
themselves.  
 
6.8 A proposed framework for the application of the essential facilities doctrine 
After devoting attention to market definition and assessment of dominance, the framework set 
out below distinguishes between three different scenarios as regards essential facilities cases: 
absolute refusals to deal involving inputs which the dominant undertaking has not previously 
supplied to others (section 6.8.2), disruptions of existing levels of supply (section 6.8.3) and 
discriminatory conditions of supply (section 6.8.4).
879
 In addition to this three-part typology, 
two other differentiations can be made with respect to refusals to deal. While most essential 
facilities cases involve unilateral decisions of dominant undertakings to refuse to deal, it is 
also possible that two or more firms team up together and engage in a concerted action not to 
do business with a certain party. The latter is referred to as a ‘collective’ refusal to deal and 
may also give rise to coordination concerns under Article 101 TFEU. Such concerns are not 
addressed in this thesis. Next to outright refusals to deal whereby the dominant undertaking 
does not supply at all or even refuses to negotiate about supply, constructive or indirect 
refusals to deal can be distinguished which, in the words of the European Commission, may 
‘take the form of unduly delaying or otherwise degrading the supply of the product or involve 
the imposition of unreasonable conditions in return for the supply’.880 Since the analysis of 
potential anticompetitive exclusionary effects of collective and unilateral refusals to supply is 
similar, no further attention will be paid to this distinction. Discriminatory refusals to deal and 
margin squeezes can be regarded as constructive refusals to deal and are discussed in section 
6.8.4. If a constructive refusal to deal forms part of a wider tying or bundling strategy which 
aims to exclude rivals from the market, the anticompetitive nature of the behaviour may rather 
be found in those latter practices than in the indispensability of the input that is withheld. 
Application of the essential facilities doctrine may for that reason not lead to the identification 
of abusive conduct in those cases.
881
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6.8.1 Market definition and dominance in essential facilities cases  
TWO RELEVANT MARKETS - Market definition is different for the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine than for the assessment of other types of abusive conduct or for the review 
of mergers. The conduct that the essential facilities doctrine aims to redress under the current 
legal standards in the European Union is the leveraging of market power from the main 
market in which the holder of the essential facility is dominant to a derivative market in which 
it tries to strengthen its current market position by refusing to (continue to) supply a 
competitor (that wants to become) active in that market. As a result, in essential facilities 
cases two related relevant markets have to be defined. The approach of the European 
Commission and the EU courts towards market definition in essential facilities cases has been 
consistent up to the Microsoft case.  
MARKET DEFINITION PRIOR TO MICROSOFT - Before Microsoft, the upstream or primary market 
had been defined in such a way as to contain the product or service to which access was 
requested. The downstream or secondary market in its turn comprised the derivative product 
or service that would be offered by the access seeker once it was given access to the necessary 
input.
882
 As an illustration, the primary market in Magill comprised the listings of television 
programmes to which Magill asked access in order to be able to publish a weekly television 
guide, the secondary market. Similarly, in IMS Health the copyrighted brick structure 
developed by IMS which divided Germany in 1860 districts constituted the primary market, 
while the service of providing pharmaceutical companies with data on the sale of 
pharmaceutical products formed the secondary market in which NDC wanted to compete with 
IMS. Since the brick structure of IMS had become the industry standard, NDC argued that 
access to the system was indispensable to be able to compete with IMS in the downstream 
market. The scenario at issue in IMS Health differs in one aspect from the facts of the Magill 
case. The Irish broadcasting stations in the Magill case had already provided their programme 
listings to newspapers prior to Magill’s request for a copyright license as a result of which it 
was clear that the broadcasting stations were able and willing to offer the television listings to 
third parties as a separate product. It was therefore logical to define an upstream market for 
television listings even though the newspapers were provided with a copyright license free of 
charge and a market for the programme listings in the strict sense of the word did not yet 
exist. In IMS Health, the definition of an upstream market for the 1860 brick structure was 
more controversial because IMS had not provided any third party access to its system before 
NDC requested a license. IMS only relied upon the brick structure in supplying regional sales 
data to pharmaceutical companies.
883
  
EXISTENCE OF A POTENTIAL OR HYPOTHETICAL UPSTREAM MARKET SUFFICIENT - In its IMS 
Health judgment, the Court of Justice made clear that the fact that the requested input has 
never been marketed separately does not preclude the possibility of identifying a separate 
                                                 
882
 L. HOU, "The Essential Facilities Doctrine – What Was Wrong in Microsoft?", International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2012, vol. 43, no. 4, (451), p. 463-464. 
883
 See also the opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in IMS Health who argued that it was already clear from 
the Magill and Bronner judgments that in order to identify an upstream market, the Court of Justice does not 
deem it necessary that the requested input be autonomously marketed by the dominant undertaking (Opinion of 
Advocate General Tizzano in IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, C-418/01, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:537, par. 56). 
210 
 
relevant market for the input or of applying the essential facilities doctrine altogether. To this 
end, the Court referred to the Bronner judgment in which an upstream relevant market for 
home delivery of daily newspapers was defined even though Mediaprint had not marketed its 
home-delivery scheme as a separate product.
884
 In the Court’s view, it therefore appeared that, 
for the purposes of the application of the earlier case law, the identification of a potential or 
even a hypothetical market is sufficient which is the case ‘where the products or services are 
indispensable in order to carry on a particular business and where there is an actual demand 
for them on the part of undertakings which seek to carry on the business for which they are 
indispensable’.885 The Court went on to explain that ‘it is determinative that two different 
stages of production may be identified and that they are interconnected, inasmuch as the 
upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream product’.886 In other 
words, an upstream market for the input can be defined as long as the access seeker is able to 
show that it needs the input in order to compete on a related downstream market.  
DUTY TO SUPPLY AN INTERMEDIARY PRODUCT - As a consequence, it is possible for a 
competition authority or court to oblige a dominant undertaking under the essential facilities 
doctrine in the European Union to provide third parties access to a necessary input which 
merely constitutes an intermediary product and has never been marketed independently. In its 
Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU, the European Commission 
relied on the IMS Health judgment when making clear that it does not regard it as necessary 
for the refused product to have been already traded. According to the Commission, ‘it is 
sufficient that there is demand from potential purchasers and that a potential market for the 
input at stake can be identified’.887 The US Supreme Court, to the contrary, does not seem to 
be willing to hold monopolists liable for refusing to supply a product which has not been 
marketed before. One of the grounds on the basis of which the Supreme Court denied antitrust 
liability in Trinko was that the systems to which Verizon had to offer its rivals access were 
not otherwise marketed or available to the public but existed ‘only deep within the bowels of 
Verizon’.888 
EVALUATING THE CONCEPT OF POTENTIAL OR HYPOTHETICAL MARKETS - Criticism has been 
expressed by commentators that the concept of potential or hypothetical markets is so broad 
as to open the door to access requests which will change existing market structures and 
undermine investments in cases where the requested input has not been marketed 
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independently before.
889
 With regard to intellectual property rights, it is argued that although 
a license can always be ‘hypothetically’ marketed independently from the product or service 
in which it is incorporated, this does not imply that an upstream licensing market actually 
exists.
890
 In addition, it has been pointed out that such an interpretation would lead to 
situations in which a right holder can be forced to license the intellectual property right as a 
separate product even though it may not be rational to do so and that this may discourage 
dominant firms from investing in new production processes.
891
 While it is a far-reaching 
interference in the business model of an undertaking to require it to start marketing an input as 
a stand-alone product, such interventions should be possible because otherwise perverse 
incentives are created for dominant firms to prevent an enforcement action by deciding not to 
market an input that is indispensable for competitors as a separate product. To ensure as much 
as possible that the benefits of the imposition of such a duty to deal outweigh the negative 
effects, competition authorities and courts should not force dominant undertakings to market a 
necessary input independently when this is not technically or commercially viable. Examples 
of such situations may involve cases where it would be very costly for the dominant 
undertaking to ‘unbundle’ the input from the final product or where congestion may occur 
once the facility is shared with third parties.  
ENABLING HORIZONTAL COMPETITION - It is important to note that the concept of hypothetical 
or potential markets makes it possible for access seekers to compete with the dominant 
undertaking in a horizontal way. If an input is regarded as constituting the upstream market 
even though it is not marketed independently, a successful access seeker will be able to 
compete with the dominant undertaking on the only ‘real’ market at issue. In the IMS Health 
case, where the 1860 brick structure of IMS was held to form the upstream market, such a 
scenario occurred. IMS had not traded or granted third parties access to the system prior to 
NDC’s request for a license and only used the brick structure as a way to supply the 
pharmaceutical companies with relevant sales data. The imposition of a duty to license would 
therefore have had the effect of enabling NDC to compete directly with IMS in the provision 
of data on the sale of pharmaceutical products.
892
 Whereas the essential facilities doctrine 
could formerly only be applied to launch vertical and indirect competition, the introduction of 
the concept of hypothetical or potential markets in IMS Health makes it possible for a duty to 
deal to give rise to horizontal or direct competition. 
MARKET DEFINITION IN MICROSOFT - The Microsoft case revolved around the refusal of 
Microsoft to give competitors access to interoperability information which would allow them 
to introduce non-Microsoft work group server operating systems for Microsoft’s client PC 
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operating system Windows. Unlike in earlier cases where the definition of the upstream 
market was based on the input being requested, the European Commission did not define a 
market for interoperability information or, more broadly, for interoperability with Windows. 
Instead, the Commission relied upon client PC operating systems as the main market.
893
 It is 
unclear why the Commission deviated from the earlier practice of taking the requested input 
as a starting point for the definition of the main market. In its decision, the Commission 
merely stated that, with regard to the refusal to license, the following two markets were 
relevant: the market for client PC operating systems which forms the main market and the 
market for work group server operating systems which constitutes the derivative market.
894
  
NO MARKET FOR INTEROPERABILITY DEFINED IN MICROSOFT - Since Microsoft had previously 
provided third parties access to its interoperability information, it would have been possible 
for the Commission to define a market for interoperability considering that supply and 
demand for the information existed. The problem may have laid with the fact that 
interoperability is a matter of degree rather than a black-and-white concept which makes the 
process of market definition more complex.
895
 In particular, the definition of a relevant 
market for interoperability with Windows would have required the Commission to decide 
which levels of interoperability should be regarded as substitutable to one another.
896
 An 
alternative explanation for why the Commission chose not to base the relevant market on the 
interoperability information might be found in the peculiar nature of interoperability which 
connects markets in a ‘two-way’ manner. Unlike the usual scenario in which the requested 
input can only be used to create competing products at one level in the value chain, the 
sharing of interoperability information with third parties may affect two levels of business 
activity. In this sense, the interoperability information to be licensed by Microsoft could not 
only be used by competitors to launch non-Microsoft work group server operating systems 
but also, even though it was not at issue in the case, non-Microsoft client PC operating 
systems.
897
 In addition, the Commission may have chosen to focus on client PC operating 
systems as the main market and on work group server operating systems as the derivative 
market due to the strong links between these two products.
898
 Nevertheless, an upstream 
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market definition that is based on the input to which access is being requested should remain 
the rule in essential facilities cases because such an approach forces competition authorities 
and courts to assess at the outset of a case whether the facility deemed essential by the access 
seeker is capable of being sold as an independent product on a given market. 
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE TWO RELEVANT MARKETS - For determining the scope of the two 
relevant markets in essential facilities cases, the approach generally employed for market 
definition in competition cases can be applied. For defining the boundaries of the upstream 
market, it has to be assessed which products or services, if any, are substitutable to the input 
requested by the access seeker. Market definition of the downstream market involves an 
analysis of whether the product or service that the access seeker would like to offer once 
given access to the requested input has any substitutes. One should note, however, that market 
definition in the context of the application of the essential facilities doctrine often amounts to 
an artificial exercise. This is because the definition of an upstream market for a product that 
has not yet been traded before can only be based on assumptions on how the market could be 
structured instead of on concrete market evidence relating to supply and demand as in usual 
circumstances.
899
 
THREE TYPES OF COMPETITIVE CONSTRAINTS - In accordance with the Commission notice on 
market definition, firms are subject to three types of competitive constraints which should be 
taken into account when defining a relevant market. Whereas demand-side substitutability is 
the most relevant indicator of market definition, constraints arising from supply-side 
substitutability and potential competition can also play a role when the analysis of demand-
side substitution is inconclusive. For examining demand-side substitutability, the question is 
whether the access seeker and other potential customers of the requested input can switch to 
readily available substitutes. Supply-side substitutability involves an assessment of whether 
the essential facility holder and other potential suppliers are able to easily switch production 
to other products and market them in the relevant market. Constraints arising from potential 
competition are only scrutinised in exceptional circumstances and after the relevant market 
has already been ascertained.
900
 The definition of the upstream market is key to the 
assessment of dominance of the essential facility holder. The likelihood of finding dominance 
increases the narrower the market is defined. When no dominance is found on the upstream 
market, the refusal to deal cannot be held abusive. The boundaries of the downstream market 
have to be set in order to be able to assess the abusive nature of the refusal to deal, because 
one of the exceptional circumstances that have to be present for establishing a violation of 
Article 102 TFEU is the exclusion of all effective competition on the downstream market. 
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DOMINANCE ON THE UPSTREAM MARKET - The relevant market on which the essential facility 
holder has to be found dominant is the upstream market. If there is no existing substitute for 
the requested input and if it is unlikely that a substitute will become available in the near 
future, the dominance of the owner of the essential facility is established as such. When 
substitutes to the requested input are offered on the relevant market, the market power of the 
holder of the essential facility has to be measured by analysing the actual and potential 
competition from third parties. As discussed in part I, instead of solely relying on market 
shares as an indicator of dominance in dynamic markets the European Commission is also 
increasingly taking into account potential competition and recent entry when assessing 
whether an undertaking holds a dominant position on a given market.
901
 An assessment of 
potential competition may be particularly relevant in cases where the requested input has not 
yet been provided as an independent product and a market for the input does not yet exist. In 
the absence of potential competition, dominance will in such situations usually be given with 
the fact that the requested input is considered to form a relevant market of its own because no 
other firm has already traded the input on a market. With regard to inputs protected by 
intellectual property law, it is important to note that the grant of an intellectual property right 
does not in itself lead to dominance.
902
 While an intellectual property right gives rise to 
exclusivity, this does not equal with a dominant position on a given market because 
consumers may regard other products in which the intellectual property right at stake is not 
incorporated as substitutes. 
 
6.8.2 Absolute refusals to supply 
Absolute refusals to supply are understood in this thesis as refusals whereby the essential 
facility holder has not given any other undertaking access to the requested input. The 
proposed framework for assessing absolute refusals to deal starts from the current four-prong 
exceptional circumstances test set out in European Union case law: (1) the refusal relates to a 
product or service indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a downstream 
market; (2) the refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any effective competition on that 
downstream market; (3) the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there 
is potential consumer demand; and (4) there is no objective justification for the refusal.
903
 
 
6.8.2.1 Indispensability 
OBJECTIVE NECESSITY OF THE INPUT - The requirement of indispensability of the requested 
input can be considered as consisting of two different elements: (1) the objective necessity of 
the input for being able to compete on the downstream market and (2) the absence of 
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economically viable substitutes for the input. The purpose of the first element of the 
indispensability test is to examine the relationship between the input and the product or 
service that the requesting undertaking would like to introduce on the downstream market 
once given access to the input. Whether access to a certain input is objectively necessary can 
normally be easily established by applying common knowledge of the sector concerned.
904
 
For example, in Tiercé Ladbroke it was quite uncontroversial for the General Court to point 
out that the television broadcasting of horse races is not indispensable for the taking of bets on 
horse races. In particular, the Court stated: ‘transmission is not indispensable, since it takes 
place after bets are placed, with the result that its absence does not in itself affect the choices 
made by bettors and, accordingly, cannot prevent bookmakers from pursuing their 
business’.905 The refusal of a transmission license to a Belgian bookmaking company for 
broadcasting French horse races did for that reason not constitute abuse of dominance in the 
Court’s view.  
ABSENCE OF SUBSTITUTES FOR THE INPUT - The second element of indispensability seeks to 
examine whether actual or potential substitutes for the input exist. The analysis to be 
conducted in this regard has similarities to market definition in the sense that both types of 
assessments involve an evaluation of the substitutability of the input with alternative products 
or services. The statements that the Court of Justice made in Bronner illustrate the overlap 
between the market definition exercise and the indispensability test. With regard to the 
definition of the relevant market, the Court made clear that it was for the national court to 
determine ‘whether home-delivery schemes constitute a separate market, or whether other 
methods of distributing daily newspapers, such as sale in shops or at kiosks or delivery by 
post, are sufficiently interchangeable with them to have to be taken into account also’.906 In 
the subsequent analysis of whether access to Mediaprint’s home-delivery scheme was 
indispensable, the Court argued that one of the factors to be considered is the availability of 
these other methods of distributing daily newspapers: ‘it is undisputed that other methods of 
distributing daily newspapers, such as by post and through sale in shops and at kiosks, even 
though they may be less advantageous for the distribution of certain newspapers, exist and 
are used by the publishers of those daily newspapers’.907 The question is whether there is a 
difference in the degree of substitutability required for defining the relevant market on the one 
hand, and for establishing the indispensability of the input on the other hand. The fact that the 
Court considered the distribution of newspapers by post and through sale in shops and at 
kiosks as sufficiently substitutable in the context of the indispensability test ‘even though they 
are less advantageous for the distribution of certain newspapers’ indicates that a lesser 
degree of substitutability may be required in assessing the indispensability of an input as 
compared to the degree of substitutability needed for including products or services in the 
same relevant market.
908
 Further evidence for the close connection between the market 
definition exercise and the indispensability test can be found in IMS Health in which the 
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Court of Justice seems to regard the indispensability of the requested input as an aspect to be 
taken into account in the definition of the upstream relevant market. The Court held that it is 
sufficient that a potential or hypothetical upstream market can be identified which is the case 
‘where the products or services are indispensable in order to carry on a particular business’ 
and that ‘it is determinative that two different stages of production may be identified and that 
they are interconnected, inasmuch as the upstream product is indispensable for the supply of 
the downstream product’.909 When defining potential or hypothetical upstream markets, the 
indispensability of the requested input may thus determine the scope of the upstream relevant 
market.
910
  
ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF DUPLICATION - The Court of Justice made clear in Bronner that, in 
addition to the absence of readily available substitutes, it has to be established that ‘there are 
no technical, legal or even economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even 
unreasonably difficult’, for the requesting undertaking to produce a substitute, either alone or 
in cooperation with others.
911
 While it is not sufficient that duplication would be difficult or 
expensive, absolute impossibility is not required.
912
 The economic viability of duplication is 
the main factor to be considered in determining whether the creation of a substitute is a 
realistic potential alternative to granting access to the requested input. It is important to note 
that the Court of Justice in Bronner referred not to the feasibility of setting up a second home-
delivery scheme with a small circulation of daily newspapers to be distributed but to the 
creation of a scheme for the distribution of newspapers with a circulation comparable to that 
of Mediaprint.
913
 As a result, in order to accept the existence of economic obstacles it must be 
established that duplication of the requested input ‘is not economically viable for production 
on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking which controls the existing product or 
service’.914 In this regard, the European Commission stated in its Guidance Paper on 
exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU that it ‘will normally make an assessment of 
whether competitors could effectively duplicate the input produced by the dominant 
undertaking in the foreseeable future’ and that ‘an input is likely to be impossible to replicate 
when it involves a natural monopoly due to scale or scope economies, where there are strong 
network effects or when it concerns so-called ‘single source’ information’.915 The presence of 
switching costs may also be of relevance as evidenced by IMS Health. The Court of Justice 
argued that the degree of participation by users in the development of the copyrighted 1860 
brick structure of IMS and the outlay, particularly in terms of costs, on the part of potential 
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users in order to work with an alternative structure were factors to be taken into account by 
the national court in determining whether access to the brick structure of IMS was 
indispensable. The Court stated that the high level of participation by the pharmaceutical 
companies in the improvement of the brick structure of IMS had created a dependency in 
regard to that structure as a consequence of which those companies would have to make 
significant efforts in order to be able to use a different brick structure. In that light, the Court 
argued that ‘[t]he supplier of that alternative structure might therefore be obliged to offer 
terms which are such as to rule out any economic viability of business on a scale comparable 
to that of the undertaking which controls the protected structure’.916 
ADDED VALUE OF THE INDISPENSABILITY REQUIREMENT - Although there is a degree of overlap 
between the market definition exercise and the requirement of indispensability of the 
requested input, there is sufficient reason to retain the latter as an independent condition under 
the essential facilities doctrine. It can be noted in this perspective that the objective necessity 
of the input, which constitutes the first element of indispensability, does not play a role in the 
determination of relevant markets. This component of indispensability aims to establish 
whether access to the input is needed for being able to compete on the downstream market. 
The fact that a company is found to hold a dominant position on the upstream relevant market 
for the input does not necessarily entail that access to the input is required for developing the 
product or service that the requesting undertaking would like to introduce on the downstream 
market. The Tiercé Ladbroke case in which broadcasting of horse races was not considered to 
be indispensable for a bookmaking company to be able to take bets on horse races serves as 
an illustration. With respect to the second element of indispensability, the degree of 
substitutability to be applied seems higher in the context of the indispensability test as 
compared to the market definition exercise as a result of which the overlap between the two 
types of assessments is not complete. Even if the holder of the input is considered to hold a 
dominant position on the upstream relevant market, the input may nevertheless not meet the 
indispensability test in case duplication of the input is economically viable or an alternative to 
the input held by the dominant firm is anticipated to become available in the foreseeable 
future. In the latter situation, the upstream relevant market is currently not sufficiently 
competitive to prevent a finding of dominance but is expected to tend towards competition in 
the medium term so that the requested input cannot be considered indispensable. Such a 
requirement of indispensability that takes the dynamic nature of the industry into account 
reduces the risk that an obligation to give access to the requested input undermines the 
incentives of competitors to invest in developing alternatives to be introduced in the upstream 
relevant market.
917
 
 
                                                 
916
 Judgment in IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, C-418/01, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, par. 29-30. 
917
 See T. KÄSEBERG, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU and the US, Hart 
Publishing, 2012, p. 157-158 who suggests to rely on a period of two years for assessing the indispensability of 
an input in order to align the essential facilities doctrine with merger review and with the three-criteria test in 
sector-specific electronic communications regulation where the same time horizon is applied. 
218 
 
6.8.2.2 Exclusion of all effective competition on the downstream market 
RESERVING THE DOWNSTREAM MARKET TO ITSELF - The second condition of the essential 
facilities doctrine requires that the refusal to supply excludes all effective competition on the 
downstream market. The way in which this requirement has been applied in previous essential 
facilities cases on EU level indicates that the relevant issue is whether the essential facility 
holder reserves the downstream market to itself by denying a competitor access to the 
requested input. In the context of the application of the condition of exclusion of effective 
competition in Magill, the Court of Justice explicitly stated that the Irish broadcasting stations 
‘reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all 
competition on that market’.918 Similarly, in IMS Health, the Court of Justice argued that the 
refusal was ‘such as to reserve to the owner of the intellectual property right the market for 
the supply of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member State concerned by 
eliminating all competition on that market’.919 It can be concluded from these statements that 
the requirement of exclusion of effective competition aims to target the situation in which an 
essential facility holder is already active on the downstream market and tries to reserve that 
market to itself by refusing to deal. The other EU essential facilities cases also involved 
dominant undertakings trying to prevent third parties from becoming their competitors in the 
downstream market. For instance, by refusing to give access to its interoperability 
information, Microsoft aimed to keep Sun out of the downstream market for work group 
server operating systems in which Microsoft itself wanted to strengthen its position. Under 
this interpretation, the condition of exclusion of effective competition does not capture the 
scenario in which a requesting undertaking needs access to the essential facility in order to 
enter a market on which the holder of the facility is not (yet) active, because the essential 
facility holder does not reserve the downstream market to itself by refusing to deal in that 
situation. In this factual scenario, the downstream market to be entered by the requesting 
undertaking will typically be a new market.
920
 An existing market implies that others have 
been able to become active on the market without having access to the input held by the 
dominant undertaking in the upstream market. In that case, the input to which access is sought 
does not seem to be indispensable for competition on the downstream market and the access 
request will likely be rejected for not meeting the first requirement of the essential facilities 
doctrine. 
ABSENCE OF DOMINANT UNDERTAKING ON EXISTING DOWNSTREAM MARKET - In Tiercé 
Ladbroke, the General Court was confronted with a scenario in which the essential facility 
holder was not present on the downstream market. Ladbroke, a company providing betting 
services on the Belgian market, was refused a transmission license for sound and pictures of 
French horse races. One of the reasons why the General Court held that the refusal did not 
amount to abuse under Article 102 TFEU was that the organisers of the French horse races 
were not competitors of Ladbroke on the relevant market for the provision of betting services 
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in Belgium and could therefore not be seeking to reserve that downstream market for 
themselves.
921
 The condition of exclusion of effective competition was thus interpreted 
restrictively in this case. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the refusal to license in 
Tiercé Ladbroke did not prevent Ladbroke from being active in the downstream market for 
betting services in Belgium. In fact, Ladbroke was already present in and even had the largest 
share of that market.
922
 As a result, the General Court argued that the indispensability 
requirement was also not met, because television broadcasting of horse races could not be 
considered indispensable for the taking of bets.
923
 
ABSENCE OF DOMINANT UNDERTAKING ON NEW DOWNSTREAM MARKET - The question is 
whether the European Commission and the EU courts will hold on to the current 
interpretation of the requirement of exclusion of effective competition once they have to 
decide on a case involving a refusal to deal that prevents the requesting undertaking from 
opening up a new market. One could argue that it is not likely that such a case will occur 
because a dominant undertaking does not have an incentive to refuse access in such a 
situation. Since the essential facility holder is not active on the downstream market that the 
requesting undertaking would like to enter, it does not have to protect its position on that 
market and will only gain revenue from selling access to the requested input. The owner of 
the essential facility may nevertheless be incentivised to refuse access to the requested input if 
it is planning to become active on the new market itself in the near future. To be effective in 
such a situation, the requirement of exclusion of effective competition should not entail that 
the access seeker has to compete with the essential facility holder in the downstream market 
upon having access to the necessary input. The second condition of the essential facilities 
doctrine should also be considered met in case effective competition is excluded on a 
downstream market on which the dominant undertaking is not present. In the latter situation, 
the essential facilities doctrine would apply to behaviour that does not consist in the 
leveraging of market power from the upstream market in which the essential facility holder 
possesses a dominant position into the downstream market in which it wants to strengthen its 
market position by precluding the entry of competitors. One could argue that the other 
scenario is more damaging to innovation and consumer welfare than leveraging, because it 
implies that the owner of the essential facility is capable of preventing the development of a 
new market by refusing to deal.
924
 
EXCLUSION OF EFFECTIVE COMPETITION RESULTS FROM INDISPENSABILITY OF THE INPUT - The 
requirement of exclusion of effective competition is usually considered in close connection 
with the indispensability test. For instance, in Magill the Court of Justice noted that by 
reserving the downstream market of weekly television guides to themselves, the Irish 
broadcasting companies were ‘excluding all competition on that market since they denied 
access to the basic information which is the raw material indispensable for the compilation of 
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such a guide’.925 In the Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU, the 
European Commission made clear that once the requirement of indispensability is met, it 
‘considers that a dominant undertaking’s refusal to supply is generally liable to eliminate, 
immediately or over time, effective competition in the downstream market’.926 As such, the 
exclusion of effective competition on the downstream market can be seen as a consequence of 
the indispensability of the requested input.
927
  
DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF COMPETITION TO BE EXCLUDED - Nevertheless, it is important to 
preserve the requirement of exclusion of effective competition as a separate condition of the 
essential facilities doctrine because it determines what degree of foreclosure of competition 
brings about liability for a refusal to deal and, as a result, what degree of competition is 
protected under the essential facilities doctrine.
928
 To this end, the General Court made clear 
in Microsoft that it is not necessary for the Commission to demonstrate that all competition on 
the market would be eliminated. What matters, in the Court’s view, is that the refusal is liable 
or likely to eliminate all effective competition on the market. The Court particularly noted 
that ‘the fact that the competitors of the dominant undertaking retain a marginal presence in 
certain niches on the market cannot suffice to substantiate the existence of such 
competition’.929 In this perspective, the Court also explicitly stated that Article 102 TFEU 
does not apply only from the time when there is no more competition on the market: ‘If the 
Commission were required to wait until competitors were eliminated from the market, or until 
their elimination was sufficiently imminent, before being able to take action under Article 82 
EC, that would clearly run counter to the objective of that provision, which is to maintain 
undistorted competition in the common market and, in particular, to safeguard the 
competition that still exists on the relevant market’.930 
DEGREE OF COMPETITION NEEDED IN THE DOWNSTREAM MARKET DETERMINES HOW 
INDISPENSABLE THE REQUESTED INPUT HAS TO BE - Since the requirement of exclusion of 
effective competition overlaps with the indispensability test, the fulfilment of one condition 
may influence the application of the other. In this sense, the degree of indispensability of the 
requested input that is required for meeting the indispensability test may be assessed in 
accordance with the degree of competition that is necessary for effective competition in the 
downstream market as determined under the condition of exclusion of effective competition. 
As made clear by the General Court, the European Commission adopted such an approach in 
Microsoft for determining whether the interoperability information at issue was indispensable: 
the Commission, first of all, ‘considered what degree of interoperability with the Windows 
domain architecture non-Microsoft work group server operating systems must achieve in 
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order for its competitors to be able to remain viably on the market and, second, it appraised 
whether the interoperability that Microsoft refused to disclose was indispensable to the 
attainment of that degree of interoperability’.931 Although a certain level of interoperability 
was already possible with Microsoft’s client PC operating system Windows, the General 
Court followed the finding of the European Commission that access to Microsoft’s 
interoperability information was indispensable because non-Microsoft work group server 
operating systems had to be capable of interoperating with Windows on an equal footing with 
Windows work group server operating systems if they were to be marketed viably on the 
market.
932
 The two-stage approach implemented by the Commission in Microsoft seems a 
sensible way to test the first two conditions of the essential facilities doctrine. According to 
this approach, in a first step, the degree of competition is defined that is necessary for 
enabling effective competition in the downstream market which determines, in a second step, 
the degree of indispensability that the requested input has to meet in order to be considered 
indispensable under the first requirement of the essential facilities doctrine.  
 
6.8.2.3 Prevention of the introduction of a new product  
NO DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN REFUSALS INVOLVING IP AND NON-IP PROTECTED ASSETS - The 
third condition of the essential facilities doctrine that has been developed in the Magill and 
IMS Health case law of the Court of Justice requires that the refusal to deal prevents the 
introduction of a new product. The new product requirement is only applied in cases 
concerning refusals to license intellectual property rights.
933
 However, as argued earlier,
934
 
there does not seem to be a solid economic basis for applying a different legal test to refusals 
to license than to refusals to deal involving non-intellectual property protected assets. For this 
reason, no separate standard for intervention or additional condition is put forward under this 
framework for holding a refusal to license an intellectual property right abusive. Both types of 
refusals to deal are thus assessed in the same way under the proposed framework.  
NEW PRODUCT CONDITION APPLICABLE TO ABSOLUTE REFUSALS TO DEAL IN GENERAL - As 
made clear by the Court of Justice, the new product condition aims to determine whether a 
refusal to license ‘prevents the development of the secondary market to the detriment of 
consumers’.935 Such damage to consumer welfare may occur as well due to a refusal to deal 
involving an asset not protected by an intellectual property right. Whether essential facility 
holders are trying to prevent new market developments from occurring is an issue which in 
principle deserves to be considered for absolute refusals to deal in general and not merely for 
absolute refusals to license. However, as shown above,
936
 the new product condition in its 
current form has some shortcomings. It is therefore meaningful to consider the 
appropriateness of other conditions or tests put forward in the literature.   
                                                 
931
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 369. 
932
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 371-436. 
933
 See Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 334. 
934
 See section 6.7.3 above. 
935
 Judgment in IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, C-418/01, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, par. 48. 
936
 See section 6.7.2 above. 
222 
 
MARKET EXPANSION AS A PROXY FOR DETERMINING THE NEWNESS OF A PRODUCT - In order to 
operationalise the new product condition and to ensure that its application leads to consistent 
results, a test has been suggested for identifying whether a product is new under the 
exceptional circumstances test of Magill and IMS Health. According to this test developed by 
Ahlborn, Evans & Padilla, a product can be considered new if it ‘satisfies potential demand 
by meeting the needs of consumers in ways that existing products do not’ in the sense that the 
product brings in ‘at current prices consumers who were not satisfied before’ thereby 
expanding the market ‘by a significant amount’.937 In other words, the relevant question is 
whether the introduction of the product would add a new class of consumers to the market 
whose preferences were such that they preferred not to buy anything prior to the launch of the 
‘new’ product. Although this test gives a clearer and more objective definition to novelty, it 
has been criticised because it does not regard products as ‘new’ that better satisfy existing 
consumer preferences but do not expand the market. This while it is clear that consumers may 
also benefit from better quality products which do not necessarily lead to new demand.
938
 As 
such, the test does not solve the problem that the new product requirement is unable of 
protecting the interests of consumers in cases where specific market characteristics prevent 
competitors from successfully introducing novel products.  
COMPETITION BY SUBSTITUTION AND IMITATION AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL - As argued by 
Drexl, the imposition of a duty to deal is appropriate to restore competition by imitation when 
external market failures are present so that consumers can at least benefit from static 
competition on the basis of price and output in situations where dynamic competition on the 
basis of innovation is not possible.
939
 In this context, it is worthwhile to reflect on whether the 
distinction between competition by substitution and competition by imitation, as relied upon 
by Drexl, can be used as an analytical tool alternative to the new product condition.
940
 The 
adoption of that distinction for the purpose of applying the essential facilities doctrine would 
entail that in cases where no external market failures are present, access seekers are required 
to indicate a specific product they would like to introduce that is not merely a duplication of 
the product offered by the essential facility holder. In turn, if such a form of competition by 
substitution is not possible due to the characteristics of the market at issue, access seekers 
should be allowed to compete by imitation and to introduce a product similar to that of the 
essential facility holder.  
GIVING A COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE ECONOMIC TRADE-OFF - One should note, however, that 
the product to be launched by the access seeker in both situations will compete with the 
product of the essential facility holder in the same relevant product market. The difference of 
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competition by substitution and competition by imitation thus merely relates to competition in 
existing markets and does not consider incentives for competition for new markets.
941
 As an 
analytical tool to be used for the application of the essential facilities doctrine, the distinction 
relied upon by Drexl gives an incomplete picture of the different interests that are at stake in 
refusal to deal scenarios, considering that it does not account for the trade-off between, on the 
one hand, competition for the market and disruptive innovation and, on the other hand, 
competition in the market and sustaining innovation. Taking this economic trade-off fully into 
account would require a tool that differentiates on the basis of the type of competition or 
innovation that is at risk in a particular market situation. The new product requirement is by 
its very nature capable of implementing such an exercise under the essential facilities doctrine 
because it determines what level of innovativeness the product or service to be introduced by 
the access seeker has to bring about. In this context, an adapted version of the new product 
condition can be proposed that accounts for these differences in market characteristics. 
ADAPTING THE NEW PRODUCT REQUIREMENT - Even though the distinction between 
competition by imitation and competition by substitution does not appropriately reflect the 
economic trade-off to be made in essential facilities cases, its underlying logic according to 
which the scope for competition law liability for refusals to deal is wider in situations where 
external market failures are present can be retained in order to make the policy choice 
between competition for and in the market more objective. External market failures such as 
the presence of network effects and switching costs may make it commercially unviable for 
competitors to introduce a new product. If, for instance, consumers are locked-in to a 
particular standard, a requirement that access seekers have to introduce a new product is of no 
relevance because consumers are not willing to switch to a different system. Instead of 
making the applicability of the new product dependent on whether the asset to which access is 
requested is protected by intellectual property law, the new product condition could 
differentiate based on whether external market failures occur in the market. Indeed, external 
market failures may enable the incumbent to extend its dominance in time irrespective of 
whether the asset to which access is requested is protected by an intellectual property right or 
not. Considering that there is no convincing economic rationale for treating intellectual 
property rights differently than other types of assets under the essential facilities doctrine,
942
 it 
is proposed to focus instead on the presence of external market failures as a way to determine 
whether the new product condition should be met in order to hold a refusal to deal abusive 
under Article 102 TFEU. It is submitted that the essential facilities will be better able to 
adequately address all scenarios in which refusals to deal require competition law intervention 
by adapting the new product requirement in this way. 
PRESENCE OF EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES - With regard to situations where external market 
failures are present, the new product condition should be dropped to ensure that access 
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seekers who intend to introduce sustaining innovations or products similar to that of the 
dominant undertaking are able to gain access to the necessary input so that the process of 
competition in the market can be (re-)launched. As explained above,
943
 the potential 
competition problems in markets that are characterised by external market failures relate to 
the fact that an incumbent may try to prolong its dominance by preventing competitors from 
entering the market and competing on price or through offering better quality products. The 
imposition of a duty to deal in such markets will open up the process of competition in the 
market and ensure that price levels and product variety are kept at a competitive level. 
Therefore, if the market is locked-in due to the presence of network effects or switching costs 
and the essential facility holder has had a stable dominant position for some time, competition 
authorities should be able to impose a duty to deal even if the access seeker is not able to 
indicate a new product that it would like to introduce once given access to the requested input 
(provided that the other conditions of the essential facilities doctrine are met). As outlined in 
section 6.7.2 above, IMS Health and Microsoft form examples of such situations where 
external market failures prevented potential competitors from entering the market by 
introducing their own products due to the fact that consumers were not interested in switching 
to a new type of brick structure or client PC operating system. 
ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES - In situations not characterised by external market 
failures, however, the new product condition should be applied strictly to encourage 
investments in innovation. As described earlier,
944
 the process of competition for the market 
cannot, in principle, be launched by way of a competition law intervention and incentives for 
this type of competition are best preserved by avoiding government interference in the market 
and thereby maintaining the prospect of dominance for new entrants. Competition 
enforcement in markets where external market failures are absent should be subject to stricter 
conditions, considering that the self-correcting nature of the market is stronger in these 
circumstances as a result of which a competition law intervention to encourage competition in 
the market risks unnecessarily lowering incentives for competition for the market. 
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Existence of external market failures as a determining factor for whether the 
new product condition should be met: 
 
AMBIVALENT STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING NOVELTY - Since the interpretations given to the 
new product condition by the EU courts are ambivalent
945
 and may as a result give rise to 
unpredictable outcomes, there is a need for more clarity about how the requirement has to be 
applied. The Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU issued by the 
European Commission also does not shed a clear light on this issue and merely echoes the 
differing standards put forward in case law on the EU level. One of the factors that the 
Commission deems relevant for prioritising refusal to deal cases is the likelihood of consumer 
harm. In this regard, the Commission stated that such consumer harm may particularly occur: 
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market players to attack the dominance 
of the incumbent by competing on price, 
quality or output or by introducing 
sustaining innovations in the market 
 
 
- A competition law intervention in 
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market failures therefore carries a higher 
risk of reducing incentives for 
competition for the market and disruptive 
innovation 
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‘if the undertaking which requests supply does not intend to limit itself essentially to 
duplicating the goods or services already offered by the dominant undertaking on the 
downstream market, but intends to produce new or improved goods or services for which 
there is a potential consumer demand or is likely to contribute to technical development’.946 
The Commission thus endorses the fact that different thresholds currently exist for meeting 
the new product requirement but does not clarify which threshold should apply in which 
situation.  
SUBSTITUTABILITY AS A PROXY FOR NOVELTY - By relying on the concept of substitutability as 
an indicator of the ‘newness’ of a product, the standard to be used for the application of the 
new product requirement becomes more clearly defined and easier to employ.
947
 In order to be 
considered new, the product to be introduced by the access seeker should either have no or a 
relatively low degree of substitutability to the product of the essential facility holder. In case 
the product is non-substitutable to the existing product, its introduction creates a new market 
in which the owner of the essential facility is not active.
948
 In this situation, the second 
condition of exclusion of effective competition should, as explained in the previous 
subsection, not be understood as meaning that the owner of the essential facility must exclude 
competition on a downstream market in which it competes with the access seeker upon the 
imposition of the duty to deal. Such a reading would prevent competition authorities from 
intervening in cases where access seekers are planning to use the requested input as a way to 
open up a new market. A low degree of substitutability implies that the product that the access 
seeker intends to launch is of such better quality or has such additional features that it 
becomes incomparable to the existing product of the essential facility holder. Whereas mere 
product differentiation is insufficient to meet this standard, the establishment of a new market 
is not required. The lower the degree of substitutability to the existing product, the more will 
consumers benefit from the introduction of the product of the access seeker because it 
constitutes a new or hugely improved product or leads to significant follow-on innovation.
949
  
MORE THAN A LIMITATION OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT REQUIRED - Under the proposed 
framework, the fulfilment of the new product condition in markets not characterised by 
external market failures would require that the potential new product adds substantial utility 
to consumers thereby incentivising market players to invest in innovation. No or a relatively 
low degree of substitutability can be used as a proxy for such significant value to consumers. 
Substitutability may be easier for competition authorities to examine than the more abstract 
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notion of novelty currently relied upon by the European Commission and the EU courts. The 
adoption of the concept of substitutability under the new product requirement would imply 
that the product to be launched by the access seeker already has to be concretely defined. 
Otherwise, it would be impossible to assess the degree of substitutability to the existing 
product of the essential facility holder. As a result, the fact that a refusal to deal limits 
technical development, which the General Court accepted as amounting to the prevention of 
the launch of a new product in Microsoft, would not suffice under the new product 
requirement proposed here. Such an interpretation of the new product requirement rests on a 
mere presumption that consumers will benefit from the general development of the industry 
which competitors of the essential facility holder will bring about upon having access to the 
requested input, without the need to define a concrete product or service that such 
development may create. By strictly applying the new product condition, possible negative 
effects on incentives to invest in competition for the market and disruptive innovation are 
counteracted as much as possible. In addition, under this reading the new product requirement 
adds no extra legal hurdle to the first two conditions of the essential facilities doctrine in the 
sense that a limitation of technical development can be seen as an inevitable consequence of 
the indispensability of the requested input and of the exclusion of all effective competition on 
the downstream market. If access to the input of the essential facility holder is necessary for 
downstream competition, it is logical that the general development of the industry is restricted 
due to the refusal to deal.
950
 
 
6.8.2.4 Absence of an objective justification 
BURDEN OF PROOF - After the presence of the aforementioned exceptional circumstances is 
identified, the essential facility holder can still try to invoke an objective justification for its 
refusal to deal to prevent the establishment of an abuse under Article 102 TFEU. In order to 
be successful, the justification has to prevail over the exceptional circumstances of 
indispensability, exclusion of effective competition and prevention of the emergence of a new 
product. While the burden of proof of the existence of these three conditions is borne by the 
competition authority or court, it is for the owner of the essential facility to put forward an 
objective justification.
951
 Previous cases indicate that it is very difficult for a dominant 
undertaking to succeed in justifying its refusal to deal once the other requirements of the 
essential facilities doctrine have been met.  
EARLY JUSTIFICATIONS - In the early refusal to supply case law, the Court of Justice hinted at 
possible justifications.
952
 In Commercial Solvents and BP, the Court suggested that capacity 
constraints in supply may constitute a valid reason for an essential facility holder to refuse to 
deal. The Court of Justice argued in Commercial Solvents that the statements of Commercial 
Solvents concerning capacity limits could not be taken into account in the case because, even 
though the production possibilities of the raw material to which Zoja sought access were not 
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unlimited, it was clear that Commercial Solvents was able to satisfy Zoja’s needs in view of 
its production capacity and Zoja’s very small percentage of Commercial Solvents’ 
production.
953
 One may conclude from this analysis of the Court that capacity constraints can 
constitute objective justification for a refusal to deal provided that the dominant undertaking 
succeeds in proving that it is not able to meet the demand of the access seeker. In BP, the 
Court of Justice held that it was not abusive for a dominant supplier of petroleum products to 
reduce the delivery to one of its non-regulator customers in the period of shortage during the 
oil crisis with more than the rate that it applied to its regular customers.
954
 As a result, a lack 
of supply due to a crisis affecting an entire industry may form a valid reason for disrupting 
existing levels of supply to an occasional customer.
955
 As evidenced by Télémarketing, a 
second type of objective justification for a refusal to deal includes technical or commercial 
requirements. The Court of Justice made clear that one of the factors that the national court 
should take into account in assessing whether the refusal of RTL to continue to permit a third 
party to provide telemarketing services on its television channel amounted to abuse was 
whether the refusal could be ‘justified by technical or commercial requirements relating to 
the nature of the television’.956 Finally, in United Brands the Court stated that a dominant 
undertaking ‘cannot stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by regular 
commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of the 
ordinary’.957 In Sot. Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline, the Court of Justice relied on its statement in 
United Brands and argued that ‘in order to appraise whether the refusal by a pharmaceuticals 
company to supply wholesalers involved in parallel exports constitutes a reasonable and 
proportionate measure in relation to the threat that those exports represent to its legitimate 
commercial interests, it must be ascertained whether the orders of the wholesalers are out of 
the ordinary’.958 The Court clarified that an order may be out of the ordinary in terms of 
quantity and that ‘a producer of pharmaceutical products must be in a position to protect its 
own commercial interests if it is confronted with [such] orders’.959 The Court of Justice thus 
made clear that a dominant undertaking cannot be held liable for a refusal to supply if the 
access request constitutes improper commercial behaviour of which an order that is out of the 
ordinary in terms of quantity forms an example.  
OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION IN MICROSOFT - Microsoft is the first case in which the notion of 
objective justification has been analysed in detail in a refusal to deal context. In order to 
justify its refusal to give access to interoperability information, Microsoft did not rely on any 
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of the abovementioned objective justifications but tried to justify its behaviour by invoking 
three different arguments. In the first place, Microsoft claimed that its refusal to supply was 
objectively justified by the intellectual property rights which it argued to hold over the 
interoperability information.
960
 The General Court rejected this argument by considering that 
the mere fact of holding intellectual property rights cannot in itself constitute justification for 
a refusal to grant a license. As made clear by the Court, a refusal to license an intellectual 
property right could otherwise never be considered an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, 
while the Court of Justice specifically stated the contrary in Magill and IMS Health.
961
 
Secondly, Microsoft relied on the fact that the technology which it was required to disclose to 
its competitors was secret, that it was of great value for licensees and that it contained 
significant innovation.
962
 This reasoning of Microsoft did not succeed either. The General 
Court noted that the secret nature of the technology at issue was the consequence of a 
unilateral business decision of Microsoft and that there is no reason why secret technology 
should enjoy a higher level of protection than technology which has necessarily been 
disclosed to the public by its inventor in a patent-application procedure. The Court also made 
clear that once the indispensability requirement is met the interoperability information is 
necessarily of great value to the competitors who wish to have access to it and that it is 
inherent in the fact that the undertaking concerned holds an intellectual property right that the 
subject-matter of that right is innovative or original.
963
 Finally, Microsoft tried to justify its 
refusal to give access to the interoperability information by arguing that forced disclosure of 
the necessary protocols would adversely affect its incentives to innovate.
964
  
EFFECT ON INNOVATION INCENTIVES - In this respect, the General Court endorsed the findings 
of the European Commission and argued that Microsoft did not sufficiently establish the 
significant negative impact that a duty to disclose the interoperability information would have 
on its incentives to innovate. In the Court’s view, Microsoft merely put forward vague, 
general and theoretical arguments on this point and did not specify the technologies or 
products that would be affected by reduced incentives to invest.
965
 The Court also argued that 
the imposition of a duty to deal did not allow Microsoft’s competitors to copy its products, 
that it was normal practice in the industry to make interoperability information public as 
evidenced by Microsoft’s own disclosure policy on earlier versions of Windows and that a 
similar disclosure made under the United States settlement had no negative impact on 
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate.966 Microsoft also asserted before the General Court that 
the Commission had applied a new evaluation test when rejecting its objective justification 
‘which is legally defective and marks a radical departure from the tests defined in the case-
law’.967 Microsoft referred to the paragraph in the Microsoft decision of the Commission 
where the latter noted that ‘a detailed examination of the scope of the disclosure at stake leads 
                                                 
960
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 666. 
961
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 690. 
962
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 667. 
963
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 692-695. 
964
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 668. 
965
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 697-699. 
966
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 700-703. 
967
 Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, par. 669. 
230 
 
to the conclusion that, on balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on 
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of 
innovation of the whole industry (including Microsoft)’.968 The General Court argued that 
Microsoft’s claim that the Commission used a new test was based on a misreading of the 
decision and that the paragraph in question merely contained the findings of the 
Commission’s analysis.969 According to the Court, the Commission came to its conclusion 
‘not by balancing the negative impact which the imposition of a requirement to supply the 
information at issue might have on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate against the positive 
impact of that obligation on innovation in the industry as a whole, but after refuting 
Microsoft’s arguments’ including those relating to the fear that its products might be cloned 
and to the fact that disclosure of interoperability was widespread in the industry concerned.
970
  
INCENTIVES BALANCE TEST - Although the General Court neither endorsed nor rejected a test 
balancing the positive and negative effects of a duty to deal, the analysis by the European 
Commission and the General Court of Microsoft’s argument about the impact of forced 
disclosure of interoperability information on its incentives to innovate has led scholars to 
comment on the introduction of a so-called ‘incentives balance test’ under the essential 
facilities doctrine.
971
 The adoption of such a test for assessing whether a refusal to deal is 
objectively justified would imply that, after it has been established that the requirements of 
indispensability, exclusion of effective competition and new product are met, a justification 
can only be accepted if the dominant undertaking is able to show that the negative impact of a 
duty to deal on its own incentives to innovate outweighs the positive impact of a duty to deal 
on the level of innovation in the whole industry.
972
 In Microsoft, the Commission expressed 
the view that Microsoft’s innovation incentives would not be negatively affected due to the 
imposition of a duty to deal. For the assessment of the objective justification raised by 
Microsoft, it was thus not necessary to evaluate the positive impact on the entire industry and 
to conduct a balancing exercise.
973
 Whereas such a balancing of innovation incentives has not 
yet been undertaken by the European Commission or the EU courts, scholars have assessed 
the pros and cons of the implementation of a balancing test in future competition cases. While 
the incentives balance test in general is considered to constitute an interesting approach from 
an economic perspective,
974
 the test is said to be difficult to apply because of the uncertainties 
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surrounding the working of innovation processes.
975
 In addition, it is argued that a balancing 
test will reduce legal certainty because it is almost impossible for any company to apply such 
a test ex ante.
976
  
SIMILARITY TO BALANCING UNDERTAKEN UNDER NEW PRODUCT REQUIREMENT - As such, the 
balancing exercise to be undertaken in this context has similarities to the analysis that is 
conducted under the new product requirement. By determining what level of innovativeness 
the access seeker has to pursue in order to get access to the requested input, the new product 
condition already balances the interest of the dominant undertaking with the interest in free 
competition or, in other words, the interest of the entire industry.
977
 The analysis to be carried 
out under the two requirements would thus overlap if a balancing exercise similar to the one 
undertaken under the new product condition takes place under the condition of objective 
justification.
978
 In this regard, it seems an insurmountable task for a dominant undertaking to 
objectively justify its refusal to deal by proving that the balance tilts in its favour when the 
competition authority has already established that the interest in free competition should 
prevail over the interest of the dominant undertaking under the new product requirement. 
Furthermore, a possible negative effect on the innovation incentives of the dominant 
undertaking is not merely a defence for its own refusal to deal but also a concern about the 
long term effects of a competition law intervention on competition and innovation in the 
sector in general.
979
 It would therefore be more appropriate to deal with such a concern under 
the assessment of abuse rather than as an objective justification at the end of the analysis 
under the essential facilities doctrine. This would also put the burden of proof on the 
competition authority instead of on the dominant undertaking. A balancing of innovation 
incentives as proposed by the Commission in Microsoft should not be regarded as a desirable 
test or tool considering the inherent difficulties relating to its practical application and its 
unpredictability.
980
 Instead of such an open-ended balancing exercise, the adapted version of 
the new product condition as proposed in the previous subsection may be used as a way to 
determine in which circumstances the interest of the industry as a whole should prevail over 
the interest of the dominant undertaking.  
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JUSTIFICATIONS OTHER THAN THE EFFECT ON INNOVATION INCENTIVES - As suggested 
earlier,
981
 in markets characterised by external market failures the new product condition may 
be dropped to make sure that access seekers wishing to introduce sustaining innovations can 
also get access to the necessary input. In this situation, it is thus assumed that the interest of 
the industry as a whole in getting access to the requested input outweighs the interest of the 
dominant undertaking to refuse to deal once the requirements of indispensability and 
exclusion of effective competition have been met. In markets where no external market 
failures occur, it is proposed to apply the new product requirement strictly. In such cases, the 
competition authority has to assess whether the product that the access seeker wants to 
introduce meets the level of innovativeness required for the balance to shift to the interest in 
free competition. The balancing of the interest of the dominant undertaking with the interest 
in free competition would thus not take place when considering an objective justification, but 
form part of the assessment of the abusive nature of the refusal to deal. Appropriate defences 
that a dominant undertaking may put forward to justify its refusal to deal include the objective 
justifications suggested in the early refusal to deal case law such as capacity restraints in 
supply (Commercial Solvents and BP), technical or commercial requirements (Télémarketing) 
and improper commercial behaviour of the access seeker (United Brands). In addition, a 
dominant undertaking may try to justify its refusal to deal by showing that it would not have 
invested in the creation of the requested input in the first place if it had known beforehand 
that it would have to share it with competitors (ex ante efficiency defence) or that the duty to 
deal will disrupt its business operations by posing unreasonable costs (ex post efficiency 
defence). The dominant undertaking may succeed in relying on the first type of defence by 
proving that it would not be able to recoup its investment as well as a reasonable profit if it 
had to supply access seekers at their maximum ability to pay. Examples of the second type of 
justification would include situations where congestion occurs due to the duty to supply or 
where extra capacity has to be installed in order to successfully accommodate access 
requests.
982
 Such justifications are more workable than requiring a dominant undertaking to 
conduct a balancing of innovation incentives and should therefore be preferred over a type of 
incentives balance test as suggested by the European Commission in its Microsoft decision. 
 
6.8.3 Disruptions of supply 
INTERPRETATION BY THE GENERAL COURT IN MICROSOFT - The second type of scenario that 
can be distinguished with regard to refusals to deal is that of a disruption of existing levels of 
supply. Disruptions of supply have a behavioural element that is absent in absolute refusals to 
deal where the ground for competition law intervention is more structural and does not lie in 
the conduct of the dominant firm but in the fact that it holds an input which is essential for 
competition on a downstream market.
983
 Whereas absolute refusals to deal are remedied by 
way of the imposition of a positive duty on dominant undertakings to actively promote 
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competition by providing competitors access to a particular facility, disruptions of existing 
levels of supply instead give rise to a mere negative duty to refrain from certain 
anticompetitive action.
984
 Yet, the same legal standards apply to absolute refusals to deal and 
disruptions of supply in current EU competition law. This is evidenced by the Microsoft case 
which involved a termination of supply of previous levels of interoperability information to 
Microsoft’s competitors in the market for work group server operating systems but was 
nevertheless assessed by the General Court under the strict exceptional circumstances test set 
out in the cases of Magill and IMS Health which dealt with absolute refusals to deal.  
INTERPRETATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN POLICY DOCUMENTS - While the European 
Commission in 2005 still expressed the view that different legal conditions should be 
applicable to a termination of an existing supply relationship in its Discussion Paper,
985
 it 
made clear in its Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU of 2009 
that it would use the same criteria for determining enforcement priorities, which are based on 
the conditions of the exceptional circumstances test,
986
 for cases of disruption of existing 
levels of supply and refusals to supply a good or service which the dominant undertaking has 
not previously supplied to others. At the same time, the Commission acknowledged in the 
Guidance Paper that it is more plausible that a termination of an existing supply arrangement 
meets the criteria than an absolute refusal to deal. Firstly, the Commission may be more likely 
to regard the input in question as indispensable when ‘the requesting undertaking had made 
relationship-specific investments in order to use the subsequently refused input’. Secondly, 
‘the fact that the owner of the essential input in the past has found it in its interest to supply is 
an indication that supplying the input does not imply any risk that the owner receives 
inadequate compensation for the original investment’.987 Nevertheless, since the conditions of 
the exceptional circumstances test are also used for assessing disruptions of supply, it seems 
that the less strict standards applied to terminations of existing supply relationships in the 
early case law of Commercial Solvents are not valid anymore.  
INDISPENSABILITY NOT REQUIRED FOR A DISRUPTION OF SUPPLY - A difference between the two 
types of tests is that the Commercial Solvents reasoning, unlike the exceptional circumstances 
test of Magill and IMS Health, does not require essentiality or indispensability of the 
requested input. In its Commercial Solvents judgment, the Court of Justice even made clear 
that arguments relating to whether Zoja was able to adapt its installations and its 
manufacturing processes in order to continue its production of ethambutol based on other raw 
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materials were irrelevant to the dispute.
988
 Similarly, in United Brands the Court of Justice 
merely based its conclusion on the fact that United Brands stopped the supply to a long-
standing customer acting in accordance with usual commercial practice and did not discuss 
whether the banana deliveries from United Brands were essential for Olesen or whether 
alternative means of supply were available.
989
 It was only until the Télémarketing case that 
the requirement of indispensability was explicitly mentioned by the Court of Justice.
990
  
APPLICATION OF THE NEW PRODUCT CONDITION TO DISRUPTIONS OF SUPPLY - The fact that 
disruptions of supply are currently assessed under the exceptional circumstances test of 
Magill and IMS Health may lead to undesirable outcomes. This can be best illustrated by 
analysing the application of the new product condition, which is another requirement that was 
absent in the Commercial Solvents reasoning, to the facts of the Microsoft case. As discussed 
earlier,
991
 the European Commission and the General Court have lowered the standard for the 
fulfilment of the new product requirement in Microsoft. A possible explanation for this may 
be found in the fact that Microsoft’s competitors were not able to identify a new product that 
they would like to introduce upon having access to Microsoft’s interoperability information, 
because they were already active on the market for work group server operating systems and 
merely wanted to keep competing on that market by continuing to offer their work group 
server operating systems to consumers. While the European Commission stated in its 
Microsoft decision that the disruption of previous levels of supply ‘is of interest when 
assessing instances of refusal to supply’,992 the European Commission and the General Court 
still applied the four-prong exceptional circumstances test to the facts of the case and solved 
the problem with regard to the new product condition by arguing that a mere limitation of 
technical development suffices to meet this requirement. The application of the new product 
requirement to disruptions of supply has the consequence that downstream competitors who 
were already active on the market and have likely made commercial decisions on the basis of 
the supply have to identify a new product that they would like to introduce in the market in 
order to continue to have access to the input of the dominant firm. If downstream competitors 
cannot point out such a new product (or, if the Microsoft standard is used and upheld in future 
cases: a new technical development) that they would like to develop on the basis of the 
requested input, they have no cause of action under Article 102 TFEU towards a dominant 
undertaking that decides to enter the downstream market itself and withdraws previous levels 
of supply in order to become the sole supplier of the downstream product.
993
  
PROPOSING A SEPARATE LEGAL TEST FOR DISRUPTIONS OF SUPPLY - To prevent these situations, 
disruptions of supply should be assessed under different legal standards than absolute refusals 
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to deal. As demonstrated by the Microsoft case in which Microsoft was found to have 
engaged in a strategy to exclude competitors from the downstream market for work group 
server operating systems, a disruption of supply may be used to drive downstream 
competitors off the market. It is therefore worth considering if a separate cause of action for 
disruptions of supply under Article 102 TFEU can be based on the predatory nature of such 
behaviour. In this regard, a comparison can be made with the US where two cumulative 
conditions have to be met in order for a refusal to deal to amount to a violation of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act: (1) the monopolist entered into a pre-existing voluntary course of dealing, 
and (2) the monopolist is willing to forsake short-term profits in order to achieve an 
anticompetitive end.
994
 The willingness of a dominant undertaking to sacrifice short-term 
profits by unilaterally terminating a voluntary and thus presumably profitable course of 
dealing reveals the predatory character of a refusal to deal and forms a reliable proxy for 
assessing the abusive nature of a disruption of supply. A proposed legal test in EU 
competition law specifically applicable to disruptions of supply may therefore be based on the 
US framework.  
VOLUNTARY PRIOR COURSE OF DEALING FOR AN INDISPENSABLE INPUT - A first step may in 
that light involve establishing a voluntary prior course of dealing for an indispensable input 
between the dominant undertaking and the existing customer. A pre-existing business 
relationship based on a regulatory duty, such as the statutory access obligation that the US 
Telecommunications Act imposed on Verizon in Trinko, does not qualify as a voluntary 
course of dealing. If the dominant undertaking has not engaged in a prior course of dealing on 
a voluntary basis, the predatory nature of the disruption of supply cannot be established 
because there is no presumption that the dominant undertaking profited from the course of 
dealing and decided to forego these profits by terminating the business relationship.
995
 The 
input which forms the object of the dispute has to be indispensable in terms of its objective 
necessity for competition in the downstream market and the absence of economically viable 
substitutes.
996
 If the input is not indispensable, the existing customer will not be driven off the 
market once the dominant undertaking starts to deny access to the requested input. Either the 
input is not objectively necessary for competition on the downstream market which means 
that the existing customer does not need access to the input in order to be active on that 
market. Or there are actual or potential substitutes for the input as a result of which the 
existing customer can avoid being excluded from the downstream market by relying on one of 
these alternative sources of supply. Because no anticompetitive effects arise if the 
indispensability requirement is not met, it is submitted that a disruption of supply involving a 
non-essential input should not be regarded as abusive under Article 102 TFEU.
997
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ANTICOMPETITIVE NATURE OF THE DISRUPTION OF SUPPLY - A second step for determining 
whether a disruption of supply amounts to a violation of the EU prohibition on abuse of 
dominance (outside the conditions of the exceptional circumstances test of Magill and IMS 
Health) would involve establishing the anticompetitive nature of the termination of the prior 
course of dealing. In devising a legal test for the assessment of whether a termination of an 
existing business relationship is anticompetitive, the case law of the EU courts on predatory 
pricing may serve as a source of inspiration. In the Akzo case, the Court of Justice put forward 
a two-tier approach for assessing predatory pricing conduct under Article 102 TFEU. 
According to the Court, pricing below average variable cost is presumed to be abusive 
because a ‘dominant undertaking has no interest in applying such prices except that of 
eliminating competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by taking advantage 
of its monopolistic position’,998 while pricing below average total cost but above average 
variable cost is only regarded as abusive if proof of ‘a plan for eliminating a competitor’999 
or, in other words, of ‘intention to eliminate competition’1000 can be established. These 
insights from the EU case law on predatory pricing can be transposed to the area of 
disruptions to supply in the following way. The sacrifice of short-term profits that results 
from a dominant undertaking’s decision to disrupt existing levels of supply gives rise to a 
presumption of a plan or intent to eliminate competition considering that the dominant firm 
has no interest in terminating the existing business relationship except that of eliminating 
competitors from the downstream market so as to enable it subsequently to raise its prices to 
consumers. The abusive nature of the disruption to supply is then in principle established, 
unless the dominant undertaking is able to successfully invoke an objective justification. If the 
willingness of the dominant undertaking to forsake short-term profits cannot be established, 
proof of a plan or intent to eliminate competition would be necessary in order to hold a 
disruption of supply abusive under Article 102 TFEU. In line with the Post Danmark I 
judgment, in which the Court of Justice seems to have accepted proof of anticompetitive 
effects as a substitute for proof of a plan or intent to eliminate competition,
1001
 competition 
authorities and courts may also rely on anticompetitive effects in order to prove the predatory 
nature of a disruption of supply. One way to establish such anticompetitive effects may be to 
demonstrate that the termination leads to the exclusion of all effective competition on the 
downstream market.
1002
 In such a case, the assessment of a disruption of supply would 
overlap to a large extent with the exceptional circumstances test applicable to absolute 
refusals to deal because both the indispensability of the input and the exclusion of all effective 
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competition are considered. Nevertheless, if the dominant undertaking is foregoing short-term 
profits by disrupting previous levels of supply, no proof of anticompetitive effects is 
necessary and a violation of Article 102 TFEU can be established without having to consider 
whether all effective competition is excluded on the downstream market. 
NO OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION - Once a voluntary prior course of dealing for an indispensable 
input has been identified and the anticompetitive nature of the disruption of supply has been 
established, the dominant undertaking must, in a third step, be given the chance to objectively 
justify the unilateral termination of its business relationship with the existing customer. Since 
the dominant undertaking voluntarily decided to deal in the past, it will be hard to proof that a 
disruption of supply is justified. Nevertheless, two defences may be particularly relevant. If 
the dominant undertaking notices that the existing customer starts having trouble paying for 
access to the requested input, it may invoke the inability to pay of that customer as a 
justification for the disruption of supply. In addition, as made clear by the Court of Justice in 
Sot. Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline a dominant undertaking may protect its own commercial 
interests if it is confronted with orders from existing customers that are out of the ordinary. 
The Court explained that an order could be out of the ordinary if it consists of ‘quantities 
which are out of all proportion to those previously sold by the same wholesalers to meet the 
needs of the market’.1003 In order to ascertain whether the orders are ordinary, ‘the previous 
business relations’ between the parties as well as ‘the size of those orders in relation to the 
requirements of the market’ were thus relevant in the Court’s view.1004 These statements of 
the Court of Justice may imply that no violation of Article 102 TFEU can be established if a 
dominant undertaking refuses to supply an existing customer with quantities in excess of 
those ordinarily ordered by that customer. Objective justifications relating to the negative 
impact that a duty to continue to supply may have on the innovation incentives or the ability 
to recoup investments of the dominant undertaking are not likely to be successful, because the 
existence of a voluntary prior course of dealing indicates there is no such risk.
1005
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Proposed three-step framework for assessing the abusive nature of 
disruptions of supply under Article 102 TFEU: 
 
 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TEST IS LIMITED TO INSTANCES OF PREDATION - One 
could argue that creating a separate cause of action for disruptions of supply may generate 
perverse incentives for dominant firms to refrain from supplying inputs to competitors in the 
first place out of fear that they may then be forced to deal with their rivals for as long as the 
latter require access to the inputs.
1006
 However, the fact that a disruption of supply may give 
rise to a violation of Article 102 TFEU outside the conditions of the essential facilities 
doctrine does not mean that dominant firms are locked-in to their existing customers and can 
only terminate an existing business relationship by relying on an objective justification.
1007
 
The only prohibition that the three-part test proposed here imposes on dominant undertakings 
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• Voluntary prior course of dealing for an 
indispensable input 
• Plan or intent to eliminate competition:                           
- a presumption applies if dominant undertaking sacrifices short-term profits     
- if this presumption does not hold, anticompetitive effects have to be 
demonstrated 
• Absence of an objective justification 
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is that a disruption of supply cannot be based on a predatory strategy.
1008
 The scope for 
competition law enforcement in this respect is thus limited to instances where a dominant 
undertaking disrupts existing levels of supply in order to drive a competitor off the market. In 
the absence of a predatory strategy of the dominant firm, customers may rely on contract law 
to compel the latter to continue to supply or to obtain damages for the loss caused by the 
refusal to deal.
1009
 Since the relationship between a firm and its customers primarily falls 
within the ambit of contract law, enforcement actions on the basis of competition law should 
remain limited to cases in which disruptions of supply are used by dominant undertakings as a 
pretext to exclude a competitor from the market.  
ROOM FOR A DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF DISRUPTIONS OF SUPPLY - While the European 
Commission and the General Court expressed the view that disruptions of supply should not 
be treated differently than absolute refusals to deal in, respectively, the Guidance Paper on 
exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU and the Microsoft case, the Court of Justice 
still appears to distinguish with regard to the legal thresholds applicable to the two types of 
refusal to deal. In Sot. Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline, a preliminary ruling case involving a refusal 
of a dominant pharmaceutical company to meet orders of existing customers in full with the 
aim of restricting parallel trade, the Court of Justice argued that ‘established case-law of the 
Court shows that the refusal by an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the market 
of a given product to meet the orders of an existing customer constitutes abuse of that 
dominant position under Article [102 TFEU] where, without any objective justification, that 
conduct is liable to eliminate a trading party as a competitor’.1010 It is striking in this regard 
that the Court referred to the Commercial Solvents and United Brands judgments and not to 
the Magill and IMS Health judgments in which it established the stricter exceptional 
circumstances test. This may indicate that the Court of Justice still regards the Commercial 
Solvents reasoning as the applicable law for disruptions of supply. Since the Microsoft 
judgment of the General Court was not appealed, the Court of Justice has not been given the 
opportunity to rule on the fact that the lower court applied the stricter exceptional 
circumstances test to Microsoft’s termination of the previous level of disclosures of 
interoperability information. Its statements in the Sot. Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline judgment 
may imply that the Court of Justice does not agree with the approach of the General Court in 
Microsoft and is of the view that the exceptional circumstances test of Magill and IMS Health 
should not be applied for determining the abusive nature of disruptions of supply.
1011
 Instead, 
disruptions of supply may be assessed for their predatory character as the three-part test put 
forward here aims to do. 
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6.8.4 Discriminatory refusals to deal 
APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TEST - Discriminatory refusals to deal 
can be considered as a third type of scenario. Under Article 102(c) TFEU, a dominant firm is 
prohibited from ‘applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage’. In the refusal to deal context, 
this provision may capture situations in which a dominant firm treats a competitor differently 
from others by supplying this competitor on the basis of less favourable terms or by refusing 
to deal with this competitor while supplying (one of) the others thereby giving rise to a 
constructive refusal to deal. A critical question in this regard is whether the exceptional 
circumstances test has to be met in order for a form of discrimination with regard to the terms 
of supply to be abusive. The relevant issue is thus, in other words, whether discriminatory 
conditions of supply can be considered abusive in the absence of a duty to supply under the 
essential facilities doctrine. In TeliaSonera, the Court of Justice made clear that the conditions 
set out in Bronner do not ‘necessarily also apply when assessing the abusive nature of 
conduct which consists in supplying services or selling goods on conditions which are 
disadvantageous or on which there might be no purchaser’.1012 The case concerned a so-
called margin squeeze whereby a vertically integrated dominant firm sets its upstream and 
downstream prices to such a level to create a margin between them at which downstream 
competitors cannot generate a profit. The Court argued that a margin squeeze ‘may, in itself, 
constitute an independent form of abuse distinct from that of refusal to supply’ that is not 
subject to the exceptional circumstances test.
1013
 Otherwise, in the Court’s view: ‘before any 
conduct of a dominant undertaking in relation to its terms of trade could be regarded as 
abusive the conditions to be met to establish that there was a refusal to supply would in every 
case have to be satisfied, and that would unduly reduce the effectiveness of Article 
102 TFEU’.1014 
RECONCILING TELIASONERA WITH BRONNER - The TeliaSonera case can be understood as 
meaning that once a dominant firm voluntarily decides to supply, it must do so on terms at 
which competitors can effectively compete even though no duty to deal can be established 
under the essential facilities doctrine.
1015
 In that regard, TeliaSonera thus treats refusals to 
deal and margin squeezes, a form of constructive refusals to deal, differently. This approach 
adopted by the Court of Justice stands in contrast to the situation in the United States where 
the Supreme Court made clear in linkLine that no violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
can be found for a margin squeeze in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal.
1016
 One could 
argue that the creation of a separate form of abuse for margin squeezes leads to the perverse 
situation that a dominant firm is better off by refusing to give access to a non-indispensable 
input, for which no duty to deal exists under the exceptional circumstances test, to prevent the 
risk that the terms under which it would otherwise have supplied the input give rise to a 
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margin squeeze. According to the Court of Justice, its reasoning was in line with Bronner 
because it could not be inferred from the latter judgment that ‘the conditions to be met in 
order to establish that a refusal to supply is abusive must necessarily also apply when 
assessing the abusive nature of conduct which consists in supplying services or selling goods 
on conditions which are disadvantageous or on which there might be no purchaser’.1017 In 
particular, the Court argued that in Bronner it was only called upon to interpret the conditions 
under which a refusal to supply may be abusive and therefore ‘did not make any ruling on 
whether the fact that an undertaking refuses access to its home-delivery scheme to the 
publisher of a rival newspaper where the latter does not at the same time entrust to it the 
carrying out of other services, such as sales in kiosks or printing, constitutes some other form 
of abuse of a dominant position, such as tied sales’.1018 
LIABILITY FOR DISCRIMINATION EVEN IF NO DUTY TO DEAL - Since the Court referred to ‘any 
conduct of a dominant undertaking in relation to its terms of trade’, the TeliaSonera judgment 
is also of relevance for types of conduct other than margin squeeze.
1019
 In this sense, 
TeliaSonera may imply that discriminatory terms of supply can be abusive even in the 
absence of a duty to supply under the exceptional circumstances test. In Clearstream, the 
European Commission did not apply the conditions of the exceptional circumstances test to a 
discriminatory refusal to deal but only assessed whether the difference in treating requests for 
the supply of primary clearing and settlement services in the context of securities transactions 
was justified by valid and objective reasons.
1020
 However, the investigation targeted several 
access requests which were either refused or substantially delayed in comparison with other 
comparable customers in equivalent situations. The Commission did consider the conditions 
of indispensability and elimination of all effective competition with respect to the absolute 
refusals to deal. As made clear by the General Court on appeal, the Commission found that 
the absolute refusals to deal and the unjustified discrimination were two manifestations of the 
same course of conduct instead of two separate offences.
1021
 Since the absolute and 
discriminatory refusals to deal were closely linked and considered together, no strong 
conclusions can be drawn from Clearstream as regards the applicable legal standards for 
assessing the abusive nature of discriminatory conditions of supply. 
SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO COMPETITION AND CONSUMERS - The fact that discriminatory 
conditions of supply constitute a self-standing form of abuse does not mean that a dominant 
firm should be obliged to deal with every similarly situated competitor once it has supplied 
one. The welfare effects of discrimination are more ambiguous than those of exclusionary 
conduct and may in many instances even be positive.
1022
 Therefore, discriminatory refusals to 
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deal should only be considered abusive if they have a substantial effect on competition. As 
regards an appropriate benchmark for assessing such substantial harm, the BP case is 
instructive. The case involved the allegedly abusive nature of BP’s decision to reduce its 
supplies to ABG, an occasional customer, during the oil crisis to a much greater extent than in 
relation to all its other customers. In this context, the Court of Justice referred to ‘an obvious, 
immediate and substantial competitive disadvantage’ which might have jeopardised ABG’s 
continued existence.
1023
 With respect to selective refusals to deal whereby a dominant 
undertaking is only willing to supply certain competitors and not others, it is important to note 
that Article 102 TFEU covers practices that cause harm to consumers and does not protect the 
position of particular competitors. As made clear by the Court of Justice in Post Danmark I, 
‘[c]ompetition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the 
marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from 
the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation’.1024 As a result, 
in the absence of damage to consumer welfare, the fact that a dominant firm excludes a 
particular competitor from the market by selectively refusing to supply this competitor does 
not violate Article 102 TFEU. For example, in cases where a large number of competitors 
already has access to the necessary input for providing certain products or services to 
consumers, not supplying the input to other competitors is unlikely to give rise to substantial 
consumer harm.
1025
 In conclusion, discriminatory refusals to deal should only be held abusive 
if the different treatment of competitors in similar situations results in substantial harm to 
competition and consumers that cannot be objectively justified. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
DIFFERENT STANDARDS AND POLICY IN THE US AND EU - The standards for the application of 
the essential facilities doctrine are different in the United States and the European Union. 
After the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Trinko, it is clear that the scope for antitrust 
liability is limited to instances where a monopolist foregoes short-term profits by terminating 
voluntary prior course of dealing. In the EU, absolute refusals to deal where the requested 
input has never been marketed before may also be found abusive under Article 102 TFEU. 
Apart from these distinct legal standards, there is also an important difference in policy. 
Whereas US authorities and courts rely on the strength of the self-correcting mechanism of 
the market and emphasise the negative effects on innovation that may result from an 
interventionist approach, EU competition policy is characterised by its emphasis on keeping 
markets open and by the assumption that openness of markets is a prerequisite for innovation.  
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TRADE-OFF - Essential facilities cases involve a trade-off between different interest. The trade-
off that is made explicit in the EU decision-making practice and case law concerns the 
balance between the interest of essential facility holder on the one hand, and the interest in 
free competition on the other hand. EU cases remain silent on the underlying economic trade-
off between competition for and competition in the market. The framework proposed in this 
chapter aims to contribute to the state of the art by providing a way to apply this economic 
trade-off in practice and to make it more objective, in particular in cases concerning absolute 
refusals to deal. Instead of distinguishing between whether assets are protected by intellectual 
property law or not, the framework suggests to let the applicability of the new product 
condition depend on whether a market is characterised by external market failures. 
Considering that a competition law intervention cannot re-establish the race for competition 
for the market, caution is warranted in markets in which external market failures are absent. In 
these markets, the new product condition should be applied strictly because of the stronger 
self-correcting mechanism of the market which may make a competition law intervention to 
stimulate competition in the market less pressing. In markets where external market failures 
are present, the new product requirement should be dropped to ensure that access seekers 
planning to introduce competition in the market can gain access to the necessary input. In 
these markets, there is a higher risk that the incumbent is able to extend its dominance in time 
and to prevent competitors from entering the market and competing on the basis price or 
quality which justifies a wider scope of liability for refusals to deal under Article 102 TFEU. 
In line with the approach in the US, the framework also provides for a different legal standard 
for disruptions of supply based on their potential predatory nature.  
ROOM FOR A NEW APPROACH - Considering that the proposed framework diverges from the 
existing legal standards in several ways, the question rises whether there is room for such a 
new approach towards the assessment of refusals to deal. From the way the exceptional 
circumstances test is phrased in Magill and IMS Health, it becomes clear that the existing 
conditions are not necessary for finding a violation of Article 102 TFEU but merely 
sufficient. In other words, the exceptional circumstances test is not exhaustive and the 
existing conditions may be complemented or even replaced by others.
1026
 Statements of the 
Court of Justice in Sot. Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline may suggest that it is of the view that 
disruptions of supply should be assessed under less strict standards than the current conditions 
of the exceptional circumstances test. It also remains to be seen whether the lower standards 
for the fulfilment of the exceptional circumstances tests as applied by the European 
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Commission and the General Court in Microsoft will be upheld in future cases. This is 
especially relevant because the Court of Justice has not been given the opportunity to rule in 
the Microsoft case. One could argue in this regard that the Commission and the Court may 
have deliberately tailored the exceptional circumstances test to the particular market situation 
in the Microsoft case by lowering the applicable standards. If that is the case, there might be 
room for a framework in which the presence of external market failures is determinative for 
the strictness with which conditions have to be applied.  
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7 Application of the essential facilities doctrine to data 
 
7.1 Introduction 
NOVEL ISSUE - The essential facilities doctrine has been applied to physical infrastructures and 
intangible assets protected by intellectual property rights on several occasions. The question is 
if and how the essential facilities doctrine should be applied to user information on online 
platforms. Because of the personal nature of the data and the peculiar business model of 
online platform providers, the issue raises new concerns and may require a different analysis 
under the existing competition rules. 
OUTLINE - Section 2 discusses whether and to what extent the large collections of data of 
incumbent providers of search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms give rise 
to a competitive advantage in the form of network effects and barriers to entry. In section 3, 
two scenarios with regard to refusals to give access to data on online platforms are identified 
based on whether a duty to deal leads to direct or indirect competition with the holder of the 
requested input. Afterwards, it is analysed how a relevant market for data can be defined in 
section 4, how market power with regard to data can be established in section 5 and how the 
abusive nature of refusals to deal involving data can be assessed in section 6. 
 
7.2 Data as a competitive advantage1027 
KEY ISSUE IN THE DEBATE - The role of data in the competitive process between online 
platforms and companies in the digital economy in general is a contentious issue that has 
started to attract attention from policy makers and scholars.
1028
 Over the past years, a number 
of reports have been issued by government bodies and competition authorities in which the 
interaction between data and competition law has been discussed.
1029
 Most notably, the 
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Autorité de la concurrence (the French competition authority) launched a sector inquiry into 
the online advertising industry in May 2016 to gather information with a view to assessing the 
significance of data processing for competition in this sector.
1030
 One of the questions central 
to the debate is whether and to what extent the accumulation of data by incumbent online 
platforms gives rise to a competitive advantage. While it is uncontroversial that providers of 
search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms employ a business model that 
relies on the acquisition and monetisation of user data, it is fiercely debated whether the effort 
required to collect the data necessary to be able to compete on equal footing with the 
incumbent amounts to a sustainable competitive advantage and barrier to entry.
1031
  
ROLE OF DATA ON THE USER AND ADVERTISER SIDE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - Online platforms 
use algorithms to return the most relevant search results, suggested social network 
interactions and recommendations for future purchases to users. As more data on the 
behaviour and interests of users becomes available, the algorithm can be improved and will 
provide users with more relevant responses.
1032
 The former Commissioner for Competition 
argued in this regard: ‘the more people use a search engine the better it gets, because 
engineers need search data to refine their algorithms’.1033 On the advertise side of the 
platform, the collected data is monetised to fund the usually free delivery of functionalities to 
users by giving advertisers the possibility to target their advertisements to specific groups of 
users. Under the pay-per-click advertising model that is most commonly employed on online 
platforms, advertisers only pay the provider once a user has actually clicked on an 
advertisement. By accumulating data about users, the provider is able to increase its revenues 
because with more user information available it will become better at displaying ads to users 
that are of such relevance that they will actually click on them. In addition, better targeting 
possibilities will also attract more advertisers to the platform because of the higher probability 
that a user buys the advertised product or service.
1034
 This will again raise the revenues of the 
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provider. This phenomenon can be referred to as economies of scale with regard to the 
monetisation of user data.
1035
 
DIMINISHING RETURNS TO SCALE - These economies of scale relating to data on the user
1036
 
and advertiser side of online platforms are argued to be subject to diminishing returns to 
scale.
1037
 This implies that the value of having additional information declines as the amount 
of data rises. The strength of the benefits relating to large datasets would then depend on the 
volume at which the returns from extra data start to diminish.
1038
 If the benefits of having 
additional information start to decline only at a very high amount of data, large volumes of 
data can give rise to, respectively, a competitive advantage for incumbent platforms and an 
entry barrier for new entrants and potential competitors. 
ECONOMIES OF SCOPE - One should note that it is not only the amount of data that matters but 
also its variety. In its Google/DoubleClick merger decision, the Commission argued that: 
‘Competition based on the quality of collected data thus is not only decided by virtue of the 
sheer size of the respective databases, but also determined by the different types of data the 
competitors have access to and the question which type eventually will prove to be the most 
useful for internet advertising purposes’.1039 In economic terms, economies of scope can be 
identified. By combining and linking data from different sources, a deeper and more detailed 
profile can be gained of users.
1040
 In this regard, companies providing a number of related 
online services are in a better position because they have access to a wide variety of 
information enabling them to build a more comprehensive picture of consumer preferences. 
For example, Newman argues with regard to Google: ‘Whether a user is watching videos on 
YouTube, sending email from a Gmail account, checking for updates at Google News, 
checking their location on an Android phone, or buying a product through Google Offers, this 
data feeds the accumulating profile that Google has not only on the user as an individual, but 
on aggregated profiles of people like them that Google can package for its advertisers in ads 
                                                                                                                                                        
generates ad inventory. A larger inventory translates into more opportunities for advertisers to reach and target 
their intended audience. More advertisers lead to more ads for the search engine to choose from for any given 
query. This, in turn, improves ad relevance and the likelihood that a user will click on an ad and ultimately 
convert his click into a purchase. As a result, the inventory becomes more valuable to advertisers who see their 
return on investment increase’ (Case No COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 18 February 
2010, par. 163). 
1035
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broadcast on any and all of those products’.1041 In addition, in a report commissioned by the 
Belgian Privacy Commission about Facebook’s new privacy policy introduced in January 
2015, concerns were expressed about the horizontal and vertical expansion of Facebook. In 
particular, it was observed that Facebook combines data from an increasingly wide variety of 
sources, including acquired companies, partnering platforms and websites or mobile 
applications that rely on Facebook for advertising or other services, and collects a growing 
variety of types of information by adding new functionalities.
1042
 
FEEDBACK LOOP - The different economies of scale and economies of scope relating to data 
may reinforce each other and give rise to a so-called ‘feedback loop’. Users that appreciate 
relevant or personalised services will spend more time on the platform, which allows the 
provider to collect even more data, leading to better insights into consumer preferences, 
which can be used to further improve the quality of the services offered to users and 
advertisers, attracting even more users and advertisers. As the number of different 
applications, such as email, messaging, video and music, offered by a certain provider 
increases, a wider variety of information becomes available which can be linked together and 
used to deliver better services to users and advertisers.
1043
  
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DATA - When assessing to what extent the datasets to which 
incumbent providers have access may constitute a competitive advantage or an entry barrier, 
the economic characteristics of data should also be considered. Data is a so-called non-
rivalrous good which means that the fact that a certain entity has collected a piece of data does 
not preclude others from gathering identical information. Consumers commonly provide 
general information such as their home address, phone number, gender and date of birth to 
many entities as a result of which the same data may be used by different firms at the same 
time.
1044
 Furthermore, the value of data often does not lie in the collected information itself 
but instead depends on the knowledge that can be extracted from it.
1045
 This implies that 
different entities may generate the same knowledge by gathering distinct types of data. For 
example, a search engine provider may get to know the music preferences of a particular user 
by way of analysing the search queries that a user has inserted while a social network provider 
is able to gain the same knowledge by looking at the profile information that the user has 
shared on its platform. 
DIVERSITY IN VALUE OF DATA - Another important characteristic of data is its diversity in 
value. While some data including name and date of birth has lasting value and only has to be 
                                                 
1041
 N. NEWMAN, "Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data", Yale Journal on 
Regulation 2014, vol. 31, no. 2, (401), p. 431. 
1042
 B. VAN ALSENOY, V. VERDOODT, R. HEYMAN, ET AL., ‘From social media service to advertising network. A 
critical analysis of Facebook’s Revised Policies and Terms’, report commissioned by the Belgian Privacy 
Commission, 25 August 2015, p. 10. 
1043
 OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation. Big Data for Growth and Well-Being’, 6 October 2015, p. 185. 
1044
 UK COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, ‘The commercial use of consumer data. Report on the CMA’s 
call for information’, June 2015, par. 3.6. In its Telefónica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere merger decision, 
the Commission noted that: ‘Customers generally tend to give their personal data to many market players, which 
gather and market it. Therefore, this type of data is generally understood to be a commodity’ (Case No 
COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, par. 543). 
1045
 G.A. MANNE AND R.B. SPERRY, "The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an 
Antitrust Framework", CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2015, vol. 5, no. 2, (1), p. 9. 
249 
 
collected once by a specific entity, other types of data, such as the search queries that users 
have been looking for, are more transient in value and are relevant over a shorter period of 
time.
1046
 The latter types of data lose value over time as a result of which firms have to 
continue to gather up-to-date information about the interests and preferences of users in order 
to be able to return relevant responses to users and to deliver targeted advertising services to 
advertisers. The control over these types of data may not in itself give rise to a durable barrier 
to entry.
1047
 The Competition Commissioner argued in this regard that: ‘It might not be easy 
to build a strong market position using data that quickly goes out of date. So we need to look 
at the type of data, to see if it stays valuable’.1048 One should thus note that it is not only 
essential for an online platform to have access to information on past events but also to be 
able to collect and process real-time data. A search engine, for example, has to keep gathering 
information to ensure that its search algorithm is constantly updated as the needs and 
intentions of users looking for information may change. An incumbent search engine provider 
is in a better position because of its established user base which enables it to quickly adapt to 
new consumer preferences.
1049
 As a result, it seems to be a combination of factors which may 
result into strong market positions for incumbent providers of online platforms. 
COMBINATION OF FACTORS WHICH LEADS TO STRONG MARKET POSITION OF AN INCUMBENT - 
Markets in which online platforms compete are often by nature quite concentrated because the 
network effects crossing customer groups and the scale economies tend to limit the number of 
viable firms in a market.
1050
 This is especially the case for multi-sided markets where users 
single-home and use only one provider for a specific service. Since users and advertisers 
expect to gain more value and are attracted to platforms with the largest group of customers 
on both sides, small and new firms may face difficulties in attaining a critical mass and in 
successfully launching their own platform.
1051
 The transient nature of some of the data that 
providers need to provide relevant services to users and advertisers arguably reinforces the 
operation of network effects. Because providers have to continue to gather real-time data 
about current preferences and interests of users, it is not sufficient to have a large dataset with 
varied information on past events and past behaviour of users. Even if potential competitors 
are able to purchase relevant data from data brokers and other market players, providers with 
an established user base are in a better position to update their databases and therefore have a 
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competitive advantage over smaller platforms and new entrants which may be slower in 
adapting to the changing needs of users.  
ALLEGED UBIQUITY OF DATA AND LOW COSTS OF DATA COLLECTION - Arguments put forward 
for claiming that multiple providers of online platforms are easily able to collect relevant 
information include the alleged ubiquitous nature of data and low costs of data collection, 
storage and analysis.
1052
 While some types of data such as basic contact and demographic 
information may indeed be purchased from data brokers and other companies, the information 
that search engines, social networks or e-commerce platforms need to operate their services is 
specific and does not seem to be readily available on the market. As argued by Grunes & 
Stucke, providers of online platforms would not be investing considerable amounts of money 
in developing free services for users in order to collect and analyse relevant information if 
data was so widely and freely available as asserted.
1053
 Claims about the wide availability of 
data therefore have to be nuanced considering that situations can be identified in which 
providers of online platforms will be able to exclude competitors by preventing or restricting 
access to information for which few or no substitutes are available. Firms whose business 
model is built on the acquisition and monetisation of personal data feel the need for keeping 
their datasets to themselves. Some providers of online platforms try to shield data away from 
competitors: in the case of Facebook, for example, by prohibiting third parties in its general 
conditions from scraping content off its platform
1054
 or, in the case of Google, by restricting 
the portability of advertising campaigns and by requiring websites to enter into exclusivity 
agreements for search advertisements
1055
. By engaging in such actions, these providers aim to 
reserve data to themselves and prevent competitors from making use of their data sources.
1056
 
In addition, as made clear in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 above, providers of online platforms 
may rely on intellectual property and trade secret law to protect the data they have collected. 
With regard to the collection, storage and analysis of data, it is important to note that the costs 
involved in setting up the necessary tools for these activities are typically fixed whereas the 
marginal costs of increased production are low. As a result, economies of scale are created 
which may actually give rise to an entry barrier for small companies and new entrants.
1057
 
ROLE OF DATA ANALYTICS - One should recognise at the same time that in addition to relevant 
and recent data, engineering resources and a well-functioning underlying technology 
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including an algorithm are required to successfully operate an online platform.
1058
 The value 
of data is argued to be context dependent which means that the insights which can be 
extracted from it are determined by how the data is structured and analysed.
1059
 But even 
though access to a large and up-to-date database is in itself no guarantee for the success of an 
online platform, data remains a necessary input of production for the delivery of services to 
users and advertisers that are of the quality and relevance they expect. In this regard, a chief 
scientist of Google even suggested: ‘We don't have better algorithms than anyone else. We 
just have more data’.1060  
IDENTIFYING SITUATIONS IN WHICH ACCESS TO DATA AMOUNTS TO A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
- Whether data gives rise to a barrier to entry depends on the factual circumstances of the case 
which means that it cannot be excluded at the outset that access to user data confers an 
economic advantage on an incumbent. If partial substitutes for the required data are available, 
the question is whether they are good enough for new entrants to attract at least a number of 
users to be able to reach the critical mass needed to successfully launch a new service. 
Beyond that point, it may not be necessary to have access to additional data. In such cases, a 
new entrant may be able to improve the service in another way and become a viable 
competitor to the incumbent. In conclusion, it is submitted that the databases held by 
incumbent providers of online platforms may well give rise to a competitive advantage for 
incumbents and an entry barrier for potential competitors if two cumulative conditions are 
met: (1) data is an important input of production for the services provided on the online 
platform; and (2) the specific information necessary to compete on equal footing with the 
incumbent is not readily available to potential competitors.
1061
 New entrants may get access to 
the required data by purchasing it elsewhere and substituting it with other existing data 
sources or by collecting the required information themselves. If the data necessary to provide 
good quality services is not readily available on the market and can only be gained through 
serving customers, it is clear that a barrier to entry exists. In that situation, empirical analysis 
is needed to establish the height of the entry barrier.  
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7.3 Scenarios with regard to access to data 
INDIRECT COMPETITION - Two main scenarios can be distinguished with respect to requests for 
access to data depending on the intention of the access seeker. The first scenario concerns the 
situation in which a potential competitor or new entrant needs access to data as an input for a 
product or service that does not stand in direct competition to the services that the provider 
offers to users and advertisers on its own platform. This is the usual scenario in essential 
facilities cases, since the fact that the dominant undertaking can prevent indirect competition 
from occurring by refusing to deal points to the leveraging of dominance from the main or 
upstream market to a derivative or downstream market. An example of indirect competition in 
the context of online platforms is the use of data as an input to introduce statistical or 
analytics services.  
PEOPLEBROWSR V. TWITTER - The PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter case that occurred in the United 
States forms an illustration of such a scenario of indirect competition. PeopleBrowsr is a 
company that analyses Twitter data in order to sell information to clients about, for example, 
consumer reactions to products and services and identification of the Twitter users who have 
the most influence in certain communities. Twitter had informed PeopleBrowsr (and several 
other third-party developers) that as from 30 November 2012 it would be losing its full access 
to the Twitter ‘firehose’ which is the entirety of tweets that are passing through Twitter on a 
second-by-second basis. Instead of having direct access to the Twitter data, PeopleBrowsr 
would have to approach one of Twitter’s certified data resellers to gain access to the required 
data. PeopleBrowsr argued that it needed full firehose access to be able to deliver its services 
to customers.
1062
 A San Francisco court mandated Twitter to temporarily continue providing 
PeopleBrowsr full access to its data by way of the imposition of a temporary restraining 
order.
1063
 In April 2013, PeopleBrowsr and Twitter settled the dispute. The parties agreed that 
PeopleBrowsr would have continued full firehose access until the end of 2013. As of 2014, 
PeopleBrowsr had to transition over to an authorised Twitter Data Reseller for getting access 
to Twitter data.
1064
 The facts of the PeopleBrowsr case point to the typical ‘leveraging’ 
behaviour whereby an undertaking seeks to extend its dominant position in the upstream 
market, the market for data relating to social networks or (more narrowly) microblogging 
services, to the downstream market, the market for data analytics services, by refusing to give 
access to the necessary input which in the present case amounted to Twitter’s full firehose 
data.
1065
 This way, Twitter may arguably have tried to foreclose competition in the 
downstream market in which its certified data resellers were already active by providing third 
parties access to a processed or analysed form of Twitter data.
1066
 It could also be argued that 
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Twitter refused to give access to its full firehose only after PeopleBrowsr demonstrated the 
existence of a lucrative market for analytics.
1067
 
DIRECT COMPETITION - The second scenario involves a potential competitor or new entrant 
which seeks access to data on an online platform in order to launch a form of direct 
competition and to provide a rival platform to users and advertisers. In other words, the access 
seeker requests to have access to the user data collected by the incumbent provider to 
introduce its own search, social network or e-commerce platform which will compete with the 
platform offered by the incumbent in the same relevant product market. Data forms an 
important input for online services because it can be deployed as a means to improve, on the 
one hand, the possibilities of advertisers to engage in targeted advertising and, on the other 
hand, the relevance of, respectively, search results, purchase suggestions and social 
interactions. The imposition of such a duty to deal would have the effect of enabling an access 
seeker to compete with the provider at issue in a direct and horizontal way by introducing its 
own platform.  
 
Comparing possible scenarios of indirect and direct competition as regards 
access to data: 
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In addition to these situations in which competitors need data for being able to introduce their 
own services to users and advertisers, rival providers may also seek access to incumbent 
platforms in order to enable users to incorporate previously created and uploaded content into 
their own system or to bring profiles on different platforms together in one place. Since the 
sharing of content is at the core of their functionality, such disputes may particularly occur in 
the context of social networks. Two such cases have already occurred in the United States.
1068
 
 
7.4 Market definition in essential facilities cases relating to data1069 
HYPOTHETICAL AND POTENTIAL MARKETS - Because the essential facilities doctrine targets the 
leveraging of market power from the main or upstream market in which the holder of the 
essential facility is dominant to a derivative or downstream market, two relevant markets have 
to be defined in refusal to deal cases. The downstream market comprises the derivative 
product or service that the access seeker will offer once given access to the required input 
which forms the upstream market. After the introduction of the concept of hypothetical or 
potential markets by the Court of Justice in IMS Health,
1070
 it is not necessary anymore for the 
requested input to have been already traded as an independent product by the dominant 
undertaking. The fact that online platform providers such as Facebook and Google have, 
unlike Twitter which actively licenses data to third parties, never marketed data separately 
before
1071
 does therefore not preclude competition authorities or courts from imposing a duty 
to give their competitors access to the datasets these providers hold. While relevant markets 
are usually defined on the basis of concrete market experience by looking at supply and 
demand of products and services, the definition of a hypothetical or potential market can only 
be based on assumptions about how the market could be structured. Market definition in such 
cases thus amounts to a normative decision about how the market should look rather than 
constituting a reflection of market realities.
1072
  
DEFINING THE UPSTREAM MARKET FOR DATA - While Twitter licenses data to third parties and 
is thus active on a ‘real’ upstream market for data, other prevailing providers of search 
engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms do not sell or trade data. For the data held 
by those providers, only a hypothetical market can be defined. The key issue for determining 
the boundaries of a relevant market for data is the substitutability of different types of data. So 
far, the European Commission has not yet had to define a market for personal data or for any 
of its particular usages.
1073
 In the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, the Commission did not 
investigate any possible market definition with respect to the provision of data or data 
analytics services, since neither of the parties involved was active in any such potential 
                                                 
1068
 These cases are also discussed in C.S. YOO, "When Antitrust Met Facebook", George Mason Law Review 
2012, vol. 19, no. 5, (1147), p. 1158-1160. 
1069
 The analysis in this section is based on earlier work in I. GRAEF, "Market Definition and Market Power in 
Data: The Case of Online Platforms", World Competition 2015, vol. 38, no. 4, (473), p. 495-501. 
1070
 See section 6.8.1 above. 
1071
 Although Facebook and Google have each entered into specific partnerships with third parties for access to 
their platforms, both providers do not share data with advertisers and do not sell data to third parties.   
1072
 P. LAROUCHE, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2000, p. 207 and 212. 
1073
 Speech former Competition Commissioner Almunia, ‘Competition and personal data protection’, Privacy 
Platform event: Competition and Privacy in Markets of Data Brussels, 26 November 2012, SPEECH/12/860. 
255 
 
markets.
1074
 The Commission does have experience in reviewing mergers between firms 
providing data-related services. These cases did not involve hypothetical or potential markets 
but ‘real’ markets where the data at issue was truly traded.  
TOMTOM/TELE ATLAS AND THOMSON REUTERS - In 2008, the European Commission approved 
two mergers where markets relating to different types of data were defined. In TomTom/Tele 
Atlas, the Commission identified an upstream market for the provision of navigable digital 
map databases consisting of compilations of digital data typically including geographic 
information, additional information such as street names, addresses and speed limits, and 
display information. These digital map databases are sold to manufacturers and producers 
such as TomTom which integrates the databases it purchases from Tele Atlas into the 
navigation software and the navigation devices the company produces.
1075
 The Commission 
concluded that the vertical integration of Tele Atlas into TomTom would not lead to a 
significant impediment of competition despite the duopoly market for navigable digital maps 
(in which only Tele Atlas and NAVTEQ were active) and TomTom’s strong position in the 
market for portable navigation devices. In the same year, the Commission cleared a merger 
between Thomson and Reuters raising competition concerns in the financial information 
industry only after accepting commitments requiring the parties to divest copies of the 
databases containing financial information products together with relevant assets as 
appropriate to allow purchasers of the databases and assets to quickly establish themselves as 
a credible competitive force in the marketplace in competition with the merged entity.
1076
 The 
Commission also adopted a commitment decision in an abuse of dominance case against 
Thomson Reuters at the end of 2012 in which it argued that the latter had abused its dominant 
position in the worldwide market for consolidated real-time datafeeds by prohibiting its 
customers from using its so-called Reuters Instrument Codes to retrieve data from 
consolidated real-time datafeeds of other providers and by preventing third parties from 
creating and maintaining mapping tables incorporating Reuters Instrument Codes that would 
allow the systems of Thomson Reuters’ customers to interoperate with consolidated real-time 
datafeeds of other providers.
1077
  
TELEFÓNICA /VODAFONE /EVERYTHING EVERYWHERE - In its appraisal of the joint venture 
between UK mobile operators Telefónica, Vodafone and Everything Everywhere in 2012, the 
Commission defined a market for data analytics services. It referred to the previous merger 
decisions WPP/TMS and VNU/ACNielsen in which related relevant markets where 
identified.
1078
 In WPP/TMS, a merger in the sector for marketing communications services, 
the Commission defined a separate market for market research services aimed at measuring 
and understanding consumer attitudes and purchasing behaviour.
1079
 In VNU/ACNielsen, the 
Commission identified the existence of different types of services related to marketing and 
audience measurement. These so-called marketing data services were further segmented into 
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marketing information services, which consist of the provision of data (age, social group, etc.) 
on individual customers for direct marketing purposes, market research services, which are 
aimed at measuring actual purchasing patterns, and media measurement services, which are 
aimed at measuring the audience of specific media such as television and internet.
1080
 In 
Telefónica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere, the Commission considered whether separate 
relevant markets had to be defined for the provision of data analytics services for static online 
advertising and mobile advertising. According to the vast majority of respondents to the 
market investigation, these two types of data analytics were considered as complementary and 
could not be substituted because the two services collect a different type of information and 
amount of consumer details. A market player submitted that the information collected via 
mobile data analytics is more personal, geo-located, and can be cross referenced with call 
behaviour, which cannot be offered by online data analytics to a comparable extent. While the 
Commission left the precise product market definition open, it argued that there were possibly 
separate relevant markets for online and mobile data analytics.
1081
 As regards the data 
analytics activities of the joint venture, the Commission concluded that the operation was not 
likely to significantly impede effective competition since there would be various other players 
having access to a comparable set of data and offering services in competition with the joint 
venture.
1082
 
OFFLINE VERSUS ONLINE DATA - Whereas brick-and-mortar undertakings such as retailers, 
telecom operators, banks and insurance companies also collect personal information, this data 
cannot necessarily be considered substitutable to the data gathered by providers of online 
platforms. Each of these entities is involved in a different activity and consequently has 
access to a particular kind of information about consumers such as transactional data, call data 
records and information relating to the financial position of consumers. These different types 
of data are clear supplements giving a more comprehensive picture of a specific consumer 
once brought together. But even though the information held by the different entities will 
overlap to a certain extent, the data gathered by any of the above mentioned brick-and-mortar 
companies may not in itself enable providers of online platforms to offer services to users and 
advertisers that are of the relevance they expect. The scope and specificity of information 
collected on the internet is not comparable to the data to which brick-and-mortar undertakings 
have access. While offline retailers and online e-commerce platforms both gather information 
about the purchasing behaviour of consumers, a provider of an e-commerce platform is able 
to collect much more detailed information by analysing the behaviour of users on its platform. 
By looking at the product pages that a user viewed, the provider can easily find out which 
products a user has considered to buy before making his or her final purchase decision. A 
traditional retailer, to the contrary, might never know whether a shopper put a product back 
on the shelf before going to the check out.
1083
 For this reason, it is doubtful whether the 
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information held by brick-and-mortar retailers can serve as a substitute for the detailed data to 
which providers of e-commerce platforms have access. An analogy can be drawn with 
advertising where the European Commission held that separate relevant markets have to be 
defined for offline and online advertising because of the more precise targeting possibilities, 
measurement of effectiveness of ads and price mechanism applied to advertising.
1084
 The 
Commission could apply a similar reasoning to distinguish separate relevant markets for data 
collected offline and online.  
ONLINE DATA AS INPUT FOR SERVICES ON USER SIDE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - Within a potential 
market for online data, a further segmentation may be made between search data, social 
network data and e-commerce data as input for services offered on both the user and 
advertiser side of online platforms. Following the approach taken by the European 
Commission and suggested by economists to define separate relevant markets for each of the 
sides of online platforms,
1085
 distinct relevant markets should also be defined for the data 
required to provide services on each of the sides of the platform in line with the purpose for 
which the data is used. The data that a search engine needs to be able to offer a search 
functionality to users consists of the search queries that users have looked for and the links 
subsequently clicked on.
1086
 This type of data is different from the information collected by a 
social network provider which includes profile information shared by users and the 
interactions in which users engage on the platform. E-commerce data, in turn, involves 
information about the purchasing behaviour of users, their virtual shopping cart and the items 
they have viewed, liked or rated. As a result, each of these online platforms needs a specific 
type of data as input to deliver good quality services to users thereby diminishing the 
substitutability of different kinds of data. With regard to social network data, a distinction 
may even be made between information collected by microblogging services such as Twitter 
and general social networking sites including Facebook. In the context of the PeopleBrowsr v. 
Twitter case that occurred in the United States, PeopleBrowsr stated in a court document that 
Twitter data is a unique and essential input because tweets are ‘contemporaneous reports on 
users’ experiences that provide unique feedback regarding consumers’ reactions to products 
and brands’. In addition, it argued that the way Twitter enables users to respond to each other 
by retweeting each other’s content or mentioning each other in their own tweets, forms a web 
of interactions that ‘provides unique insight about which members of communities are 
influential’. While data from social networking sites as Facebook may serve as a valuable 
complement, Twitter data can in PeopleBrowsr’s view not be replaced by data from these 
sources. According to PeopleBrowsr, social networking sites ‘do not provide the same rich set 
of public data regarding users’ sentiments and influence’.1087 Because the parties settled their 
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dispute, the competent US court did not have to express its opinion on the substitutability of 
Twitter data in the proceedings on the merits. 
ONLINE DATA AS INPUT FOR SERVICES ON ADVERTISER SIDE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - On the 
advertiser side of online platforms, a further market segmentation may also be made between 
different types of data. In merger cases such as Google/DoubleClick, Microsoft/Yahoo and 
Facebook/WhatsApp, and in the ongoing Google investigation, the European Commission 
considered the definition of separate relevant markets for search and non-search advertising. 
In Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the Commission even referred to the possibility of 
defining a specific relevant market for non-search advertising on social networking sites.
1088
 
If separate relevant markets are distinguished for these types of advertising, it would be 
logical to define separate relevant markets for the data that is used as input for providing 
different kinds of advertising services too. Whereas social network providers target 
advertisements on the basis of the information they have gathered about the demographics 
and interests of users, targeting of advertising on search engines and e-commerce platforms 
takes place on the basis of the intent of the user revealed by entering a search query or a 
product that he or she is interested in. The substitutability of the data needed to provide, on 
the one hand, social network advertising and, on the other hand, search advertising therefore 
seems limited. Since providers of search engines and e-commerce platforms are both active in 
search advertising, the data they collect on their respective platforms may be considered 
interchangeable to a certain extent. However, the data of a provider of an e-commerce 
platform relates more specifically to the purchasing behaviour of users so that it can only 
partially substitute the information to which a horizontal search engine needs access for being 
able to provide search advertising services on its platform where search queries not only 
consist of products or services a user is looking for.  
LESSONS FROM EXISTING CASES INVOLVING COMBINATION OF DATASETS - Nevertheless, the 
Commission has not distinguished between different types of data in merger cases where the 
combination of the datasets of the merging parties were identified as a possible competition 
concern in markets for online advertising and data analytics services. In Google/DoubleClick, 
the Commission referred to portals, other major web publishers, internet service providers and 
Microsoft as players which ‘have the ability to collect large amounts of more or less similar 
information that is potentially useful for advertisement targeting’.1089 The Commission 
argued that the combination of the information on search behaviour from Google and web-
browsing behaviour from DoubleClick would not give the merged entity a competitive 
advantage that could not be matched by competitors considering that such a combination of 
data was already available to a number of Google’s competitors at the time of the proposed 
concentration.
1090
 In the context of its appraisal of the joint venture between UK mobile 
operators Telefónica, Vodafone and Everything Everywhere, the Commission assessed 
whether the joint venture would foreclose competing providers of data analytics services or 
advertising services by combining different types of data and by so creating a unique database 
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that no competing provider would be able to replicate.
1091
 The Commission concluded that the 
information available to the joint venture was ‘also available to a large extent to both existing 
and new market players such as Google, Apple, Facebook, card issuers, reference agencies 
or retailers’.1092 Similarly, in its Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision the Commission 
referred to data collection across the web in general without differentiating between different 
types of advertising. The Commission considered Google, Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, 
AOL, Yahoo!, Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe and Yelp as market participants that collect 
user data alongside Facebook and concluded that post-merger there would ‘continue to be a 
large amount of Internet user data that are valuable for advertising purposes and that are not 
within Facebook's exclusive control’.1093 The reasoning applied in these cases thus implies 
that the Commission regards the data collected by companies active on the internet as 
substitutable. However, important differences can be identified between the nature of the data 
gathered by, for example, search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms. 
Furthermore, in Telefónica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere, the Commission argued that 
separate relevant markets possibly existed for the provision of data analytics services for 
static online advertising, on the one hand, and mobile advertising, on the other hand, on the 
ground that these two services collect a different type of information and amount of consumer 
details.
1094
 In that perspective, data collected through PCs may not be substitutable to data 
collected through mobile devices, because only the latter type of information contains 
sufficient details about the user’s real-time location in order to provide mobile advertising 
services.
1095
 Such differences in the type of information seem to be even more substantial for 
search, social network and e-commerce data used as an input to provide targeted advertising 
possibilities. It thus remains to be seen if an all-encompassing market for internet data will be 
defined once the Commission is confronted with a case in which it has to determine the 
relevant market for personal data collected by a particular internet player. 
DEFINING THE DOWNSTREAM MARKET - The downstream or derivative market is defined 
around the product or service that the access seeker would like to introduce once given access 
to the required data. As discussed in the previous section, two possible scenarios can be 
distinguished depending on whether the access seeker is planning to introduce indirect or 
direct competition with the provider of the online platform. In the first scenario, the 
downstream market may consist of statistical or analytics services. In the second scenario, the 
access seeker will compete with the online platform provider in the same relevant market(s) 
for the functionality offered to users and/or the targeted advertising services delivered to 
advertisers.
1096
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7.5 Market power with regard to data1097 
LIKELIHOOD OF DOMINANCE IN A DATA MARKET - In order to establish liability under Article 
102 TFEU for a refusal to deal, the holder of the requested input has to be found dominant on 
the upstream market. Because of the alleged ubiquitous and non-rivalrous nature of 
information, it is argued that it is implausible for an undertaking to obtain market power with 
respect to user data.
1098
 However, as discussed above in the context of the existence of entry 
barriers,
1099
 such claims have to be nuanced. While an incumbent cannot prevent potential 
competitors or new entrants from gathering similar factual information such as the age, 
gender, profession and location of a user, the specific data that is necessary to compete on an 
equal footing with a prevailing search engine, social network or e-commerce platform 
provider may not be readily available to others. As an illustration, reference can be made to 
the argument of PeopleBrowsr in its court case against Twitter that Twitter data is not 
substitutable to user information from other social networks including Facebook. Particular 
types of user data may thus not be as widely available as claimed as a result of which it is not 
unlikely for an undertaking to have a dominant position in a certain market for data. 
DATA-RELATED REVENUE AS INDICATOR OF DOMINANCE - The question is how the existence of 
a dominant position in a market for data can be established and in particular how market 
shares should be calculated. The amount or quality of data that an undertaking controls do not 
seem to constitute adequate indicators for market power, because the datasets of different 
providers cannot be easily compared in this regard. It may be hard, if not impossible, to 
distinguish different pieces of information and attribute value to each of them. Factual 
information including the age and occupation of a particular user will normally have lower 
value than data that is harder to get hold of such as information relating to the behaviour of a 
specific user on an online platform. Nevertheless, it seems challenging to quantify this 
difference in value. A more objective way to measure the competitive strength of providers 
active in a market for data would be to look at their ability to monetise the collected 
information. The revenue gained by a provider through licensing of data to third parties 
and/or delivering targeted advertising services indicates how successful it is in the market. In 
a similar vein, the OECD proposed to look at the financial results of a company such as 
market capitalisation, revenues and net income on a per-user or per-record in order to estimate 
the monetary value of personal data.
1100
 Since the value of a dataset depends on how it is 
employed by its owner and not only on its sheer volume, market shares can be calculated in a 
reliable way by looking at the share of the total profit earned by undertakings active in the 
relevant market for a specific type of data. This way the analysis of dominance does not only 
take into account the value of the dataset in itself but also the success of a provider in putting 
in place relevant resources and technologies for monetising the data. In this regard, it has been 
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argued that the value of data is context dependent in the sense that the insights that can be 
extracted from it are determined by how the data is structured and analysed.
1101
 
ABSENCE OF ANY DATA-RELATED REVENUE - In case a particular market player does not offer 
paid products or services to customers on the basis of the collected data and does not monetise 
its dataset in another way, its dominance in a potential market for data cannot be established 
by following this approach. When the data is only used as an input for products or services for 
which no direct profits are realised, no data-related revenues can be identified and no value 
can be attributed to the data in this way. An example of a company which could be considered 
active in a potential market for data but which does not monetise the data by licensing it to 
third parties or by providing targeted advertising is WhatsApp. Since WhatsApp does not 
have any data-related revenues, its position in a potential market for data cannot be 
established by looking at its share of the turnover made by undertakings in this market. If 
possible competition problems cannot be sufficiently addressed in the ‘real’ relevant markets 
for the end product or service (in the case of WhatsApp possibly the relevant market for 
consumer communications services) and there is still a need to assess the competitive effects 
in a potential input market for data in the absence of any data-related revenues, competition 
authorities and courts could look at potential competition as a proxy for dominance.  
POTENTIAL COMPETITION - Instead of merely calculating market shares, the European 
Commission is increasingly taking into account potential competition in its assessment of 
dominance in dynamic markets.
1102
 In cases where the data has not yet been traded as a 
separate product and a ‘real’ market does not exist, it is particularly relevant to analyse the 
likelihood that other undertakings hold similar information or are able to collect the required 
data themselves thereby putting the incumbent under competitive pressure. If potential 
competition is absent, dominance will in such circumstances normally be established with the 
definition of a relevant market for the data to which access is requested. Since there are no 
readily available substitutes traded by others, potential competition is the only restraint to 
which the holder of the requested data can be subject. The presence of the following non-
exhaustive circumstances may in particular be considered to point towards market power in a 
market defined around data: (1) data is a significant input into the end products or services 
delivered on online platforms; (2) the incumbent relies on contracts or on intellectual property 
and trade secret law to protect its dataset as a result of which competitors cannot freely access 
the necessary data; (3) there are few or no actual substitutes readily available on the market 
for the specific information needed to compete on equal footing with an incumbent; (4) it is 
not viable for a potential competitor to collect data itself in order to develop a new dataset 
with a comparable scope to that of the incumbent (for example due to network effects or 
economies of scale and scope).
1103
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7.6 Characteristics which set data apart from other assets previously being considered 
under the essential facilities doctrine 
NON-RIVALROUS NATURE OF DATA - Several features can be identified that set data apart from 
other assets to which the essential facilities doctrine has been applied in previous cases. These 
characteristics may influence the assessment of the abusive nature of refusals to give access to 
data. As a non-rivalrous good, data can be used simultaneously by more than one entity. The 
fact that a certain entity has collected a piece of information does not preclude others from 
gathering the same data. The non-rivalrous nature of data may have an impact on the 
application of the essential facilities doctrine in two ways. Data that is truly non-rivalrous 
may not be found indispensable under the first condition of the essential facilities doctrine and 
may also not be liable to exclude effective competition on the downstream market under the 
second condition.  
EXCLUSIVITY OF DATA UNDER SUI GENERIS DATABASE PROTECTION AND TRADE SECRET LAW - 
At the same time, data can be made exclusive by way of contracts or by relying on sui generis 
database protection and trade secret law. The peculiarity of these regimes is that they do not 
require the underlying subject matter of protection to be innovative. This is opposed to 
traditional forms of intellectual property protection such as patents and copyright which 
demand, respectively, an inventive step and originality for an invention or creation to benefit 
from protection. As discussed in section 6.7.3 above, sui generis database protection and trade 
secret law do not necessarily promote innovation because there are no such qualitative 
requirements concerning the subject matter of protection. In that context, there is more scope 
for competition problems to occur with regard to these regimes in the sense that a dominant 
player may solely rely on sui generis database protection or trade secret law to protect its 
market position and prevent competitors from entering the market. It is worth recalling that 
the sui generis database right entitles a database maker to exclude others from re-utilising 
mere factual information and data. Single-source databases containing self-created data may 
attract protection despite the restrictive interpretation of the scope of the sui generis database 
right provided by the Court of Justice. If substantial investment has been made in either the 
verification or the presentation of the content of the database that can be differentiated from 
the investment in the creation of data, a database maker can still obtain sui generis protection 
for databases containing self-created data. In such situations, the holder of a sui generis 
database right can prevent others from re-utilising the self-generated information. Trade secret 
law, on the other hand, only requires that commercially valuable information is kept secret. 
As a result, a trade secret holder may shield non-innovative information from competition for 
an unlimited period of time by refusing to deal in cases where independent discovery or 
reverse engineering is not successful. While trade secret law also played a role in Microsoft, 
the European Commission and the General Court did not explicitly consider the 
characteristics of trade secret protection when applying the conditions of the essential 
facilities doctrine. Although it does not seem to be necessary to set a new standard of 
intervention for refusals to deal involving sui generis database rights or trade secrets, it must 
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be kept in mind that these forms of protection may lead to the control of information on which 
competitors are dependent for being able to enter a market. 
VALUE OF DATA MAY GO BEYOND ITS CURRENT USE - A characteristic of data that would 
require competition authorities and courts to proceed with caution when mandating access to 
data is its value may go beyond the way it is currently used by its holder. In this regard, an 
access seeker may not only be able to use the requested data as an input to introduce a specific 
product that competes with or complements the product of the dominant firm but also to 
analyse it and extract further knowledge from it. Such knowledge could then potentially be 
used to identify trends and to develop new products for which consumer demand exists. In 
such cases, a duty to deal may have effects going beyond the relevant markets considered in 
the competition analysis. To prevent this, competition authorities and courts should limit the 
duty to deal to the type and amount of data that is necessary to remedy the negative effects of 
the refusal of the dominant firm on the downstream market. 
LIMITED SCOPE FOR EX ANTE EFFICIENCY DEFENCES WHEN DATA IS A BY-PRODUCT - With 
regard to possible objective justifications for refusals to deal, a dominant firm may try to 
show that it would not have invested in the creation of the requested input in the first place if 
it had known beforehand that it would have to share it with competitors. While any duty to 
deal imposed under the essential facilities doctrine may negatively affect ex ante investment 
incentives, there are reasons to believe that such an effect is more limited with regard to data 
collected by incumbent providers of online platforms as compared to other types of essential 
facilities. One could argue that the dataset established by a dominant provider of an online 
platform is a by-product of its past success. Even if the provider had known that it would later 
be required to share its data with competitors, it is unlikely that it would not have refrained 
from returning as relevant search results, social interactions or purchase suggestions as 
possible to users.
1104
 Although the business models of most providers of online platforms 
nowadays revolve around data, the ownership of data was not what motivated initial entry in 
the markets that incumbents are currently dominating.
1105
 Indeed, Google at first tried to gain 
revenue from licensing its search engine to other firms and Amazon’s and eBay’s initial 
business model was solely based on charging transaction fees.
1106
 For these reasons, a duty to 
share data may only have a limited effect on ex ante innovation incentives which reduces the 
scope for ex ante efficiency defences to succeed. 
LIMITED SCOPE FOR EX POST EFFICIENCY DEFENCES WHEN DATA IS NON-RIVALROUS - With 
regard to possible ex post efficiency defences, the non-rivalrous nature of data may reduce the 
scope for objective justifications which refer to the costs that a duty to deal would pose for the 
dominant undertaking. In particular, a duty to give competitors access to data does not 
undermine the ability of the dominant undertaking to use its dataset to serve its own 
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customers.
1107
 In a similar vein, capacity constraints are unlikely to be accepted as objective 
justification for a refusal to give access to non-rivalrous data.
1108
 
PERSONAL NATURE OF DATA - While the scope for objective justifications involving ex ante or 
ex post efficiency defences relating to data may be limited, dominant firms may instead rely 
on their obligations under data protection law to justify a refusal to give access to data. When 
a duty to deal requires a dominant undertaking to give access to information relating to 
identified or identifiable natural persons, competition authorities and courts also have to take 
into account possible considerations under data protection law. The interaction with the data 
protection regime in the context of objective justifications under the essential facilities 
doctrine is discussed in the next section. 
 
7.7 Abusive nature of refusals to give access to data on online platforms 
Under the current standards of the EU essential facilities doctrine, four conditions are 
applicable to refusals to deal: indispensability, exclusion of all effective competition on the 
downstream market, prevention of the introduction of a new product and absence of an 
objective justification. In this section, guidance is given for each condition separately on how 
it may be applied and interpreted in the context of refusals to give access to data. 
 
7.7.1 Indispensability of data 
LESSONS FROM THE EU AND US GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK MERGER DECISIONS - With regard to 
the application of the indispensability requirement to user data, statements of the European 
Commission in merger decisions involving online advertising services are instructive.
1109
 In 
Google/DoubleClick, the European Commission argued that the combination of information 
on search behaviour from Google and web-browsing behaviour from DoubleClick would not 
give the merged entity a competitive advantage that could not be matched by competitors 
thereby concluding that the data of Google and DoubleClick is not necessary or essential for 
providing advertising services in an online environment.
1110
 The European Commission stated 
that similar data was already available to Google’s competitors, including Microsoft and 
Yahoo!, and that the data could also be acquired from third parties and internet service 
providers.
1111
 In this regard, it is also instructive to refer to the statement of the United States 
Federal Trade Commission in Google/DoubleClick. The US Federal Trade Commission 
concluded that ‘the evidence indicates that neither the data available to Google, nor the data 
available to DoubleClick, constitutes an essential input to a successful online advertising 
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product’.1112 In particular, the US Federal Trade Commission was of the view that a number 
of Google’s most significant competitors in the advertising intermediation market, namely 
Microsoft, Yahoo and Time Warner, had access to their own unique data stores containing 
information not available to Google. On this ground, the US Federal Trade Commission 
argued that all of these firms appeared to be well-positioned to compete vigorously against 
Google.
1113
 
LESSONS FROM OTHER MERGER CASES INVOLVING ONLINE ADVERTISING - In 
Telefónica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere, the European Commission assessed whether the 
joint venture between UK mobile operators Telefónica, Vodafone and Everything Everywhere 
would foreclose competing providers of targeted advertising services by creating a unique 
database of different types of information leading to a situation in which other providers 
might be dependent on the joint venture or might be unable to compete. After analysing which 
data the joint venture would possess, the European Commission concluded that the operation 
would not impede effective competition because similar information was available to other 
companies active in the market for targeted advertising and customers generally tend to give 
their personal data to many market players.
1114
 In the context of its approval of the acquisition 
of WhatsApp by Facebook, the European Commission similarly argued that even if Facebook 
were to start collecting and using data from WhatsApp users to improve targeted advertising 
on its social network the transaction would not raise competition concerns considering that 
‘there will continue to be a large amount of Internet user data that are valuable for 
advertising purposes and that are not within Facebook's exclusive control’.1115  
INDISPENSABILITY OF DATA FOR SERVICES PROVIDED TO USERS - Although the outcome of these 
three merger cases indicates that data of incumbents will not easily be considered 
indispensable for providing targeted advertising services, this may be different with regard to 
the use of data for offering services of good quality to users in the form of, for example, the 
relevance of search results in online search engines, suggested social network interactions and 
purchase suggestions in e-commerce platforms. For the provision of these functionalities to 
users, a specific type of data is needed that may not be readily available on the market. For 
example, if the specific data needed to operate a search engine of good quality can only be 
obtained through serving customers, other data that is available from third parties will not 
form an adequate substitute for the search data of the incumbent search engine provider. In 
addition, in line with the scenario involving indirect competition, third parties may need user 
data as an input for a product that is unrelated to the main services that the dominant provider 
offers such as statistical or analytics services. In its US court case against Twitter, 
PeopleBrowsr argued that Twitter data constituted an indispensable input for it to be able to 
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provide its own customers with analytics services. In PeopleBrowsr’s view, Twitter data 
could not substituted with information from other social networks.
1116
 
INTERVENTION BY THE FRENCH COMPETITION AUTHORITY IN THE ENERGY MARKET - The 
French and Belgian competition authorities have both already assessed the extent to which a 
dataset held by a dominant undertaking may be reproducible by competitors. In September 
2014, the Autorité de la concurrence adopted an interim decision in which it found GDF Suez 
capable of taking advantage of its dominant position in the market for natural gas by using 
customer files it had inherited from its former monopoly status to launch offers at market 
prices outside the scope of its public service obligation. The Autorité de la concurrence made 
clear that the conformity of these practices with competition law depends on the conditions in 
which the company has established its customer base, as well as on the possibility for its 
competitors to reproduce such information. If the data has been acquired by the dominant 
undertaking in the context of a competition on the merits and can be reproduced by equally 
efficient competitors in the market at reasonable financial conditions and in a timely manner, 
the cross-use of a customer base does not constitute an abuse of dominance in the view of the 
Autorité de la concurrence.
1117
 When analysing the specific facts of the case, the Autorité de 
la concurrence found that the database of GDF Suez was a legacy of its former status as a 
monopolist in the market for the supply of gas and could not be regarded as the result of a 
particular innovation that GDF Suez had developed by its own merit. As regards the 
reproducibility of the database, the Autorité de la concurrence followed the arguments of 
competitors which had stated that it was not reasonably possible for them to reproduce the 
advantage held by GDF Suez or to rely on other databases from which information could be 
retrieved that was effective for prospecting new customers in the market for the supply of 
gas.
1118
 Against this background, the Autorité de la concurrence argued that the practices of 
GDF Suez could constitute abuse of dominance and foreclose potential competitors from the 
liberalised gas market and the electricity market.
1119
 To remedy such effects, the Autorité de 
la concurrence required GDF Suez by way of interim measures to share certain customer 
information with other market players having government authorisation to supply natural gas 
in order to enable them to contact potential new customers.
1120
 Interim measures were 
necessary in the view of the Autorité de la concurrence to restore ‘equality of arms’ with 
regard to the prospecting of new customers in the liberalised market for gas and to prevent 
that GDF Suez would attract a substantial part of customers which may have had an 
irreversible impact on a market in transition.
1121
 To ensure the effectiveness of the adopted 
measures, the Autorité de la concurrence also ordered GDF Suez to suspend its commercial 
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activities relating to the supply of gas outside the scope of its public service obligation in case 
it had not made the required data available to competitors before a certain date.
1122
 
INTERVENTION BY THE BELGIAN COMPETITION AUTHORITY IN THE LOTTERY MARKET - In 
September 2015, the Belgian competition authority imposed a fine on the National Lottery for 
having abused its dominance in the Belgian market for public lotteries in which it has a legal 
monopoly. When entering the competitive market for sports betting in 2013, the National 
Lottery used the contact details of individuals contained in a database that it had established 
in the context of its legal monopoly in order to send a one-off promotional email for the 
launch of its new sports betting product Scooore!.
1123
 In reference to the approach of the 
Autorité de la concurrence, the Belgian competition authority made clear that for establishing 
whether this practice amounts to abuse it was necessary to look at the circumstances in which 
the National Lottery had built the database as well as at the possibility for competitors to 
reproduce the database. In this regard, the Belgian competition authority concluded that the 
contact details used by the National Lottery were not acquired on the basis of a competition 
on the merits but resulted from its activities conducted in the framework of its legal 
monopoly. Moreover, given its nature and size, the data could not have been reproduced by 
competitors in the market at reasonable financial conditions and within a reasonable period of 
time in the view of the Belgian competition authority.
1124
 Even though the Belgian 
competition authority followed the Autorité de la concurrence as regards the criteria for 
assessing the reproducibility of the database of GDF Suez, it did not require the National 
Lottery to share the contact details obtained in framework of its monopoly status with 
competitors in the market for sports betting. This difference in approach could be explained 
by the fact that the National Lottery only made use of these contact details once when sending 
an email to promote the launch of its new sports betting product. In these circumstances, an 
obligation to share the contact details with competitors, as imposed on GDF Suez by the 
Autorité de la concurrence, may have been disproportionate. 
RELEVANCE FOR ASSESSING INDISPENSABILITY OF DATA UNDER THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
DOCTRINE - Both of these national competition cases involved cross-use of data developed in 
the context of a monopoly
1125
 and therefore do not have much similarity to a factual scenario 
centring around data gathered by a provider of an online platform. In addition, the data at 
issue in the two cases concerned contact details of customers instead of information valuable 
for advertising purposes or for offering relevant and good quality services to users on online 
platforms. Nevertheless, the reference made by both competition authorities to reasonable 
                                                 
1122
 Autorité de la concurrence, Décision n° 14-MC-02 du 9 septembre 2014 relative à une demande de mesures 
conservatoires présentée par la société Direct Energie dans les secteurs du gaz et de l’électricité, par. 297. 
1123
 Belgian Competition Authority, Beslissing n° BMA-2015-P/K-27-AUD van 22 september 2015, Zaken nr. 
MEDE-P/K-13/0012 en CONC-P/K-13/0013, Stanleybet Belgium NV/Stanley International Betting Ltd en 
Sagevas S.A./World Football Association S.P.R.L./Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU S.C.R.L. 
t. Nationale Loterij NV, par. 44-48, available at http://www.mededinging.be/nl/beslissingen/15-pk-27-nationale-
loterij.  
1124
 Belgian Competition Authority, Beslissing n° BMA-2015-P/K-27-AUD van 22 september 2015, Zaken nr. 
MEDE-P/K-13/0012 en CONC-P/K-13/0013, Stanleybet Belgium NV/Stanley International Betting Ltd en 
Sagevas S.A./World Football Association S.P.R.L./Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU S.C.R.L. 
t. Nationale Loterij NV, par. 69-70. 
1125
 These and a few other, similar competition cases that occurred in non-digital markets are also discussed in 
Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, ‘Competition Law and Data’, 10 May 2016, p. 31-33.  
268 
 
financial conditions and a reasonable period of time when assessing the possibility for 
competitors to reproduce a database may also be of relevance when assessing the economic 
viability of duplication in the context of the indispensability of a dataset in the online 
environment under the essential facilities doctrine.  
 
7.7.2 Exclusion of all effective competition on the downstream market 
NEW MARKETS - The condition relating to the exclusion of effective competition is interpreted 
in previous EU essential facilities cases as requiring that the holder of the requested input is 
already active on the downstream market and reserves this market to itself by refusing to 
deal.
1126
 This means that a dominant provider of an online search engine, social network or e-
commerce platform cannot be forced to give access to its dataset to an access seeker that 
needs the data to start competing in a market in which the provider is not present. This is 
particularly relevant in the scenario of indirect competition where companies may seek access 
to data in order to introduce statistical, analytics or other products not directly related to the 
main services that providers of online platforms offer to users and advertisers.
1127
 If the 
current interpretation of the requirement of exclusion of effective competition is upheld, a 
provider of an online platform can legitimately prevent access seekers from opening up new 
markets in which it is not active itself by refusing to give access to its dataset. 
EQUAL FOOTING - The conditions of indispensability and exclusion of effective competition 
overlap to a certain extent and can therefore be analysed in close connection. In Microsoft, the 
European Commission first considered what degree of interoperability was necessary to 
enable effective competition in the derivative market and then assessed whether the 
interoperability that Microsoft refused to disclose was indispensable to reach that degree of 
interoperability. In possible future cases involving access to data, a similar approach can be 
taken. The relevant issue that has to be assessed is whether potential competitors and new 
entrants need to be put on an equal footing with the incumbent and thus be given access to its 
dataset in order to ensure effective competition on the downstream market.  
 
7.7.3 Prevention of the introduction of a new product 
DEGREE OF NOVELTY - If the object to which access is sought is protected by intellectual 
property law, the new product condition also has to be met for a refusal to deal to be 
considered abusive under current Article 102 TFEU standards. As argued in section 5.3 
above, user data may be protected under copyright, sui generis database protection and/or 
trade secret law as a result of which an access seeker would have to point to a new product 
that it would like to develop once given access to the required information. In the scenario of 
direct competition where the access seeker is planning to compete with the dominant provider 
by introducing rival services to users and advertisers, the new product requirement will not 
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easily be considered met if the service to be introduced by the access seeker is similar to the 
existing service of the incumbent. For example, an access seeker will probably not succeed in 
its access request if it wants to set up its own online search engine in competition with that of 
the incumbent Google. Nevertheless, in Microsoft the European Commission and the General 
Court accepted that a mere technical development suffices to fulfil the new product condition. 
NEW APPROACH - As discussed in section 6.8.2.3 above, there is no convincing economic 
reason for treating refusals to license differently than refusal to deal involving non-intellectual 
property protected assets. In line with the proposed framework set out in the previous chapter, 
the applicability of the new product condition could instead be made dependent on whether a 
market is characterised by external market failures. In situations where a dataset is protected 
by strong network effects or economies of scale and scope, the fact that an incumbent remains 
dominant in the market may merely result from the market situation grown around the dataset 
instead of from its competitive success. It is submitted that a competition law intervention is 
warranted under less strict conditions in these cases to guarantee a certain level of competition 
in the market and to prevent an incumbent from artificially extending its dominance by 
refusing to give access to its dataset. This can be achieved by dropping the new product 
requirement.  
IDENTIFYING EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES RELATING TO DATA - For determining whether the 
new product condition should be applied to cases where data is the alleged essential facility, 
the extent to which a dataset gives rise to a competitive advantage for incumbents and an 
entry barrier for potential competitors would need to be established. If external market 
failures relating to the dataset of the dominant undertaking can be identified which prevent 
competitors from entering the market and from introducing their own products or services, the 
new product condition would not need to be met. As a result, an access seeker would not have 
to identify a new product that it wishes to introduce once given access to the data. This way, 
consumers will be able to benefit from sustaining innovations or products similar to that of 
the dominant undertaking in cases where external market conditions restrict the ability of 
potential competitors which do not have access to the necessary data to compete in the 
market.  
POSSIBLE DATA-RELATED EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES IN THE ONLINE SEARCH MARKET - 
Against this background, it is instructive that Argenton & Prüfer concluded in 2012 that there 
is a strong tendency towards market tipping and monopolisation in the market for online 
search engines due to the existence of indirect network externalities relating to the collected 
information on search queries and subsequent clicking behaviour of users.
1128
 The results of 
their economic model of search engine competition showed that ‘the rate of innovation, 
quality, consumer surplus, and total welfare are higher if search engines only compete with 
their actual algorithm’ and not on the basis of the amount of search data they hold.1129 Even 
though they acknowledged that a dominant search engine provider could possibly face an 
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obligation to share search data under the essential facilities doctrine, they proposed to 
introduce a universal data-sharing scheme requiring all search engines to share anonymised 
data on search queries.
1130
 In their view, ‘intense competition between search engines based 
alone on the merits of the search algorithm provides better incentives to the firms to produce 
high-quality products than the rent enjoyed by a dominant firm that exploits a competitive 
advantage created by network externalities’.1131 Considering the possible existence of such 
external market failures as identified by Argenton & Prüfer, access seekers may rely on the 
essential facilities doctrine, in the absence of any regulatory initiatives, to get hold of the 
search data of the incumbent in order to launch their own search engine without having to 
fulfil the new product requirement (provided that the other conditions of the essential 
facilities doctrine are met). This would restore the ability of other market players to compete 
in the market with the incumbent. 
INTRODUCTION OF A NEW PRODUCT HAVING DATA AS NECESSARY INPUT - In situations where 
the position of the dominant player is not protected by external market failures, the new 
product condition should be applied strictly. This to ensure that a competition law 
intervention only takes place if it results into substantial utility for consumers in the form of a 
new product. In this regard, the product to be introduced by the access seeker once given 
access to the requested data should have no or a relatively low degree of substitutability to the 
product already offered by the essential facility holder. Even though it is not necessary that 
the new product establishes a new market, it must be of such better quality or have such 
complementary features that it is not comparable to the existing product of the dominant firm 
from the perspective of consumers. Under this interpretation, the new product requirement is 
most likely to be fulfilled in a scenario of indirect competition whereby a refusal to give 
access to data would prevent an access seeker to introduce a value-added service such as data 
analytics. 
 
7.7.4 Absence of an objective justification 
INTERACTION WITH DATA PROTECTION - An objective justification that a dominant provider 
may invoke to offset an alleged anticompetitive refusal to give access to data, can be based on 
its obligations towards its users under data protection law. The provider could argue that it 
will not be able to comply with these obligations anymore, since it cannot vouch for an 
adequate level of data protection if it is forced to share personal data of its users with third 
parties.
1132
 
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM - A comparison can be made in this regard with the so-called ‘regulated 
conduct defence’ raised in the Deutsche Telekom case. Deutsche Telekom, the German 
incumbent telecom operator, tried to justify its potential abuse of dominance by relying on the 
fact that its behaviour was regulated by the German telecommunications regulator on the 
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basis of sector-specific telecommunications regulation. Deutsche Telekom was obliged to 
provide competitors with local access to its network. The national regulatory authority had 
fixed the wholesale prices it could charge its competitors and the retail tariffs for end 
consumers were subject to a price cap. In its 2003 decision, the European Commission 
concluded that Deutsche Telekom had abused its dominant position by charging prices to its 
competitors for wholesale access to its local loop network that were higher than its own retail 
tariffs to end consumers thereby preventing competitors from generating a profit from their 
retail services.
1133
 The Court of Justice argued that, although wholesale prices were set by the 
German regulator, the margin squeeze was attributable to Deutsche Telekom, since it had 
sufficient scope to adjust the retail prices it charged to its end users, notwithstanding the fact 
that those prices were subject to some form of regulation.
1134
 The Deutsche Telekom case thus 
makes clear that the fact that a sector is regulated does not mean that it is immune from 
competition law intervention as long as the applicable regulation leaves room for autonomous 
conduct. In analogy to the Deutsche Telekom case, it could be argued that as long as data 
protection law leaves room for autonomous conduct by a dominant provider an objective 
justification based on this legal regime will not be accepted by competition authorities.
1135
 
 
7.8 Conditions under which access to data should be granted 
REASONABLE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY TERMS IN MICROSOFT - An important issue relating to 
the imposition of a duty to deal under the essential facilities doctrine is under which 
conditions access should be granted to the requested input. For this purpose, reference can be 
made to the 2004 Microsoft decision in which the European Commission imposed an 
obligation on Microsoft to make the necessary interoperability information available on the 
basis of reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. The Commission specified that Microsoft 
should not be allowed to render the duty to supply ineffective by imposing unreasonable 
conditions as regards the access to, or the use of, the interoperability information. With 
respect to the element of non-discrimination, the Commission noted that the disclosures 
should be made to any undertaking having an interest in offering work group server operating 
system products. While the Commission did not set the rate that Microsoft was allowed to 
charge for access to the protocols, it did state that the remuneration should not reflect the 
‘strategic value’ stemming from Microsoft’s market power in the market for client PC 
operating systems or in the market for work group server operating systems.
1136
  
ASSESSMENT OF REASONABLENESS IN MICROSOFT - In February 2008, the Commission adopted 
a new decision imposing on Microsoft a penalty payment for non-compliance with its 
obligation in the 2004 decision to give access to the interoperability information on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. By reference to the pricing scheme that Microsoft 
itself devised, the Commission made clear that in order to be considered reasonable the 
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remuneration should allow interested third parties who implement the interoperability 
information to viably compete with Microsoft’s work group server operating system and 
should not compensate Microsoft for the strategic value of the protocols stemming from its 
market power in the two markets at issue. In accordance with Microsoft’s own remuneration 
scheme, the Commission stated that it was necessary to examine whether the protocols 
concerned were Microsoft’s own creations, to examine whether those creations constituted 
innovation and to take into account a market valuation of comparable technologies excluding 
the strategic value stemming from the dominant position of any such technologies.
1137
 After a 
factual assessment, the Commission concluded that the royalties demanded by Microsoft prior 
to 22 October 2007 were unreasonable. In particular, the Commission argued that in the 
absence of convincing evidence as to the innovative character of almost all of Microsoft’s 
unpatented interoperability information and in view of a comparison with the pricing of 
similar interoperability information, including other technology made available by Microsoft 
itself, the remuneration scheme had to be considered unreasonable.
1138
  
NO PRIOR SPECIFICATION OF THE RATE OF REMUNERATION IS NECESSARY - Microsoft lodged an 
appeal against this Commission decision before the General Court. In its 2012 judgment, the 
General Court rejected Microsoft’s argument that the Commission was not entitled to impose 
a penalty payment for infringement of the 2004 decision before having made specific the 
obligations arising under it and, in particular, without having determined the rate of 
remuneration that it considered reasonable. The General Court made clear that even though 
several rates may be covered by the notion of ‘reasonable remuneration rates’, it was not for 
the Commission to impose upon Microsoft its own choice from among what are reasonable 
rates for the purpose of the 2004 decision.
1139
 On that ground, the General Court held that the 
absence of a prior specification of a rate of remuneration which, in the Commission’s view, 
would be reasonable did not stand in the way of the imposition of a penalty payment for a 
breach of the 2004 decision.
1140
 
POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR GRANTING ACCESS TO DATA - Following the General Court’s 
endorsement of the Commission’s approach in Microsoft, no remuneration rate has to be set 
by a competition authority when requiring a dominant undertaking to give access to its dataset 
under the essential facilities doctrine. It would suffice to lay down in the decision that the 
essential facility holder is obliged to share data with competitors on the basis of reasonable 
and non-discriminatory conditions. It is then for the essential facility holder to set the rate, 
keeping in mind, however, that it is not allowed to ask compensation for the strategic value of 
the data stemming from its dominant position in the market at issue. It is instructive to note 
that the Autorité de la concurrence required GDF Suez in the interim decision discussed in 
section 6.8.2.1 above to give access to the required customer information at its own 
expense.
1141
 This may be explained, however, by the fact that GDF Suez acquired the data in 
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the framework of its former monopoly position and did not create the information itself. In 
this regard, it should also be noted that the data to be shared concerned merely factual 
information such as names, addresses, fixed telephone numbers and consumption profiles of 
customers. If a dataset to which access is mandated under the essential facilities doctrine has 
been developed by the dominant player itself and contains innovative information, the holder 
should be entitled to ask for a reasonable remuneration rate. 
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY - Finally, technical issues need to be considered which may stand in 
the way of imposing a duty to supply data on dominant providers of online platforms. The 
fact that Microsoft’s search engine Bing integrates data from a number of social networks 
such as Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare in its search results illustrates the technical 
feasibility of making datasets accessible to third parties for use in their own services.
1142
 
Reference can also be made to Twitter which gives developers access to its data via several 
types of application programming interfaces (APIs).
1143
 API access seems particularly 
appropriate in situations where data runs stale quickly and access seekers need recent data to 
be able to offer their own services to customers. Data analytics would be an example of a 
service for which continuous access to a constantly updated database is necessary. With 
regard to search data, it is instructive to note that Argenton & Prüfer suggest to require search 
engine providers to exchange anonymised data on search queries directly and bilaterally in 
order to implement their proposal for a universal data-sharing regime among online search 
engines.
1144
 In addition to a body achieving standardisation of how search queries are 
reported, a compliance or monitoring regime would need to be set up to enable such a - in 
their view - relatively timely delivery of data.
1145
 However, it should be kept in mind that their 
proposal goes beyond what can be achieved under the essential facilities doctrine considering 
that the data-sharing regime would apply to all search engine providers in the market. 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO - Although the extent to which data can constitute a competitive 
advantage or a barrier to entry is subject to controversy, it cannot be excluded at the outset 
that the large and varied datasets of incumbent online providers give rise to an economic 
benefit. The specific data to which potential competitors or new entrants need access in order 
to provide services competing with or complementing the services offered by providers of 
online search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms may not be readily 
available on the market or be reasonably reproducible. With regard to possible cases 
involving refusals to give access to data on online platforms, two main scenarios can be 
identified based on whether an access seeker is planning to launch direct or indirect 
competition with the dominant provider. The finding of liability under Article 102 TFEU 
seems most likely in a scenario of indirect competition because this situation concerns the 
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typical leveraging behaviour whereby an undertaking seeks to extend its dominant position in 
the upstream or main market to the downstream or derivative market by refusing to give 
access to the necessary data. Nevertheless, after the IMS Health judgment it is not necessary 
for a product to have been traded on a market already as a result of which a duty to deal may 
also be imposed to enable an access seeker to compete with the holder of the requested input 
in a direct or horizontal way.  
PECULIARITIES OF DATA COMPARED TO OTHER ‘ESSENTIAL FACILITIES’ - When assessing 
refusals to give access to data, competition authorities and courts should take into account the 
specific characteristics of data that set it apart from other assets to which the essential 
facilities doctrine has been applied in previous cases. While data is inherently non-rivalrous, it 
can be made exclusive. Sui generis database protection and trade secret law are of particular 
relevance in this regard. The peculiarity of these regimes is that they do not impose any 
qualitative requirements as regards the subject matter of protection. The fact that the sui 
generis database right and trade secret law protect, respectively, investment and secrecy 
should be taken into account in essential facilities cases as well as the higher probability of 
anticompetitive effects as compared to refusals to license traditional intellectual property 
rights. At the same time, there is also reason for competition authorities and courts to proceed 
with more caution when mandating access to data. Because the value of data may extend 
beyond its current usages, duties to deal involving data should be limited to the specific data 
needed to remedy the competition problem caused by the refusal of the dominant firm. This 
way, possible effects outside the relevant markets at stake in a particular essential facilities 
case can be mitigated.  
LINK WITH DATA PROTECTION LAW - With regard to possible objective justifications for 
refusals to give access to data, the scope for ex ante and ex post efficiency defences seems 
limited. Instead, dominant firms may invoke obligations relating to the adequate protection of 
the personal data of users to justify a refusal to share data with competitors. If a duty to deal 
requires a dominant firm to give access to personal data of its users, competition authorities 
and courts should pay attention to the interaction of competition law with the data protection 
regime. The role of data protection interests in competition enforcement forms the focus of 
the third part of the thesis. 
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Part III: Data Protection Interests in Competition Enforcement 
LINKING COMPETITION AND DATA PROTECTION - The emergence of personal data as an asset for 
market players does not only raise competition issues but also leads to data protection 
considerations. The increasing importance of data in the digital economy reveals links 
between these two fields of law. It is important to note that not all issues involving the use of 
personal data by dominant firms or parties to a merger raise data protection concerns. For 
example, questions of whether data constitutes a barrier to entry or whether a market for data 
has to be defined form part of the usual competition analysis relating to online platforms. 
While such questions may raise novel issues in terms of the application of existing 
competition tools to new situations, they can be adequately addressed by competition 
authorities and courts without having to consider data protection interests. Such ‘mere’ 
competition issues are discussed in parts I and II and are not further explored here. The aim 
of part III of the PhD is rather to identify how the field of data protection interacts with 
competition law and to what extent such interests can or should be integrated in competition 
analysis. 
OUTLINE - To that end, it is first discussed how data protection can be defined and how these 
interests have become relevant to competition enforcement. Afterwards, the interaction 
between competition and data protection law is discussed. Issues to which attention is paid 
include an analysis of key data protection principles in relation to competition law, the effect 
of data protection regulation on competition and potential conflicts between the two legal 
regimes. With regard to the question of how data protection issues may be incorporated into 
competition analysis, it is analysed whether data protection can constitute a non-price 
parameter of competition and to what extent it can be protected as non-efficiency concern in 
competition policy. While chapter 8 takes a descriptive approach, the analysis in chapters 9 
and 10 provides more in-depth assessment of the potential for a greater role of data 
protection interests in competition cases. 
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8 How data protection has become relevant to competition enforcement 
 
8.1 Introduction 
ORIGIN OF THE DEBATE - In the past years, the interaction of competition law with data 
protection gained prominence in policy debates. As the role of data in the digital economy 
keeps increasing, mergers and certain types of conduct of dominant undertakings seem to 
have as objective the collection of additional information about consumers. These issues may 
not only lead to competition problems but also give rise to data protection concerns. Against 
this background, data protection advocates have been pleading for a greater role of data 
protection considerations in competition cases. 
OUTLINE - In section 2, the notions of data protection and privacy are analysed against the 
background of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Section 3 discusses how data protection started to attract attention in 
competition enforcement. The Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp mergers have 
played an important role in this regard. While the main focus is on the decisions of the 
European Commission in this chapter, the approach of the US Federal Trade Commission to 
these mergers is also discussed to allow for a comparative element in the analysis. 
 
8.2 Disentangling data protection and privacy 
EUROPEAN LEGAL PROVISIONS - In Europe, data protection and privacy are protected under the 
Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)1146 as well as under the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights)
1147
. Both legal instruments comprise a provision on privacy by providing for a right to 
respect for private and family life in Article 8 of the ECHR and in Article 7 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Whereas the Charter includes a separate right to data protection in 
Article 8, no such specific provision on data protection can be found in the ECHR. 
Nevertheless, by interpreting the right to privacy contained in Article 8 of the ECHR broadly, 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has held this article to include a right to 
data protection as well.
1148
 In the EU legal order, the right to data protection is not only 
recognised as a fundamental right in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which became 
legally binding as a source of primary EU law with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
in December 2009, but is also enshrined in Article 16 TFEU which was introduced in the 
Lisbon Treaty as the new legal basis for the adoption of secondary data protection legislation. 
The General Data Protection Regulation
1149
 which was adopted in April 2016 and will replace 
                                                 
1146
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended, 4 November 1950. 
1147
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391. 
1148
 See, for example, ECHR 16 February 2000, Amann v. Switzerland, No. 27798/95, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0216JUD002779895, par. 65 and ECHR 4 May 2000, Rotaru v. Romania, No. 28341/95, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0504JUD002834195, par. 43. 
1149
 Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1. 
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the current Data Protection Directive,
1150
 is based on Article 16 TFEU. The General Data 
Protection Regulation will apply from 25 May 2018 onwards.
1151
 
DEFINING DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY - In accordance with the wording of the right to 
privacy in the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the term privacy is used in 
this thesis to refer to the protection of one’s ‘private life’. In general, the notion of privacy is 
regarded as a concept that is difficult to define. Different descriptions of privacy can 
consequently be found in the literature.
1152
 Most notably, Warren and Brandeis referred to 
privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’ in their seminal US law review article of 1890,1153 
whereas Westin defined privacy as the right to control personal information being 
communicated to others
1154
. The latter description of privacy can be considered a predecessor 
of the principle of informational self-determination which originates from a ruling of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court relating to personal information collected during the 
1983 census.
1155
 The right to data protection as contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, in its turn, requires that personal data be processed fairly for specified purposes and 
on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or another legitimate basis laid down by 
law.
1156
 
DIFFERENTIATING DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY - Although the terms ‘data protection’ and 
‘privacy’ are sometimes used interchangeably, there are important differences between the 
two rights in terms of scope and substance. In general, the scope of the right to data protection 
is more limited than that of the right to privacy, since the right to data protection only comes 
into play if personal data is processed. The right to privacy, on the other hand, protects the 
private sphere of individuals irrespective of whether any processing of personal data is 
involved. At the same time, the scope of data protection is broader than the scope of privacy 
as far as the application of both rights to personal data is concerned. The right to data 
protection grants protection to all personal data and not only to data which is invasive of one’s 
private life as protected under the right to privacy. Private life does not necessarily include all 
information relating to identified or identifiable natural persons which is the definition of 
personal data under EU data protection legislation.
1157
  
                                                 
1150
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data 
Protection Directive) [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
1151
 Article 99(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
1152
 See for example, D.J. SOLOVE, "A Taxonomy of Privacy", University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2006, 
vol. 154, no. 3, (477), p. 479-482. 
1153
 S.D. WARREN AND L.D. BRANDEIS, "The Right to Privacy", Harvard Law Review 1890, vol. 4, no. 5, (193), 
p. 195. 
1154
 A.F. WESTIN, Privacy and Freedom, New York, Atheneum, 1967, p. 7. 
1155
 BVerfG 65, 1 - Volkszählung, 15.12.1983, available at http://openjur.de/u/268440.html.  
1156
 Article 8(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This provision also explicitly provides for a right of 
access to personal data and a right to have personal data rectified. 
1157
 Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive defines ‘personal data’ as ‘any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person’, and specifies that ‘an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to 
his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’. Article 4(1) of the General Data 
Protection Regulation similarly defines ‘personal data’ as ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person’ and specifies that ‘an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
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Difference in scope of the rights to data protection and privacy: 
 
In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights appears to require an additional element 
to be present in order for personal data to be included in the scope of private life.
1158
 In 
Rotaru, the European Court of Human Rights made clear that personal data concerning a 
person’s distant past that is systematically collected and stored falls within the scope of 
private life.
1159
 In the more recent M.M. case, the European Court of Human Rights argued 
that information about a criminal conviction or caution constitutes personal data but also 
becomes part of a person’s private life ‘as the conviction or caution itself recedes into the 
past’. In the case at hand, the administration of the caution occurred almost twelve years 
beforehand.
1160
 With respect to their substance, one could regard the right to privacy as giving 
rise to a negative duty to refrain from unlawfully interfering in the private life of individuals, 
while the right to data protection can be considered to bring about a positive duty to take 
measures in order to process personal data in a legitimate way. In this perspective, the Data 
Protection Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation grant individuals (referred to 
as ‘data subjects’)1161 whose personal data is being processed certain rights and lay down 
obligations of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality with which public 
authorities and private entities (known as ‘controllers’1162 or ‘processors’1163) have to comply 
                                                                                                                                                        
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, 
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity of that natural person’. 
1158
 As argued by J. KOKOTT AND C. SOBOTTA, "The Distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the 
Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR", International Data Privacy Law 2013, vol. 3, no. 4, (222), p. 224. 
1159
 ECHR 4 May 2000, Rotaru v. Romania, No. 28341/95, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0504JUD002834195, par. 43. 
1160
 ECHR 13 November 2012, M.M. v. the United Kingdom, No. 24029/07, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:1113JUD002402907, par. 188. 
1161
 Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive and Article 4(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation 
define a data subject as ‘an identified or identifiable natural person’. Hereafter, the terms ‘data subject’, 
‘individual’, ‘consumer’ and ‘user’ are used interchangeably. 
1162
 Article 2(d) of the Data Protection Directive and Article 4(7) of the General Data Protection Regulation 
define a ‘controller’ as ‘the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which, alone or 
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data’.  
1163
 Article 2(e) of the Data Protection Directive and Article 4(8) of the General Data Protection Regulation 
define a ‘processor’ as ‘a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller’. 
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when processing personal data. Most activities relating to personal data such as its collection, 
storage and analysis qualify as acts of processing.
1164
  
JUSTIFYING AN INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY - To prevent an interference with 
the right to data protection contained in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
personal data must be processed fairly, for specified purposes and on the basis of consent of 
the individual concerned or another legitimate legal basis. Yet, the act of processing of 
personal data may still be considered invasive of one’s private life under Article 7 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 8 of the ECHR. With regard to the relationship 
between these two instruments, Article 52(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights makes 
clear that rights contained in the Charter corresponding with those in the ECHR must be 
interpreted as having the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR.
1165
 As a 
result, when applying the right to privacy as protected by Article 7 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, regard should be had to the interpretation given to the corresponding 
Article 8 of the ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights. If a form of processing of 
personal data relates to one’s private life, there is an interference with the right to privacy 
which has to be justified in order to be lawful under the ECHR. A justification is examined in 
three steps under Article 8(2) of the ECHR: (1) the interference must be in accordance with 
the law (i.e. have a sufficient legal basis); (2) the interference must pursue a legitimate aim 
(i.e. one of the following admissible grounds mentioned in Article 8(2): national security, 
public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, 
the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others); and 
(3) the interference must be necessary in a democratic society (i.e. be proportional). 
Nevertheless, once an act of processing complies with the EU data protection rules, it is 
unlikely that a possible corresponding interference with the right to privacy cannot be 
justified.
1166
 For this reason, the analysis in this thesis mainly focuses on the relationship 
between EU data protection legislation and competition law.  
 
8.3 Rise of attention for data protection in competition enforcement 
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK AS STARTING POINT - The interaction of data protection with 
competition law started to gain attention from policy makers and academics after the 
announcement of Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick in 2007. The data protection 
concerns of the merger were in particular considered to relate to the concentration of user 
                                                 
1164
 Article 2(b) of the Data Protection Directive defines ‘processing of personal data’ as ‘any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, 
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction’. Article 4(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation defines ‘processing’ as ‘any operation or set 
of operations which is performed upon personal data or sets of personal data, whether or not by automated 
means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction’. 
1165
 The provision goes on to state that EU law is, however, not precluded from providing more extensive 
protection. 
1166
 J. KOKOTT AND C. SOBOTTA, "The Distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of 
the CJEU and the ECtHR", International Data Privacy Law 2013, vol. 3, no. 4, (222), p. 226. 
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information in the hands of Google after the acquisition. Most notably, Peter Swire argued in 
his testimony to the US Federal Trade Commission Town Hall Meeting on behavioural 
advertising that the combination of ‘deep’ information from Google on search behaviour of 
individuals with ‘broad’ information from DoubleClick on web-browsing behaviour of 
individuals could significantly reduce the quality of Google’s search engine for consumers 
with high privacy preferences.
1167
  
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION - Despite calls to 
oppose the Google/DoubleClick merger on the basis of privacy considerations,
1168
 the Federal 
Trade Commission made clear that it lacks legal authority to attach conditions to a merger 
that do not relate to antitrust. In its view, the sole purpose of merger review is to identify and 
remedy transactions that harm competition. That said, the Federal Trade Commission still 
investigated the possibility that Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick would adversely affect 
non-price attributes of competition including consumer privacy. It concluded, however, that 
the evidence did not support such a conclusion.
1169
 In particular, Google and DoubleClick 
were found not to be able to significantly affect each other’s prices or non-price product 
dimensions such as consumer privacy and service quality after the merger, because they were 
not regarded as competitors in the same relevant market.
1170
  
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION - The European 
Commission also argued that Google and DoubleClick were not exerting major competitive 
constraints on each other’s activities as a result of which they could not be considered as 
competitors at the moment of the proposed transaction.
1171
 Unlike the Federal Trade 
Commission, the European Commission did not refer to data protection as a non-price 
parameter of competition in this regard. Along similar lines to those of the Federal Trade 
Commission, the European Commission noted that its decision referred exclusively to the 
appraisal of the transaction with EU competition rules and was without prejudice to the 
obligations imposed on Google and DoubleClick by EU and national legislation in the field of 
data protection and privacy. In this regard, the European Commission expressly stated that: 
‘Irrespective of the approval of the merger, the new entity is obliged in its day to day business 
to respect the fundamental rights recognised by all relevant instruments to its users, namely 
but not limited to privacy and data protection’.1172 
 
                                                 
1167
 P. SWIRE, ‘Submitted Testimony to the Federal Trade Commission Behavioral Advertising Town Hall’, 18 
October 2007, p. 5, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/testimony_peterswire_/Testimony_peterswir
e_en.pdf.  
1168
 The term ‘privacy’ or ‘information privacy’ is used in the US instead of and in the meaning of the notion of 
‘data protection’ as developed in the EU. For that reason, the terms ‘privacy’ and ‘data protection’ are used 
interchangeably in this thesis when referring to the US context. 
1169
 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170, 20 December 
2007, p. 2-3, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220googledc-commstmt.pdf. 
1170
 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170, 20 December 
2007, p. 8 and footnote 7. 
1171
 Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par. 221. 
1172
 Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par. 368. 
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HARBOUR’S DISSENT - In response to the decision of the majority to close the US investigation 
into the Google/DoubleClick merger, then-Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour issued a 
dissenting statement in which she argued that the Federal Trade Commission could have 
relied on various theories to include privacy issues in its competition analysis of the 
transaction. She argued, for example, that consumer choice would decrease if network effects 
lead to a reduction in the number of competing search engines in the market. This would in 
turn diminish incentives of search engine providers to compete based on privacy 
protections.
1173
 In addition, she stated that the Federal Trade Commission could have 
                                                 
1173
 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-
0170, 20 December 2007, p. 10 and footnote 25, available at  
EU Google/DoubleClick merger decision:  
At the time of the proposed concentration, the two parties were engaged in the 
following relevant activities. Google operated an internet search engine, offered 
online advertising space on its own websites and provided intermediation services 
to publishers and advertisers for the sale of online advertising space on partner 
websites through its AdSense network. DoubleClick was mainly active in the sale 
of ad serving, management and reporting technology worldwide to website 
publishers, advertisers and advertising agencies.  
The Commission’s market investigation pointed out that Google and DoubleClick 
were not exerting a significant competitive constraint on each other’s activities. 
Therefore, the merger did not seem to significantly impede effective competition 
with regard to the elimination of actual competition. While it could not be excluded 
that DoubleClick would, absent the merger, have developed into an effective 
competitor of Google in the market for online ad intermediation, it was rather likely 
in the Commission’s view that a sufficient number of other competitors would be 
left in the market. As a result, sufficient competitive pressure would remain after 
the merger. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the elimination of 
DoubleClick as a potential competitor would not have an adverse impact on 
competition in that market.  
The Commission also analysed the potential effects of non-horizontal relationships 
between Google and DoubleClick. Concerns expressed by third parties involved 
foreclosure scenarios based on DoubleClick’s market position in ad serving, 
foreclosure scenarios based on Google’s market position in search advertising and 
online ad intermediation services, and foreclosure scenarios based on the 
combination of DoubleClick’s and Google’s databases on customer online 
behaviour. The Commission found that such types of foreclosure would be unlikely 
to occur. Even if such scenarios did occur, they would not result in a significant 
impediment to effective competition according to the Commission. With regard to 
the possible combination of data of Google and DoubleClick after the merger, the 
Commission stated that this would be very unlikely to bring more traffic to 
AdSense so as to squeeze out competitors and ultimately enable the merged entity 
to charge higher prices for its intermediation services.  
 
Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par. 4-5, 192, 221-222, 
278, 286-289, 329-332, 356-366.  
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conducted a fuller analysis of the data-related issues of the merger through the definition of ‘a 
putative relevant product market comprising data that may be useful to advertisers and 
publishers who wish to engage in behavioral targeting’.1174 She also suggested the Federal 
Trade Commission to mandate a firewall between the Google and DoubleClick data for some 
period of time to prevent potential anticompetitive effects.
1175
 In a subsequent law journal 
article, Pamela Jones Harbour and her former advisor Tara Isa Koslov further advanced a new 
approach towards market definition in ‘a Web 2.0 world’ which does not only rely on 
substitutability between existing products and technologies but also accounts for the 
emergence of new forms of competition. In order to start the process of making privacy 
cognisable under competition law, they proposed to define relevant product markets either 
around data, separate from the markets for the services built on the data, or around privacy as 
a dimension of competition.
1176
  
FACEBOOK/WHATSAPP - The debate about the role of data protection in competition analysis 
has continued since the Google/DoubleClick merger
1177
 and attracted renewed attention from 
the competition law community in the context of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp in 
2014. Both the US Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission approved the 
merger without obtaining any commitments from the parties. In the view of the European 
Commission, the acquisition of WhatsApp would not increase the amount of data potentially 
available to Facebook for advertising purposes because WhatsApp did not collect data 
valuable for advertising purposes at the time of the merger.
1178
 The European Commission 
still investigated possible theories of harm relating to data concentration to the extent that it 
was likely to strengthen Facebook’s position in the market for online advertising. In its 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the European Commission explicitly stated: ‘Any 
privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of data within the control 
of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall within the scope of the EU competition 
law rules but within the scope of the EU data protection rules’.1179  
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FTC:WATCH February 2008, no. 714, (1); J. BRILL, "The Intersection of Consumer Protection and Competition 
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of European Competition Law & Practice 2012, vol. 3, no. 3, (225).  
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The Federal Trade Commission did not address the data protection issues in its antitrust 
review of the merger either.
1180
 Instead, the director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection urged Facebook in a letter to keep to WhatsApp’s current 
privacy policy which gives users a higher level of protection with regard to the collection and 
use of their data than its own privacy statement. In addition, she made clear that both 
companies could be violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
1181
 if 
WhatsApp fails to honour its privacy promises.
1182
 
INITIATIVE OF THE EDPS - A final development that has moved forward the ongoing debate 
about the role of data protection in competition enforcement in the European Union, is the 
publication of a Preliminary Opinion on ‘Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big 
data’1183 by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)1184 in March 2014. The 
                                                 
1180
 The statement of the Federal Trade Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp has not been published as a result of 
which the exact substance of the analysis under US antitrust standards remains unclear. 
1181
 Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45), ‘unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’ are unlawful. Failure to 
keep promises made about data protection may constitute a deceptive practice and use of data in a manner 
inconsistent with promises made at the time the data was collected may qualify as an unfair practice. Both acts 
fall within the consumer protection competencies of the Federal Trade Commission. 
1182
 Letter From JESSICA L. RICH, Director of the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, to 
Erin Egan, Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook, and to Anne Hoge, General Counsel, WhatsApp Inc., 10 April 
2014, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/297701/140410facebookwhatappltr.pdf.  
1183
 PRELIMINARY OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in 
the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the 
Digital Economy’, March 2014. 
EU Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision:  
The Facebook/WhatsApp investigation of the European Commission covered three 
areas: consumer communications services, social networking services and online 
advertising services. With regard to the relevant market for consumer 
communications services, the Commission found that Facebook Messenger and 
WhatsApp were not close competitors and that consumers would continue to have a 
wide choice of alternative communications apps after the transaction. The 
Commission did not take a final view on the existence and the still evolving 
boundaries of a potential market for social networking services and concluded that, 
irrespective of the exact market borders, Facebook and WhatsApp were only distant 
competitors given the differences between the functionalities and focus of their 
services. In the area of online advertising services, the Commission argued that the 
merger would not raise competition concerns even if Facebook would introduce 
targeted advertising on WhatsApp or start collecting data from WhatsApp users 
with a view to improving the accuracy of the targeted ads served on Facebook’s 
social networking platform. In the Commission’s view, there would continue to be 
a sufficient number of alternative providers to Facebook for the supply of targeted 
advertising after the merger, and a large amount of internet user data that are 
valuable for advertising purposes were not within Facebook's exclusive control. 
 
Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, par. 101-115, 146-158, 
172-179 and 184-189. 
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Preliminary Opinion and subsequent events organised by the EDPS
1185
 have launched a more 
in-depth discussion of how the fields of data protection, competition law and consumer 
protection intersect in the digital economy. The initiative is hoped to stimulate a further 
dialogue between regulators and experts to explore the scope for closer coordination among 
the competent EU institutions in the three different areas of law.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY IN THE TWO EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDERS - In Europe, data 
protection and privacy are protected in the legal order of the Council of Europe as well as the 
European Union. Within the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg oversees the implementation of the ECHR which provides for a right to respect for 
private and family life in Article 8. This provision has been interpreted by the European Court 
of Human Rights to also comprise a right to data protection. In the European Union, privacy 
and data protection are included as separate rights in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduced Article 16 TFEU which forms 
the new legal basis for the adoption of secondary data protection legislation on the EU level. 
While the Data Protection Directive is still applicable at the moment, it is going to be replaced 
by the General Data Protection Regulation that will apply from 25 May 2018 onwards. The 
rights to data protection and privacy are not identical as regards scope and substance. 
However, if a certain form of processing of personal data conforms to EU secondary data 
protection rules, a potential parallel interference with the right to privacy will likely be 
justifiable under the ECHR.  
STATE OF THE DEBATE - Despite calls from data protection advocates to consider data 
protection issues in the merger analysis of the Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp 
acquisitions, the US Federal Trade Commission as well as the European Commission made 
clear that merger review in principle takes place on the basis of the competition rules and that 
data protection-related concerns should rather be resolved under data protection law. 
Nevertheless, the debate about the proper role of data protection in competition cases is being 
continued at both sides of the Atlantic by former US Federal Trade Commissioner Pamela 
Jones Harbour and the EDPS in particular.  
                                                                                                                                                        
1184
 The EDPS is the independent supervisory authority which oversees the data processing activities of the EU 
institutions and provides the EU institutions with advice on data protection issues. 
1185
 In 2014 and 2015, several events were organised by or in collaboration with the EDPS (see 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/Consultation/big_data) including a workshop in the European 
Parliament on ‘Privacy, Consumers, Competition and Big Data’ on 2 June 2014; a Privacy Platform organised by 
Member of European Parliament Sophie in ‘t Veld on ‘Privacy and Competition in the Digital Economy’ on 21 
January 2015; a seminar entitled ‘Antitrust, Privacy & Big Data’ organised by Concurrences and Cadwalader, 
Wickersham & Taft LLP on 3 February 2015; and a workshop held by the EDPS and the European Academy of 
Law entitled ‘Competition Rebooted: Enforcement and Personal Data in Digital Markets’ on 24 September 
2015.  
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9 Identifying the interaction between competition and data protection law  
 
9.1 Introduction 
FOCUS OF THE ANALYSIS - Several links between competition and data protection law can be 
identified. Instead of focusing on procedural aspects, attention is paid in this chapter to how 
the two legal fields interact in terms of the substance of their respective obligations. The 
interface is examined from the viewpoint of competition law in the sense that the impact of 
the rise of attention for data protection concerns on competition enforcement forms the basis 
of the analysis.  
OUTLINE - In section 2, the main data protection principles and their enforcement are 
discussed by comparing them to relevant notions in competition law. Afterwards, the effect of 
data protection regulation on competition is analysed in section 3. Section 4 focuses on the 
question of whether and how data protection can be considered as constituting a non-price 
parameter of competition. Finally, potential conflicts between competition and data protection 
law are outlined in section 5. 
 
9.2 Key data protection principles and their enforcement in relation to competition 
law  
As an introduction to the more substantive analysis of how EU data protection and 
competition law interact, it is instructive to have a look at the key data protection principles 
and how they are enforced. This allows for a comparison with relevant concepts and 
enforcement mechanisms of EU competition law. 
 
9.2.1 From consent and purpose limitation to substitutability 
DEFINING CONSENT - One of the main notions of EU data protection law is the principle of 
lawful processing which forms the first of the so-called data quality requirements contained in 
Article 6(1) of the current Data Protection Directive and Article 5(1) of the future General 
Data Protection Regulation. The principle of lawful processing requires that the processing of 
personal data has to take place on the basis of a legitimate ground.
1186
 The most commonly 
used legal ground to lawfully process personal data in the context of digital services is by 
obtaining consent from the individual whose data will be processed. Article 2(h) of the Data 
Protection Directive defines consent as ‘any freely given specific and informed indication of 
his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him 
being processed’. Under Article 4(11) of the General Data Protection Regulation, consent is 
defined as ‘any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data 
subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies 
                                                 
1186
 Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive and Article 6(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation specify 
the legal grounds for lawful processing of personal data. 
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agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her’.1187 The application of 
such a key data protection concept as consent is difficult in concentrated markets where 
consumers are often confronted with take-it-or-leave-it offers and do not have a real choice 
but to accept the terms and conditions if they want to use a particular service.  
CONSENT AS A GENUINE AND FREE CHOICE IN CONCENTRATED MARKETS - Due to the existence 
of network effects, the markets in which online businesses compete are typically characterised 
by the presence of only a few firms that have a rather large market share. Individual control 
over personal data is becoming illusory when dominant companies are able to impose their 
practices on individuals by exploiting information asymmetries. Even though EU consumer 
protection legislation, in particular the Consumer Rights Directive, requires traders to provide 
consumers with relevant information on the main characteristics of a service before entering 
into a contract,
1188
 consumers are often not fully aware to what extent and for what purposes 
the personal information they reveal by using a certain service is processed. This may result 
into an imbalance of power between individuals and providers of online services which calls 
into question the existence of a genuine choice for data subjects whether or not to give their 
consent to a particular form of processing of personal data.
1189
 Since consent has to result 
from a free choice, its validity may be challenged when there is a limited number of providers 
in the market or when one provider is dominant.
1190
  
POSSIBLE ROLE FOR COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT IN FACILITATING CHOICE - The increased 
attention from data protection advocates for competition enforcement seems to stem from the 
concentrated nature of online markets which may reduce possibilities for users to exercise 
effective control over their personal data. Against this background, it is argued that strong 
competition enforcement could render data protection rules more effective by increasing 
competition in concentrated markets and by facilitating genuine consumer choice.
1191
 
However, a high level of concentration in itself is not a reason for competition authorities to 
intervene in a market. The application of competition law is only triggered in the presence of 
actual, proven competition problems. 
                                                 
1187
 Article 7 of the General Data Protection Regulation lays down specific conditions for consent. For a detailed 
analysis of the concept of consent, see E. KOSTA, Consent in European Data Protection Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2013. 
1188
 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights 
(Consumer Rights Directive) [2011] OJ L 304/64 requires traders to provide consumers in a clear and 
comprehensible manner with information on, for instance and as relevant for digital services: the main 
characteristics of the services (Article 6(1)(a)); the functionality, including applicable technical protection 
measures, of digital content (Article 6(1)(r)); and any relevant interoperability of digital content with hardware 
and software that the trader is aware of or can reasonably be expected to have been aware of (Article 6(1)(s)). 
1189
 PRELIMINARY OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in 
the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the 
Digital Economy’, March 2014, par. 79. 
1190
 For a detailed discussion of the requirements that have to be met for consent to be valid, see ARTICLE 29 
WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’, WP 187, 13 July 2011, p. 11-26. For example, 
the Article 29 Working Party has held that reliance on consent in the employment context where there may be a 
situation of subordination ‘should be confined to cases where the worker has a genuine free choice and is 
subsequently able to withdraw the consent without detriment’. See ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 
8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context’, WP 48, 13 September 2001, p. 23. 
1191
 C. KUNER, F.H. CATE, C. MILLARD, et al., "When two worlds collide: the interface between competition law 
and data protection", International Data Privacy Law 2014, vol. 4, no. 4, (247), p. 247. 
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PURPOSE LIMITATION PRINCIPLE - Another concept that lies at the heart of EU data protection 
law is the so-called ‘purpose limitation’ principle which sets the boundaries within which 
personal data collected for a particular purpose may be processed and put to further use. The 
principle of purpose limitation is designed to offer a balanced approach that aims to reconcile 
the need for predictability and legal certainty of data subjects on the one hand, and the need 
for some flexibility for controllers on the other hand.
1192
 In accordance with Article 6(1)(b) of 
the Data Protection Directive and Article 5(1)(b) of the General Data Protection Regulation, 
the principle consists of two components: (1) personal data must be ‘collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes’ (notion of purpose specification); and (2) once collected, 
personal data must not be ‘further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those 
purposes’ (notion of compatible use). 
NOTION OF PURPOSE SPECIFICATION - The notion of purpose specification requires that the 
purpose of the processing activities be precisely identified and clearly revealed, explained or 
expressed to data subjects before the processing of personal data starts. In addition, the 
purpose must be legitimate. This requirement of legitimacy goes beyond the need to have a 
legal ground for processing under Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive and Article 6(1) 
of the General Data Protection Regulation. Legitimacy under the notion of purpose 
specification extends to other areas of law such as non-discrimination and has to be 
interpreted within the context of the processing which determines the reasonable expectations 
of the data subject. Purpose specification is a prerequisite for other data quality requirements 
including adequacy, relevance and proportionality of personal data (Article 6(1)(c) of the Data 
Protection Directive and Article 5(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulation), accuracy 
of personal data (Article 6(1)(d) of the Data Protection Directive and Article 5(1)(d) of the 
General Data Protection Regulation) and the requirement that personal data has to be kept in 
an identifiable form for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data was 
collected (Article 6(1)(e) of the Data Protection Directive and Article 5(1)(e) of the General 
Data Protection Regulation).
1193
 The General Data Protection Regulation adds a sixth data 
quality requirement relating to integrity and confidentiality of personal data in Article 5(1)(f). 
NOTION OF COMPATIBLE USE - The notion of compatible use entails that in each situation 
where further processing of personal data is considered, a distinction has to be made between 
additional uses that are compatible with the original purpose, and other uses which are 
incompatible and therefore unlawful.
1194
 The fact that further processing of personal data is 
allowed as long as it is not incompatible with the original purpose for which the data was 
collected indicates that the legislator may have intended to provide for some degree of 
flexibility with regard to further use. Compatibility is a complex issue which needs to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account all relevant circumstances. Due to the 
lack of a harmonised interpretation, the notion of compatible use has been applied in 
                                                 
1192
 ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’, WP 203, 2 April 2013, p. 5. 
1193
 ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’, WP 203, 2 April 2013, p. 38-39. 
1194
 For a further analysis of the notion of compatible use as well as of the purpose limitation principle and the 
notion of purpose specification, see EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, Handbook on European data protection law, 2014, p. 68-70, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_data_protection_ENG.pdf. 
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divergent ways in the different Member States.
1195
 In order to reduce inconsistencies, the 
Article 29 Working Party proposed some key factors that should be considered when 
conducting a compatibility assessment such as the context in which the personal data have 
been collected, the reasonable expectations of data subjects as to the further use of their 
personal data, the nature of the personal data in question, the impact of the further processing 
on data subjects and the safeguards adopted by the controller to protect the data subject.
1196
 
Some of these factors have been codified in Article 6(4) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation which lays down five specific elements a controller should consider when 
ascertaining whether further processing is compatible with the original purpose for which the 
data was collected. This provision is applicable to situations where the processing is not based 
on the data subject’s consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a 
necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard certain objectives 
including national security, defence and public security. In these cases, the controller should 
take into account in its compatibility assessment: (a) any link between the purposes for which 
the data has been collected and the purposes of the intended further processing; (b) the 
context in which the personal data has been collected, in particular regarding the relationship 
between data subjects and the controller; (c) the nature of the personal data, in particular 
whether special categories of personal data are processed or whether data related to criminal 
convictions and offences is processed; (d) the possible consequences of the intended further 
processing for data subjects; and (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards which may 
include encryption or pseudonymisation. 
COMPATIBLE USE VERSUS SUBSTITUTABILITY - In its Preliminary Opinion on ‘Privacy and 
competitiveness in the age of big data’, the EDPS makes a link between the notion of 
compatible use in data protection law and the concept of substitutability as applied in 
competition cases to define relevant product markets. If a company collects personal data for 
the purpose of providing a service in one market and decides to further process the data in 
order to launch another service in a different market, this may, in the view of the EDPS, be an 
indication that the further processing is incompatible with the initial purpose for which the 
personal data was collected. In other words, if the two services are not substitutable from a 
competition law perspective and thus cannot be included in the same relevant market, it is 
argued that competition analysis would support the finding of a possible breach of data 
protection law.
1197
 However, the notion of compatibility in data protection law seems wider 
than the concept of substitutability in competition law. While application of the competition 
law concept of substitutability may indicate that personal data are being processed for distinct 
purposes, this does not imply that the further processing is incompatible with the original 
purpose for which the personal data was collected. As the Article 29 Working Party makes 
clear, a change of purpose may be permissible and further processing of personal data may be 
considered compatible in situations where the expectations of society or of the data subjects 
                                                 
1195
 ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’, WP 203, 2 April 2013, p. 5 and 21. 
1196
 ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’, WP 203, 2 April 2013, p. 23-27. 
1197
 PRELIMINARY OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in 
the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the 
Digital Economy’, March 2014, par. 23 and 58. 
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themselves have changed about what additional use the data may be put to.
1198
 A 
substitutability test in analogy to competition law thus cannot fully replace a compatibility 
assessment under data protection law. If the services are considered not to be substitutable 
from a competition law perspective, an additional analysis still has to be conducted in order to 
assess whether the further processing has to be deemed incompatible with the original 
purpose taking into account all relevant circumstances. 
 
9.2.2 Comparing the enforcement mechanisms of EU data protection and competition law 
ENFORCEMENT OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW - Unlike the EU competition enforcement 
mechanism which consists in joint application and enforcement of the EU competition rules 
by the European Commission and national competition authorities,
1199
 enforcement of data 
protection law solely takes place at the national level. Although the national data protection 
authorities of all Member States cooperate in the framework of the current Article 29 
Working Party,
1200
 each authority takes decisions on the basis of national data protection law 
that only take effect in its own territory. In accordance with Articles 22 to 24 of the Data 
Protection Directive, the Member States have set out appropriate remedies and sanctions in 
national law against unlawful processing of personal data and against any act incompatible 
with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. Since the Member States have 
been given a significant degree of discretion as regards applicable remedies, liability and 
sanctions when transposing the provisions of the Data Protection Directive into national law, 
there are considerable divergences among the Member States with regard to the enforcement 
mechanisms that are used to address violations of data protection principles in the EU.  
NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO GOOGLE’S PRIVACY POLICY UPDATE - As 
an illustration, reference can be made to the investigations into Google’s privacy policy 
update announced in March 2012. After the French data protection authority started a 
preliminary investigation on behalf of all data protection authorities in the EU,
1201
 several 
national authorities decided to launch national investigations on the basis of their own local 
data protection laws. These investigations have led to different outcomes. While the Dutch 
data protection authority imposed an incremental penalty payment on Google in December 
2014 for combining personal data from different Google services without obtaining 
unambiguous consent from users to do so, the data protection authority from the United 
Kingdom did not impose a sanction but required Google to sign a formal undertaking to 
                                                 
1198
 ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’, WP 203, 2 April 2013, p. 21. 
1199
 Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 states that the competition authorities of the Member States have the power to 
apply Article 101 and 102 TFEU in individual cases. 
1200
 The Article 29 Working Party was set up under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive and is composed 
of a representative from the national data protection authority of each EU Member State, a representative of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (the independent supervisory authority that is responsible for ensuring that 
all EU institutions and bodies respect people’s right to personal data protection and privacy when processing 
their personal data) and a representative of the European Commission.  
1201
 See Press Release Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), ‘Google's new privacy 
policy : incomplete information and uncontrolled combination of data across services’, 16 October 2012, 
available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/googles-new-privacy-policy-incomplete-
information-and-uncontrolled-combination-of-data-across-ser/.  
292 
 
improve the information it provides to users about how it collects personal data.
1202
 Even 
though national data protection authorities may join forces to investigate alleged data 
protection breaches of companies operating on an EU-wide basis, they still act as separate 
entities taking their own decisions as a result of which a company has to comply with 
individual recommendations from each Member State’s data protection authority. 
ENFORCEMENT OF EU COMPETITION LAW - This is different in competition law which relies on 
joint enforcement of the EU competition rules by the European Commission and the national 
competition authorities through the European Competition Network. In this regard, Article 
3(1) of Regulation 1/2003
1203
 provides that national competition authorities should also apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to, on the one hand, agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and, on 
the other hand, abuses prohibited by Article 102 TFEU.
1204
 With respect to the cooperation 
between the European Commission and the national competition authorities, Article 11(6) of 
Regulation 1/2003 states that the initiation of a competition law proceeding by the 
Commission relieves the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to 
apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In addition, Article 13(1) of Regulation 1/2003 lays down 
that once one competition authority is dealing with a particular competition issue under 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU, this shall be sufficient grounds for the others to suspend 
proceedings or to reject a complaint against the same agreement, decision of an association or 
practice. In the area of merger review, a so-called ‘one-stop-shop’ system is applied whereby 
the European Commission has exclusive competence to assess concentrations with a 
Community dimension.
1205
 Article 21(3) of the EU Merger Regulation provides that no 
Member State shall apply its national competition rules to any concentration that has a 
Community dimension. Concentrations that fall below the Community dimension turnover 
thresholds are, in principle, subject to national merger control. However, if a concentration 
that does not have a Community dimension is capable of being reviewed under the national 
competition laws of at least three Member States, the undertakings concerned may request the 
European Commission to examine the merger. Once the Commission accepts to assess the 
concentration, it is deemed to have a Community dimension as a result of which the Member 
States are relieved of their competence to review the merger under their own national 
competition laws.
1206
 
                                                 
1202
 Press Release Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Google to change privacy policy after ICO 
investigation’, 30 January 2015, available at https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-
blogs/2015/01/google-to-change-privacy-policy-after-ico-investigation/.  
1203
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Regulation 1/2003) [2003] OJ L1/1. 
1204
 It is important to note that Member States are not ‘precluded from adopting and applying on their territory 
stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings’ under Article 
3(2) of Regulation 1/2003. In other words, national competition law may diverge from the EU competition rules 
by having stricter national equivalents to Article 102 TFEU. 
1205
 Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (EU Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1 lays down the turnover thresholds that have to 
be met in order for a concentration to have a Community dimension. 
1206
 Article 4(5) of the EU Merger Regulation. 
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NEW ONE-STOP-SHOP MECHANISM OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW - By laying down a single set 
of rules for the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation will bring about changes in the 
enforcement of data protection rules. Several new features are introduced by the Regulation 
which are expected to strengthen the enforcement of EU data protection law. Apart from 
setting out concrete measures to facilitate cooperation among national data protection 
authorities and to ensure consistency of application of EU data protection rules,
1207
 the 
Regulation also provides for a one-stop-shop mechanism in cases where the controller or 
processor is established in more than one Member State. The objective of the one-stop-shop 
system is to increase the consistent application of EU data protection law and to reduce the 
administrative burden for controllers and processors. In accordance with Article 56(1) of the 
General Data Protection Regulation, the national data protection authority of the main 
establishment or of the single establishment of the controller or processor is competent to act 
as lead supervisory authority for the cross-border processing of this controller of 
processor.
1208
 As Article 4(23)(a) and (b) makes clear, cross-border processing of personal 
data means either ‘processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the 
activities of establishments in more than one Member State of a controller or processor in the 
Union where the controller or processor is established in more than one Member State’ or 
‘processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of a single 
establishment of a controller or processor in the Union but which substantially affects or is 
likely to substantially affect data subjects in more than one Member State’. The lead 
supervisory authority will, in the wording of Article 56(6) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation, be ‘the sole interlocutor of the controller or processor for the cross-border 
processing carried by that controller or processor’. Nevertheless, each national data 
protection authority is still competent to deal with a complaint lodged with it or to deal with a 
possible infringement of the Regulation in case the subject matter relates only to an 
establishment in its Member State or substantially affects data subjects only in its Member 
State.
1209
 The national data protection authority at issue then has to inform the lead 
supervisory authority and may submit a draft for a decision which the latter has to take utmost 
account of when preparing the draft decision referred to in Article 60(3) of the General Data 
Protection Regulation.
1210
 If the lead supervisory authority decides not to handle the case, the 
national data protection authority which informed the lead supervisory authority has to deal 
with it.
1211
  
                                                 
1207
 Articles 60 to 67 of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
1208
 According to Article 4(16)(a) and (b) of the General Data Protection Regulation, main establishment means: 
‘as regards a controller with establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central 
administration in the Union, unless the decisions on the purposes and means of the processing of personal data 
are taken in another establishment of the controller in the Union and the latter establishment has the power to 
have such decisions implemented, in which case the establishment having taken such decisions is to be 
considered to be the main establishment’and ‘as regards a processor with establishments in more than one 
Member State, the place of its central administration in the Union, or, if the processor has no central 
administration in the Union, the establishment of the processor in the Union where the main processing 
activities in the context of the activities of an establishment of the processor take place to the extent that the 
processor is subject to specific obligations under this Regulation’. 
1209
 Article 56(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
1210
 Article 56(3) and (4) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
1211
 Article 56(5) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
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NEW CONSISTENCY MECHANISM OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW - Where the lead supervisory 
authority decides to deal with the case, the cooperation procedure of Article 60 of the General 
Data Protection Regulation applies according to which the lead supervisory authority has to 
cooperate with the other concerned national data protection authorities in an endeavor to reach 
consensus.
1212
 In particular, in line with Article 60(4) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation, the consistency mechanism set out in Articles 63, 64 and 65 applies if any of the 
other concerned national data protection authorities expresses a relevant and reasoned 
objection
1213
 to the draft decision of the lead supervisory authority and the latter does not 
follow the objection or is of the opinion it is not relevant and reasoned. The consistency 
mechanism requires that the European Data Protection Board (which will replace the current 
Article 29 Working Party) is given the opportunity to issue an opinion on such draft measures 
which the lead supervisory authority is considering to adopt.
1214
 The European Data 
Protection Board will consist of the head of one national data protection authority of each 
Member State and of the European Data Protection Supervisor.
1215
 The European 
Commission will also designate a representative and has the right to participate in the 
activities and meetings of the European Data Protection Board without voting right.
1216
 In 
case a national data protection authority has expressed a relevant and reasoned objection to a 
draft decision of the lead supervisory authority and the lead authority has rejected an 
objection as not being relevant and/or reasoned, the European Data Protection Board will 
adopt a binding decision.
1217
 The lead supervisory authority will then adopt its final decision 
on the basis of the decision of the European Data Protection Board and notify it to the 
controller or the processor.
1218
  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS IN EU DATA PROTECTION LAW - In 
principle, one single national data protection authority (the authority of the main 
                                                 
1212
 Under Article 4(22) of the General Data Protection Regulation, a national data protection authority is 
concerned by a certain form of processing of personal data if ‘(a) the controller or processor is established on 
the territory of the Member State of that supervisory authority; (b) data subjects residing in the Member State of 
that supervisory authority are substantially affected or likely to be substantially affected by the processing; or 
(c) a complaint has been lodged with that supervisory authority’. 
1213
 Article 4(24) of the General Data Protection Regulation defines ‘relevant and reasoned objection’ as ‘an 
objection to a draft decision as to whether there is an infringement of this Regulation, or whether envisaged 
action in relation to the controller or processor complies with this Regulation, which clearly demonstrates the 
significance of the risks posed by the draft decision as regards the fundamental rights and freedoms of data 
subjects and, where applicable, the free flow of personal data within the Union’. 
1214
 The consistency mechanism is also applicable whenever a competent national data protection authority 
intends to adopt one of the specific measures listed in Article 64(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation. In 
addition, as made clear in Article 64(2), any national data protection authority, the Chair of the European Data 
Protection Board or the European Commission may request that any matter of general application or producing 
effects in more than one Member State be examined by the European Data Protection Board with a view to 
obtaining an opinion. 
1215
 Article 68(3) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
1216
 Article 68(5) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
1217
 Article 65(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulation. In line with Article 65(1)(b) and (c), the 
European Data Protection Board will also adopt a binding decision where there are conflicting views on which of 
the concerned national data protection authorities is competent for the main establishment and where a 
competent national data protection authority does not request the opinion of the European Data Protection Board 
in the cases mentioned in Article 64(1) or does not follow the opinion of the European Data Protection Board 
issued under Article 64. 
1218
 Article 65(6) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
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establishment of the controller or processor (i.e. the lead supervisory authority)) will thus 
become competent under the General Data Protection Regulation for monitoring the 
processing of personal data and for taking the related decisions as far as the cross-border 
processing of personal data is concerned. At the same time, the General Data Protection 
Regulation gives each national data protection authority, other than the lead supervisory 
authority, the competence to deal with complaints lodged with it or to take action against 
possible infringements only involving an establishment in its Member State or substantially 
affecting data subjects only in its Member State. In practice, controllers and processors may 
thus still have to deal with more than one national data protection authority which reduces the 
effectiveness of the one-stop-shop enforcement mechanism. The main difference with the 
enforcement of EU competition law will persist after the entry into force of the General Data 
Protection Regulation, namely that the European Commission does not have the competence 
to take action and adopt measures under EU data protection law. However, the Commission is 
involved in the European Data Protection Board which, as discussed above, can take binding 
decisions in case of disagreement between national data protection authorities. Since it does 
not have a voting right in the European Data Protection Board, it remains to be seen to what 
extent the Commission can improve the uniformity in the application and strengthen the 
enforcement of the EU data protection rules after the entry into force of the General Data 
Protection Regulation. 
FINES - Unlike the Data Protection Directive which left the exact scope of applicable 
enforcement mechanisms largely to the discretion of the Member States, the provisions of the 
General Data Protection Regulation are much more detailed as regards remedies, liability and 
sanctions. Particular attention deserves Article 83 which requires national data protection 
authorities to impose administrative fines on anyone who does not comply with any of the 
data protection obligations contained in the Regulation. Depending on the exact obligation 
that is violated, the fines amount to up to either 10 million euro and in case of an undertaking 
up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover (whichever is higher), or 20 million euro and 
in case of an undertaking up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover (whichever is 
higher).
1219
 The maximum height of these fines is significantly lower than the ones applicable 
in EU competition cases where the European Commission is entitled to levy fines up to 10% 
of the total turnover for a breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.
1220
 Nevertheless, the fact that 
fines can be imposed under the General Data Protection Regulation by national data 
protection authorities for data protection breaches is hoped to improve compliance with EU 
data protection rules. 
 
9.3 Effect of data protection regulation on competition 
DATA PROTECTION AS A BURDEN ON COMPETITION - When analysing the link between data 
protection and competition, it is also important to consider any possible competitive impact of 
data protection regulation. Since personal data is a vital input of production for many internet 
players, strict data protection rules place a burden on these market players. The imposition of 
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further limits on the collection and use of personal information will restrict the freedom of 
internet companies to develop services building on user data as they wish and to gain revenue 
through the provision of targeted advertisements. As a result, such additional limits may force 
internet companies to charge consumers a monetary fee for the use of their services instead of 
letting them pay with their personal data.
1221
 Since consumers have heterogeneous preferences 
with regard to data protection, an overly strict data protection regime may not only harm 
competition but also innovation by banning future products or services from the market that 
would have been valued by consumers who are less sensitive to data protection issues.
1222
  
STRICT DATA PROTECTION RULES MAY CONSOLIDATE MARKETS AND LIMIT CHOICE - Although a 
higher level of data protection may benefit consumers by limiting possibilities for exploitation 
of personal information,
1223
 an increase in protection may also weaken competition in the 
market. Assuming that new entrants need access to data in order to become viable 
competitors, stricter data protection rules relating to the purchase and use of personal 
information could increase barriers to entry.
1224
 For instance, rules prohibiting the transfer or 
sale of personal information between companies would lead to the situation that each market 
player has to collect the necessary data organically. This may reduce the ability of new firms 
to successfully enter the market, since they would not be able to buy the data they need to 
compete with incumbents. In addition, data protection rules that only permit sharing and 
disclosure of personal information within a single company may create incentives for 
undertakings to circumvent such limits by vertically integrating their business and by 
engaging in acquisitions that would otherwise be unattractive.
1225
 This will facilitate 
consolidation and favour large market players which potentially diminishes consumer 
choice.
1226
 
NEED FOR BALANCED DATA PROTECTION REGULATION - On the one hand, strong data 
protection rules may harm consumer welfare by limiting firms in their ability to improve the 
quality of their services, by restricting possibilities to monetise user data and by letting 
advertisers forego potential cost reductions resulting from better targeting possibilities. 
Ultimately, the decrease in advertising costs ensuing from more effective targeting could 
directly benefit consumers in the form of lower prices for advertised products and services. 
On the other hand, weak data protection rules may harm consumer welfare because 
consumers have to incur the costs of disclosing their personal information and being tracked 
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for commercial purposes. Eventually, consumers may start to distrust internet services due to 
data protection concerns and reduce their online activities.
1227
 The overall effect of data 
protection regulation on consumer welfare thus remains ambiguous and can only be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis. Economic theory does not provide an answer to the issue of what 
level of data protection is optimal from a consumer welfare perspective in general. Economic 
findings to this end can only be used in individual cases.
1228
 The only broad conclusion that 
can be drawn is that a balanced level of data protection regulation is necessary which 
addresses proven data protection harm while also providing consumers with the benefits of a 
competitive market.
1229
 In other words, room should be made for differentiation, for example 
by providing consumers with a baseline level of data protection by way of regulation and 
enabling them to transact for additional data protection with individual market players.
1230
  
ADDRESSING EXTERNALITIES AND BEHAVIOURAL BIASES - A minimum level of data protection 
is particularly desirable for addressing possible externalities and persistent behavioural biases. 
Externalities are a form of market failure whereby an individual who reveals personal 
information does not take into account the positive or negative impact of his or her disclosure 
on other individuals (in case of shared preferences within a group of family or friends) or 
even on society at large (for instance by using data to improve existing services and develop 
new ones).
1231
 In addition, due to behavioural biases consumers do not always act rationally 
and may make decisions that are not in their own long-term interest.
1232
 Both of these 
phenomena justify a certain level of data protection regulation.
1233
 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES RELATING TO DATA PROTECTION - Since the ability to collect, 
analyse and monetise data is critical to the success of undertakings operating in the online 
environment, differences in data protection legislation between EU Member States and at the 
international level may result into competitive advantages for companies that are subject to 
less strict data protection rules. This is presuming that companies will use the opportunities 
available under data protection law to collect and process personal data.
1234
 Although 
competition to achieve a higher level of data protection is conceivable in theory and privacy-
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friendly alternatives for online services such as search engines are becoming increasingly 
available, the market for privacy-enhancing services in the digital economy in general remains 
rather undeveloped.
1235
 
CREATING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR DATA PROTECTION IN THE EU - The General Data 
Protection Regulation is hoped to achieve a better level playing field between the different EU 
Member States. Differences in data protection standards across the EU enable companies to 
commercially exploit personal data to varying degrees and limit their market opportunities in 
different ways depending on the strictness of the rules that are applicable to them.
1236
 As 
made clear in recital 7 of the Data Protection Directive and recital 9 of the General Data 
Protection Regulation, differences in the level of protection afforded to the processing of 
personal data in the Member States may constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of economic 
activities at the EU level and distort competition. The General Data Protection Regulation is 
expected to reduce legal fragmentation between Member States and to contribute to the 
functioning of the internal market by facilitating the free flow of personal data throughout the 
Union.
1237
 Since the new EU data protection rules are contained in a Regulation instead of a 
Directive, they will be directly applicable in all Member States in accordance with Article 288 
TFEU without the need for national implementing legislation. At the same time, the General 
Data Protection Regulation comprises a number of open-ended clauses and even provisions 
giving Member States the freedom to adopt specific provisions at the national level to apply 
the rules contained in the Regulation.
1238
 For instance, according to Article 6(2) Member 
States may, for certain processing situations, maintain or introduce more specific provisions 
and other measures to ensure lawful and fair processing under the General Data Protection 
Regulation. To ensure that such provisions do not give rise to fragmentation between Member 
States and result into forum-shopping by controllers and processors of personal data, the role 
of the European Data Protection Board in developing a common approach towards the 
application and enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation is vital. 
CREATING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN EU- AND NON-EU DATA CONTROLLERS - As 
regards the level playing field between European and non-European countries, the General 
Data Protection Regulation is more likely to improve the status quo because of its wider 
geographic scope. The current Data Protection Directive applies to processing of personal 
data carried out in the context of a controller’s EU establishment or, in case the controller is 
not established in EU territory, through the use of equipment situated in the EU.
1239
 Yet, the 
future General Data Protection Regulation can also be applicable if neither the controller, nor 
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its equipment is situated in the EU. The processing of personal data of data subjects who are 
in the EU is caught by the General Data Protection Regulation as soon as the processing 
activities are related to the offering of goods or services to such data subjects, irrespective of 
whether a payment of the data subject is required, or to the monitoring of their behaviour as 
far as their behaviour takes place within the European Union.
1240
 As a result, online 
businesses active in the EU will be subject to EU data protection rules even though they are 
based outside the Union. 
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF EU COMPETITION LAW - The General Data Protection Regulation 
thereby brings the geographic scope of application in line with that of EU competition law 
which can be determined on the basis of two doctrines: the doctrine of implementation and 
the effects doctrine. The doctrine of implementation has evolved from the Woodpulp cases in 
which the Court of Justice held that the decisive factor for the applicability of the EU 
competition rules is the place where the behaviour is implemented.
1241
 In the Gencor case, the 
Court of Justice followed the effects doctrine by establishing that the application of EU 
competition law is justified when an immediate and substantial effect in the EU is 
foreseeable.
1242
 In its 2014 Intel judgment, the General Court made clear that these two 
doctrines are alternative so that for the EU competition rules to apply, it is sufficient to 
establish either the qualified effects of the practice in the EU or that the practice was 
implemented in the EU.
1243
 It follows that the place of establishment of a market player does 
not matter for jurisdiction to be assumed under EU competition law. 
 
9.4 Data protection as a non-price parameter of competition 
DATA PROTECTION ALTERNATIVES DEVELOPED BY THE MARKET - Instead of setting a monetary 
fee, providers of online platforms typically extract personal information from users as a 
means of payment for the delivery of their services. Since no price is charged, competition 
takes place on the basis of other dimensions. As discussed in part I, the level of innovation 
and the relevance of the service are important parameters of competition in the online 
intermediary environment. In addition, the protection of personal data has emerged as a 
dimension of competition on the internet. The advent of privacy-related extensions for 
internet browsers forms an illustration of this phenomenon. An example is Ghostery which 
enables users to detect and control who is tracking their online behaviour.
1244
 New firms have 
also entered existing markets by distinguishing themselves from incumbents through the 
provision of privacy-friendly alternatives for existing services. DuckDuckGo is an example of 
a search engine which does not collect personal information and does not track its users.
1245
 
The introduction of messaging applications specifically addressing data protection issues, 
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such as Telegram
1246
 and Threema,
1247
 points to the increasing awareness among users of data 
collection by firms.
1248
 It is instructive that data protection concerns seem to have led 
thousands of WhatsApp users to switch to these more secure apps after WhatsApp’s 
acquisition by Facebook was announced in February 2014.
1249
  
RECOGNITION OF DATA PROTECTION AS A PARAMETER OF COMPETITION IN 
FACEBOOK/WHATSAPP - In line with these market developments, the European Commission 
and, in particular, the US Federal Trade Commission have started to refer to data protection as 
a potential dimension of competition. In its Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the 
European Commission argued that the main drivers of competitive interaction between 
consumer communications apps appear to be the functionalities offered and the underlying 
network or user base. With regard to functionalities, the Commission noted that, as indicated 
by the market investigation, privacy and security are becoming increasingly valued by 
users.
1250
 The Commission also found that even though Facebook would in theory be able to 
introduce targeted advertising on WhatsApp, it may not have the incentive to do so as this 
‘could create dissatisfaction among the increasing number of users who significantly value 
privacy and security’.1251 Nevertheless, the European Commission did not specifically analyse 
the Facebook/WhatsApp transaction in this light, since privacy was only regarded as one of 
the many parameters of competition applicable to the case along with price, reliability of the 
communications service, the user base and perceived trendiness of the app.
1252
  
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION AS A FORM OF QUALITY - In the context of the 
TomTom/Tele Atlas merger, the European Commission did assess the incentives of the 
merging parties to protect confidential information of customers and noted that 
‘confidentiality concerns can be considered as similar to product degradation’.1253 The 
confidentiality concerns assessed in the TomTom/Tele Atlas merger decision did not concern 
personal data of end consumers but information provided by customers of Tele Atlas who 
purchase the latter’s navigable digital maps in the upstream market in order to integrate the 
maps into their portable navigation devices which are competing with those of TomTom in 
the downstream market. During the market investigation, concerns had been expressed that 
certain categories of confidential information, such as information on future competitive 
actions and technical information, that manufacturers of navigation devices provided to Tele 
Atlas could be shared with TomTom after the merger.
1254
 The Commission argued that the 
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perceived value of the digital maps for manufacturers of navigation devices would be lower if 
they feared that their confidential information could be revealed to TomTom. Since the map 
database of Tele Atlas could be regarded as relatively less valuable than that of its competitor 
NAVTEQ in such circumstances, confidentiality concerns could lead customers of Tele Atlas 
to consider switching to NAVTEQ. Because losing a customer in the upstream market would 
not be compensated by sufficient additional gains downstream, Tele Atlas would post-merger 
still have incentives to keep its current customers from switching to NAVTEQ in the view of 
the Commission. For that reason, the Commission concluded that the merged entity would 
continue to be incentivised to mitigate third party concerns related to confidentiality after the 
merger and in particular by offering conditions to its customers that would make switching to 
NAVTEQ unattractive.
1255
  
 
The TomTom/Tele Atlas merger dealt with sensitive information of commercial entities and 
not with personal data of end consumers. Yet, the Commission did recognise that the value of 
a product may decrease due to concerns relating to how customer information is used. This 
indicates that the level of protection applicable to information provided by customers and 
generated in the course of the use of a product can be seen as an aspect of quality in 
competition analysis. However, as is discussed below, the situation is more complex for 
personal data that is also used as an input to provide benefits to consumers in the form of 
more relevant and personalised services.  
VIEW OF US FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION(ERS) ON DATA PROTECTION AS A COMPETITION 
PARAMETER - While the European Commission referred to privacy as one of the parameters of 
competition at stake in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, it has to be noted that the protection 
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of personal data has not yet been analysed in full as a dimension of competition in a 
competition case. Although the United States Federal Trade Commission addressed the 
potential effects of the Google/DoubleClick transaction on non-price attributes of competition 
including consumer privacy, there appeared to be no evidence of a privacy dimension of 
competition in the case because Google and DoubleClick could not be regarded as 
competitors in the same relevant market.
1256
 As a result, the Federal Trade Commission did 
not examine the application of this non-price parameter of competition to the case in more 
detail. Nevertheless, there seems to be consensus among US Federal Trade Commissioners 
that data protection may form a dimension of competition which has to be taken into account 
in competition cases in certain circumstances. Federal Trade Commissioner Brill argued in a 
2014 speech that competition authorities would have to investigate the effects of a merger on 
the level of privacy in the future if there is evidence of significant pre-merger privacy 
competition between the merging parties.
1257
 Similarly, in 2013 Federal Trade Commissioner 
Ohlhausen had already expressed the view that privacy, or the treatment of consumer data, 
should be included in a competition analysis where it represents a means of competition.
1258
 
When examining the protection of personal data as a non-price parameter of competition, 
several issues have to be kept in mind. 
CONCEPT OF QUALITY IN COMPETITION ANALYSIS - The 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
explicitly recognise that anticompetitive effects ‘can also be manifested in non-price terms 
and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced 
product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation’.1259 The EU Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines as well as the EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines likewise acknowledge that 
firms may influence parameters of competition other than price by engaging in acts such as 
reducing output, choice or quality of goods and services, or diminishing innovation.
1260
 While 
the notion of quality is put on equal footing with price as a dimension of competition in these 
instruments, a 2013 Policy Roundtable of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) on ‘The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis’ 
indicated that in practice it has proven to be rather difficult to incorporate the assessment of 
quality in competition analysis. According to the OECD, this is particularly the case because 
quality is difficult to define and to measure. Quality is a subjective concept in the sense that 
different consumers may value certain quality attributes to a different extent. Furthermore, 
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quality is multidimensional in nature and thus comprises a variety of factors.
1261
 The quality 
of a product may, for example, include both function and aesthetics. While a larger and more 
powerful watch battery will improve the reliability of a watch, it is likely to reduce its 
aesthetics at the same time. An assessment of quality is very complex if a trade-off has to be 
made between these quality dimensions and consumers disagree as to the preference of one 
type of quality over the other.
1262
 
CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY OF DATA PROTECTION - These difficulties also apply when 
analysing data protection as a form of quality. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences in 
this regard. This is partly because firms often compensate for limited levels of data protection 
by setting a zero or very low price for the use of their services. Some consumers may be 
willing to provide their personal data and be targeted with personalised ads in exchange for 
free services, whereas others prefer to keep their personal information undisclosed and instead 
pay a monetary fee for the use of a service. In such cases, quality effects cannot be isolated 
from price. In addition, consumers may benefit from the data they provide or reveal by using 
a certain service in the form of, for example, more relevant and personalised search results.
1263
 
The relevance of a service and the level of data protection offered are thus different 
dimensions of quality that work in opposite directions. Consumers who decide not to share 
their information trade off relevance as a quality attribute for the protection of their personal 
data, while consumers who prefer to have more relevant services give up (part of) their 
personal data.
1264
 It has to be noted that the scope for consumers to make such choices is more 
limited in communications services where consumers may suffer from social lock-in if their 
contacts are not willing to move to a new service.
1265
  
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DIFFERENT QUALITY ATTRIBUTES AND PRICE - To choose their preferred 
level of protection, consumers have to weigh the benefits derived from giving a firm access to 
their personal information against any data protection harm. As a result, the relationship 
between data protection and the quality of a service is subjective. While higher prices 
unambiguously harm all consumers, the welfare impact of a firm’s decision to collect 
additional personal data or to retain stored data for a longer period depends on the preferences 
                                                 
1261
 OECD POLICY ROUNDTABLES, ‘The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis’, 28 October 
2013, p. 5-6, available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf.   
1262
 G.A. MANNE AND R.B. SPERRY, "The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an 
Antitrust Framework", CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2015, vol. 5, no. 2, (1), p. 3. 
1263
 J.C. COOPER, "Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity", George 
Mason Law Review 2013, vol. 20, no. 4, (1129), p. 1136-1137. 
1264
 See R. CASADESUS-MASANELL AND A. HERVAS-DRANE, "Competing with Privacy", Harvard Business 
School Working Paper 13-085 October 2013, p. 7, available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/13-085_95c71478-a439-4c00-b1dd-f9d963b99c34.pdf who 
argue that several empirical studies suggest that consumers take data protection issues into account when 
considering which firm to join and how much personal information to share. In a more recent study, Pew 
Research Center conducted a survey among Americans and found that there are a variety of circumstances under 
which many Americans would share personal information in return for getting something of perceived value 
depending on the deal being offered and how much risk they face (see L. Rainie & M. Duggan, ‘Privacy and 
Information Sharing’, 14 January 2016, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-
information-sharing/). As a result, it is clear that consumers are, at least to a certain extent, aware of the 
commercial value of their personal data and make the trade-off discussed here in practice. 
1265
 For a discussion of the concept of social lock-in, see section 2.4.3 above. 
304 
 
of individual consumers.
1266
 Such acts will reduce the quality of the service in the eyes of 
consumers who are sensitive to data protection issues, but may at the same time improve 
quality in another dimension, notably in terms of the relevance and personalisation of the 
service, that is valued by other consumers. Furthermore, even consumers who are sensitive to 
data protection issues may be willing to opt for lower data protection standards in exchange 
for a free service. By aligning an increase in data collection and use with worse overall 
quality, competition authorities would make assumptions about the preferences of consumers 
which do not match the reality of consumer heterogeneity. More importantly, it is not the task 
of competition authorities to impose a certain level of data protection on consumers but to 
maintain competitive conditions on the market thereby enabling consumers to transact with 
the companies providing the products and services of their own choice.
1267
  
 
Trade-off between different quality dimensions and the price of a service: 
 
 
ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER AND DATA PROTECTION LAW AS A PRECONDITION FOR 
A WELL-FUNCTIONING MARKET - A prerequisite for consumers to make such choices is that 
they are adequately informed about what personal data is collected and how it is used, 
including the third uses to which their data may be put. By keeping consumers uninformed 
about the commercial use of their personal information, incumbents can create a so-called 
‘market for lemons’ and thereby impede other firms from convincing consumers to switch to 
more privacy-friendly services.
1268
 For a well-functioning market, it is thus vital that the 
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information requirements in consumer protection law and the conditions for valid consent in 
data protection law are strictly applied and enforced. It is interesting to note in this regard that 
the Bundeskartellamt (the German competition authority) launched an investigation into 
Facebook’s terms of service in March 2016 to examine whether consumers are sufficiently 
informed about the type and extent of personal data collected. The Bundeskartellamt suspects 
that Facebook’s terms of service are in violation of data protection law and could thereby also 
constitute abuse of dominance under competition law by representing an abusive imposition 
of unfair conditions on users.
1269
 Depending on how the investigation will evolve, the 
Bundeskartellamt may set a new precedent under which competition enforcement also has a 
role to play in preventing exploitation of consumers by dominant firms through the imposition 
of unfair conditions relating to the collection and use of personal data.  
TWO QUALIFYING REMARKS - Two remarks need to be made to qualify the above. First, it is 
submitted that not all online services are characterised by the presence of different quality 
attributes that have to be traded off against each other. Relevance is an important dimension 
of quality in online search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms which aim to 
provide users with the search results, social network interactions and purchase suggestions 
that best match their preferences. This is different, for example, for consumer 
communications apps which do not select the most relevant stories or content for a particular 
user but facilitate basic, instant real-time communication between users. Providers of these 
apps do not need access to personal information of users to make their service more relevant, 
since competition between communications apps is rather driven by the reliability of the 
communications service, the user base, price and perceived trendiness of the app.
1270
 This 
may also explain why communications apps typically provide users with better data 
protection safeguards as compared to other online platforms that rely on user data as an input 
to provide services of good quality. Indeed, most consumer communications apps including 
WhatsApp currently do not collect personal information about their users that is valuable for 
advertising purposes.
1271
 The above statements on the trade-off between relevance and data 
protection as conflicting quality attributes therefore apply in particular to online platforms like 
search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms that are characterised by relevance 
as an important parameter of competition. Second, one should note that data protection rules 
limit the ability of firms to organise how they collect and use personal data as they deem fit. 
In this regard, the purpose limitation principle contained in Article 6(1)(b) of the Data 
Protection Directive and Article 5(1)(b) of the General Data Protection Regulation and the 
principle of data minimisation derived from Article 6(1)(c) of the Data Protection Directive 
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and Article 5(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulation are of particular relevance. 
Under these principles, controllers have to limit the collection of personal data to what is 
necessary to accomplish a specified and legitimate purpose and cannot retain data any longer 
than necessary to fulfil that purpose. When collecting additional personal information or 
extending the retention period of stored data, firms have to act within these boundaries in 
order to prevent a breach of data protection law. 
DECREASE IN DATA PROTECTION DOES NOT CUT COSTS - Next to consumer heterogeneity, 
another reason can be put forward why the analogy of data protection with quality does not 
work in all circumstances. A firm that decides to degrade the quality of its products will do so 
in order to cut costs and, consequently, make more profits. For example, a manufacturer that 
starts to use inferior car parts as inputs for its cars will, all else being equal, have lower 
manufacturing costs as a result of which its profit level increases. This while a degradation in 
quality in the form of the collection of additional personal data or the extension of existing 
data retention periods might actually raise costs because it requires a firm to collect, store and 
analyse additional data.
1272
 The decision of a firm to lower data protection standards is thus 
not incentivised by the prospect of a decrease in costs, as in the usual case of product 
degradation, but should rather be seen as an investment in having better monetisation 
possibilities in the long term. However, one can question whether this differentiation from the 
normal type of product degradation forms a strong impediment to regarding data protection as 
an aspect of quality under competition law. It is submitted that this difference in business 
strategy may be merely caused by the multi-sided nature of online platforms. By extracting 
additional personal data from users, a firm is able to improve the targeting of ads in the future. 
This may lead to extra advertising revenues through an increase in user clicks on ads (under 
the pay-per-click advertising model) and a growth in demand for ads to be displayed on its 
platform.
1273
 The extra costs are thus recovered on the advertising side of the platform where 
the provider can make more profits by monetising the additional personal information 
collected on the user side. Even though the link between a degradation of the level of data 
protection and extra profits is not as direct as in the usual case of product degradation, the 
motive of a provider of an online platform to collect additional data, and thereby degrade the 
quality of its service, seems the same as in other types of product degradation by one-sided 
firms. 
DATA PROTECTION AS A FORM OF CONSUMER CHOICE OR PRODUCT VARIETY - Nevertheless, a 
parallel between an increase in data collection or data use and a degradation of quality on 
online platforms cannot be made if data protection correlates with price and other aspects of 
quality. As discussed above, a higher level of data protection is not necessarily valued by 
consumers in such circumstances. Although the analogy with quality breaks down in these 
cases, there are other ways of looking at data protection as a non-price parameter of 
competition. In this regard, it seems most appropriate to consider data protection as a form of 
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consumer choice or product variety under competition law.
1274
 While aligning the level of 
data protection with quality would endorse the incorrect belief that additional data collection 
and use is by definition harmful to consumers, this would not be the case when, instead, a 
parallel is made with consumer choice or product variety. Such an approach would take 
consumer heterogeneity towards data protection into account and merely recognise that 
consumers benefit from having the possibility to choose from products or services making a 
different trade-off between, on the one hand, the level of data protection, and, on the other 
hand, the relevance or price of the service. Enabling consumers to make such choices is the 
essence of competition.
1275
 By recognising data protection as a non-price parameter of 
competition in the form of consumer choice or product variety, the availability of products or 
services incorporating different levels of data protection and reflecting the consumer 
heterogeneity can be ensured. Even though, as discussed in section 9.3 above, externalities 
and behavioural biases may limit the ability of consumers to exercise a choice, these issues do 
not stand in the way of treating data protection as a form of choice or variety under 
competition law as long as consumer protection and data protection law provide, respectively, 
consumers and data subjects with a minimum level of protection in this regard. Competition, 
consumer protection and data protection law have to go hand in hand in order to create a well-
functioning market. While competition law aims to ensure the availability of choice, 
consumer and data protection law should empower individuals to effectively exercise such a 
choice. 
REDUCTION IN CHOICE IS PROBLEMATIC IRRESPECTIVE OF  THE LEVEL OF DATA PROTECTION - 
This way, data protection would become a dimension of competition to be considered in 
merger and abuse of dominance cases. Under merger control, the European Commission has 
to assess whether a proposed transaction would significantly impede effective competition as 
a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
1276
 Such a form of increased 
market power may not only give firms the ability to profitably increase prices but also to 
reduce choice. Negative effects on consumer choice or product variety may therefore form a 
reason to declare a transaction incompatible with the internal market. Similarly, conduct may 
be considered abusive under Article 102 TFEU if it is likely to harm consumer choice or 
product variety. The protection of effective competition under merger review and abuse of 
dominance rules may therefore include the protection of consumer choice in data protection. 
This does not mean, however, that competition enforcement is used to advance greater data 
protection. Instead, effective competition would require that consumers have a choice 
between higher and lower levels of data protection combined with either more or less relevant 
services and higher or lower prices. A merger between, for example, two competing social 
network providers implementing different levels of data protection in their respective 
platforms is likely to raise competition concerns because the merger may result into a 
reduction of consumer choice as regards the different levels of data protection available in a 
potential relevant market for social networks. The new level of data protection in itself is not 
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important; what matters is the fact that the merger has the effect of reducing options for 
consumers.
1277
 Such a reduction in options would only lead to competitive harm and call for a 
competition enforcement action if data protection is a key parameter of non-price competition 
in the market. 
 
9.5 Potential conflicts between competition and data protection law 
DATA-DRIVEN EFFICIENCIES IN THE TOMTOM/TELE ATLAS MERGER - While data protection can 
be incorporated in competition analysis as non-price parameters of competition, previous 
merger cases have also uncovered a way in which the regimes of competition and data 
protection law may conflict. In the context of the TomTom/Tele Atlas and Microsoft/Yahoo 
mergers, the parties put forward data-driven efficiencies as a defence to justify potential 
anticompetitive effects to which the respective transactions would give rise. In TomTom/Tele 
Atlas, the parties claimed that the acquisition of Tele Atlas by TomTom would bring about 
significant efficiencies due to the integration of feedback data from TomTom’s large 
customer base to improve the map databases of Tele Atlas. In this light, the parties stated that 
the rationale of the merger was to allow the merged entity to produce better maps faster. 
While the European Commission argued that end-customers would certainly benefit from the 
more frequent and comprehensive map database updates made possible by the merger, it also 
made clear that such efficiencies are difficult to quantify. In the end, the Commission did not 
estimate the magnitude of the likely efficiencies because it concluded that the transaction 
lacked anticompetitive effects irrespective of the existence of efficiencies.
1278
  
DATA-DRIVEN EFFICIENCIES IN THE MICROSOFT/YAHOO MERGER - In Microsoft/Yahoo, 
Microsoft argued that its strategic rationale in pursuing the transaction lay in the notion that 
success in search advertising and internet search is dependent on scale. By acquiring Yahoo, 
Microsoft expected to become a more credible alternative to Google because of the increased 
scale which, in its view, would have a positive effect on both users and advertisers. Microsoft 
argued, for instance, that the user and advertiser experience would improve because of the 
more relevant search results and better ad targeting possibilities resulting from a larger 
volume of search queries. While the Commission did not find conclusive evidence that higher 
scale is beneficial to users and advertisers, respondents to the market investigation confirmed 
that the merger would have procompetitive effects and would lead to more advantages than 
disadvantages. In addition, the large majority of advertisers and media agencies included in 
the market investigation believed that post-merger the new entity would be a stronger 
competitor to Google.
1279
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LINK WITH DATA PROTECTION - Mergers giving rise to data-driven efficiencies may be 
incompatible with data protection law as such if personal data is involved. Although the 
integration or combination of data from previously separate entities can be beneficial from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, it is likely to raise data protection issues because, for 
instance, personal data is further processed for a purpose different than the original one. In 
such a situation, the new purpose must be specified and a legitimate basis for the new 
processing activities must be found. In case the lawfulness of the initial processing was based 
on consent, this consent must be renewed for every data subject that will be affected by the 
new processing activities. In order to comply with EU data protection rules, additional data 
protection measures thus may need to be implemented by the merged entity when data-driven 
efficiencies relate to personal data. Such efficiencies may not only play a role in merger 
review but also in the area of restrictive agreements. In that context, agreements whereby 
competitors cooperate and share personal data may be considered to give rise to efficiencies 
under Article 101(3) TFEU. Furthermore, such an agreement may not even be anticompetitive 
under Article 101(1) TFEU if it does not have an anticompetitive object or leads to 
anticompetitive effects, while the sharing of personal data with third parties is problematic 
from a data protection law perspective. 
Microsoft/Yahoo merger decision:  
Microsoft and Yahoo entered into several partnership agreements in 2009 that were 
approved under the EU Merger Regulation by the European Commission in 
February 2010. Under the agreements, Microsoft acquired an exclusive license to 
Yahoo’s search technologies and the right to integrate Yahoo’s search technologies 
into its existing search services. Microsoft became the exclusive internet search and 
search advertising provider used by Yahoo. In exchange, Microsoft paid a certain 
percentage of the search revenues generated on Yahoo’s and its parners’ websites 
to Yahoo.  
The Commission concluded that Microsoft’s and Yahoo’s activities in internet 
search and online search advertising in the EEA were limited with combined 
market shares generally below 10% while Google was found to enjoy market shares 
of above 90% at the time of the merger. Microsoft argued that it would become a 
more credible alternative to Google and provide greater value to advertisers by 
acquiring Yahoo due to the increase of scale in search advertising. The 
investigation of the Commission had indicated that scale is indeed an important 
element to be an effective competitor in search advertising. With regard to the 
potential effects of the merger on the different market players, namely advertisers, 
users, online publishers and distributors of search technology, the Commission’s 
investigation had shown that market participants did not expect the transaction to 
have negative effects on competition or on their business. They even expected it to 
increase competition in internet search and search advertising by allowing 
Microsoft to become a stronger competitor to Google.  
 
Case No COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 18 February 2010, par. 4-6, 
152-153, 112, 121-122, 200, 226, 237-238, 246. 
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DATA PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR A COMPETITION LAW INFRINGEMENT - 
Such scenarios under Article 101 TFEU have a resemblance to other potential conflicts 
between the two legal regimes that may arise when data protection obligations are invoked to 
justify potential competition issues under EU merger review, Article 102 TFEU and Article 
101 TFEU. In the area of merger review, a potential remedy to address data-related 
competition concerns may be to demand the merging parties to duplicate the relevant data to 
enable competitors to develop competing or complementary services on this basis.
1280
 
Precedent for such a remedy can be found in the context of the acquisition of Reuters by 
Thomson in 2008 where the Commission approved the merger on the condition that the 
merging parties would divest copies of their databases containing financial information.
1281
 If 
personal data is included in the datasets, such a remedy would raise data protection issues 
which the merging parties may invoke in an attempt to prevent the remedy from being 
adopted by the Commission. In the context of Article 102 TFEU, as discussed in section 7.7.4 
above, a dominant firm may justify its refusal to give access to personal data by invoking an 
objective justification based on its obligations under data protection law. Data protection rules 
may also be invoked to justify a restriction of competition under Article 101(3) TFEU. For 
example, the implementation of the right to data portability as introduced by the General Data 
Protection Regulation may require data controllers to standardise their data formats and 
procedures for the processing and transmission of personal data. This while standardisation is 
liable to give rise to competition issues under Article 101(1) TFEU by limiting technical 
development through the foreclosure of innovative technologies.
1282
 However, such 
justifications are not likely to be accepted as long as data protection law leaves room for 
autonomous conduct to prevent a breach of competition law. With regard to the application of 
Article 101 TFEU to standardisation efforts for enabling data portability, the EU Horizontal 
Guidelines set out conditions relating to the procedure for adopting the standard and 
subsequent access to the standard under which standardisation agreements normally fall 
outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.
1283
 In the context of Article 102 TFEU and merger 
review, reference can be made to a case dealt with by the Autorité de la concurrence in 
September 2014 to illustrate how a dominant firm or the parties to a merger can implement a 
duty to share personal data with rivals in practice in a way that complies with data protection 
rules. 
FINDINGS OF THE AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE IN THE GDF SUEZ CASE - In response to a 
complaint of Direct Energie, the Autorité de la concurrence imposed interim measures on 
GDF Suez ordering it to give other market players with government authorisation to supply 
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natural gas access to certain information about its customers. This duty concerned the 
customers who had a contract for the supply of gas with GDF Suez under the regulated tariffs 
which were only provided by GDF Suez as a result of its public service obligation. For these 
customers, GDF Suez was ordered to provide its competitors with personal data such as 
names, addresses, fixed telephone numbers and consumption profiles in order to enable them 
to contact potential new customers. Awaiting the investigation on the merits, the Autorité de 
la concurrence found GDF Suez capable of abusing its dominant position in the market for 
natural gas by using customer information it had obtained within the framework of its former 
monopoly status to launch offers at market prices outside the scope of its public service 
obligation.
1284
 
REMEDIES IMPOSED BY THE AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE IN THE GDF SUEZ CASE - In the 
operative part of its decision, the Autorité de la concurrence laid down how GDF Suez had to 
comply with its obligation to share customer information with rivals. In line with the 
recommendations made by the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés 
(CNIL), the French data protection authority,
1285
 the Autorité de la concurrence specified that, 
in order to conform to data protection law, GDF Suez should send the respective customers a 
message either in the form of a letter, for customers who were receiving paper invoices, or in 
the form of an email, for customers who abandoned the paper invoices, to give them the 
possibility to oppose to the transmission of their personal data to third parties. More in 
particular, the Autorité de la concurrence stipulated that GDF Suez should request customers 
who did not want  their personal data to be shared with other gas suppliers to fill out and 
return a form either by letter (for the first group of customers) or online (for the second group 
of customers).
1286
 The Autorité de la concurrence also drafted the message that GDF Suez 
should send to its customers which included the following sentence: ‘If you do not wish your 
data to be transmitted for marketing purposes to suppliers who have made a request to access 
the customer database of GDF Suez, please return the form. In the absence of opposition from 
you within the next 30 days, your data will automatically be made available to these suppliers 
[translation]’.1287 
A COMPETITION LAW OBLIGATION AS A LEGITIMATE GROUND FOR PROCESSING - Instead of 
requiring GDF Suez to obtain explicit consent from each affected customer, the Autorité de la 
concurrence imposed an opt-out system on GDF Suez whereby customers had to take action 
themselves to prevent that other gas suppliers would get access to their personal data. To 
assess whether this approach is in line with EU data protection law, the question has to be 
answered whether GDF Suez could have relied on a legitimate ground other than consent for 
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sharing personal data of its customers with other gas suppliers. In this regard, the legitimate 
ground of Article 7(c) of the Data Protection Directive and Article 6(1)(c) of the General Data 
Protection Regulation is relevant. Under these provisions, a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject forms a legitimate ground for the processing of personal data. A duty to 
share personal data with third parties imposed on the basis of competition law would amount 
to such a legal obligation.
1288
 In general, a competition law remedy to share personal data can 
thus not lead to a conflict with data protection rules as it forms a legitimate ground for 
processing in itself. Nevertheless, considering that the GDF Suez case concerned interim 
proceedings, one could argue that consent would have constituted a more appropriate ground 
for processing. If the finding of abuse is not upheld in the proceedings on the merits, the legal 
obligation for processing will be deemed to have never existed. In that situation, the personal 
data of the customers of GDF Suez is already shared with third parties in the absence of any 
legal obligation to that end. It should also be noted that in addition to having a legitimate 
ground for processing, the other data quality requirements of Article 6(1) of the Data 
Protection Directive and Article 5(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation have to be 
met. In particular, in accordance with the notion of purpose specification, data subjects need 
to be informed that their personal data is shared with third parties and is thus processed for a 
new purpose. 
COOPERATION WITH THE DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY - Regardless of the lawfulness of the 
measures imposed on GDF Suez under data protection law, the Autorité de la concurrence 
may have overstepped its competences by interfering in the application of data protection 
rules to a specific case. It is submitted that it is not appropriate for a competition authority to 
outline specific measures that a firm should take in order to comply with data protection law. 
Even though the CNIL made recommendations about the case in an opinion addressed to the 
Autorité de la concurrence, it may have been more appropriate for the latter to have made a 
general statement that the duty to share customer information should be implemented in 
conformity with data protection law. The CNIL could then have monitored whether GDF 
Suez’s approach was in line with the data protection rules or have provided GDF Suez with a 
concrete roadmap to be followed. If a duty to share personal data with third parties is imposed 
on the basis of competition law, it is desirable for a competition authority to actively involve 
the competent data protection authority in the implementation of the remedies. Since the 
sharing of personal data with third parties may raise considerable data protection issues, the 
cooperation should go beyond asking the data protection authority for possible 
recommendations. A closer cooperation between competition and data protection authorities 
in such cases would also benefit consumers by providing them with a more integrated form of 
protection in the two fields. 
ANONYMISATION OF PERSONAL DATA - Although the duty to share personal data may not have 
been implemented in complete conformity with the data protection rules in the specific 
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circumstances of the case, GDF Suez does illustrate that it is possible for a dominant 
undertaking to prevent a breach of data protection law as long as the right safeguards as 
required under the latter field are applied. In cases where it is not appropriate to rely on the 
competition law obligation as a legitimate ground for processing, a dominant firm may 
preclude a violation of data protection law by obtaining consent from customers to share their 
personal data with competitors or by anonymising personal data before third parties are 
granted access to it. One should note that anonymisation cannot form a solution in situations 
where competitors have to be granted access to the personal details of users, such as in the 
GDF Suez case where competitors needed certain specific information about individuals in 
order to contact potential new customers. 
PSEUDONYMISED DATA - As soon as a piece of information cannot be linked to an identified or 
identifiable natural person anymore, it cannot be regarded as personal data and, as a 
consequence, EU data protection law is not applicable. A difference has to be made between 
pseudonymised and anonymised data. The General Data Protection Regulation introduces a 
definition of pseudonymisation. Pseudonymised data is personal data that is processed in such 
a way that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of 
additional information.
1289
 The Article 29 Working Party made clear that pseudonymisation 
should be seen as a useful security measure but not as a method of anonymisation.
1290
 Data 
that has undergone pseudonymisation can still be attributed to a natural person by the use of 
additional information and therefore is considered as personal data to which the data 
protection rules fully apply.
1291
 Nevertheless, recital 28 of the General Data Protection 
Regulation makes clear that the application of pseudonymisation to personal data can reduce 
the risks for data subjects and help controllers and processors to meet their data protection 
obligations.  
ANONYMISED DATA - Anonymised data, on the other hand, falls outside the scope of the data 
protection rules if the anonymisation is irreversible.
1292
 It is important to keep in mind that the 
act of anonymising constitutes a form of processing of personal data in itself and therefore has 
to comply with all the data quality requirements of Article 6(1)(a) to (e) of the Data Protection 
Directive and Article 5(1)(a) to (f) of the General Data Protection Regulation. In April 2014, 
the Article 29 Working Party published an Opinion in which it analysed a number of 
anonymisation techniques and discussed their strengths and weaknesses.
1293
 In general, it 
seems difficult to create a truly anonymous dataset. In the context of the anonymisation of 
personal data in search engines, the Article 29 Working party referred to the possibility of 
indirect identification of users by combining anonymised information held by the search 
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engine provider with information held by another stakeholder such as an internet service 
provider.
1294
 In addition, data that did not relate to an identifiable person in the past might do 
so in the future because of new technological developments.
1295
 Therefore, it is questionable 
whether a dominant firm can rightly claim that it has irreversibly anonymised personal data. 
In any case, it should consider the methods used to anonymise personal data carefully and 
perform them adequately in order to prevent a breach of data protection law. 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
NEW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW - Consent is one of the 
legitimate grounds on the basis of which personal data can be lawfully processed under EU 
data protection law. The notion of consent requires data subjects to have a genuine and free 
choice as to whether or not their personal data is to be processed for a particular purpose. 
However, such a form of control over data is lacking in concentrated markets where 
undertakings are able to impose their practices on individuals. Data protection advocates 
therefore seem to point to competition enforcement as a means to render data protection rules 
more effective. In this regard, the General Data Protection Regulation is expected to 
strengthen the enforcement of data protection law in the European Union by introducing a 
one-stop-shop and a consistency mechanism. In practice, the application and enforcement of 
the data protection rules under the General Data Protection Regulation is likely to take place 
by way of a form of cooperation between the national data protection authorities of the 
Member States considering the competences given to the European Data Protection Board in 
the Regulation. The effectiveness of the new EU data protection rules therefore seems highly 
dependent on the future functioning of the European Data Protection Board. The General Data 
Protection Regulation also introduces a uniform regime for remedies, liability and sanctions 
which will enable national data protection authorities to impose fines for breaches of data 
protection obligations. Even though the height of the fines are not comparable to those usually 
imposed in competition cases, the compliance with EU data protection law is hoped to 
increase under the new sanctions regime. 
HOW DATA PROTECTION REGULATION IMPACTS COMPETITION - The General Data Protection 
Regulation is aimed at contributing to a better functioning of the internal market by reducing 
the legal fragmentation that occurred under the Data Protection Directive. While the 
Regulation with its wider geographic scope is likely to increase the level playing field 
between European and non-European companies, it is more doubtful whether it will also lead 
to a true harmonisation of data protection rules throughout the European Union. This because 
of the room given for interpretation and additional legislation on the level of the Member 
States. As regards the impact of data protection regulation on competition in general, it can be 
concluded that in order to find a desirable level of protection a balance should be struck 
between addressing actual data protection concerns and giving firms the possibility to 
monetise their business and develop new services that bring benefits to consumers. 
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DATA PROTECTION AS A NON-PRICE PARAMETER OF COMPETITION - If data protection correlates 
with price and other aspects of quality, it is not desirable to regard it as a dimension of quality 
in competition analysis. In such situations, the analogy with quality breaks down because a 
stronger level of data protection is not necessarily valued by all consumers. This is 
particularly the case for online search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms 
where the level of data protection, on the one hand, and the price as well as the relevance and 
personalisation of the services, on the other hand, are traded off against each other. Data 
protection can still be integrated in competition analysis as a non-price parameter of 
competition in these industries by treating it as a form of consumer choice or product variety 
instead of as a dimension of quality. Such an approach would account for the heterogeneous 
consumer preferences towards data protection and enable consumers, with the help of an 
effective consumer and data protection regime, to make their own choices instead of requiring 
competition authorities to impose a preference for a certain level of data protection on 
consumers. 
HOW TO SOLVE POSSIBLE CONFLICTS - Even though competition and data protection law both 
aim to protect consumers, conflicts between the two fields may also arise. In particular, data-
driven efficiencies in merger review and under Article 101 TFEU may be beneficial from an 
economic perspective but raise data protection issues if personal data is involved. In addition, 
a competition authority or court can impose a duty to share personal data in order to remedy a 
violation of Article 102 TFEU while the sharing of personal data is problematic from a data 
protection law perspective. In principle, a competition law decision has to be regarded as a 
legitimate ground for processing in itself as it constitutes a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject. Remaining potential conflicts can be addressed by implementing the 
appropriate data protection safeguards in the form of specifying the new purpose of the 
processing activities, obtaining renewed consent from data subjects or through the 
anonymisation of personal data.   
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10 Data protection as a non-efficiency concern in competition policy 
 
10.1 Introduction 
COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT GOING BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY? - Several theories have 
been proposed to incorporate data protection issues into competition law.
1296
 As already 
discussed in section 9.4 above, data protection can be integrated into competition analysis as a 
non-price parameter of competition in case it is a key dimension of competition in the market. 
A more controversial question is whether data protection can be protected as a non-efficiency 
concern under competition law. This issue goes beyond the possible role of data protection as 
a non-price parameter of competition in the usual competition analysis. The question at stake 
is whether competition law can be used as a mechanism to advance better data protection 
standards. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind the inherent limitations of 
competition enforcement as a body of law mainly concerned with economic efficiency. 
OUTLINE - Before analysing the extent to which data protection interests can be integrated into 
merger and abuse of dominance cases, section 2 explores the objectives of EU competition 
law with the aim of examining whether room is made for the protection of non-efficiency 
considerations in current competition enforcement. While section 2 is based on a descriptive 
analysis of the current decision-making practice of the European Commission and the case 
law of the EU Courts, section 3 takes a more normative approach by discussing the scope for 
data protection interests in EU competition policy. Afterwards, more specific attention is paid 
to the potential role of data protection interests in, respectively, merger review in section 4 
and abuse of dominance investigations in section 5. 
 
10.2 Exploring the objectives of EU competition law in current decision-making 
practice and case law 
NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS AND COMPETITION LAW - When analysing to what extent 
data protection interests can be integrated in EU competition law, it is important to reflect on 
the objectives of the field. Protocol No. 27 on the internal market and competition, annexed to 
the Lisbon Treaty, makes clear that the internal market that the European Union is to establish 
in accordance with Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union
1297
 includes ‘a system 
ensuring that competition is not distorted’.1298 The EU competition rules are necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market and seek ‘to prevent competition from being distorted to the 
detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the 
well-being of the European Union’.1299 Although the exact scope of protection offered by EU 
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competition law is the subject of recurrent debate,
1300
 it is clear that the competition rules as 
currently enforced by the European Commission and the EU Courts predominantly seek to 
protect economic efficiency. This implies that non-efficiency concerns relating to, for 
instance, media pluralism, environmental protection, public health and also data protection are 
in principle protected through other laws and means to the extent that they cannot be 
translated into economic efficiency benefits. It is important to note that the notion of 
economic efficiency will comprise data protection if it forms a key factor on the basis of 
which companies compete in a particular market. However, the issue at stake here goes 
beyond the possible role of data protection as a non-price parameter of competition in the 
standard competition analysis. The point to be discussed is whether competition law should be 
used as an instrument to stimulate a higher level of data protection. 
NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS AND ARTICLE 101 TFEU - The current focus on economic 
efficiency is apparent in the three main branches of EU competition law. The prohibition of 
Article 101(1) TFEU on agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the internal market does not apply when the cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) 
TFEU are met. These conditions require that the restrictive practice at issue: (1) contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress; (2) allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; (3) does not impose on the 
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives; and (4) does not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. According to the 
Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, goals pursued by other Treaty 
provisions can be taken into account ‘to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four 
conditions’.1301 Non-efficiency concerns had been integrated in the analysis conducted under 
Article 101(3) TFEU at instances before. With respect to the protection of media plurality, 
reference can, for instance, be made to the EBU/Eurovision case in which the European 
Commission granted the Eurovision System an individual exemption under Article 101(3) 
TFEU on the ground that the Eurovision System benefitted consumers ‘in that the System 
enables the members to show more, and higher-quality, sports programmes - both widely 
popular sports and minority sports - than they would be able to do without the advantages of 
Eurovision’.1302 However, the decision of the Commission was annulled by the General Court 
which has arguably limited the possibility to take non-efficiency concerns into account under 
Article 101(3) TFEU by requiring the analysis of indispensability of a restrictive practice to 
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be made on an economic basis.
1303
 The statement of the Commission in the Guidelines makes 
clear that goals pursued by other Treaty provisions will currently only be considered when 
they translate into economic benefits that satisfy the four conditions.
1304
 
NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS AND EU MERGER CONTROL - In the area of merger review, 
Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation is instructive as regards the role of non-efficiency 
concerns in EU merger cases. On the basis of this provision, Member States are entitled to 
take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into account 
by the EU Merger Regulation. The legitimate interests that are specified include public 
security, plurality of the media and prudential rules. Any other public interest must be 
communicated to the European Commission by the Member State concerned after which its 
compatibility with the general principles and other provisions of Community law will be 
assessed by the Commission. Non-efficiency concerns raised by proposed concentrations may 
thus be dealt with at national level and in principle do not play a role in EU merger review. 
The NewsCorp/BSkyB merger can serve as an illustration in this regard. The European 
Commission made clear in its merger decision that its analysis of the acquisition of BSkyB by 
NewsCorp was solely based on competition-related grounds under the EU Merger Regulation 
and was without prejudice to the media plurality review of the relevant UK authorities.
1305
 
While the European Commission approved the merger on the basis of a competition 
assessment, Ofcom, the regulatory and competition authority for the broadcasting, 
communications and postal industries in the UK, required remedies from NewsCorp to 
address media plurality issues.
1306
 However, there are also EU merger cases in which 
concerns relating to media pluralism have been recognised and taken into account.  
ROLE OF NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS IN EU MERGER CONTROL IN PRACTICE -  In its April 
2012 merger decision involving the concentration by which Sony and Mubadala would 
acquire joint control of EMI Music Publishing, the European Commission explicitly stated in 
this regard that: ‘According to Article 167 (4) of the TFEU, the Union shall take cultural 
diversity aspects into account in its actions under the other provisions of the Treaties, 
including the EU competition rules’.1307 It has to be noted, however, that the protection of 
cultural diversity or media plurality is mostly regarded as a side effect of the fact that 
competition will not be restricted by the proposed concentration. Cultural diversity was also 
considered in the context of the acquisition of EMI by Universal which was approved by the 
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European Commission in September 2012. As a condition for the clearance of the merger, 
Universal had to divest a number of assets including local EMI entities in certain Member 
States and EMI Recording Limited including EMI’s iconic Parlophone label. The 
Commission was concerned that the proposed transaction, as initially notified, would harm 
consumers by increasing Universal’s bargaining power and ability to impose onerous 
licensing terms on digital platforms, in particular small and emerging innovative music 
platforms. This would likely result in retail price increases for consumers, as well as a 
reduction in innovation and consumer choice. The Commission argued that, as a result, the 
proposed concentration would also have a negative impact on cultural diversity.
1308
 The 
protection of cultural diversity thus only seems to have played an ancillary role in the decision 
of the Commission to demand remedies from Universal, since the expected negative effect on 
cultural diversity is merely regarded as a consequence of the more economic impact of the 
concentration on innovation and consumer choice.
1309
 Currently, the protection of non-
efficiency concerns in EU merger review therefore typically forms an indirect result of 
competition rather than its aim.
1310
 
NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS AND ARTICLE 102 TFEU - Although Article 102 TFEU 
does not have a provision like paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU which renders the prohibition 
on abuse of dominance inapplicable when certain conditions are fulfilled, it is clear that 
abusive conduct can also be justified. In the Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under 
Article 102 TFEU, the European Commission specified that a dominant undertaking may do 
so either by demonstrating that its conduct is objectively necessary or by demonstrating that 
its conduct produces substantial efficiencies which outweigh any anticompetitive effects on 
consumers. The Commission will then assess whether the conduct in question is indispensable 
and proportionate to the goal allegedly pursued by the dominant undertaking.
1311
 This 
approach of the European Commission has been confirmed by the Court of Justice in Post 
Danmark I. In its judgment, the Court of Justice argued that a dominant undertaking may 
justify its abusive behaviour by demonstrating ‘either that its conduct is objectively necessary 
[...], or that the exclusionary effect produced may be counterbalanced, outweighed even, by 
advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers’.1312 In the last situation, ‘it is 
for the dominant undertaking to show that the efficiency gains likely to result from the 
conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative effects on competition and 
consumer welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are likely to be, 
brought about as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement 
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of those gains in efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing 
all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition’.1313  
ROLE OF NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE GUIDANCE PAPER ON ARTICLE 102 TFEU - 
As examples of efficiencies, the Commission refers in the Guidance Paper on exclusionary 
conduct under Article 102 TFEU to technical improvements in the quality of goods or 
reductions in the cost of production or distribution. Since only economic factors will point to 
such efficiencies, the scope to take into account other interests seems limited. With regard to 
justifications relating to the objective necessity of the conduct, the Commission made clear in 
its Guidance Paper that the question of whether conduct is objectively necessary must be 
determined on the basis of factors external to the dominant undertaking. In particular, the 
Commission noted that: ‘Exclusionary conduct may, for example, be considered objectively 
necessary for health or safety reasons related to the nature of the product in question. 
However, proof of whether conduct of this kind is objectively necessary must take into 
account that it is normally the task of public authorities to set and enforce public health and 
safety standards. It is not the task of a dominant undertaking to take steps on its own initiative 
to exclude products which it regards, rightly or wrongly, as dangerous or inferior to its own 
product’.1314 As a result, the European Commission will probably follow an approach similar 
to the one applied in the context of Article 101(3) TFEU, under which non-efficiency 
concerns are only considered if they lead to economic benefits for consumers. 
FOCUS ON CONSUMER WELFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU - The focus on 
economic efficiency is also apparent from the objectives of EU competition law as identified 
by the EU Courts and the European Commission. In its Post Danmark I judgment, the Court 
of Justice argued that ‘[i]t is apparent from case law that Article [102 TFEU] covers not only 
those practices that directly cause harm to consumers but also practices that cause 
consumers harm through their impact on competition’.1315 Similarly, the General Court noted 
in Intel that ‘[i]t is apparent from the case-law that Article [102 TFEU] is aimed not only at 
practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are 
detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure’.1316 In Post 
Danmark I, the Court of Justice expressly stated that Article 102 TFEU does not ‘seek to 
ensure that competitors less efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position should 
remain on the market’ and that ‘not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to 
competition’.1317 In this regard, the Court noted that ‘[c]ompetition on the merits may, by 
definition, lead to departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are 
less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other 
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things, price, choice, quality or innovation’.1318 Finally, in the Court’s view, Article 102 
TFEU ‘applies, in particular, to the conduct of a dominant undertaking that, through 
recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition on the basis of the 
performance of commercial operators, has the effect, to the detriment of consumers, of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition existing in the market or the growth 
of that competition’.1319 All these statements make clear that the main underlying goal of 
Article 102 TFEU as currently enforced by the Court of Justice is to protect competition in 
order to enhance consumer welfare. As a result, a certain type of conduct which reduces 
competition is not necessarily abusive. What is decisive for the assessment under Article 102 
TFEU is whether the reduction of competition caused by the behaviour of a dominant 
undertaking leads to consumer harm.
1320
 In the Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct 
under Article 102 TFEU, the European Commission also referred to the ‘wider objective of 
achieving an integrated internal market’ and argued that effective enforcement of Article 102 
TFEU is particularly important in this regard in order to make markets work better for the 
benefit of businesses and consumers.
1321
  
FOCUS ON CONSUMER WELFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND EU MERGER 
REVIEW - The Court of Justice argued in T-Mobile and GlaxoSmithKline that ‘Article [101 
TFEU], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of 
the market and thus competition as such’.1322 As such, the Court did not reject the notion of 
consumer welfare as an objective of Article 101 TFEU or EU competition law altogether but 
only seems to have placed it among several goals having equal importance. Nevertheless, a 
clear focus on the protection of consumer welfare is still apparent in the Guidelines on the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU. The European Commission stated explicitly in the 
Guidelines that the objective of Article 101 TFEU is ‘to protect competition on the market as 
a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. 
Competition and market integration serve these ends since the creation and preservation of 
an open single market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the 
Community for the benefit of consumers’.1323 With regard to the objectives of EU merger 
review, the European Commission specified in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 
EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines that: ‘Effective competition brings benefits to 
consumers, such as low prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods and services, 
and innovation. Through its control of mergers, the Commission prevents mergers that would 
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be likely to deprive customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the market power of 
firms’.1324 The emphasis on the protection of consumers in EU competition law has led data 
protection advocates to query whether data protection considerations can be integrated into a 
broader consumer welfare standard to be pursued by EU competition law.
1325
 
 
10.3 Examining the scope for data protection interests in EU competition policy 
When examining the scope for data protection interests in EU competition policy, it is 
instructive to consider the underlying objectives of the two fields. While there is an overlap in 
goals, the means by which the objectives of EU competition and data protection law are 
pursued differ. Against this background, several pros and cons can be distinguished of 
integrating data protection interests in EU competition policy. In line with its elevation to a 
fundamental right after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, three main ways are put 
forward of how data protection interests should be considered when applying and enforcing 
EU competition law.  
 
10.3.1 Comparing the objectives of EU competition and data protection law 
OVERLAP IN GOALS BUT DIFFERENT MEANS - There is a certain overlap between the goals of 
EU competition and data protection law. Both legal fields aim to protect the general public 
(either consumers more generally or individual data subjects, respectively) and to contribute 
to the functioning of the internal market. However, the means by which these objectives are 
pursued differ. EU data protection law aims to protect the fundamental right to data protection 
by giving data subjects control over their personal data and by setting limits on the collection 
and use of personal data. EU competition law, in turn, tries to enhance consumer welfare by 
intervening against restrictive practices, abusive behaviour and concentrations that 
significantly impede effective competition. Whereas EU data protection policy seeks to 
contribute to the functioning of the internal market through positive integration by adopting 
legislative instruments to harmonise national data protection law in the Member States, EU 
competition policy is based on negative integration by ensuring that undertakings do not 
inhibit effective competition to the detriment of consumer welfare.
1326
 In addition, EU data 
protection law follows a human rights-based approach, while EU competition enforcement 
takes place against the background of a more economic and effects-based analysis. This 
difference in approach can be explained by reference to the concept of data portability.  
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available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2703655. 
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Comparison between the objectives and means of EU data protection and 
competition law: 
 
DATA PORTABILITY AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH - As discussed in 
section 5.4.1 above, the General Data Protection Regulation introduces a right to data 
portability in EU data protection law. Article 20 of the Regulation gives a data subject the 
right to receive personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a 
controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and to transmit this 
data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data has 
been provided. This right applies where the processing is carried out by automated means and 
is based on consent or on a contract.
1327
 Where technically feasible, the data subject also has 
the right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another.
1328
 
Irrespective of the applicability of the right to data portability under data protection law, data 
portability may also be enforced under competition law. If an undertaking is found to possess 
a dominant position on a given market, a refusal to ensure data portability which exploits 
consumers or excludes competitors and for which no objective justification exists would 
qualify as abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU. In such a situation, the European 
Commission can impose a duty on the dominant provider to give users the possibility to 
transfer their data to a competitor. This can be illustrated by the Google case in which the 
Commission negotiated with Google about commitments which would force the search 
engine provider to stop imposing obligations on advertisers preventing them from moving 
their advertising campaigns to competing platforms.
1329
 The difference with the General Data 
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Protection Regulation in this regard is that the proposal gives data subjects a right to data 
portability, while competition authorities can impose a duty on dominant providers to enable 
data portability in case their behaviour amounts to abuse under Article 102 TFEU. 
DATA PORTABILITY AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN SCOPE OF APPLICATION - In 
addition, the scope of application of the two regimes is different. The right to data portability 
only applies to transfers of personal data. Information that does not qualify as personal data 
falls outside the scope of the new right, while action under competition law can potentially be 
taken against a lack of portability of all data irrespective of whether it relates to an identified 
or identifiable natural person. The scope of application of competition law in this regard is 
thus much wider. However, action on the basis of Article 102 TFEU can only be taken if the 
restrictions on data portability qualify as abuse of dominance. In contrast, the right to data 
portability would apply generally to all forms of processing carried out by automated means 
and based on consent or on a contract.
1330
 No dominance or abuse will have to be established 
in order for users to be able to transfer their data between services under the General Data 
Protection Regulation.
1331
 
GUIDANCE FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE - As the analysis in 
the previous section points out, even though non-efficiency considerations have at times been 
recognised in competition cases, current competition enforcement mainly focuses on 
protecting economic efficiency. Both the European Commission and the Court of Justice have 
already expressed views on the role of data protection concerns in EU competition law. Like 
discussed in section 8.2, the European Commission did not take into account data protection 
interests when assessing the Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp mergers. Prior to 
these merger decisions, the Court of Justice already made a statement in 2006 about the scope 
for data protection interests in EU competition policy in the context of a preliminary ruling 
case involving agreements between financial institutions for the exchange of customer 
solvency information. In its judgment in Asnef-Equifax, the Court noted that ‘any possible 
issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition 
law, they may be resolved on the basis of the relevant provisions governing data 
protection’.1332 As a result, the Court seems of the view that data protection issues should, in 
principle, be addressed under data protection legislation rather than under the competition 
rules. At the same time, the wording used by the Court, i.e. that data protection is not as such 
a matter for competition law, is also interpreted by commentators as opening the door to the 
application of competition law to a set of facts to which data protection rules apply in parallel. 
In this regard, the Court’s statement does not imply that data protection have no relevance to 
                                                                                                                                                        
campaigns across multiple platforms (Press Release US Federal Trade Commission, ‘Google Agrees to Change 
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competition enforcement at all, but only seems to indicate that competition law should be 
applied in pursuit of the objectives underlying the discipline.
1333
 In essence, this is what the 
European Commission did by leaving purely data protection-related interests aside and 
instead assessing possible competition concerns resulting from the combination of datasets in 
Google/DoubleClick and from data concentration in Facebook/WhatsApp. Irrespective of the 
fact that the European Commission and the Court of Justice are currently hesitant towards the 
inclusion of data protection interests in competition law, the more normative question can be 
raised whether the protection of this non-efficiency concern should be considered in the 
competition analysis.  
 
10.3.2 Weighing pros and cons of integrating data protection interests in EU competition 
policy 
WHY GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS? - In the literature, calls have 
been made upon the European Commission to give greater consideration to non-efficiency 
concerns in competition cases.
1334
 The use of the relatively strong enforcement mechanism of 
EU competition law to foster other interests like media pluralism, public health or 
environmental protection is argued to result into a better protection of such non-efficiency 
concerns which are often safeguarded by legal regimes that lack the necessary force to be 
truly effective. In addition, the democratic legitimacy of competition law could increase when 
its scope of protection goes beyond preserving economic efficiency. At the same time, the 
protection of non-efficiency considerations by way of the application of competition law may 
create legal uncertainty and complicate the enforcement of the competition rules in individual 
cases. A similar weighing of pros and cons applies when considering the desirability of 
integrating data protection interests in EU competition policy. 
CONS OF INTEGRATING DATA PROTECTION INTERESTS IN EU COMPETITION POLICY -  On the one 
hand, there are reasons why competition policy would not be well-placed to serve as a 
mechanism to advance better data protection standards. As explained in section 9.4, data 
protection can form an aspect of quality but is often traded off against price and other quality 
dimensions such as relevance and personalisation. If data protection is not an isolated aspect 
of quality and interacts with other quality dimensions, consumer preferences for the product 
or service at issue will be heterogeneous. In such circumstances, competition authorities 
should not use their competences to impose a preference for strong data protection on 
consumers. Instead, it is the role of competition authorities to keep markets competitive in 
order to ensure that consumers can choose themselves between a variety of products and 
services with different characteristics. A prerequisite for the existence of a well-functioning 
market is that consumer and data protection law are effectively applied to enable individuals 
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to exercise a genuine and well-informed choice. Since data protection is valued differently by 
distinct groups of consumers, it is argued that competition enforcement would become less 
predictable and transparent if its focus on economic efficiency were to be set aside at times in 
order to increase the level of data protection offered by a particular undertaking.
1335
 It rather 
seems the task of the legislator to impose stricter data protection standards which also have a 
more general scope of application than the remedies adopted in individual competition cases. 
In this regard, the US Federal Trade Commission argued in its Google/DoubleClick statement 
that ‘regulating the privacy requirements of just one company could itself pose a serious 
detriment to competition in this vast and rapidly evolving industry’.1336 Specific issues 
involving the protection of personal data are perhaps best left to data protection authorities 
which have the necessary expertise to enforce data protection rules and to oversee activities 
relating to the processing of personal data.  
SELECTING THE MOST APPROPRIATE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR A PARTICULAR TYPE OF HARM - 
Against this background, US Federal Trade Commissioner Ohlhausen and her Attorney 
Advisor Okuliar proposed to rely on a three screen test to select the most appropriate legal 
framework to deal with a particular concern by looking at (1) the type of harm, (2) its scope 
and (3) the effectiveness of the available remedies. Harm caused by a reduction in economic 
efficiency is likely to be best tackled under competition law, while other types of more 
personal harm are more appropriately dealt with under data protection law. Whereas the latter 
legal field focuses on the protection of individual data subjects, competition law protects 
consumer welfare in a broader way. As a result, it is less appropriate to apply competition law 
as the scope of the respective data protection harm is more individualised. With regard to the 
available remedies, data protection law offers more effective remedies in response to data 
protection-related violations than competition law which only provides for remedies if there 
has also been harm to competition.
1337
 As a side note, it is important to keep in mind that the 
rights granted to data subjects under EU data protection law apply irrespective of whether any 
harm to an individual is caused.
1338
 In the EU context, it is therefore more appropriate to 
speak of the type of violation instead of the type of harm. 
PROS OF INTEGRATING DATA PROTECTION INTERESTS IN EU COMPETITION POLICY - On the other 
hand, there are reasons why it would be desirable to integrate data protection interests in EU 
competition policy. Despite the delivery of several high-profile judgments by the Court of 
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Justice such as Google Spain
1339
 and Schrems
1340
, EU data protection law remains rather 
under-enforced to date while compliance is not as rigorous as one would like to believe.
1341
 
This begs the question of whether EU competition law with its strong enforcement 
mechanism should contribute to promoting data protection interests. The commonality in 
objectives of EU data protection and competition law may plead for such an integrated 
approach towards the protection of the interests of individuals.  
 
10.3.3 Three-layer approach towards the integration of data protection interests in EU 
competition policy 
STATE AID IN THE TAX SECTOR AS AN ILLUSTRATION - Irrespective of whether it is considered 
desirable to advance data protection interests through competition enforcement, it is important 
to note that nothing prevents competition law from being applied alongside data protection 
law in case a particular type of conduct or a proposed concentration also raises economic 
efficiency concerns. As an illustration of such a situation in a different field, reference can be 
made to the state aid cases in the area of corporate taxation. In parallel to the introduction of a 
number of legislative initiatives to improve the corporate tax environment in the EU, the 
European Commission declared the selective tax advantages granted to Fiat in Luxembourg 
and Starbucks in the Netherlands as well as a Belgian tax scheme illegal under EU state aid 
rules.
1342
 These enforcement activities and ongoing investigations into tax rulings involving 
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Apple in Ireland,
1343
 Amazon in Luxembourg
1344
 and McDonald’s in Luxembourg1345 should 
be seen against this broader background. The active role of the Commission as a competition 
authority in this sector has served as a lever to break open the gridlock around the ongoing 
reform of corporate taxation in the EU.
1346
  
ADVANCING DATA PROTECTION INTERESTS BY PROTECTING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY - In a similar 
way, the Commission could rely on the regimes of merger review and abuse of dominance 
under EU competition law in order to enhance the effectiveness of data protection law and 
help to achieve its goal of protecting data subjects. For example, by blocking a merger 
between two social network providers on the ground that it significantly impedes effective 
competition through its effect on the market for social networking services, the Commission 
can also prevent that previously separate datasets are combined and that personal data is used 
for incompatible purposes. In such a situation, competition law is applied to protect economic 
efficiency and at the same time achieves results that also foster data protection interests. This 
scenario has a resemblance with the acquisition of EMI by Universal discussed in the 
previous section where the Commission took into account the negative effect on cultural 
diversity but merely as a consequence of the more economic impact of the concentration on 
innovation and consumer choice. In both cases, the protection of the non-efficiency concerns 
at stake is not the aim of the measures taken by the Commission but rather their indirect 
result. In other words, competition law is applied in accordance with its inherent limitations as 
a body of law mainly concerned with economic efficiency. Another situation in which the 
protection of competition will at the same time advance data protection interests occurs if data 
protection is an isolated aspect of product quality and a key parameter of competition in a 
market. A competition law intervention to address the anticompetitive effects of a type of 
behaviour or a merger will then at the same time foster data protection. Considering the status 
of data protection as a fundamental right in the EU legal order, it is submitted that EU 
competition policy may have to go further than indirectly protecting data protection interests 
in situations where certain conduct or a proposed concentration simultaneously raises 
economic efficiency concerns, or where data protection is a key parameter of competition. 
SPECIAL STATUS OF DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER - In 
this regard, one should note that the Lisbon Treaty brought about changes in the EU 
institutional framework as a result of which data protection cannot simply be regarded as any 
other non-efficiency concern. In particular, the Lisbon Treaty introduced the new Article 16 
TFEU which has placed the right to data protection among the provisions having general 
application in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In conjunction with 
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Article 7 TFEU, the EU institutions have to ensure consistency between different policies and 
activities which now also includes data protection.
1347
 In addition and more importantly, with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became 
legally binding as a source of primary EU law and thereby elevated data protection to a 
fundamental right in the EU legal order. In this regard, Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights makes clear that the EU institutions are under a duty to respect and 
promote the application of the rights contained in the Charter. The EU therefore does not only 
have a negative duty to avoid violations (i.e. respect the fundamental rights) but also a 
positive obligation to take action to uphold (i.e. promote the application of) the fundamental 
rights. This implies that the European Commission is also bound by the fundamental rights of 
the Charter, including the right to data protection set out in Article 8, when acting in the field 
of EU competition law.
1348
 In line with the wording used in Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, a distinction can be made between a negative duty to respect the right to 
data protection and a positive duty to promote the application of the right to data protection.  
NEGATIVE DUTY TO RESPECT THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION AS 
REGARDS PROCEDURE - As a fundamental right to be protected by the EU institutions, the right 
to data protection contained in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights imposes 
limits on the application of EU competition law in terms of procedure as well as substance. 
As regards procedure, the European Commission has to implement safeguards in its 
competition investigations to ensure that the right to data protection is respected.
1349
 In this 
perspective, the question arises whether undertakings may invoke a violation of the right to 
data protection or the right to privacy in order to seek annulment of a measure or decision 
taken by a competition authority. However, as case law of the General Court suggests, not all 
acts taken by the Commission are challengeable in themselves and, additionally, companies 
may not have legal standing to bring claims based on a violation of their employees’ right to 
privacy, as considered in Nexans, and the right to data protection, as explored in 
Pilkington.
1350
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NEXANS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY DURING COMPETITION LAW INSPECTIONS - In Nexans, the 
General Court made clear that ‘the copying of each document and the asking of each question 
during an inspection are not to be regarded as acts separable from the decision under which 
the inspection was ordered but as measures implementing that decision’.1351 Since the 
contested acts were considered to form part of the inspection decision, the applications for 
annulment of the these acts were declared inadmissible.
1352
 In the view of the General Court, 
two other options had been open to Nexans to bring claims against the Commission which 
would have affected the legality of its decisions. Nexans could either have waited until the 
Commission had adopted its final decision and have tried to challenge that decision on the 
ground of a violation of the right to privacy of its employees under Article 263 TFEU.
1353
 It is 
important to note, however, that this would not have enabled Nexans to prevent the 
Commission from copying and reviewing documents potentially containing employees’ 
personal data.
1354
 Alternatively, Nexans could simply have refused to give access to the 
requested documents and to provide answers to the inspectors’ questions during the 
inspection. If the Commission would afterwards have taken a decision on the basis of Article 
23(1)(c) and (d) of Regulation 1/2003 imposing a fine for such refusals to cooperate, Nexans 
could have challenged this decision which would be distinct from the inspection decision and 
the final decision adopted by the Commission.
1355
 However, by refusing to comply with the 
Commission’s requests during the inspection, Nexans would have exposed itself to the risk of 
a fine in the hope that its reliance on the right to privacy would succeed in the end.
1356
 As a 
result, these two other options do not seem to provide the same level of protection as if 
separate acts taken by the Commission during an inspection would be challengeable in their 
own right. As a third option and with regard to the copy that the Commission took of several 
computer files and of the hard drive of one of Nexans’ employees, the General Court referred 
to the possibility of bringing an action against the Commission for non-contractual liability on 
the basis of Article 340 TFEU. However, as made clear by the General Court, such a remedy 
is not part of the system for the review of the legality of acts of the European Union.
1357
 A 
claim for non-contractual liability thus suffers from the limitation that it does not affect the 
legality of the decisions of the Commission. One should keep in mind that such a claim is 
only of use for undertakings to claim damages for the harm suffered on account of the 
unlawful conduct on the part of the Commission. 
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PILKINGTON AND THE LEGAL STANDING  OF COMPANIES TO RAISE CLAIMS RELATING TO THE 
PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES’ PERSONAL DATA - Even in cases where the actions of the 
Commission are challengeable, the company concerned must still demonstrate that it has legal 
standing to raise claims relating to the protection of the privacy or personal data of its 
employees. After all, as an economic entity, a company cannot as such benefit from the 
protection offered by a fundamental right applicable to individuals. In Pilkington, a company 
brought an application for interim measures in order to prevent the publication of certain 
information by the Commission which would cause prejudice to the right to data protection of 
its employees who were allegedly involved in the implementation of a cartel. In this context, 
the General Court argued that ‘the applicant cannot rely on the damage which its employees 
alone would suffer [...] rather the applicant must show that such damage is likely to entail – 
for itself – serious and irreparable personal harm’.1358 The General Court considered that 
Pilkington had not ‘succeeded in establishing that the alleged damage to the interests of its 
employees would entail serious and irreparable harm for its undertaking as such’. In 
particular, the General Court found that Pilkington had confined ‘itself to a vague and 
speculative assertion’ and had not provided ‘any details in that regard or substantiate[d] its 
assertion with any evidence’. Similarly, Pilkington had failed to show, in the view of the 
General Court, that it would have been ‘in the interests of the sound administration of justice 
for it to ensure the collective defence of the interests of the employees concerned on the 
ground that they cannot be required, because there are so many of them, to bring separate 
actions to secure protection of their personal data’.1359 Considering the high standards set by 
the General Court in Pilkington, it will not be easy for companies in the future to show a level 
of harm to their own interests sufficient for giving them legal standing. At the same time, the 
General Court has put forward several ways in Nexans in which companies may successfully 
rely on the right to privacy or the right to data protection of their employees to attack the 
legality of decisions taken by the Commission.
1360
 As a result, the Commission should be 
prepared to respect these fundamental rights in its competition investigations. 
NEGATIVE DUTY TO RESPECT THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE - With 
respect to substance, competition law remedies have to be brought in line with the right to 
data protection in the sense that the European Commission cannot adopt measures that violate 
this fundamental right. For instance, when the Commission remedies a form of abuse under 
Article 102 TFEU by requiring a dominant undertaking to share personal data with 
competitors, it has to prevent that this form of processing breaches the principle of fair and 
lawful processing and the notion of purpose specification as laid down in Article 8(2) of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As suggested in the context of the French GDF Suez case 
discussed in section 9.5 above, the Commission could comply with this negative duty by 
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 Order in Pilkington Group Ltd v. European Commission, T-462/12 R, ECLI:EU:T:2013:119, par. 40. The 
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Investigations: An Overview of the Challenges", World Competition 2014, vol. 37, no. 1, (69), p. 101 who plead 
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authorities would ‘be prevented from relying on evidence which they have gathered in violation of data 
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making a statement in its decision that the competition law duty to share data should be 
implemented in conformity with EU data protection law. 
POSITIVE DUTY TO PROMOTE THE APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION - A more 
controversial issue is to what extent the Commission can be considered to be bound under the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to take proactive measures to promote the application of 
the right to data protection. It should be noted at the outset that the principle of legality 
precludes the Commission from using its competences in the field of EU competition law to 
advance data protection interests in the absence of any economic efficiency concerns that 
trigger the application of Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU or the EU merger regime. In 
this regard, Article 51(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly states that the 
Charter does not establish any new power or task for the EU, or modify powers and tasks 
defined by the Treaties. However, when acting in its capacity as a competition authority to 
address identified violations of the competition rules, the Commission could guarantee the 
effectiveness of the right to data protection by adopting measures that actively promote data 
protection interests and go beyond what is necessary to protect economic efficiency concerns. 
The wording of Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights may even be argued to  
give rise to a duty for the Commission to take such positive action. While competition 
authorities cannot and should not use their competences to promote data protection interests if 
no violations of the competition rules can be identified, a better alignment between the two 
fields would benefit consumer welfare in situations where a competition law infringement 
interacts with data protection interests. To this end, the scope for the Commission to take such 
a proactive approach seems to be present in particular when requiring remedies from the 
parties to a merger
1361
 and in commitment proceedings
1362
.  
LEEWAY OF THE COMMISSION IN NEGOTIATING MERGER REMEDIES AND COMMITMENTS IN 
ARTICLE 101 AND 102 TFEU CASES - In both situations, undertakings find themselves at the 
mercy of the Commission to approve a merger or to abstain from adopting a prohibition 
decision and imposing a fine for a breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU. This position gives the 
Commission scope to demand measures that do not only end the harm identified and restore 
competition but also reduce the risk of future violations. In the context of commitments 
proceedings, the Court of Justice made clear in Alrosa that while the principle of 
proportionality applies to both prohibition and commitment decisions, the application of that 
principle nonetheless differs according to the nature of the procedure.
1363
 In this regard, the 
Court of Justice stated that undertakings which offer commitments ‘consciously accept that 
the concessions they make may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose on them’ 
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in a prohibition decision.
1364
 Considering that commitment decisions are typically not 
challenged in court, the Commission has some leeway to take a more proactive approach and 
facilitate the effectiveness of the right to data protection in a way that might otherwise not 
have been possible under EU data protection law. 
 
Three-layer approach towards the integration of data protection interests in 
EU competition policy: 
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Comparison with 
other non-
efficiency concerns 
Character of the obligation 
incumbent on the European 
Commission as a 
competition authority 
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application of 
competition law 
Data protection 
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Protection of economic efficiency 
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protection as a 
fundamental right in 
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protection on the basis of 
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Scenario 2: economic efficiency 
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protection when taking 
competition law measures 
Take proactive 
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guarantee the 
effectiveness of the 
right to data 
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IMPROVING CONSUMER WELFARE - Despite the often expressed criticism that the use of 
remedies and commitments in this way will lead to an undue expansion of the Commission’s 
competences and will shift competition law towards a more regulatory model,
1365
 such an 
approach can be beneficial from the perspective of consumers. In particular, it may lead to a 
more proper form of protection in a time where the boundaries between different legal fields 
are blurring and there is a need for coherent enforcement of EU law. Due to the elevation of 
data protection to a fundamental right, it could even be argued that the Commission does not 
have a choice anymore but rather an obligation stemming from the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to actively take measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to 
data protection.
1366
 Against this background, the interplay between data protection, on the one 
hand, and merger review and abuse of dominance, on the other hand, is discussed in the next 
two sections. 
 
10.4 Data protection interests in merger review 
This section outlines how the three-layer approach put forward above for integrating data 
protection interests into EU competition policy can be applied to merger review. In particular, 
it is discussed how data-related competition concerns in mergers should be assessed and to 
what extent there is room for positive action by the European Commission to integrate data 
protection considerations into its merger decisions. 
 
10.4.1 Assessing data-related competition concerns in merger cases 
PRIVACY AS A PARAMETER OF COMPETITION - In Google/DoubleClick and 
Facebook/WhatsApp, the European Commission explicitly stated that its merger analysis 
solely took place on the basis of EU competition rules and was without prejudice to 
obligations under data protection law. While the Commission did not assess the effect of the 
respective mergers on the protection of personal data and privacy as such, it did consider 
issues relating to data protection and privacy to the extent relevant for the competition 
analysis. In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission referred to privacy as one of the 
dimensions or parameters on the basis of which competition was taking place between 
providers of consumer communications apps. If data protection or privacy is a significant 
parameter of competition in a particular market, competition authorities have to take it into 
account in order to make a reliable analysis of the competitive situation. The Commission did 
not specifically analyse the Facebook/WhatsApp merger in the light of privacy as a dimension 
of competition, because it considered privacy to constitute only one out of several parameters 
of competition in the market for consumer communications apps.
1367
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DATA-RELATED COMPETITION CONCERNS - With respect to the data-related competition 
concerns identified in the two merger cases, the Commission analysed the impact on the 
market of the combination of datasets in Google/DoubleClick and of data concentration in 
Facebook/WhatsApp. It is striking that the Commission has so far only assessed the effect of 
such competition concerns on the advertising side of the market. When assessing the 
competitive impact of the combination of the two data collections in Google/DoubleClick, the 
Commission referred to the possibility of the merged entity to use the combined dataset in 
order to better target ads to users.
1368
 As regards the potential data concentration issues in 
Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission analysed two theories of harm ‘according to which 
Facebook could strengthen its position in online advertising’, namely by introducing 
advertising on WhatsApp and/or using WhatsApp as a potential source of user data for the 
purpose of improving the targeting of Facebook’s advertising activities outside WhatsApp.1369 
The Commission did not consider the effect of the data-related competition concerns on the 
user side of the market in these merger cases. This despite the important role of data in the 
process of optimising and personalising services provided to users. In order to gain reliable 
insight into data-related competition concerns in merger cases, competition authorities should 
also reflect on the possible effects of the combination of datasets or data concentration on 
effective competition in the provision of services to users. In addition, the significance of data 
for the development of new products and services was not taken into account in 
Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp. The collection of data on users’ behaviour and 
interests also enables undertakings to identify trends and changes in preferences which helps 
them to develop new products and services for which there is potential demand.
1370
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DEFINITION OF A POTENTIAL MARKET FOR DATA - In such circumstances, the competitive 
effects of a combination of datasets or greater data concentration caused by a merger go 
beyond existing markets. Such effects cannot be adequately considered when solely relying 
on a competition analysis in the relevant markets for the end products or services provided to 
users and advertisers. This problem can be solved by defining a potential market for data in 
addition to the existing relevant markets for the user and advertiser side of online platforms. 
The definition of such an additional market for data would enable competition authorities to 
more fully assess possible competition concerns relating to the asset that is used as an input to 
improve existing services and to develop new ones. In addition, it would allow for a more 
forward-looking stance towards market definition which does not merely rely on how data is 
currently used for the development of existing end products and services.
1371
 As regards 
merger review, the current distinction made between horizontal, vertical and conglomerate 
mergers does not always seem adequate to identify possible data-related competition issues. 
Even if a merger does not lead to a horizontal or vertical overlap or does not give rise to 
conglomerate effects in terms of the products and services that are offered by the merging 
parties, a combination of datasets may still have a competitive impact. In particular, it may 
give the merged entity a greater amount or variety of data to be used to improve existing 
services or to develop new ones. As proposed in part I, even if data is not traded to third 
parties and no ‘real market’ exists in which supply and demand for data can be identified, a 
hypothetical or potential market for data could be defined by regarding data as a specialised 
asset in analogy to the EU Horizontal Guidelines.
1372
 
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK AND FACEBOOK/WHATSAPP IN THE LIGHT OF A POTENTIAL MARKET FOR 
DATA - At the same time, it is important to note that the fact that no market for the provision 
of data could be defined in Facebook/WhatsApp did not form a reason for the Commission to 
refrain from assessing potential data concentration issues.
1373
 Nevertheless, by defining a 
potential market for data competition authorities would be able to undertake a more complete 
analysis of competition concerns relating to a combination of datasets or data concentration in 
merger cases. This would be a welcome development in merger review considering that 
acquisitions in the online environment are said to be increasingly motivated by the underlying 
dataset of the target undertaking.
1374
 In a March 2016 speech, the Competition Commissioner 
stated in this regard that what makes a company an attractive merger partner is not always 
turnover: ‘Sometimes, what matters are its assets. That could be a customer base or even a set 
of data’. Even though the Competition Commissioner argues that ‘our test is nimble enough 
to be applied in a meaningful way to the "new economy"’,1375 the limitations of the current 
static approach to market definition in competition law have prevented the Commission from 
conducting a more forward-looking assessment in its Google/DoubleClick and 
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Facebook/WhatsApp merger decisions. While, respectively, Google and DoubleClick as well 
as Facebook and WhatsApp might not have been close competitors in the relevant markets for 
the services they offered to consumers, it is likely that the Commission would have been able 
to identify current or foreseeable future competitive constraints relating to data as an input for 
Google’s and Facebook’s services. Regardless of whether such constraints would have called 
for additional remedies or even for a prohibition of the mergers, these issues would have been 
worth an assessment by the Commission.
1376
 
ACQUISITION OF NEST BY GOOGLE IN THE LIGHT OF A POTENTIAL MARKET FOR DATA - The 
added value of conducting an additional competition analysis of a potential relevant market 
for data can also be illustrated by reference to the acquisition of Nest by Google in early 
2014.
1377
 Nest, a producer of smart home devices such as thermostats and smoke detectors, 
was not competing with Google in any relevant product market when it was acquired by 
Google. Nevertheless, this move of Google has reinforced its position with regard to access to 
data about the behaviour of consumers.
1378
 The acquisition of Nest has arguably not only 
impacted Google’s ability to improve the relevance of existing services offered to users and 
advertisers on its search platform, but may also enable Google to develop new products on the 
basis of the new insights gained by analysing the additional data from Nest and combining it 
with its own information. The US Federal Trade Commission, which cleared the deal in 
February 2014,
1379
 would have been able to assess such concerns in more detail had it defined 
an input market for data.
1380
 
VIEWS OF THE EDPS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE ROLE OF DATA PROTECTION IN 
MERGER REVIEW - The EDPS has criticised the analysis of the European Commission in 
Google/DoubleClick on a different basis. In its Preliminary Opinion on ‘Privacy and 
competitiveness in the age of big data’, the EDPS argued that the Commission due to its 
‘purely economic approach to the case [...] neglected the longer term impact on the welfare 
of millions of users in the event that the combined undertaking’s information generated by 
search (Google) and browsing (DoubleClick) were later processed for incompatible 
purposes’ under data protection law.1381 Although it does not add a conclusion to its 
reasoning, the EDPS seems to suggest the Commission to use its competences under merger 
control to advance data protection interests irrespective of the existence of any economic 
efficiency concerns. In the extreme, such an approach may lead to the situation that a merger 
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which does not significantly impede effective competition is blocked on the sole basis that it 
may give rise to future data protection issues. The Commission finds itself at the other side of 
the spectrum considering its statements in Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp that 
its merger analysis was without prejudice to the obligations imposed on the parties by data 
protection legislation and that privacy-related concerns do not fall within the scope of EU 
competition law. While the approach of the EDPS is too blunt and would require the 
European Commission to go beyond the competences granted to it as a competition authority, 
the Commission is submitted to be too conservative by denying any role for data protection 
interests in competition law. In order to develop a more refined approach towards the 
integration of data protection considerations in merger review, two scenarios can be 
distinguished depending on whether a merger is found to significantly impede effective 
competition or not. 
 
10.4.2 Scenario 1: the merger does not significantly impede effective competition 
IMPOSSIBILITY AND UNDESIRABILITY OF BLOCKING MERGERS FOR PURE DATA PROTECTION 
PURPOSES - If a proposed transaction does not significantly impede effective competition, the 
European Commission has to declare the merger compatible with the common market in 
accordance with Articles 6(1)(b) and 8(1) of the EU Merger Regulation. In those situations, 
the Commission does not have the competence to impose any remedies or even block the 
merger because it might raise data protection issues. Even if the European Commission were 
to block a merger for the mere reason that the resulting combination of datasets or the 
increased concentration of data might give rise to data protection concerns, this may actually 
have the perverse effect of providing incentives to the parties to structure their transaction in a 
way which would avoid triggering the application of the merger control rules, for example by 
sharing data through licensing agreements.
1382
 The integration of data protection issues into 
merger analysis in such a way therefore does not seem to constitute an adequate means to 
foster data protection interests on a long term basis. 
ROLE OF ARTICLE 21(4) OF THE EU MERGER REGULATION - Since merger review is without 
prejudice to the obligations of the parties under data protection law, the approval of a 
transaction under the EU Merger Regulation does not prevent national data protection 
authorities from initiating their own parallel investigation to examine whether the 
concentration raises any data protection issues. In order to achieve a better coordination 
between the European Commission as a competition authority and the national data protection 
authorities in this regard, Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation may be relied upon by 
Member States. As discussed in the context of the NewsCorp/BSkyB merger in section 10.2 
above, this provision enables Member States to take appropriate measures to protect public 
interests other than those considered in merger review. Data protection is not explicitly 
mentioned as a legitimate interest, unlike public security, plurality of the media and prudential 
rules. This means that a Member State has to notify data protection as a public interest to the 
Commission before it is entitled to take appropriate measures to this end on the national level. 
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The Commission then has to decide whether data protection can be recognised as a legitimate 
interest on the basis of its compatibility with the general principles and other provisions of 
Community law. 
DATA PROTECTION AS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST UNDER ARTICLE 21(4) OF THE EU MERGER 
REGULATION - Since the right to data protection is mentioned among the principles of general 
application in Article 16 TFEU and is protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
the Commission does not seem to have much room to reject data protection as a legitimate 
interest under Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation when invoked by a Member State. 
Nevertheless, data protection is different than the public interests that are explicitly mentioned 
in the provision because it is not an issue solely subject to national law.
1383
 After all, the right 
to data protection is recognised as an EU fundamental right. At the same time, even though 
the General Data Protection Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States and does 
not need national implementing legislation, the enforcement of EU data protection law will 
continue to take place at the national level.
1384
 One could therefore argue that there is no 
reason why a Member State should not be able to invoke data protection as a legitimate 
interest under Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation. In case questions would arise about 
which national data protection authority is best placed to take action, it is submitted that the 
new one-stop-shop mechanism could be applied which prescribes that the national data 
protection authority of the main establishment of the controller or processor is competent. 
LIMITS TO THE ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE 21(4) OF THE EU MERGER REGULATION - It is 
important to note that the analysis conducted by a Member State under Article 21(4) takes 
place on the basis of national law and outside the framework of EU merger review. If a new 
public interest such as data protection will indeed be accepted by the Commission as a 
legitimate basis for adopting measures to protect non-efficiency considerations at the national 
level, the Member State may, on the basis of national law, subject a merger to additional 
conditions and may even block it if prohibiting the transaction altogether is proportionate in 
order to protect the public interest concerned. However, since EU data protection law does not 
provide national data protection authorities with the possibility to adopt any prospective or 
structural measures, it does not seem possible for a national data protection authority to 
subject a merger to any conditions, let alone block it, if it does not give rise to data protection 
issues at the time the merger is approved by the Commission under the EU Merger 
Regulation. Merger analysis is forward-looking by nature and the EU Merger Regulation 
explicitly provides for the possibility to block mergers which are incompatible with the 
common market. This while the current Data Protection Directive and the future General Data 
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Protection Regulation only provide for behavioural remedies by enabling national data 
protection authorities to sanction companies after they have infringed data protection law and 
to require changes in the way they process personal data. These instruments do not enable 
data protection authorities to take action in order to prevent certain market developments from 
occurring that might have a detrimental effect on data protection interests in the future. 
POSSIBLE USE OF ARTICLE 21(4) OF THE EU MERGER REGULATION IN GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK - 
By criticising the Commission in Google/DoubleClick for not taking into account the 
possibility that Google would start to use the combined data for incompatible purposes, the 
EDPS seems to attempt to lay the ground for the adoption of measures in merger cases that 
prevent possible data protection problems from arising. Even if a Member State had relied on 
Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation in order to examine the merger in the light of its 
impact on data protection, its national data protection authority would not have been 
competent to impose any conditions on the transaction because the acquisition of DoubleClick 
by Google did not in itself breach data protection law. The sole possibility that a violation of 
data protection law might occur in the future if, for example, the combined data of Google 
and DoubleClick would be used for incompatible purposes, had not given a national data 
protection authority the competence to take pre-emptive measures in order to protect the data 
protection interests of users. Allowing the fields of data protection and competition law to 
blend in such a way would jeopardise legal certainty and create the situation that remedies or 
conditions will be imposed on a transaction which actually complies with both the applicable 
competition and data protection rules but not with the mix of the two that is put forward by 
data protection advocates such as the EDPS.
1385
  
LAUNCH OF PARALLEL INVESTIGATION BY A NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY - A 
national data protection authority would thus only be entitled to impose conditions to a 
merger under Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation if the transaction in and of itself 
infringes data protection rules. If a national data protection authority merely anticipates that 
certain data protection issues might occur at some point in the future after the merger has been 
finalised, its only option is to monitor whether the merged entity continues to comply with its 
data protection obligations. Once there are indications that the merged entity is breaching data 
protection rules, it may start an investigation on its own initiative on the basis of data 
protection law and thus outside the framework of Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation. 
The procedure under the latter provision therefore only seems to have relevance for mergers 
that at the time of their notification to the Commission under EU merger review already raise 
data protection issues.  
REQUIREMENT OF DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENTS INTRODUCED BY THE GENERAL 
DATA PROTECTION REGULATION - One should note, however, that the General Data Protection 
Regulation introduces new requirements for controllers which will enable national data 
protection authorities to monitor risky processing activities more proactively. Under Article 
35(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation, controllers must, prior to the processing, 
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carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection 
of personal data where a type of processing is likely to result in a high risk for the rights and 
freedoms of individuals. Article 36(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation requires the 
controller to consult the competent national data protection authority prior to the processing 
of personal data in situations where the data protection impact assessment indicates that the 
processing would result in a high risk in the absence of measures taken by the controller. It is 
submitted that the obligation of a controller to conduct a data protection impact assessment 
would also apply in case a merger gives rise to a combination of previously separate datasets 
which contain personal data. Because of the risk that personal data will be processed for 
incompatible purposes after the merger, the merged entity may have to take mitigation 
measures and consult the national data protection authority before the start of the processing 
activities. In this way, the data protection authority can closely monitor how personal data are 
processed after the merger and give advice to the controller even though no violation of EU 
data protection law could be identified at the time the merger had been notified to the 
European Commission under EU merger review. 
ACCOUNTABILITY AS A KEY PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION - In addition, the principle of accountability, which is explicitly mentioned and 
plays a significant role in the General Data Protection Regulation, may enable national data 
protection authorities to act in a more proactive way. The principle of accountability implies 
that the controller is responsible for and able to demonstrate compliance with EU data 
protection rules.
1386
 For instance, Article 24(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation 
requires controllers to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure 
and be able to demonstrate that the processing of personal data is performed in compliance 
with the rules. Upon request of a data protection authority, controllers thus have to be able to 
show that adequate measures are in place to ensure that their processing activities comply 
with EU data protection law. 
 
10.4.3 Scenario 2: the merger significantly impedes effective competition 
SCOPE FOR PROACTIVE MERGER REMEDIES - When a proposed transaction is found to 
significantly impede effective competition, the merging parties typically offer remedies to the 
European Commission to address the identified competition concerns with a view to 
rendering the concentration compatible with the common market. In accordance with Articles 
6(2) and 8(2) of the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission attaches conditions and 
obligations to its decision intended to ensure that the merging parties comply with the 
commitments they have entered into vis-à-vis the Commission in this regard. Because the 
merging parties are dependent on the discretion of the Commission to prevent the merger 
from being blocked, the Commission has scope to require remedies that go beyond ending the 
identified competition concerns and that have a more structural impact. As discussed in the 
previous section, the scope for prospective analysis under EU data protection law is limited. 
In particular, the current Data Protection Directive and the future General Data Protection 
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Regulation do not give national data protection authorities the competence to adopt structural 
measures to prevent possible future data protection issues from occurring. By imposing 
conditions to a merger, the Commission may be able to overcome this limitation. Conditions 
could be adopted which not only address economic efficiency concerns but also guarantee the 
effectiveness of the right to data protection in a way that would otherwise not have been 
available to national data protection authorities when enforcing data protection law.  
INVOLVING DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MERGER REMEDIES - 
For example, if the combination of datasets is considered to strengthen the position of the 
merged entity in a particular relevant market in such a way as to significantly impede 
effective competition, the Commission could require the merging parties to keep their datasets 
separate. In this light, former US Federal Trade Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour 
suggested in her dissenting statement regarding the Google/DoubleClick merger that it may 
have been desirable to mandate a firewall between the data of Google and DoubleClick for 
some period of time to prevent any anticompetitive effects.
1387
 In line with the positive duty 
of the Commission to promote the application of the right to data protection included in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, it could involve the competent national data protection 
authority in the implementation of the merger remedies. In this regard, it is instructive to note 
that the establishment of a firewall between the datasets of the merging parties would also 
prevent personal data to be used for incompatible purposes under EU data protection law. 
This way, a remedy designed to address economic efficiency concerns could be extended to 
include commitments with regard to how the merged entity will handle personal data after the 
merger. To ensure that the merged entity indeed keeps the datasets separate as committed to 
the Commission, the competent national data protection authority could be put in charge of 
monitoring whether personal data is not exchanged between previously distinct services. This 
would also enable the data protection authority to require the merged entity to take pre-
emptive measures to prevent that personal data is being combined and, as a consequence, used 
for incompatible purposes. A breach of the notion of compatible use would imply a violation 
of the conditions imposed by the Commission in the merger decision. In accordance with 
Article 14(2)(d) of the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission may then impose fines up to 
1% of the aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned if they intentionally or 
negligently fail to comply with one of the conditions included in the merger decision. 
SCOPE FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES - The question can be raised whether a 
further cooperation between competition and data protection authorities should be realised in 
general. In this regard, the current EDPS Buttarelli
1388
 suggested competition authorities to 
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inform data protection authorities when investigating a merger or an alleged anticompetitive 
practice in the digital sector.
1389
 While it is indeed desirable for the two types of authorities to 
exchange views on cases that are under parallel investigation by competition and data 
protection authorities, it should be kept in mind that the cause of concerns is different in the 
two legal fields. Unlike competition law, data protection law is not concerned with scale as 
such in the sense that a breach of data protection rules can be equally damaging to the 
interests of individual data subjects irrespective of the market position of the firm and the size 
of the dataset or the processing activities.
1390
 Data protection authorities should thus not limit 
their resources to investigate cases that are notified to them by competition authorities if such 
a collaboration between the two types of authorities would be established in the future.  
 
10.5 Data protection interests and abuse of dominance  
INDICATIONS OF DOMINANCE IN MARKETS FOR FREE SERVICES - Data protection is also 
becoming of relevance to competition enforcement in the area of Article 102 TFEU. In this 
context, data protection may play a role in assessing dominance as well as in establishing 
abuse. It is argued that a serial disregard for the privacy interests of consumers forms an 
indication that an undertaking has the power to behave independently in the market and thus 
possesses a dominant position.
1391
 The fact that, for example, a company can make its terms 
and conditions less privacy-friendly without losing a significant number of customers is 
alleged to point to the existence of dominance.
1392
 Such a reasoning would only be valid in 
markets where data protection in itself, instead of price or variety of services, is a key 
parameter of competition. As explained in section 9.4 above, no competition case has yet 
been fully analysed in the light of the protection of personal data or privacy as a dimension of 
competition. In its Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU, the 
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European Commission did make a reference to how decisions of undertakings to influence 
non-price parameters of competition could point to the existence of a dominant position. In 
this regard, the Commission stated that an undertaking which is capable of profitably 
increasing prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time can generally be 
regarded as dominant. The Commission made clear that the expression ‘increase prices’ is 
used in this context ‘as shorthand for the various ways in which the parameters of 
competition - such as prices, output, innovation, the variety or quality of goods or services - 
can be influenced to the advantage of the dominant undertaking and to the detriment of 
consumers’.1393 Ironically, the ability to set a very low or zero price in order to limit the scope 
for potential competitors to offer more privacy-friendly services against a monetary fee may 
form an indication of the existence of dominance in online markets. 
DISREGARD FOR PRIVACY AS AN INDICATION OF DOMINANCE? - However, it should be kept in 
mind that a decrease in data protection is not necessarily detrimental to consumer welfare if 
privacy forms only one aspect of quality and is traded off against other product characteristics 
such as price and relevance. A continuous disregard for the privacy of consumers can 
therefore not form an indication of dominance if a decrease in data protection leads to better 
prices or to more relevant end products or services. Nevertheless, if data protection is an 
isolated aspect of quality and does not interrelate with price or other product dimensions,
1394
 a 
serial disrespect for the privacy of consumers may indeed indicate that the undertaking at 
issue is dominant. In these circumstances where data protection is the main parameter of 
competition, an undertaking may lower data protection guarantees to its own advantage and to 
the detriment of consumers.  
EXCESSIVE EXTRACTION OF PERSONAL DATA AS ABUSE OF DOMINANCE - With regard to the role 
of data protection in establishing abuse, the EDPS Buttarelli stated in a 2015 speech that 
‘[w]e should be prepared for potential abuse of dominance cases which also may involve a 
breach of data protection rules’.1395 In 2012, the then-Commissioner for Competition 
Almunia already referred to the possibility that ‘[a] single dominant company could of course 
think to infringe privacy laws to gain an advantage over its competitors’.1396 By collecting 
personal data beyond the consent of data subjects, a company can get more insight into the 
preferences of individuals and thereby create better services for users as well as advertisers. In 
this regard, the excessive extraction of personal data of users has been identified as a potential 
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form of abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU.
1397
 Since personal data replaces price as a 
type of currency in the online environment, exploitative abuse may relate to the excessive 
collection of information about consumers instead of to the monetary price charged for a 
product or service. The question then arises what amount of data is to be considered as 
excessive.  
ESTABLISHING THE EXCESSIVE NATURE OF PRICES - With regard to excessive pricing, the Court 
of Justice argued in United Brands that ‘a price which is excessive because it has no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied’ is abusive under Article 
102 TFEU.
1398
 In its Preliminary Opinion on ‘Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big 
data’, the EDPS seems to rely on this statement in United Brands by stating that exploitative 
abuse may occur if ‘the ‘price’ paid through the surrender of personal information [is] to be 
considered excessive in relation to the value of the service consumed’.1399 In order to establish 
whether the price charged for the Chiquita bananas in United Brands were of an excessive 
nature, the Court suggested to make a comparison between the selling price and the 
production costs which would then disclose the profit margin. If this difference is indeed 
excessive, it would still need to be determined, in the Court’s view, whether the price is unfair 
in itself or when compared to competing products.
1400
 The Court made clear that next to this 
method, alternative ways may be devised of determining whether a price is excessive.
1401
  
ESTABLISHING THE EXCESSIVE NATURE OF DATA COLLECTION - It seems difficult to apply such 
an economic test to assess whether the collection of personal data by a particular firm is 
excessive. Even though surveys and experiments may be held to determine the willingness of 
consumers to reveal certain information in exchange for being provided with a particular 
service,
1402
 it will be hard to prove a form of exploitative abuse relating to the extraction of 
personal data. As explained by the Monopolkommission, an independent expert committee 
which advises the German government and legislature in the area of competition policy, the 
services provided in the online environment may be so complex or user-specific that they 
require a situation- or user-dependent evaluation of the value of the service in question.
1403
 In 
addition, the heterogeneous preferences of consumers towards data protection may ask for a 
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user-specific analysis. While some consumers will not regard a particular form of data 
collection as excessive because they value the higher level of relevance and personalisation 
that it brings about, this may be different for consumers who are more sensitive to data 
protection issues.
1404
 
USING THE PURPOSE LIMITATION AND  DATA MINIMISATION PRINCIPLES AS BENCHMARKS FOR 
ASSESSING ABUSE OF DOMINANCE - Another approach that has been proposed to assess whether 
a certain form of data collection is excessive under Article 102 TFEU involves the use of data 
protection principles as a benchmark against which the existence of abusive behaviour can be 
tested.
1405
 For example, the purpose limitation principle contained in Article 6(1)(b) of the 
Data Protection Directive and Article 5(1)(b) of the General Data Protection Regulation and 
the principle of data minimisation derived from Article 6(1)(c) of the Data Protection 
Directive and Article 5(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulation could be applied. 
Under these principles, controllers have to limit the collection of personal data to what is 
necessary to accomplish a specified and legitimate purpose and cannot retain data any longer 
than necessary to fulfil that purpose. In other words, if a firm extracts personal data beyond 
what is necessary to achieve a particular purpose or keeps it for a period longer than necessary 
to fulfil this purpose, it is violating the data minimisation and purpose limitation principles of 
the Data Protection Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation.  
USING CONSUMER PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AS BENCHMARKS FOR ASSESSING ABUSE OF 
DOMINANCE - A similar analogy can be made with regard to principles used in consumer 
protection law. In speeches, the EDPS Buttarelli also referred to non-negotiable and 
misleading privacy policies as constituting a potential form of abuse of dominance.
1406
 It 
seems hard to determine at what point a (change in) privacy policy should give rise to 
competition law liability under Article 102 TFEU. Article 6(1) of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive
1407
 may be of assistance in this regard. According to this provision, a 
commercial practice has to ‘be regarded as misleading if it contains false information and is 
therefore untruthful or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to 
deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct’ in relation to one 
or more of the elements specified in subsections (a) to (g) such as the nature of the product or 
its main characteristics. 
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GUIDANCE FROM THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN ASTRAZENECA - By using principles from these  
legal regimes as benchmarks for assessing abuse of dominance, data protection and consumer 
protection interests can be integrated in the competition analysis conducted under Article 102 
TFEU. If a particular practice of a dominant firm does not comply with, for example, the 
purpose limitation or data minimisation principle as contained in the Data Protection 
Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation, or qualifies as misleading under the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, this may be taken as an indication of the existence of 
abuse of dominance. Reference can be made in this regard to the AstraZeneca and Allianz 
Hungaria judgments in which the Court of Justice recognised that the breach of one area of 
law can be a factor in deciding that there has been a violation of competition law as well. The 
AstraZeneca case involved a pharmaceutical group which was fined by the European 
Commission for having committed two abuses of a dominant position. One of these abuses 
consisted in the provision of misleading representations to patent offices which was alleged to 
form part of an overall strategy designed to prevent or delay market entry of competing 
generic products. The Court of Justice endorsed the finding of the General Court that 
representations designed to unlawfully obtain exclusive rights constitute an abuse if it is 
established that they are actually liable to lead the public authorities to grant the exclusive 
right applied for.
1408
 Since AstraZeneca’s misleading representations enabled it to obtain 
exclusive rights either to which it was not entitled or to which it was entitled only for a shorter 
period, the Court of Justice confirmed the abuse identified by the Commission and upheld by 
the General Court.
1409
 In this way, the AstraZeneca judgment makes clear that the misuse of 
regulatory procedures is to be regarded as abuse of dominance where such conduct has a 
potential anticompetitive effect.
1410
  
GUIDANCE FROM THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN ALLIANZ  HUNGARIA - The Allianz Hungaria case 
dealt with agreements between insurance companies, on the one hand, and individual car 
repairers and a car repairers’ association, on the other hand. The agreements related to the 
hourly charge to be paid by the insurance company to car dealers in their capacity as repair 
shops. Since the charge was increased in accordance with the number and percentage of 
insurance contracts that the dealer sells for that insurance company, the agreements linked the 
remuneration for the car repair service to that for the car insurance brokerage. The Court 
argued that ‘while the establishment of such a link between two activities which are in 
principle independent does not automatically mean that the agreement concerned has as its 
object the restriction of competition, it can nevertheless constitute an important factor in 
determining whether that agreement is by its nature injurious to the proper functioning of 
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normal competition’.1411 In addition, the Court stated that the agreements at issue could in 
particular amount to a restriction of competition by object where ‘domestic law requires that 
dealers acting as intermediaries or insurance brokers must be independent from the 
insurance companies’.1412 The Court thus put weight on the breach of domestic insurance law 
in identifying a restriction of competition by object under Article 101 TFEU.
1413
 One could 
argue that, in line with this reasoning of the Court of Justice in AstraZeneca and Allianz 
Hungaria, a breach of data protection or consumer protection law may be of relevance in 
assessing a violation of competition law.
1414
  
FACEBOOK INVESTIGATION OF THE BUNDESKARTELLAMT - In March 2016, the 
Bundeskartellamt announced the opening of proceedings against Facebook on suspicion of 
having abused its possible dominant position in the market for social networks. In particular, 
the Bundeskartellamt suspects that Facebook’s terms of service are in violation of data 
protection law and thereby also represent an abusive imposition of unfair conditions on users. 
If a connection can be identified between the alleged data protection infringement and 
Facebook’s possible dominance, the use of unlawful terms and conditions by Facebook could, 
in the view of the Bundeskartellamt, also be regarded as an abuse of dominance under 
competition law.
1415
 The Bundeskartellamt thus appears to rely on data protection law as a 
benchmark for assessing whether certain exploitative behaviour of a dominant firm should be 
considered anticompetitive under Article 102 TFEU. The investigation in fact forms a first 
attempt by a competition authority to integrate data protection interests into competition 
analysis. A possible intervention by the Bundeskartellamt on the basis of competition law 
could thereby also help alleviate data protection concerns. It is worth noting that the 
investigation does not seem to relate to the excessiveness of data collection but rather to the 
question of whether consumers are sufficiently informed about the type and extent of personal 
data collected. The specific benchmark relied upon by the Bundeskartellamt to establish 
anticompetitive exploitation of consumers under abuse of dominance would then be the 
validity of consent under data protection law. In particular, the main focus of the investigation 
seems to be whether the consent given by Facebook users is sufficiently informed as required 
by Article 2(h) of the current Data Protection Directive and Article 4(11) of the future General 
Data Protection Regulation. 
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE NE BIS IN IDEM PRINCIPLE - Considering that the finding 
of a competition law infringement would become partly dependent on the application of rules 
from another legal regime, it is worth analysing if the ne bis in idem principle imposes any 
limitations in this regard. According to this general principle of law laid down in Article 50 of 
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the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European 
Convention of Human Rights, legal proceedings cannot be instituted twice for the same cause 
of action. As regards the application of the ne bis in idem principle in the context of EU 
competition law, the Court of Justice made clear that it is subject to the threefold condition of 
identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the legal interest protected. In other words, 
the same defendant cannot be sanctioned more than once for a single unlawful course of 
conduct designed to protect the same legal asset.
1416
 In her Opinion in Toshiba, Advocate 
General Kokott argued that, in line with the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle in 
areas of EU law other than competition law and in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, account should only be taken of the identity of the facts which necessarily 
includes the unity of the offender.
1417
 The only relevant criterion for the application of the 
principle in the view of Advocate General Kokott is identity of the ‘material acts, understood 
as the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together’.1418 
However, under current law, identity in the legal interest protected is still one of the 
conditions for the application of the ne bis in idem principle. Because of the difference in their 
underlying legal interest, this general principle of law would not stand in the way of launching 
an investigation on the basis of competition law in addition to a parallel procedure under the 
data protection or consumer protection rules for the same facts.  
APPROPRIATENESS OF COMPETITION LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT TO ADDRESS ABUSIVE 
COMMERCIAL PATTERNS - Another way in which the use of principles from data protection or 
consumer protection law to establish a competition law infringement may be opposed is by 
questioning whether competition law is an appropriate instrument to address potential abusive 
commercial patterns relating to the exploitation of individual data subjects or consumers. In 
this respect, the former Commissioner for Competition Almunia argued: ‘When unfair or 
manipulative commercial practices become pervasive in a market to the detriment of 
consumers and users the matter is best resolved with regulation’.1419 It is also important to 
note that the European Commission has not provided any guidance relating to abusive 
exploitative conduct while its Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct under Article 102 
TFEU was published in 2009. In fact, competition authorities rarely challenge behaviour that 
directly harms individuals and instead focus on addressing conduct of dominant firms leading 
to the foreclosure of competitors. This may be explained by the fact that it remains 
complicated to establish at what point a certain type of exploitative behaviour becomes 
anticompetitive. By using principles from data protection or consumer protection law as 
benchmarks for analysing whether abuse of dominance under competition law exists, these 
difficulties may be overcome. Such an approach could enrich the traditional toolkit of 
                                                 
1416
 Judgment in Aalborg Portland and Others v. Commission, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, 
C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, par. 338; and Judgment in Roquette Frères v. Commission, T-
322/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:267, par. 278. 
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competition authorities to address new forms of anticompetitive behaviour in the online 
environment. At the same time, caution is required to avoid outcomes whereby any law 
infringement by a dominant firm automatically becomes of relevance to competition 
enforcement. For that reason, commercial manipulation of personal data and privacy policies 
should remain an issue first and foremost tackled by data protection and consumer protection 
authorities. Nevertheless, if a strong link can be identified between a violation of data 
protection or consumer protection law and the dominant position of the infringer in the 
relevant market, a breach of one of these legal regimes may also amount to an independent 
violation of Article 102 TFEU.
1420
 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
RELATIONSHIP OF DATA PROTECTION TO OTHER NON-EFFICIENCY INTERESTS - Even though the 
European Commission and the Court of Justice currently seem reluctant to take data 
protection concerns into account when enforcing competition law, it is submitted that greater 
consideration should be given to data protection in competition cases in accordance with its 
status as a fundamental right in the EU legal order. In this regard, the role of data protection in 
EU competition policy has to go beyond the way the Commission has occasionally addressed 
other non-efficiency considerations in previous cases. A distinction can be made between 
three approaches by which the Commission and national competition authorities, when 
applying the EU competition rules, could or even should, following the wording of Article 
51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, advance data protection interests through 
competition enforcement.  
THREE-LAYER APPROACH TOWARDS THE INTEGRATION OF DATA PROTECTION INTERESTS INTO 
EU COMPETITION POLICY - First, by adopting remedies in order to address economic efficiency 
concerns, competition authorities may at the same time foster data protection interests and 
prevent, for instance, that personal data is processed for incompatible purposes after a merger. 
Second, competition authorities are under a negative duty to respect the right to data 
protection as contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this context, the right to 
data protection imposes limits on how competition law can be applied in terms of procedural 
safeguards to be followed in competition investigations and limits as regards the substance of 
competition law measures. Third, competition authorities are subject to a positive duty to 
promote the application of the right to data protection in cases where a breach of the 
competition rules is found. While it may be considered controversial to require competition 
authorities to take proactive measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to data 
protection, one could argue that the Commission has leeway to negotiate remedies that go 
beyond merely ending the identified economic efficiency concern in merger and commitment 
decisions. 
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BORROWING PRINCIPLES FROM OTHER LEGAL REGIMES TO ESTABLISH ABUSE - In the context of 
Article 102 TFEU, data protection interests can be integrated into competition analysis by 
using the purpose limitation or data minimisation principle as a benchmark to establish 
whether a certain form of data collection by a dominant undertaking is excessive and qualifies 
as abuse of dominance. In its Facebook investigation, the Bundeskartellamt seems to rely on 
the validity of consent under data protection law in order to establish a possible form of 
anticompetitive exploitation of consumers in the market for social networks. Similarly, the 
definition of a misleading practice in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive can be used 
to identify whether a privacy policy should give rise to competition law liability under Article 
102 TFEU. Support for the approach whereby a breach of another legal regime is considered 
relevant for determining whether competition law has also been violated can be found in the 
AstraZeneca and Allianz Hungaria judgments of the Court of Justice. 
WAY FORWARD - With regard to enforcement, a closer cooperation between competition and 
data protection authorities is desirable in order to provide consumers with a more unified form 
of protection. To that end, Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation could be interpreted in 
such a way as to give data protection authorities a legal ground to review proposed 
concentrations on the basis of their impact on data protection. Since EU data protection law 
does not provide for the possibility to adopt structural or prospective remedies, this provision 
does not make national data protection authorities competent to block mergers on the basis of 
data protection considerations or to impose remedies to address possible future data protection 
issues. However, the principle of accountability and the introduction of data protection impact 
assessments for risky processing activities in the General Data Protection Regulation may 
enable data protection authorities to take more proactive measures in the future even if a 
concrete violation of the EU data protection rules cannot yet be identified. In addition, the 
Commission could involve the competent national data protection authority in the 
implementation or even the monitoring of merger remedies which also affect data protection 
interests. While there is scope for more collaboration between the two types of authorities, it 
should be kept in mind that competition and data protection law are distinct legal regimes 
having a different cause of concerns and requiring a specific kind of expertise. This implies 
that pure data protection issues should remain to be mainly addressed by the competent data 
protection authority. Nevertheless, considering that the use of personal data as an asset by 
market players may conflict with the data protection interests of individuals, it is submitted 
that the Commission has a certain level of responsibility to respect and promote the 
application of the right to data protection when acting in its capacity as a competition 
authority. 
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11 Conclusion 
 
11.1 Threefold relevance of data for competition policy  
ROLE OF DATA IN COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT - Against the background of the emergence of 
data as an asset for market players operating in the online environment, the relevance of data 
for competition enforcement is submitted to be threefold: (1) as personal data is replacing 
price as a currency on the internet, theories of harm relating to price may have be converted to 
data; (2) data may constitute a necessary input for products and services to be introduced by 
competitors of incumbent providers of online platforms; and (3) by analysing data, an 
incumbent may be able to detect trends and changes in consumer preferences enabling it to 
develop new products and services possibly giving rise to new markets. Each of these 
possible roles of data in competition policy relates to one of the three parts of the thesis.  
ROLE OF DATA CONSIDERED IN PART III - In the light of the value of data as an asset, the 
underlying objective of mergers and behaviour of dominant undertakings may be to collect 
additional information about consumers. Theories of harm applicable to firms operating in the 
digital economy should therefore consider the role of data. When it comes to personal data, 
not only the economic value for market players has to be taken into account but also the link 
with the right to data protection of individuals as protected by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as under EU secondary data 
protection legislation. In this context, the possible role of data protection considerations in 
merger review and abuse of dominance cases have been discussed in part III.  
ROLE OF DATA CONSIDERED IN PART II - Part II revolved around the issue of whether and to 
what extent data forms a necessary input for products and services to be launched by 
competitors of a dominant online platform provider. To answer this question, a normative 
analysis of the essential facilities doctrine has been undertaken resulting in a proposed 
framework which may lay the ground for a more coherent application of the doctrine in future 
cases.  
ROLE OF DATA CONSIDERED IN PART I - In line with the role of data in identifying possible 
future products and services for which consumer demand exists, it has been proposed in part I 
to take a more forward-looking approach to competition analysis in merger and abuse of 
dominance cases. In the context of market definition and the assessment of dominance 
relating to online platforms, it seems desirable to consider a form of potential competition 
whereby providers do not only compete in the relevant product markets for the specific 
services offered to users and advertisers but also in a broader market for data. 
 
11.2 Two general observations 
ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO ADAPT - Two general observations can be made that are valid 
for all three parts of the thesis. As is outlined in more detail below, one can observe from the 
analysis in each part that existing competition concepts are still fit for purpose, provided that 
their application is adapted to the peculiarities of online platforms. Even though the necessary 
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tools are available, competition authorities and courts have to be willing to employ them in 
such a way as to ensure that the competition analysis reflects the competitive reality of the 
markets in which providers of online platforms compete. For each dimension of the threefold 
relevance of data to competition enforcement, a lack of willingness can be identified on the 
part of the European Commission and the EU Courts to use existing concepts and tools in a 
way enabling them to reliably assess possible data-related competition issues. In this context, 
recommendations are provided to these institutions in the next sections for bringing the 
application of competition law in line with the demands of dynamic markets and for 
adequately protecting consumer welfare in the online environment. 
WIDER RELEVANCE OF THE ANALYSIS - While the thesis focuses on a specific issue that is at 
the heart of current competition law debates, the relevance of the analysis is not confined to 
the role of data in competition analysis. Broader insights can be obtained from each of the 
three parts that go beyond the particular setting of the thesis and that may still be relevant 
when the attention shifts to other or even newer competition issues. Against this background, 
the results from the analysis in the three parts of the thesis are presented in the following 
sections and put in a broader perspective by outlining their wider relevance for competition 
policy in general. 
 
11.3 Summarising the results from the analysis in part I 
SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ONLINE PLATFORMS - In part I of the thesis, the economic 
characteristics of online platforms have been outlined with the aim of analysing how the 
existing competition concepts of market definition and dominance can be applied to online 
search engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms. Relevant economic characteristics 
include the multi-sided nature of the business models of currently predominant providers and 
network economy features such as economies of scale, network effects, switching costs and 
entry barriers. Another peculiarity of online platforms is that due to the fact that services are 
typically provided free of charge to users, innovation instead of price is the predominant 
parameter of competition. While online platforms raise new challenges for competition 
enforcement, the tools that are used to define relevant markets and to assess dominance are 
sufficiently apt to be adequately applied to these new services. 
SEPARATE RELEVANT MARKETS FOR EACH SIDE OF AN ONLINE PLATFORM - With regard to 
market definition, the approach of the Commission in the ongoing Google abuse of 
dominance investigation and the Facebook/WhatsApp merger to define separate relevant 
markets for the user and advertiser side of an online platform seems most appropriate. If only 
one relevant market for the entire platform would be defined, it is not possible to consider 
potential competitive constraints imposed by businesses that are not active on both sides of 
the platform but only compete with the provider on one side. One should note in this regard 
that multi-sided platforms may also compete with one-sided undertakings and with multi-
sided businesses that have an overlap with the respective platform on only one side. These 
forms of competitive pressure can only be taken into account when defining separate relevant 
markets for the user and advertiser side of the platform.   
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DYNAMIC NATURE OF COMPETITION - Because of the fast-moving nature of competition in the 
online environment, market boundaries are under a constant rate of change. To reflect the 
dynamic process of competition in new economy industries, it would be desirable for 
competition authorities and courts to define relevant markets more loosely. Even though the 
European Commission and the General Court acknowledged in the Microsoft/Skype merger in 
the framework of online consumer communications services that potential competition forms 
a better indicator of dominance than market shares, such a willingness to apply existing 
competition concepts more in line with the dynamic nature of competition cannot be observed 
with regard to market definition. Statements made by the Commission in the context of the 
Google case and its merger decisions in Microsoft/Yahoo, Microsoft/Skype and 
Facebook/WhatsApp indicate that relevant product markets are still defined narrowly on the 
basis of the functionality offered to users.  
POTENTIAL MARKET FOR DATA - A specific recommendation that has been made in part I in 
this regard is for competition authorities and courts to define and analyse a potential market 
for data in addition to the narrow relevant product markets for the services provided to users 
and advertisers. This would result into a more forward-looking approach to competition 
analysis. By considering possible competitive constraints in a potential market for data, the 
significance of data for the development of new products and services can be taken into 
account. In this context, it is proposed to rely on the existing notion of competition in 
innovation as developed within the framework of Article 101 TFEU and to regard user data as 
a specialised asset in analogy to the EU Horizontal Guidelines. Even if user data is not traded 
to third parties and no supply and demand for data can be identified under current competition 
law standards, it is submitted that it would still be desirable for competition authorities and 
courts to define a potential market for data in order to make competition analysis more 
conducive to innovation. 
WIDER RELEVANCE OF THE ANALYSIS - The analysis of a potential market does not only seem 
desirable for data-related competition issues but also for other cases in the context of digital 
markets where market players experience competitive pressure beyond relevant markets for 
existing products and services. By defining relevant markets narrowly, the Commission 
implicitly chooses to favour sustaining innovation within existing markets over disruptive 
innovation in new markets. This while market players in the new economy typically compete 
by introducing new services instead of by substituting or improving existing services. Such a 
static approach therefore risks overlooking potential competitive constraints from related or 
future services. This can be overcome by defining a potential market in addition to the 
specific relevant product markets. Although this would require competition authorities and 
courts to go beyond current competition law standards in the sense that a market has to be 
defined in the absence of supply and demand, existing concepts used in the area of Article 
101 TFEU could be relied upon. This way, a more dynamic approach towards competition 
analysis can be developed which better reflects the competitive reality of current digital 
markets.  
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11.4 Summarising the results from the analysis in part II 
TWO MAIN SCENARIOS - As a new tool for data subjects to exercise effective control over their 
personal data in the online environment, the right to data portability as introduced in the 
General Data Protection Regulation is to be welcomed. While this new right may also impact 
the level of competition in the market, potential competitors and new entrants will still have to 
rely on competition law in order to get access to data of an incumbent online platform 
provider. In part II, two scenarios have been distinguished with regard to refusals to give 
access to data on online platforms. The usual scenario in essential facilities cases concerns the 
situation in which a market player needs access to an input for a product or service to be 
launched in a downstream market. An example in the context of online platforms would be 
the use of data for the introduction of a statistical or analytics service. The other scenario 
would involve the use of data as an input to launch a form of direct competition with the 
dominant firm and to provide a rival search, social network or e-commerce platform to users 
and advertisers.  
COMPETITION FOR VERSUS IN THE MARKET - It is submitted that competition authorities and 
courts have to make a trade-off between competition for and competition in the market when 
deciding whether to impose a duty to deal under the essential facilities doctrine. Competition 
in the market comprises competition on the basis of price and output in established markets, 
whereas competition for the market attacks existing market structures and leads to the 
development of new markets. Although innovation is a complex process that may have 
unpredictable outcomes, competition for the market is generally argued to provide stronger 
incentives for disruptive innovation, whereas competition in the market primarily stimulates 
sustaining innovation. 
TRADE-OFF IN ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES - The trade-off to be made in essential facilities 
cases amounts to a choice between giving competitors access to the required input, which 
would enable them to create products complementary to that of the dominant firm, or denying 
access as a result of which competitors would be mainly incentivised to develop substitutes 
competing with the product of the dominant firm. While the first option provides stronger 
incentives for competition in the market and sustaining innovation, the second option will 
primarily stimulate competition for the market and disruptive innovation. Considering that 
both types of competition and innovation bring value to society albeit in a different way, the 
decision to give preference to one over the other amounts to a policy issue. 
NEED FOR MORE TRANSPARENCY - The framework proposed in part II aims to contribute to the 
state of the art by providing a way to apply this economic trade-off in practice and to make 
the application of the essential facilities doctrine more coherent. Taking the trade-off fully 
into account would require a tool that differentiates on the basis of the type of competition or 
innovation that is at risk in a particular market situation. The new product requirement is by 
its very nature capable of implementing such an exercise under the essential facilities doctrine 
because it determines what level of innovativeness the product or service to be introduced by 
the access seeker has to bring about. Even though the new product condition forms an 
adequate tool to make the trade-off between competition for and competition in the market 
more transparent in essential facilities cases, the Commission and the EU Courts have so far 
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been unwilling to explicitly consider incentives for competition for the market in decisions 
and judgments. While it is a valid choice of the Commission and the EU Courts to favour 
competition in the market, this does not mean that incentives for competition for the market 
should be disregarded. In order to make the trade-off visible, it is submitted that incentives for 
competition for the market should be openly analysed in essential facilities cases even if 
preference is given to competition in the market. 
EXTERNAL MARKET FAILURES AS A DETERMINING FACTOR - In this context, an adapted version 
of the new product condition has been put forward that accounts for differences in market 
characteristics. Instead of distinguishing between whether assets are protected by intellectual 
property law or not, the proposed framework suggests to let the applicability of the new 
product condition depend on whether a market is characterised by external market failures. 
External market failures such as the presence of strong network effects and switching costs, 
which to a certain extent also characterise the markets in which online search engines, social 
networks and e-commerce platforms operate, could make it commercially unviable for 
competitors to introduce a new product. If, for instance, consumers are locked-in to a 
particular standard, a requirement that access seekers have to introduce a new product is of no 
relevance because consumers are not willing to switch to a different system. It is important to 
note that external market failures may enable the incumbent to extend its dominance in time 
irrespective of whether the requested input is protected under intellectual property law. Since 
there is no convincing economic rationale for treating intellectual property rights differently 
than other types of assets under the essential facilities doctrine, it is proposed to focus instead 
on the presence of external market failures as a way to determine whether the new product 
condition should be met in order to hold a refusal to deal abusive under Article 102 TFEU.  
APPLICABILITY OF THE NEW PRODUCT CONDITION - Considering that a competition law 
intervention cannot re-establish the race for competition for the market, caution is warranted 
in markets in which external market failures are absent. In these markets, the new product 
condition should be applied strictly because of the stronger self-correcting mechanism of the 
market. As a result, a competition law intervention to encourage competition in the market 
risks unnecessarily lowering incentives for competition for the market in this situation. 
Incentives for competition for the market are best preserved by avoiding government 
interference in the market and thereby maintaining the prospect of dominance for new 
entrants. In markets where external market failures are present, the new product requirement 
should be dropped to ensure that access seekers planning to introduce competition in the 
market by introducing sustaining innovations or products similar to that of the dominant 
undertaking can gain access to the necessary input. In these markets, there is a higher risk that 
the incumbent is able to extend its dominance in time and to prevent competitors from 
entering the market and competing on the basis price or quality which justifies a wider scope 
of liability for refusals to deal under Article 102 TFEU. Therefore, if the market is locked-in 
due to the presence of strong network effects or switching costs and the essential facility 
holder has had a stable dominant position for some time, competition authorities should be 
able to impose a duty to deal even if the access seeker is not able to indicate a new product 
that it would like to introduce once given access to the requested input. This provided that the 
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other conditions of the essential facilities doctrine are met which require, respectively: 
indispensability of the requested input, exclusion of all effective competition on the 
downstream market and absence of an objective justification. 
DATA AS ESSENTIAL FACILITY - When assessing the abusive nature of refusals to give access to 
data, attention has to be paid to the characteristics which set data apart from other assets 
previously being considered under the essential facilities doctrine. These features include its 
inherently non-rivalrous nature which may, however, be lost when the data is made exclusive 
by way of contracts or by protecting it under the sui generis database right and trade secret 
law, and the possible personal nature of data as a result of which the EU data protection 
regime would become applicable. 
INDISPENSABILITY OF DATA - One of the main issues for the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine will be to establish the indispensable nature of the requested data. In this 
regard, the question has to be answered whether the data is objectively necessary for being 
able to compete on the downstream market and whether economically viable substitutes are 
available. Even though the statements of the Commission in the Google/DoubleClick, 
Telefónica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere and Facebook/WhatsApp mergers may indicate 
that data of incumbents will not easily be considered indispensable for providing targeted 
advertising services, this may be different with regard to the use of data for offering services 
of good quality to users in the form of, for example, the relevance of search results in online 
search engines, suggested social network interactions and purchase suggestions in e-
commerce platforms. For the provision of these functionalities to users, a specific type of data 
is needed that may not be readily available on the market. For example, if the specific data 
needed to operate a search engine of good quality can only be obtained through serving 
customers, other data that is available from third parties will not form an adequate substitute 
for the search data of the incumbent search engine provider. With regard to the economic 
viability of duplication of the required data, the interventions by the French and Belgian 
competition authorities in, respectively, the national energy and lottery markets are 
instructive. Both national competition cases concerned the cross-use of data developed in the 
context of a monopoly and therefore do not have much similarity to a factual scenario 
centring around data gathered by a provider of an online platform. Nevertheless, the reference 
made by both competition authorities to reasonable financial conditions and a reasonable 
period of time when assessing the possibility for competitors to reproduce a database may 
also be of relevance when assessing the economic viability of duplication in the context of the 
indispensability of a dataset in the online environment under the essential facilities doctrine. 
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION - As an answer to the main research question, it can be 
concluded from the analysis in part II that the essential facilities doctrine can be adequately 
applied to potential refusals to give access to data on online platforms as long as the 
peculiarities of data are taken into account. Whether new regulation is necessary beyond the 
application of the essential facilities doctrine under Article 102 TFEU, is essentially a policy 
issue. A regulatory intervention may be considered desirable in situations where horizontal 
competition in a market is limited due to external market failures. Reference can be made here 
to Argenton & Prüfer’s proposal to require all search engine providers to share data on search 
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queries so that market players only compete with their algorithms and not on the basis of the 
information they hold about previous searches on their platform.
1421
 It would, however, be 
challenging to adequately devise such a new form of regulation. Apart from any problems 
relating to the practical implementation and enforcement of such an obligation, it may prove 
difficult to establish to which entities the duty to share data should apply. In this regard, it has 
to be kept in mind that search functionality also plays a role in social networks. E-commerce 
platforms, in their turn, can be regarded as vertical search engines. As a result, it seems 
arbitrary to limit the scope of application of a potential data-sharing scheme to a particular 
class of market players. In addition, the expected short-term increase of competition in the 
market has to be weighed against possible negative effects of a regulatory intervention on 
competition and innovation in the long term. Moreover, there are strong reasons to adhere to 
the case-by-case assessment under Article 102 TFEU. In particular, the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine enables competition authorities and courts to take into account all 
specific factual circumstances. Since the extent to which data may constitute a competitive 
advantage or an entry barrier differs depending on the particular setting, it is difficult to make 
generalisations about the circumstances in which data should be shared with competitors. 
While data may be an important input of production that cannot be easily duplicated in some 
scenarios, the assessment may be different in other situations where data cannot be made 
exclusive. With regard to possible limitations that data protection legislation puts to the 
mandated sharing of data with third parties under Article 102 TFEU, it should be noted that, 
in principle, a competition law obligation in itself constitutes a legitimate ground for 
processing of personal data under the EU data protection regime. Any remaining potential 
conflicts between competition and data protection law can be adequately addressed by 
requiring the dominant firm to implement appropriate data protection safeguards in the form 
of specifying the new purpose of the processing activities, obtaining renewed consent from 
affected data subjects or through the anonymisation of personal data. 
WIDER RELEVANCE OF THE ANALYSIS WITH REGARD TO MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET 
POWER - Even though part II focuses on refusals to deal as a specific type of behaviour of 
dominant firms, several elements of the analysis have a wider relevance. In particular, the way 
the relevant market for data is defined and dominance is assessed in essential facilities cases 
may illustrate how a competition analysis of a potential market for data in other abuse and 
merger cases in the online environment, as proposed in part I, can be undertaken. After the 
introduction of the concept of hypothetical or potential markets by the Court of Justice in IMS 
Health, it is not necessary anymore for the application of the essential facilities doctrine that 
the requested input is already traded as an independent product by the dominant undertaking. 
In such cases where the alleged essential facility has not been marketed before, market 
definition amounts to a normative decision about how the market should look and does not 
reflect ‘real’ supply and demand of products and services. Such a hypothetical or potential 
market for data, in essential facilities as well as in other abuse and merger cases, can be 
defined by looking at the substitutability of different types of data and in particular at the 
functionality which can be offered with a specific set of data as input. In this way, separate 
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relevant markets can possibly be defined for offline and online data and, as further 
subsegmentations within the latter market, for search, social network and e-commerce data. 
As regards market power in data, one needs to find an objective manner to attribute value to 
data. The turnover generated by a provider through the monetisation of data by licensing 
information to third parties, delivering targeted advertising services or offering other paid 
products and services to customers on the basis of the collected data, may form an indication 
of its competitive strength in a potential market for a particular type of data. In the absence of 
any data-related revenues, potential competition may form an adequate proxy for dominance 
in relevant markets defined around data. 
WIDER POLICY RELEVANCE OF THE ANALYSIS - The relevance of the analysis relating to the 
economic trade-off between competition for and competition in the market also extends 
beyond the specific setting of the essential facilities doctrine. One could argue that, to some 
extent, competition authorities have to make a choice between encouraging competition for or 
competition in the market when determining whether to intervene in a market to remedy other 
types of exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU as well. Enforcement actions against 
tying or bundling strategies of dominant firms, for example, also have as their objective to 
restore competition in the market but may at the same time reduce incentives for competition 
for the market by taking away the prospect of dominance for new entrants. In this regard, the 
existence of external market failures could also form a guiding principle for determining the 
scope for competition law liability in other abuse of dominance cases.  
 
11.5 Summarising the results from the analysis in part III 
RISE OF ATTENTION FOR COMPETITION LAW FROM DATA PROTECTION ADVOCATES - Part III of 
the thesis revolved around the role of data protection interests in competition enforcement. 
The relevance of data protection for competition enforcement started to gain attention in the 
context of the Google/DoubleClick merger in 2007 which led to the combination of 
information from Google on users’ search behaviour with information from DoubleClick on 
users’ web-browsing behaviour. The current interest from data protection advocates in 
competition enforcement seems to stem from the concentrated nature of online markets which 
may reduce possibilities for users to exercise effective control over their personal data. The 
application of key data protection concepts such as consent is difficult in concentrated 
markets where undertakings may be able to impose their practices on individuals. One should 
note, however, that the application of competition law is only triggered in case of a real, 
identified competition problem. A high level of concentration in itself does not form a reason 
for competition authorities to intervene in a market. 
IMPACT OF DATA PROTECTION REGULATION ON COMPETITION - Considering that differences in 
data protection standards among EU Member States may lead to a distortion of competition 
within the internal market, the possible role of the new General Data Protection Regulation in 
achieving a better level playing field in the EU worthy of attention. By posing limits to the 
freedom of market players to collect and use personal data as they deem fit, data protection 
regulation may also have a competitive impact. Even though the new data protection rules are 
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contained in a Regulation and will therefore be directly applicable without the need for 
national implementing legislation, the General Data Protection Regulation leaves room for 
interpretation and additional legislation at the national level which may give rise to 
fragmentation between Member States. Because of its responsibility in ensuring the 
uniformity in the application of EU data protection law, the functioning of the future 
European Data Protection Board seems of vital importance in this regard. The main difference 
with the enforcement of EU competition law will persist under the General Data Protection 
Regulation, namely that the European Commission does have the competence to act under EU 
data protection law. While the European Data Protection Board, in which the Commission is 
involved without having a voting right, can take binding decisions in case of disagreement 
between national data protection authorities, the adoption of the final decisions as addressed 
to controllers and their enforcement will continue to take place at the national level. 
DATA PROTECTION AS A NON-PRICE PARAMETER - When considering whether data protection 
may constitute a non-price parameter of competition, it is submitted that a difference should 
be made between situations in which data protection forms an isolated aspect of quality and 
situations in which data protection correlates with price and other aspects of quality. In the 
latter case, it is not desirable to regard data protection as a dimension of quality in 
competition analysis because a stronger level of data protection is not necessarily valued by 
all consumers. This is particularly the case for online search engines, social networks and e-
commerce platforms where the level of data protection, on the one hand, and the price as well 
as the relevance and personalisation of the services, on the other hand, are traded off against 
each other. Data protection can still be integrated in competition analysis as a non-price 
parameter of competition in these industries by treating it as a form of consumer choice or 
product variety instead of as a dimension of quality. 
CURRENT RELUCTANCE TOWARDS THE INTEGRATION OF DATA PROTECTION INTERESTS - While 
data protection can be integrated as a non-price parameter of competition in the usual 
competition analysis if it is a key dimension of competition in the market, a more 
controversial question is whether data protection should be protected as a non-efficiency 
concern under competition law. Despite calls from data protection advocates, including the 
EDPS, for a greater role of data protection considerations in competition cases, the European 
Commission and the Court of Justice have so far been reluctant to integrate data protection 
into competition analysis as a non-efficiency concern. In Asnef-Equifax, the Court of Justice 
stated that issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not a matter for competition 
law as such. In its Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp merger decisions, the 
Commission made clear that its analysis was without prejudice to the obligations imposed on 
the parties by data protection legislation and that privacy-related concerns do not fall within 
the scope of EU competition law.  
PROPOSED THREE-LAYER APPROACH - Considering the status of data protection as a 
fundamental right in the EU legal order as protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, it is submitted that data protection deserves greater consideration in competition 
analysis than the way the Commission has occasionally addressed other non-efficiency 
concerns in competition cases. In this regard, a three-layer approach has been put forward for 
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integrating data protection interests in EU competition policy. First, by adopting remedies to 
address economic efficiency concerns, competition enforcement may at the same time achieve 
results that also foster data protection interests. For example, by blocking a merger or by 
imposing merger remedies to address economic efficiency concerns, a competition authority 
can also prevent that personal data is processed for incompatible purposes after the merger. 
Second, competition authorities are under a negative duty to respect the right to data 
protection in terms of procedural safeguards to be followed in competition investigations and 
as regards the substance of competition law measures that can be adopted. Third, competition 
authorities are subject to a positive duty to promote the application of the right to data 
protection in line with Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in cases where 
a breach of the competition rules is identified. While competition authorities cannot and 
should not use their competences to promote data protection interests if no violation of the 
competition rules can be found, there is scope for the Commission to take a more proactive 
approach in particular in the context of merger and commitment proceedings. In these cases, 
undertakings find themselves at the mercy of the Commission to approve a merger or to 
abstain from adopting a prohibition decision for a breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU. This 
position gives the Commission room to demand measures that do not only end the 
competitive harm identified and restore competition but also facilitate the effectiveness of the 
right to data protection in a way that might otherwise not have been possible under EU data 
protection law. 
WIDER RELEVANCE OF THE ANALYSIS - The three-layer approach may not only have relevance 
for the right to data protection but also for the other fundamental rights contained in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this regard, data protection may form a case study of how 
the European Commission and national competition authorities can take the protection of 
fundamental rights into consideration when enforcing EU competition law. Even though the 
Commission and the Court of Justice have until now been unwilling to do so, the EU Charter 
provides these institutions with the opportunity to take a more coherent approach towards the 
protection of the interests of individuals by creating room for the integration of fundamental 
rights in EU policies including competition policy. Considering the elevation of the EU 
Charter to a source of primary EU law with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, one 
could argue that the EU institutions do not only have the ability but even a legally binding 
obligation to promote the application of the fundamental rights contained in the EU Charter 
when acting in the field of EU competition law. 
 
11.6 Outlook 
INCREASING POLITICAL PRESSURE - The fact that the European Commission and the EU Courts 
have so far been unwilling to make use of the available means to adequately adapt the 
application of competition law to the realities of online and, more generally, dynamic markets 
is especially problematic in a time where competition enforcement in this sector is 
experiencing increasing political pressure. In the context of the Google investigation, 
reference can be made to the resolution on the digital single market that the European 
Parliament adopted in November 2014 calling upon the Commission ‘to enforce EU 
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competition rules decisively’ and ‘to consider proposals aimed at unbundling search engines 
from other commercial services’.1422 In addition, within the framework of the Digital Single 
Market Strategy of the Commission, the introduction of regulation for online platforms 
beyond the application of competition law in specific cases is currently being considered.
1423
 
RAISE ATTENTION FOR POSSIBLE LONG-TERM EFFECTS - Against this background, the need for 
competition authorities and courts to use existing competition concepts and tools in a way 
conforming to the demands of new market developments seems pressing. More transparency 
about how competition law is applied could help making politicians and policymakers aware 
of the trade-off that has to be made when deciding whether or not to intervene in a particular 
market. Even though regulation may increase competition and innovation in the short term, 
possible economic effects on the long term should also be considered. Since politicians and 
policymakers are inherently more incentivised to address short term concerns leading to 
observable results more quickly, it is all the more important to raise attention for how a 
regulatory intervention may negatively affect the innovation incentives of the targeted 
incumbents as well as of other market players in the long term. The analysis involving the 
economic trade-off between competition for and competition in the market in essential 
facilities cases can thereby also provide input for the broader policy debate on openness in 
digital markets in general. 
NEED FOR A BROADER FORM OF PROTECTION - With regard to the integration of data protection 
interests in competition cases, it would be beneficial for the democratic legitimacy of 
competition enforcement to give more consideration to data protection in competition 
analysis. By going beyond strictly protecting economic efficiency concerns, criticisms can be 
addressed that competition law ignores other dimensions of consumer welfare. In addition, 
such an approach would give consumers a more integrated form of protection in a time where 
there is a need for a coherent enforcement of EU law. Competition authorities and courts 
should be prepared to tackle mergers and behaviour of market players that transcend narrow 
relevant product markets and blur the boundaries between distinct legal fields. A more 
dynamic competition analysis and a wider interpretation of the scope of protection offered by 
the competition rules is vital to adequately protect the interests of consumers in the digital 
economy. 
  
                                                 
1422
 European Parliament resolution of 27 November 2014 on supporting consumer rights in the digital single 
market, 2014/2973(RSP), par. 15, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2014-0071+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
1423
 A public consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud 
computing and the collaborative economy was launched in September 2015 and closed in January 2016. See the 
Synopsis Report on the public consultation on the Regulatory environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries 
and the Collaborative Economy, 25 May 2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/full-report-results-public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries 
and the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market. 
Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM(2016) 288 final, 25 May 2016. 
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